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This thesis examines the past century of wildfire management of the coastal 
pine savanna in Belize. Combining political ecology with historical geography, it 
draws on archival evidence, interviews, and ethnographic enquiry into an 
international development project in Belize.  It considers contemporary approaches 
that seek to use prescribed fire with the participation of local communities in relation 
to past practices. The Belizean savanna has long been shaped by human fire use. 
Its flora is ecologically adapted to fire. Yet fire has been repeatedly cast as a 
problem, from c. 1920, by British colonial and, later, USA foresters, and, most 
recently, by international and local non-governmental nature conservation 
organisations. Informed by different schools of thought, each of these organisations 
has designed programmes of fire management as a form of conservation and/or 
development. Yet little has changed; Belize’s diverse and growing rural population 
has continued to use fire, and the savannas burn, year upon year. While the 
planned aims and methods differed, each programme of fire management has, in 
practice, been similarly structured and constrained by its genesis within colonial or 
international development. Funding for fire management has been inconsistent and 
has favoured ‘expert’-led technocratic approaches that could not address the 
specific context of wildfire in Belize. Each programme has been shaped by a 
specifically Belizean ecology and politics, in excess of its definition of the fire 
‘problem’ and ‘solutions’ to it. Powerful political elites and fire users in Belize have 
not granted the same authority to technical experts, nor have they seen clear 
incentives for the fire management that these experts envisaged. Belize’s political 
elite has sought to retain control over land and resources, even at the expense of 
policies (including those of fire management) they officially endorse to satisfy 
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international funders. This analysis highlights that, when examining environmental 
management, it is important not to isolate study of ideology and discourse in plans 




























This is a thesis about the past century of wildfire management of the coastal 
pine savanna in Belize. The research involved examining archival material, 
conducting research interviews and observations of an international development 
project in Belize, with which I was involved. The thesis considers this international 
development project in relation to past practices.  
Some ecosystems depend on wildfire. The savanna found along Belize’s 
coast is such an ecosystem. Fire maintains the savanna as a patchwork landscape 
of open grassland, grassland with pine trees and broadleaf forest. The savanna’s 
plant species have adaptations that help them to survive wildfires and to propagate 
following fire. In Belize, human fire use is, and has long been, the most common 
cause of fires in the savanna. Yet over the past century, wildfires have conflicted 
with the aims of forestry and nature conservation organisations managing protected 
areas within the savanna. From 1920, the colonial, and then the independent state 
Forest Department believed that fire was suppressing the growth of pine trees and 
preventing the development of a pine timber industry. Since the 1990s, the Forest 
Department and non-governmental nature conservation organisations have 
recognised that fire is important in the savanna but argued that fires are so frequent 
that they nonetheless constitute a conservation threat. These organisations have all 
tried to reduce the number of wildfires, yet they have largely been unsuccessful.  
This research compares the aims, proposed methods and realisation of 
these Belizean savanna fire management programmes since 1920. There has been 
a gradual recognition of the importance of fire, a move away from aims of complete 
fire suppression, and attempts to enrol local fire users. Yet this research highlights 
that each programme of fire management has been similarly technical and largely 
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designed by foreign experts. There has, repeatedly, been a significant gap between 
the fire management designed in policies and plans and fire management in practice 
on the ground. The thesis argues that this gap is partly explained by the way in 
which fire management has been designed within colonial or international 
development-funded projects. These projects have been short-term and 
inconsistent. They have promoted approaches based on general principles that did 
not account for the local context. The savanna environment has presented 
unforeseen logistical challenges, and its ecology been poorly understood. Local 
political elites and fire users have not granted the same authority to foreign experts 
as have international funders. While policies of fire management have been 
endorsed by the Belizean government, they have not been locally funded and 
realised, when this has threatened political control of savanna resources. This 
analysis challenges assumptions in some social science literature, that dominant 













My research for this thesis depended upon the friendship, advice and 
generosity of network of people in Belize, the UK and the USA. My deepest thanks 
go to my supervisory team in Edinburgh for standing by me as I took a plunge into 
what was, for me, a new direction academically: to Neil Stuart for introducing me to 
Belize and being unfailingly open to my thoughts and approach; to Janet Fisher and 
Charlie Withers for their generosity in joining my supervisory team.  
Many other individuals have given their academic support. I deeply thank 
Elma Kay and Rick Anderson for friendship and advice on many counts. Joel 
Wainwright and Henry Peller inspired me in combining sharp academic critique with 
dedicated activism. Rose Pritchard gave me the confidence to be open and reflexive 
about my research ‘failures’. Casey Ryan, Peter Furley and Sally Horn assisted me 
greatly in developing my understanding of the ecology of tropical savannas. Lizzie 
Rushton and Mary Alpuche provided invaluable advice as I accessed archives in the 
UK and Belize. Barbara and Victor Bulmer-Thomas were a fount of knowledge about 
Belizean history. Sophie Haines shared her experiences and insights from research 
in Toledo. Clare Barnes shared her insights of Indian forestry. Benjamin Newman 
and Briony McDonagh provided helpful comments on drafts of a paper drawn from 
my thesis. Aidan Keane provided advice for my household survey. Neil Bird and 
Rick Wilk shared their archives with me. My examiners Sam Staddon and Simon 
Pooley provided valuable feedback for this final draft of the thesis.  
I shared many of my research experiences with friends and colleagues on 
the Darwin Project. Sincere thanks to Elmar Requena, Mario Muschamp, Nilcia Xi, 
Allana Barillas, Jenny Chambers, Ryan Moore, Duncan Macqueen and Duncan 
Moss, for granting me access to your work and thoughts. Many thanks also to those 
6 
  
other staff at TIDE, who shared their advice, office, vehicles, fire-starting and reggae 
music, particularly Stephene Supaul, Andrew Williams, Leonard Williams, Santiago 
Cucul, Celia Mahung, Delonie Forman, and James Lord.  
My greatest thanks go to those who shared their time and thoughts with me 
in research interviews and surveys. I am also deeply grateful to many individuals 
and families in Bladen, Trio, San Isidro, Bella Vista and Medina Bank, for generously 
opening their doors and sharing their insights, friendship and hospitality. I 
particularly thank Gilda Arteaga, Liberato Pop, Pedro Shol, Luisa Shol, Manuel Shol, 
William Garcia, Maribel Garcia, Delia Chub, Shorlena Rash, Corina Medina, Mildred 
Medina, Tania Medina, Rene Medina, Luisa Sho, Augustin Sho, Marta Sho, Dora 
Sho, Balbino Sho, Ana Salam, Pablo Salam, Candy Ical and Johnston Ical. Among 
many other individuals who facilitated my access to research material and contexts 
in Belize are Orlando Ulloa, German Lopez, Denver Cayetano, Dale and Thomas 
Gomez, Pantaleon Escobar, Tre Mckoy and Shaun Michaels.   
I am grateful to the UK Darwin Initiative and the University of Edinburgh for 
financially supporting this research, and to the University of Edinburgh’s Go Abroad 
fund for supporting my attendance at a Political Ecology summer school at 
Wageningen University.  
Many friends provided me with the companionship, personal support and 
motivation to persist when my research experiences were difficult or isolating. In 
Belize, my particular thanks to James Foley, Isa Carrio, Fanny Tricone, Caz Oliver, 
Stephanie Smith, Beth Dorgay, Ana Chan and Loan Chau. In Edinburgh, thanks to 
all those in the School of Geosciences and to housemates who enlivened my time in 
Scotland with laughs, hikes and folk music. Grace Canning, Anya Watson and Roxi 
Neall shared their spare rooms and sofas with me when I travelled within the UK for 
my research. Lastly, to Ulrike and Mike Smith and Jake Ainscough: I could not have 
written this thesis without your unending patience and love.   
7 
  
Glossary of acronyms 
 
BEC: The Belize Estate and Produce Company 
CDW: Colonial development and welfare 
CIDA: The Canadian International Development Agency 
DEFRA: The UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
DFID: The UK Department for International Development 
GEF: The Global Environment Facility 
GFI: The Nature Conservancy’s Global Fire Initiative 
KBA: The World Bank-funded Key Biodiversity Areas Project 
NGO: Non-governmental organisation 
ODA: The UK Overseas Development Administration 
ODM: The UK Ministry of Overseas Development 
TIDE: The Toledo Institute for Development and Environment 
TNC: The Nature Conservancy 
UNDP: The United Nations Development Programme 
UN-FAO: The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
USAID: The United States Agency for International Development  
























Abstract .................................................................................................................. 1 
Lay summary ......................................................................................................... 3 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................... 5 
Glossary of acronyms ........................................................................................... 7 
Contents ................................................................................................................. 9 
List of figures ........................................................................................................11 
List of tables .........................................................................................................13 
Introduction ...........................................................................................................15 
1.1 A brief introduction to savannas, wildfire management and ‘participatory’ 
conservation ........................................................................................................19 
1.2 The Darwin Project and the motivation for this research ................................24 
1.3 Outline of the thesis .......................................................................................29 
Fire management as conservation and development ........................................35 
2.1 Fire as an ecological and socio-political phenomenon ...................................37 
2.2 The evolving concepts of ‘conservation’ and ‘development’ ...........................40 
2.3 Forestry’s fire management ...........................................................................52 
2.4 Fire management for nature conservation and sustainable development ......57 
2.5 Knowledge and power in environmental governance .....................................61 
2.6 The ideational and material, plans and practice in environmental governance
 ............................................................................................................................67 
2.7 Knowledges, expertise and authority in environmental governance ...............72 
2.8 Conclusion ....................................................................................................75 
Research methodology: retrieving ideas and practices of fire management in 
Belize .....................................................................................................................77 
3.1 Epistemology and research ethics .................................................................78 
3.2 On my research methodology........................................................................82 
3.3 Using archival traces .....................................................................................87 
3.4 Using oral testimonies ................................................................................. 102 
3.5 Using ethnography ...................................................................................... 112 
3.6 Interpreting and interweaving multiple lines of evidence .............................. 114 
3.7 Conclusions on writing the thesis ................................................................ 121 
Fire protection: ‘British Empire forestry’ in the Belizean savanna, 1920-1941
 ............................................................................................................................. 123 
4.1 Belize’s lowland savannas ........................................................................... 124 
4.2 Belize’s political economy: A brief history to 1920 ....................................... 132 
4.3 The Belizean coastal savannas and human fire use before the twentieth 
century .............................................................................................................. 138 
10 
  
4.4 The formal beginnings of state fire management in Belize .......................... 144 
4.5 The evidence, expertise and authority behind Hummel’s call for fire 
management in Belize ...................................................................................... 148 
4.6 Economic and political challenges to the Forest Department, 1921-1941 ... 161 
4.7 Maintaining fire management as ‘Empire Forestry’ ...................................... 174 
4.8 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 176 
The Belize Forest Department’s fire management, 1942 to present: policies, 
projects and practice ......................................................................................... 179 
5.1 Technical expansion of the Forest Department’s fire management from 1942-
1959 ................................................................................................................. 182 
5.2 The decline of fire management in practice from 1960 to 1986 ................... 199 
5.3 New policies for fire management from 1986 to present.............................. 207 
5.4 Expertise in the design of fire management ................................................ 217 
5.5 The implications of international funding for fire management ..................... 223 
5.6 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 233 
Burn bosses: NGO and community-led fire management ............................... 237 
6.1 Social dynamics in Toledo’s coastal savannas ............................................ 238 
6.2 Modern human use of resources and fire in Toledo’s savannas .................. 248 
6.3 TIDE, TNC and fire management in the Payne’s Creek National Park and 
Deep River Forest Reserve............................................................................... 257 
6.4 Integrated fire management as a ‘win-win’? ................................................ 265 
6.5 Expertise and authority in integrated fire management ............................... 271 
6.6 Integrated fire management in the context of international development ..... 277 
6.7 The human relationships in building fire management ................................ 287 
6.8 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 290 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 293 
7.1 The political ecology of fire management in Belizean savannas, 1920 to 
present ............................................................................................................. 294 
7.2 From colonial to post-colonial fire management in Belize ............................ 316 
7.3 Implications for further research in political ecology .................................... 324 
7.4 Implications for stakeholders in Belizean fire management ......................... 327 
7.5 Renewal and fire management in Belize ..................................................... 331 
Bibliography ....................................................................................................... 334 
Primary unpublished sources ............................................................................ 335 
Primary published sources ................................................................................ 336 















Figure 3.7 ............................................................................................................ 108 
Figure 3.8 ............................................................................................................ 109 
 
Figure 4.1............................................................................................................. 125 
Figure 4.2............................................................................................................. 126 
Figure 4.3............................................................................................................. 126 
Figure 4.4............................................................................................................. 127 
Figure 4.5............................................................................................................. 127 
Figure 4.6............................................................................................................. 130 
Figure 4.7............................................................................................................. 130 
Figure 4.8............................................................................................................. 134 
Figure 4.9............................................................................................................. 139 
Figure 4.10 ........................................................................................................... 157 
Figure 4.11 ........................................................................................................... 164 
Figure 4.12 ........................................................................................................... 165 
Figure 4.13 ........................................................................................................... 172 
 
Figure 5.1............................................................................................................. 184 
Figure 5.2............................................................................................................. 184 
Figure 5.3............................................................................................................. 185 
Figure 5.4............................................................................................................. 185 
Figure 5.5............................................................................................................. 189 
Figure 5.6............................................................................................................. 196 
Figure 5.7............................................................................................................. 197 
Figure 5.8............................................................................................................. 211 
Figure 5.9............................................................................................................. 212 
 
Figure 6.1............................................................................................................. 244 
Figure 6.2............................................................................................................. 245 
Figure 6.3............................................................................................................. 246 
Figure 6.4............................................................................................................. 252 
Figure 6.5............................................................................................................. 253 
Figure 6.6............................................................................................................. 254 
Figure 6.7............................................................................................................. 255 
12 
  
Figure 6.8 ............................................................................................................ 263 
Figure 6.9 ............................................................................................................ 263 
Figure 6.10 .......................................................................................................... 279 

























List of tables 
 
Table 3.1 ................................................................................................................89 
Table 3.2 .............................................................................................................. 103 
 
Table 4.1 .............................................................................................................. 141 
Table 4.2 .............................................................................................................. 158 
 
Table 5.1 .............................................................................................................. 180 
 
Table 6.1 .............................................................................................................. 240 
















































It's a li [sic] bit a science and art, fire management. The art is where you put 
fire on the ground. (Protected Areas Manager at TIDE) 
 
The true fundamentals of fire are not scientific questions. They involve 
values, social norms, and cultural expectations as synthesised by politics. 
(Pyne, 2015, 445) 
 
Between 2015 and 2018, I was the Project Officer for a UK Darwin Initiative 
Project entitled ‘Conserving Pine Woodland Biodiversity in Belize through 
Community Fire Management’.1 This Project took place in Belize’s southernmost 
district, Toledo (see map Figure 1.1). The Project focused on the tropical pine 
savanna in three protected areas, the Payne’s Creek National Park, the Deep River 
Forest Reserve, and Swasey-Bladen Forest Reserve, and on five villages bordering 
these protected areas: Bladen, Trio, San Isidro, Medina Bank and Bella Vista (see 
map Figure 1.2). The ‘problem’ that the project proposal identified and sought to 
address was that Belize’s ‘pine savannas are being degraded to grasslands without 
pine by intense wildfires which are occurring more frequently due to increasing 
anthropogenic burning caused by agricultural expansion in bordering areas and fires 
deliberately set by local hunters’.2  The project proposed to increase local capacity 
for fire management by introducing ecological monitoring for fire effects in the  
 
 
1 The Darwin Initiative is a grants scheme funded jointly by two UK government departments, the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and the Department for International 
Development (DFID). It funds projects worldwide that aim to fulfil both biodiversity and poverty 
alleviation objectives. In this thesis I refer to the project I worked for (Darwin Initiative Project 22-013) 
as ‘The Darwin Project’.  





Source: Map created in Arc GIS by author, using Belize Basemap shapefile (Meerman & unknown 
sources, 2013), available at http://www.biodiversity.bz/, [accessed 11/02/2019].  
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protected areas and training local villagers in prescribed fire use.3 It also planned to 
develop ‘small forest enterprises’ with groups of villagers, and partner with the 
Belize Government’s Forest Department to revise national fire legislation and pilot a 
community concession agreement for the harvest of palmetto berries from the 
protected areas.4 These activities were intended to be mutually beneficial: local 
people would gain livelihood benefits, and this would incentivise participation in 
nature conservation in the form of better fire management. The project sought 
partnership between a Belizean NGO, the Toledo Institute for Development and 
Environment (TIDE), to lead the work on the ground and provide expertise in fire 
management; the University of Edinburgh, to manage the project reporting, finances 
and provide research expertise; the Belize Forest Department, to use the project to 
trial community access to forest reserves and revise national legislation; the 
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), to provide 
consultancy in community business development; and the University of Belize’s 
Environmental Research Institute (ERI), to embed training and monitoring resources 
created for the project at a national level. Before I recount how my initial 
experiences as the Darwin Project Officer drove this PhD research, let me provide 
some context to wildfire management in savannas and to community-based 
approaches in conservation.
 
3 ‘Prescribed fire’ is fire applied to the environment in pursuit of certain management aims.  
4 Since 2001, these villagers have collected palmetto berries between August and October for casual 
sale to a single Belizean buyer based in the Belize District who has a license to export them, granted 
by the Forest Department. This license does not specify who has the rights to harvest the berries in 
which areas. The palmetto harvest is not organised at the village level, but provides a small, 
supplementary income to individuals and their families.  
Figure 1.2 
 
Source: Map created in Arc GIS 
by author, using Belize Protected 
Areas shapefile (Meerman, 
2017), Belize Roads shapefile 
(GFDRR, 2013), and Belize Point 
Settlements shapefile (Meerman 





1.1 A brief introduction to savannas, wildfire management and ‘participatory’ 
conservation 
Ecologists today understand wildfire as an important and constructive 
process in some ecosystems but destructive in others.1 In a ‘Global Fire 
Assessment’ led by global conservation NGOs and the University of California, the 
world’s ‘ecoregions’ were categorised on the basis of the role assumed by fire in 
their evolution.2 ‘Fire-dependent’ ecoregions, defined as ‘those where most of the 
species have evolved in the presence of fire, and where fire is an essential process 
for conserving biodiversity (e.g., tropical savannas, such as those in Belize, or 
temperate coniferous forests)’, were found to cover 53 percent of global terrestrial 
area. ‘Fire-sensitive’ ecosystems, defined as ‘those where most of the species have 
not largely evolved in the presence of fire…. [where] the introduction of ecologically-
inappropriate fire can have an extensive negative impact on biodiversity (e.g., 
tropical moist broadleaf forests)’, were found to cover 22 percent of global terrestrial 
area. ‘Fire-independent’ ecosystems, as defined as ‘those that naturally lack 
sufficient fuel or ignition sources to support fire as an evolutionary force (e.g., 
deserts, tundra)’, were found to cover 15 percent of global terrestrial area.3  
Since their evolution, humans have used fire in the landscapes they have 
settled, to clear and/or renew vegetation for farming, hunting, pastoralism, access 
and for other reasons. Wildfires started by human agency have thus shaped 
environments on evolutionary timescales.4 While most contemporary ecologists 
accept fire as an inherent part of many ecosystems, conservationists fear that, 
largely due to human agency, the frequency and intensity of fires in many places 
 
1 Cochrane (2009).  
2 ‘Ecoregions’ as defined by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF).  
3 Shlisky et al (2006), p. 4. 
4 Bird & Cali (1998); Pechony & Shindell (2010); Bowman et al (2011); Coughlan & Petty (2013); Scott 




worldwide differs significantly from a more ‘natural’ historical fire regime, and thus 
poses a threat to ecosystem health and biodiversity.5 The savanna that spans the 
length of Belize’s coastal plain is no exception. Today, most wildfires in Belize’s 
lowland savanna are started by human agency, and it is likely that such fires have 
played an important role in the evolution of this landscape.6 Though very little 
empirical scientific research or monitoring has been carried out in Belize on this 
issue, conservationists characterise an ‘ecologically appropriate’ fire regime for 
Belize’s pine savannas as one of low intensity surface fire at a return interval of one 
to ten years.7 Recent analysis of satellite imagery suggests that the present fire 
return interval in the coastal savanna of southern Belize is under three years.8 
Human fire use is thus deemed a conservation threat to Belize’s savannas.  
Jay Mistry loosely describes tropical savannas as ‘ecosystems with a 
continuous and important grass/ herbaceous stratum, a discontinuous layer of trees 
and shrubs of variable height and density, and where growth patterns are closely 
associated with alternating wet and dry seasons’.9 The key ecological determinants 
of savanna are understood to be climate, water and nutrient availability, fire and 
herbivory, although different conceptual frameworks have been presented for how 
these factors interact (see Chapter two). Savanna landscapes are understood to 
comprise a patchwork of habitats, such that the term may be applied at a wide 
spatial scale to include pockets of woodland.10 Disturbances like fire are understood 
 
5 Shlisky et al (2006).  
6 Myers & Rodríguez-Trejo (2009). 
7 Myers & Morrison (2006).  
8 Roper (2016). 
9 Mistry (2000), p. 1. Other recent definitions emphasise that the C4 grass stratum, specifically, 
determines a savanna. C4 grasses are characterised by a form of photosynthesis that is evolutionarily 
derived from C3 photosynthesis, but which includes an additional mechanism for actively transporting 
CO2 into specialized cells where photosynthesis occurs, making them more tolerant of high 
temperatures, low water availability, and/or low CO2 concentration. See Lehmann et al (2011); Ratnam 
et al (2011); Parr et al (2014). 




to constructively maintain savannas as dynamic mosaics. In the case of Belize’s 
savanna, this mosaic includes grassland with and without pine trees and shrubs, as 
well as pockets of broadleaf forest.11  
Savannas were understood differently in the past. In its Amerindian origins, 
the term ‘savanna’ solely referred to treeless grassy areas.12 In the early twentieth 
century, many ecologists understood savanna as grassland that would become 
forest in the absence of disturbances like fire. From this perspective fire 
management was understood to prevent or reverse the degradation of forests to 
savanna (a point I develop in Chapter two). Similar interpretations were made of the 
coastal savanna in Belize. In the 1950s, Charles Wright, leader of a team 
commissioned by the British Colonial Office to survey and classify land and soils in 
Belize, wrote how ‘the literature of this colony fairly bristles with the peculiar 
botanical terms employed by the early settlers on the coast’.13 Most nineteenth and 
twentieth century writing by foreign ecologists and foresters described the Belizean 
coastal plain using the local terminology to describe vegetation: ‘cohune ridge’ for 
the broadleaf; ‘broken ridge’ for less dense scrubby forest; ‘pine ridge’ for the 
grassland with pine.14 The term ‘savanna’ was generally reserved for treeless 
grassland areas. In 1887, for example, Hooper wrote that ‘nearer the coast … it is 
open country containing vegetation of a mixed type but poor and stunted growth with 
areas of treeless savannah interspersed’.15 In this thesis, however, I apply the term 
 
11 Wright et al (1959); Stuart, Barratt & Place (2006); Goodwin et al (2013). 
12 Mistry (2000).  
13 Diary of Charles Wright from his time as part of the British Honduras Land Survey team, 1954 [BARS 
BAD/CHW/225], p. 104.  
14 See for example Hooper (1887); Hummel (1921); Stevenson (1927); Bartlett (1935). Wright et al 
(1959), despite developing a novel vegetation classification system, use the local terminology 
throughout their text. Today these terms are still used locally.  




savanna to the broader shifting mosaic of trees and grasses at the landscape scale, 
in line with its current use in ecology.16  
I use the term ‘fire management’ for any approach to suppress or control fire 
in the environment in pursuit of specific environmental goals. Fire management has 
a long history and has been practised by many cultures (as is explored in Chapter 
two). From the seventeenth century, a strong anti-fire discourse developed in 
Europe, by which fire was deemed to hinder conservation and development of the 
environment.17 First European, and, by the late nineteenth century, North American 
state institutions sought to eliminate human fire use and wildfires from diverse 
environments, including in Empires worldwide. ‘Shifting’ forms of agriculture 
involving fire use were deemed primitive, compared to settled, ‘improved’ 
agriculture. Foresters sought to exclude fire from forests to enable sustained 
production of timber. Nature conservationists saw fire as a threat to the ‘balance’ of 
nature. These institutions largely followed policies of fire suppression, but after the 
mid-twentieth century, led largely from the USA and various British colonies, a 
gradual revolution took place in official fire management policies.18 Ecologists were 
beginning to see fire as an inherent part of many ecosystems in that they were 
deemed non-equilibrium systems. Environmental managers noted that fire 
suppression caused the build-up of fuel to levels where its ignition caused fires of 
dangerous intensity. Thus, by the 1970s, ‘prescribed fire’ management was 
accepted as a policy in the USA and in some other countries, among land managers 
with diverse management objectives. The term described the application of fire to 
the environment in pursuit of certain land management goals, such as the reduction 
of fuel levels. Generally, prescribed fire use was deemed the prerogative of 
 
16 Furley (2016) stresses that ‘savanna’ be applied at the landscape scale, and that savannas can thus 
include multiple component vegetation types.  
17 Pyne (1997); Kull (2004).  
18 Pyne (2003, 2015); Pooley (2014).  
23 
  
specialist technical agencies, and not of people seeking to use fire as part of their 
livelihoods. Pyne describes how the term ‘prescribed fire’ indicated 
that fire could be targeted – could be scientifically directed – to distinguish useful 
burning from the generic woodsburning that, to foresters' eyes, plagued the 
landscape. As with medicine each prescription had a specific purpose…. In this way 
several interests converged: those who wanted to control conflagrations, those who 
thought that the best way to reduce fires was to reduce their fuels, and those who 
believed burning could be an acceptable technique if it was legitimated by 
quantitative science. Prescribed burning could count only if it was countable.19 
 
Despite the emergence of prescribed fire management, a narrative 
promoting fire suppression remained dominant in many places worldwide (and 
continues to do so).20 In Belize, following training from The Nature Conservancy 
(TNC) under its ‘Global Fire Initiative’ (GFI) in the early 2000s, TIDE developed a 
programme of wildfire suppression and prescribed fire use in the savannas of the 
Payne’s Creek National Park. With the objective of nature conservation, TIDE now 
aims to recreate an ‘ecologically-appropriate’ fire regime of low intensity fire every 
three years. 
In the 1970s, new environmentalist social movements decried dominant 
technocratic approaches to conservation and development. They argued that such 
approaches had denied local people access to environments upon which their 
livelihoods depended. A new discourse of ‘sustainable development’ emerged as 
the mandate of global conservation and development organisations.21 Sustainable 
development suggested that development and conservation should be pursued 
concurrently: development should not degrade environments for future generations; 
conservation should recognise local cultures and livelihoods. By the late 1980s, 
‘Participatory’ development and conservation emerged from this mainstream 
discourse. ‘Community-based natural resource management’ and ‘integrated 
 
19 Pyne (2016b), pp. 42-3.  
20 Donovan & Brown (2007); Fill et al (2015). 




conservation and development projects’ were terms used to describe such 
projects.22 These discourses also touched fire management: ‘community-based fire 
management’ and ‘integrated fire management’ emerged, which aimed to involve 
local fire users in fire management and to recreate ecologically and culturally 
appropriate fire regimes.23 It is against this backdrop that the Darwin Project in 
Belize began, a project which sought to train and enrol local fire users in prescribed 
fire management of the coastal savannas.  
 
1.2 The Darwin Project and the motivation for this research 
I was the Project Officer for the Darwin Project was from September 2015 to 
April 2018. The position involved drafting bi-annual progress reports to the funder 
and generally assisting with, but never taking main responsibility for, all project 
activities that took place while I was in Belize.24 I co-facilitated, contributed to and 
provided logistical support for fire management and business training events, 
meetings with community groups, the Forest Department and other project partners, 
and dissemination events.25 Being involved with these activities gave me the 
oversight necessary to write the progress reports to the funder. At the same time, I 
maintained a certain distance from the activities, often observing and taking notes. I 
publicly kept a distance from TIDE, making it clear that I did not work for the NGO, 
but was affiliated with the University of Edinburgh. This distance made it possible for 
me to think and write about the project for this research.  
 
22 Brosius, Tsing & Zerner (1998); Adams (2008); Brockington, Duffy & Igoe (2008); Dressler et al 
(2010); Raymond et al (2010); Calfucura (2018). 
23 Myers (2006); UN-FAO (2011).  
24 Originally, it was also intended to conduct livelihood surveys at the start and end of the project which 
would demonstrate its impact in local communities. When it became apparent that this would be a 
difficult task, given the size of the villages and the marginal quantifiable benefits the project would 
provide, this output was revised. Instead I wrote an initial baseline report on the villages based on 
information gathered from village leaders and my own observations, and at end of project an 
independent reviewer conducted interviews with participants to assess the project’s impact.   
25 As most of the project activities and my own visits to Belize were timed for the dry season, I was 
present for the majority of these events.   
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The Project Officer position funded my PhD, though without constraining my 
research questions (beyond providing general themes and a context, and because I 
had to consider how my colleagues would receive academic discussion of their 
work). The historical direction for this thesis emerged from my first experiences of 
Belize in 2016. In the autumn of 2015, in Edinburgh, shortly after having been 
appointed to the Project Officer role and accompanying PhD scholarship, I and my 
supervisors envisaged that my PhD research might examine the motivations and 
incentives for local participation in the project and the extent to which it represented 
a ‘win-win’ for conservation and local livelihoods. It is worth noting that my previous 
academic training was in the natural sciences, and I had little familiarity with social 
science literature. That Autumn I read widely about social science research 
methods. I imagined that my research methodology might combine quantitative 
household surveys and more qualitative interviews.  
Having never visited Belize, I also sought, through reading reports and 
academic texts, to understand the Belizean context ahead of my first visit from 
January to April of 2016. I struggled to find material to contextualise the villages 
where I would be working. The Darwin Project proposal provided minimal 
information: ‘Belize’s Poverty Elimination Strategy recognises that communities 
living in these pine woodlands are among the poorest in Belize and wildfire poses a 
serious risk to their security and livelihood’.26 In the Darwin Project texts I 
encountered the Belize Forest Department as an organisation committed to trialling 
community-based conservation: ‘the Forest Department sees this Darwin project as 
a means to evaluate the feasibility and implications of granting greater access and 
benefit sharing to communities in its forest reserves and national parks’; lacking only 
‘capacity to implement its national wildfire management strategy’.27  
 




Without discounting that human-set wildfires have shaped Belizean 
savannas and have consequences for people living in and around them, in 2016, my 
first experiences in Belize led me to question the simplicity with which the project’s 
paperwork presented the wildfire ’problem’ and its ‘activities’ and ‘outputs’ to 
address it. I found noteworthy a lack of attention to the history of fire management, 
and environmental management more broadly, preceding present interventions in 
Belize. The Darwin Project proposal made no reference to this history. As I probed 
these questions with staff at TIDE and the Forest Department, I found little 
knowledge locally regarding the history of management of the coastal savannas or 
of the Forest Department as an institution, established in British colonial Belize (then 
British Honduras).28 This history was also unexplored in the academic literature.29 
My interest deepened as I read accounts of the history of failed colonial and post-
colonial agricultural development projects in Belize.30 From occasional 
conversations, I ascertained that fire management had been carried out by the 
colonial Forest Department in Belize. I felt that understanding this history could have 
important implications for understanding the Belize fire ‘problem’, because it might 
have left environmental, discursive and political legacies.   
As a scientist-in-training, I realised the uncertain and fragmented nature of 
the empirical science upon which TIDE’s fire management rested. The ecological 
role of fire in Belize’s savannas was poorly understood. I observed that, rather than 
relying upon empirical measurement of the savanna to guide prescribed fire 
management, TIDE’s work was driven by a combination of general principles that 
staff had learned from external technical experts and their internalised observations 
 
28 British Honduras became Belize in 1973 and gained full independence from Britain in 1981. 
Throughout this thesis, even when referring to periods before 1973, I refer to the country as Belize. 
29 Beyond two short papers on the history of forestry published in Belizean Studies (Benya, 1979a, 
1979b). Since 2016, another paper has also been published, with brief detail on the history of forestry 
in Belize (Wainwright & Zempel, 2018).  
30 Wainwright (2008); Grandia (2012).  
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of the savanna. Although the Darwin Project sought to address this by introducing 
fire-effects monitoring, it struck me that TIDE had institutionalised such general 
principles.  
It also became apparent to me that local access to and fire use in the 
savanna were intimately tied to local politics, with important implications for the 
Darwin Project’s objective to successfully incentivise fire management by local 
people. We had project meetings with Forest Department officials, who spoke the 
appropriate rhetoric regarding community fire management, but these meetings 
were never followed up with action on their part. Despite government policies calling 
for more equitable community benefit from protected areas, it became clear to me 
that it was common practice for government officials to grant land and resource 
access to villagers based upon their political allegiance. The Forest Department, 
ostensibly the co-manager of the protected areas in which we were working, neither 
conducted active management in these areas, nor upheld legislation forbidding fire 
use. Local people clearly felt little threat of punishment for using fire in savanna 
areas. They had little direct stake in fire management for the purposes of nature 
conservation or pine forestry (though there was the possible benefit to them of 
reducing wildfire damage to their property, and to the palmetto resource which some 
people harvested from protected areas). The project’s approaches of technical 
training and business support neither directly confronted inequitable access to 
savanna areas, nor the way in which elite stakeholders in Belize directed access 
and use of this land to their benefit. Though the project sought to negotiate 
community palmetto concessions for forest reserves, to the villagers, this 
represented little real change, given that they were anyway making unrestricted use 
of these areas to harvest the palmetto. In any case, the Forest Department showed 
little commitment to granting such concessions.  
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In March and April 2016, I re-entered the ‘virtual’ world of the project’s 
documentation, as I wrote my first annual report to the project funder. I was required 
to report against the project proposal’s log frame of measurable indicators for each 
specified ‘outcome’, ‘output’ and ‘activity’. Because of the format of these indicators, 
for example in reports or training materials produced or numbers of people attending 
training events, I could report ‘success’ against most of them (despite my 
reservations about the impact of the activities in practice). Yet it was becoming 
clear, for a number of reasons, that for one output, we would be unlikely to be able 
report success by end of project: ‘community non-timber forest product concessions 
involving ≥50 community members are established and yielding ~420,000 lb 
palmetto seed per annum (generating £49,000-63,000 per annum for community 
members and £8,400 per annum for the Forest Department)’.31 This output had two 
associated activities, to ‘formalise license agreements with the Forest Department 
whereby community members are granted concessions to harvest non-timber forest 
products within forest reserves’, and to ‘establish and monitor non-timber forest 
product concessions involving ≥50 community members and ‘establish a 
concessionaires committee’. My manager suggested that we might submit a ‘change 
request’ form to the funder of the project, to attempt to change this output to a more 
achievable one: if accepted before the project report was due, we could change the 
log frame against which we had to report. Together we removed the reference to 
concessions and replaced the output with the vaguer ‘the palmetto seed harvest is 
secured for community members into the future, through a formal agreement with 
the forest department, and more sustainable harvesting practices’.32 We changed 
the associated activities to ‘consult with palmetto harvesters to establish the areas 
that are currently harvested by each community, the numbers of harvesters in each 
 
31 Project proposal, submitted in 2014, for Darwin Initiative Project 22-013, p. 6. 
32 Change request for Darwin Initiative Project 22-013, submitted 15th March 2016.  
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community and to discuss how the harvest could be best secured from the 
community perspective’ and ‘discussion between TIDE and the Forest Department 
regarding the most suitable legal agreement for securing the palmetto harvest for 
community members into the future’. The change request was accepted by the 
funder. By proposing only to research the situation and advise the Forest 
Department, we had crafted a pathway to ‘success’, despite the political barriers 
encountered. The following year, we amended the output further to remove any 
suggestion of an agreement being reached during the project. I was both frustrated 
and fascinated by the way in which I, as the Project Officer, was required and 
enabled to engineer the project’s documentation to present the project’s 
interventions as successful, despite the political barriers to real incentivisation of 
local participation in fire management. I had experienced the gap between plans and 
practice in Belizean fire management.  
 
1.3 Outline of the thesis 
The direction for this research emerged out of these experiences and 
observations. This thesis became a space in which I could present a fuller account 
of fire management in Belize, to that in the constrained reports I was required to 
write for the Darwin Project’s funder. I had identified a clear knowledge gap 
regarding the history of fire management and, more broadly, of forestry in Belize. 
Wildfires and their management in Belize were manifestly both an ecological but 
also a political phenomenon, linked to wider issues of land and resource access. 
Yet, both the specifically Belizean ecological and political elements of fire 
management were neglected in contemporary policies and documentation, which 
were predominantly informed by general principles derived outside Belize. I wanted 
to discover whether, and if so, why, historical fire management had also failed to 
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address contextual factors in Belize. From initial curious forays into the archive, 
history gradually became the primary focus of this thesis.  
The broad academic discipline of political ecology provided a platform for my 
analysis. Political ecology is the study of human efforts to manage the environment, 
and environmental conditions, as the outcome of both socio-political and ecological 
processes operating at multiple scales.33 Political ecology engages explicitly with the 
power relations inherent to environmental management, which is used, with 
unequally distributed costs and benefits, to shape the environment for certain 
purposes. Political ecologists are specifically interested in how dominant 
environmental narratives shape environmental practice in specific contexts. To do 
so they must interrogate the relationship between discourse and practice (a point 
developed in Chapter two). Political ecology thus ‘focuses heavily on case studies 
that stress idiosyncrasies, contextual outcomes, and local surprises that precisely fly 
in the face of general theory building’.34 These studies often include examination of 
the historical context to contemporary environmental issues.35 
Wildfire and its management have been analysed in a handful of studies 
within political ecology, none of which examine the Belizean context. These studies 
demonstrate how, in different contexts, official colonial and post-colonial policies and 
legislation have, for economic and ideological reasons, criminalised fire use in the 
environment.36 They also demonstrate that official discourse surrounding fire use 
has not been all-powerful in suppressing fires or changing local fire use behaviour. 
This is because wildfires are, by their nature, difficult to attribute to individual fire 
 
33 Stott & Sullivan (2000); Forsyth (2004); Watts & Peet (2004), Robbins (2012), Bryant (2015).  
34 Robbins (2012), p. 84.  
35 Brannstrom (2004); Offen (2004); Davis (2015); Mathevet et al (2015). 




users, and because of corruption and internal inconsistencies within the states 
possessing these official policies.37  
This thesis is intended both to inform contemporary Belizean fire management 
(and environmental management more broadly) and to speak to current debates in 
political ecology regarding the importance of policies and discourse in shaping 
material environmental practice. It has two primary aims. The first is to examine 
how colonial and post-colonial fire management have addressed the 
ecological and political context of wildfires in Belize. I realised this by exploring 
how this context has been presented in plans, policies and reports and how this 
context has presented itself in the way fire management has been practised. The 
second is to consider the Darwin Project in the light of previous fire 
management in Belize. I addressed this by assessing whether the project’s 
approach (prescribed fire for nature conservation, with community participation) 
departed from earlier approaches to fire management in Belize, in objectives, 
methods and enrolment of different forms of expertise. These aims led to five 
principal research questions with respect to fire in Belize’s coastal savannas, in the 
period from 1920 to present:38  
1. which organisations and actors have funded and organised fire 
management?  
2. how has wildfire been cast as a ‘problem’ in the texts of these organisations, 
and with what aims has fire management been designed as a solution? 
3. what expertise has been called upon in planning and implementing fire 
management, and what context has granted this expertise the authority to do 
so? 
4. what methods of fire management have been planned and practised? 
 
37 Kull (2004); Mathews (2005).  
38 1920 being the year in which state-organised fire management was first proposed in Belize.  
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5. how can discrepancies between the texts and the actual practices of fire 
management be explained? 
The central argument of the thesis is as follows. Over the past century the 
purpose of fire management in Belize has changed, on paper, from the conservation 
of timber for capitalist exploitation and state revenue, to the conservation of nature 
and the benefit of local communities. Yet, in this period, fire management in Belize 
has been largely designed based on ideologies and policies deriving outside Belize 
and which have failed to recognise the evolving and specifically Belizean ecology 
and politics contributing to these wildfires and their management. Often, this has 
been because this fire management has been financed and designed within the 
contexts of colonial development, and later, international development, both of 
which valued general and technocratic approaches, and provided only short-term 
and inconsistent funding. Shaped in practice by Belizean ecology and politics, these 
externally-derived approaches to fire management have often failed to suppress 
fires or reduce fire frequency in line with their objectives. Belize’s political elite long 
sought to retain control over land and resources, even at the expense of policies 
(including for fire management) which they have officially endorsed to satisfy 
colonial and international funders.  
The structure of the work is as follows. The thesis begins with two chapters that 
provide further context to the research. Chapter two reviews the history of fire 
management as developed by institutions in Europe, European colonies and North 
America from the seventeenth century. It examines how fire management came to 
be conflated with ‘conservation’ and ‘development’. It then reviews how the field of 
political ecology has approached the study of environmental management and 
governance. It situates this thesis within recent political ecology literature that seeks 
to overcome the limitations of earlier work that focused too intently, I argue, on the 
study of dominant discourses in environmental management. Chapter three turns to 
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my research methodology, highlighting the importance of being critically reflexive in 
relation to the processes by which I gathered and presented evidence. This is 
followed by three empirical chapters examining Belizean fire management since 
1920. These chapters address three successive periods, and, thus, each provides 
partial answers to each of my research questions. Chapter four recounts the origins 
of the Belizean state Forest Department. After analysing how the Department’s first 
Conservator of Forests cast savanna fires as a problem in an influential report of 
1921, it examines how local factors frustrated the Department’s attempts to manage 
savanna fires in the period from 1920 to 1941.39 Chapter five examines how, from 
1942 to present, the Forest Department’s fire management was part of planned 
projects seeking international funding. This funding enabled a programme of fire 
management to be maintained despite limited local political support but constrained 
the approaches and consistency of that fire management. Chapter six explores the 
promotion of ‘integrated’ and ‘community-based’ fire management in Belize since 
the 1990s, and the role of local NGOs in leading these fire management projects. 
The thesis conclusion, chapter seven, more explicitly addresses each research 
question in turn.  
This research grapples with fundamental questions of how structural constraints 
and local agency shape environmental management. Which are more important? 
Broad discourses and policies or local ecological and political forces? The desires of 
international funders or the relationships and intentions of actors in Belize? The 
answer is always that both play a role, yet the different lines of evidence upon which 
I draw in this thesis each provide only a partial view. Being textual in format, archival 
material commonly foregrounds the discourses and policies of the colonial 
administration, international funders and development actors in Belize. Oral histories 
 
39 Hummel (1921). 
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and ethnography give greater insight into local politics and agency. Each of these 
lines of evidence is time-constrained in different ways. I was only able to combine all 
three in Chapters five and six, when discussing contemporary Belize.  
By providing the first study of the history fire management in the context of 
Belizean savannas, this thesis contributes to a growing body of case studies of the 
political ecology of fire. More generally, as little has been published on the subject, it 
provides some of the first writing on the history of forestry in Belize.40 More 
generally, the thesis joins other case studies that provide detailed historical 
contextualisation of present environmental management practices, presenting 
opportunities to reflect on the relevance of the past to present. In so doing, it 
examines both continuities and discontinuities in the broad ideas informing fire 
management, and in the processes by which they were translated into practice 
within the structures of colonial or international development and in the local 
ecological and political context. The research also makes a methodological 
contribution, demonstrating the value of reflexively combining archival research with 
oral histories and ethnography, to evaluate how different traces of the past speak to 
that past and to the present. Finally, the research is intended to have relevance for 
stakeholders in Belizean fire management. I intend it to inspire critical reflection on 
the origins of their approaches to fire management. In the design of future fire 
management, I hope that my research will focus greater attention on elements of 
Belizean ecology and politics that have rarely informed the design of fire 
management in this context historically.
 
40 As noted, brief reviews of the history of forestry in Belize have been provided only by Benya (1979a, 




Fire management as conservation and development 
 
Europeans see fire as inextricably social, its presence an outcome of human 
artifice. Lightning fire is a freak of nature, an aberration, and the episodic 
return of wildfire an index of social unrest. Americans, by contrast, begin with 
an axiomatic natural fire and seek to strip away the social context that 
encumbers its study, like physicists contemplating an ideal frictionless 
surface. For Europe the sacred fire remains the fire in the hearth. For 
Americans it is the fire in the wilderness…. Slowly, backing into the future, 
both Americans and Europeans began to converge on the common ground 
of anthropogenic fire. Americans found they had to reconnect fire with 
people; Europeans people with fire (Pyne, 1997, 5, 452).  
 
I have put forth two apparently contradictory propositions about 
micromanagerialism: that it is strongly determined by unequal power, and 
that the goals of the powerful often fail in practice. I think most 
anthropologists would agree more or less with both points, favouring one or 
the other at different times but rarely confronting their paradoxical 
simultaneity (Heyman, 2009, 181). 
 
Today most people in Europe and North America do not commonly use fire 
in the landscape as part of their livelihoods, as many human societies have 
historically. Most people understand fires in the landscape as a threat. This can 
broadly be attributed to influences, that, together, created a mentality by which fire 
use no longer fitted into a ’rational’ system of land use: fire became something to be 
largely excluded from the environment. This occurred as scientists, land managers 
and state agencies came to conflate fire’s management with ‘conservation’ and/or 
‘development’. Conceived as such, fire management, as the prerogative of state and 
non-state technical agencies, became an attempt to shape and govern 
environments and people in the name of rational improvement. Fire management 
was also instituted in colonial settings such as Belize.  
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This chapter provides foundations from the literature that situate my research 
of the Belizean encounter with state and NGO-led fire management. The chapter 
has two broad aims. Firstly, in Sections 2.1 – 2.4, it provides historical context to the 
changing aims and methods of fire management as developed by institutions in 
Europe, European colonies and North America from the seventeenth century. I 
explore the history of the complex dialectical interplay between ‘conservation’ and 
‘development’ in Anglo-American thought. I review how, as these terms have shifted 
in their meaning, so, too, the rationale for and approaches to fire management 
changed within forestry and nature conservation. Focusing on tropical savannas, I 
examine the influence of changing theory in the science of ecology on approaches 
to fire management.  
Secondly, to ground my research approach, the chapter reviews how the 
field of political ecology has studied environmental management and governance. 
Section 2.5 examines the implications of the postmodern emphasis on knowledge 
and discourse for the study of colonial and international conservation and 
development. Such studies have been criticised for attributing ‘Western’ knowledge, 
discourse and plans for environmental management too much power to remake the 
world in line with their representations. Sections 2.6 and 2.7 review more recent 
literature to which my research contributes, work that explicitly confronts the 
relationship between discourse/plans and materiality/practice in environmental 
management. This literature suggests that we should approach Belizean fire 




2.1 Fire as an ecological and socio-political phenomenon 
Fire is a chemical reaction sustained by the ‘triangle’ of heat, oxygen and 
fuel.1 A wildfire is shaped by weather, topography and fuel: reciprocally, a wildfire 
consumes and modifies its physical and biological setting. Fire ecologists describe 
the longer-term character of fires in an ecosystem as its ‘fire regime’.2 At the scale of 
a fire regime, fire can have evolutionary ecological impacts. Fire acts selectively on 
species to produce vegetative adaptations such as heat protection or the ability to 
re-sprout following fire; disseminule-based adaptations such as fire-induced 
flowering or below-ground seed or rhizome survival; competitive adaptations, such 
as increased flammability to kill neighbours.3 
Knowledge of fire’s behaviour, and its use, for example, to facilitate hunting, 
agriculture, pastoralism, physical access or protest, have been central to many 
human societies throughout history. Many of these societies have recognised the 
elements of fire regimes given technical terms and quantification by modern fire 
ecologists, such as ‘fire return intervals’ or ‘fuel composition’.4 For some, fire has 
been imbued with spiritual value.5 Some societies have also applied fire to the 
landscape as a fire management strategy, ensuring that the landscape is frequently 
enough burnt and sufficiently patchy to prevent large and catastrophic fires.6 Human 
relationships with fire are subject to influence and change: it is neither useful nor 
appropriate to consider fire use as ‘traditional’ or ‘primitive’.7 For example, fire is of 
 
1 Fire is a form of combustion, an oxidation process. Fire requires heat transfer by conduction, 
convection or radiation, which processes depend for example upon the density of the combusting 
material, wind speed and topography. Fuel feeds fire, and its type, moisture, biomass on the 
landscape, arrangement and continuity, influence fire behaviour. Oxygen rarely limits wildfire, but a 
rapid supply by wind can intensify the flames. 
2 Whelan (1995); Cochrane & Ryan (2009); Scott et al (2013).  
3 Noble & Slatyer (1980); Bond & Midgley (1995); Bond & Keely (2005); Cochrane & Ryan (2009).  
4 Huffman (2013); Fowler & Welch (2018).  
5 Huffman (2013); Pyne (2016a); Fowler & Welch (2018).  
6 Laris (2002); Putz (2003); Whitehead et al (2003); Rodríguez (2007); Butz (2009); Walters (2010); 
Fowler & Welch (2018). 
7 Eriksen (2007); Coughlan & Petty (2013); Walters (2010, 2015); Petty et al (2015); Fowler & Welch 




important cultural value to the Pemon people in Venezuela, who use fire in and 
around savannas in diverse ways that sustain their livelihoods, and also as a fire 
management strategy. This is not a timeless system, but one which has developed 
and changed over the past 400 years.8   
Fire in tropical savannas long pre-dates human evolution.9 Fire adaptations 
in tree species that characterise some tropical savannas today pre-date even the 
evolution of grasses. For example, thick, fire-resistant bark arose in pines at around 
120 Mya, coincident with increased fire levels resulting from increased atmospheric 
oxygen.10 Grasses emerged in the late Tertiary (60-70 Mya), and the C4 grasses 
that dominate tropical savannas became ecologically significant from 5-8 Mya. The 
first members of the genus Homo are dated to 2.5 Mya, the first anatomically 
modern humans to 200,000 years before present, though it was some time before 
humans migrated to reach all parts of the globe.11 Since their evolution, human 
practices have shaped fire environments.12 People are a cause of ignition and they 
shape and modify fuel environments - by grazing animals, deforesting, introducing 
new species, or building roads that break fuel continuity. Humans have also 
changed fire environments by modifying the climate. As human populations and the 
forms, organisation and scale of their land-use practices have changed, so has the 
nature of human influence on fire regimes. At different places and times, the natural 
influences on fire regimes, such as climate, differ in strength, altering the potential 
for human influence to be important.13 Human influences on fire regimes are not 
easily quantified: it is difficult to isolate human signals in the palaeorecord or in 
 
8 Rodríguez (2007); Bilbao, Mendez & Delgado-Cartay (2009). 
9 Horn & Kappelle (2009). 
10 He et al (2012). 
11 Edwards et al (2010); Lehmann et al (2011); Furley (2016). 
12 Bird & Cali (1998); Kepe (2005); Butz (2009); Pechony & Shindell (2010); Bowman et al (2011); 
Coughlan & Petty (2013); Scott et al (2013); Archibald (2016).  




contemporary fire studies.14 It is clear, nonetheless, that human fire use has 
substantially influenced ecosystems such as tropical savannas on evolutionary 
timescales.15 In many landscapes, human fire use has historically promoted diversity 
in vegetation structure and species composition.16 Fire has been a medium through 
which human institutions, economics and politics have shaped ecologies.  
Steven Pyne urges modern fire managers to cast away two false ‘slogans’ 
for fire: ‘fire as natural’ and ‘fire as tool’.17 The first insists that human fire does not 
belong; the second ignores fire’s environmental setting and assumes that people 
can have complete control of fire. Pyne instead calls for what he terms ‘fire as 
biology’, a perception of fire that understands that it exists because of its 
environment, social and ecological. It is fundamental to this thesis that fire is an 
ecological and socio-political phenomenon. This perspective of fire challenges the 
conventional categories of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’. Over the past century, this 
dichotomy has also been denounced by social theorists who have offered various 
ways to reimagine nature as social, in both its discursive and material construction.18  
The move to understand nature as social can be linked to the emergence in 
the 1970s of the broad academic discipline of political ecology.19 Political ecologists 
remain divided over how best to approach the categories of nature and culture. 
Some follow the posthuman and ‘more-than-human’ turns in social theory to discard 
conventional dualisms and understand the world as comprised of socio-natural 
hybrids, allowing for non-human entities, such as fire, to have agency and/or 
 
14 Bowman (2011); Murphy & Bowman (2012); Marlon et al (2013).  
15 Bird & Cali (1998); Pechony & Shindell (2010). 
16 Kepe & Scoones (1999); Laris (2002); Bird et al (2008); Butz (2009); Walters (2010); Nigh & Diemont 
(2013).  
17 Pyne (2003), p. 9.  
18 Castree (2001, 2013).  




politics.20 Others argue that such ontologies present an apolitical ‘flat immanence 
where everything becomes equivalent with everything else’, and prefer to keep a 
dialectical distance between nature and culture.21 I take this second position, which 
sees human agency as integral to the political, and always related in contingent 
ways to the natural.  
To take a political ecological approach to wildfire entails engaging with the 
power relations inherent to fire management, in that it is used to shape the 
environment for certain purposes.22 As I explore in this chapter, in Anglo-American 
fire management such purposes have usually been framed in terms of conservation 
and development. In Sections 2.2 – 2.4, I draw upon studies by political ecologists, 
environmental historians and historical geographers, to review the history of 
conservation, development, the science of ecology and the articulation of these with 
fire management. In Sections 2.5 – 2.7, I turn to the social theory employed by 
political ecologists to understand how power and expertise operate in environmental 
management.  
 
2.2 The evolving concepts of ‘conservation’ and ‘development’ 
Some scholars have argued that European thought since the Enlightenment 
has been characterised by dualisms, including the separation of ‘nature’ and 
‘culture’.23 This separation had roots in the Christian tradition, in which the Earth was 
created for the benefit of, and for stewardship by, humankind. From the thirteenth 
century, describing nature and creating botanical gardens, were understood as ways 
for a fallen mankind to find heaven on Earth and so become closer to God. From 
 
20 Haraway (1991); Latour (1993, 2005); Whatmore (2002). See Booth & Williams (2014) and Minor & 
Boyce (2018) for more-than-human studies of wildfire. 
21 Neyrat (2014), also Chagani (2014); Lave (2015); Swyngedouw & Ernstson (2018).  
22 See for example Kepe & Scoones (1999); Kull (2004); Kepe (2005); Mathews (2005); Kosek (2006), 
Ch. 6; Eriksen (2007); Eloy et al (2019). 
23 Glacken (1973); Castree (2014).  
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these largely Judaeo-Christian religious foundations grew a moral imperative for 
humanity to ‘improve’ nature. The global voyages and empire building of Europeans 
from the fifteenth century were highly influential in shaping new ways of 
understanding nature. Encounters with new environments necessitated new, 
scientific, ways of describing and cataloguing nature, and fuelled a romantic 
imaginary of distant tropical Edens. Man’s improvement of nature took on a new role 
as ideological justification for the settlement and exploitation associated with empire-
building. By the seventeenth century a rational and utilitarian basis was being added 
to the religious foundations of improvement.24    
This rationality was characterised firstly by the emergence of new scientific 
methods and the belief in scientific knowledge and technology for the mastery of 
nature. Scientific knowledge was to be pursued and applied for the ‘relief of man’s 
estate’ and not purely as an intellectual exercise.25 Standardised approaches to 
physical measurement of the environment made it possible to compare and 
categorise, territorialise and administer distant places and empires. A second 
dimension to rationality was the principle of possession based on improvement and 
use: ‘God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it them for their 
benefit … it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and 
uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational’.26 Improvement 
justified enclosure of common lands in favour of state land ownership and fixed, 
private property rights for agrarian improvers and settlers of empires. Between the 
seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, nature’s improvement increasingly became 
the prerogative of states and social elites. Scientific institutions and botanical 
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gardens became increasingly inflected with the management of the ‘natural 
economy’ and departments of executive government were created to manage 
agriculture and forestry on state land.27 Laws were elaborated that established legal 
definitions of rational use and restricted access for those deemed irrational users of 
resources.28  
From this ideology calling for the rational improvement of nature there 
emerged a dialectical relationship between two broad concepts: ‘development’ and 
‘conservation’. The word ‘development’ entered the English language in its modern 
usage in the eighteenth century. It carries a normative inflection, signifying the 
unfolding of something essential, but also implies an intervention; managed 
change.29 By the nineteenth century, development was strongly associated with the 
deepening of capitalist social relations. Development was a relational concept, 
‘predicated on the assumption that some people and places are more developed 
than others and therefore those who are “developed” have the knowledge and 
expertise to help those who are not’.30 In the context of the British Empire, colonial 
development signified ‘civilisation’ and ‘modernisation’ in the image of Britain.  
From roots in colonial development, international development took on a new 
urgency after World War II, as USA, Soviet and European states and financial 
organisations sought to inject capital and encourage structural reforms to enable 
industrialisation and ‘modernisation’ in the Global South. Throughout the twentieth 
and into the twenty-first century, development continued to be associated with the 
application of science and technology. From the 1950s it was increasingly 
considered the domain of technical specialists and ‘development professionals’.31 In 
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its colonial and post-colonial recapitulations, the ideology of development has been 
associated with the maintenance of the cultural and economic hegemony of the 
Global North.32  
In various forms, ‘conservation’ has been a reactionary attempt to mitigate 
against the destructive effects of deepening capitalist social relations and 
industrialisation: a ‘reasoned awareness of the wholesale vulnerability of earth to 
man’.33 Between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, environmentalism grew 
out of the visibility and physical measurement of environmental changes resulting 
from overexploitation of natural resources and industrialisation in Europe and its 
colonies and overseas territories. This environmentalism was also imbued with a 
romanticism and moralism that built on earlier ideas of Eden to decry 
industrialisation as a ‘corruptor’ of nature and of the ’less developed’ inhabitants of 
empire. Mauritius under the Dutch in the seventeenth and French in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, and St Helena under the British in the eighteenth 
centuries are early examples of state initiatives to conserve soil, water and climate 
in response to localised instances of degradation. Such examples influenced the 
development of more standardised institutions for state-led environmental 
conservation by the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.34 
Forestry was one of these subjects for the nexus of state-led conservation 
and economic development.35 Integrating conservation with timber production, 
forestry ‘resolved the tension between romantic preservationist notions and laissez-
faire policies’.36 Forestry often represented local forest users as destructive and so 
restricted access to reserved forests, which it argued should be managed for the 
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‘greater good’. Laws restricting access by peasants to forests had been established 
in Europe from the middle ages, but by the seventeenth century nation states such 
as France had created new forest reservations and plantations in response to timber 
shortages.37 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, forestry became a science 
and profession, and schools teaching standardised silvicultural methods were 
established, beginning in Germany. Informed by the French and German models, 
Britain established state forestry in India in the mid-nineteenth century. The USA 
followed the European lead, establishing its Forest Service in 1905.  
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, building on the approach 
it had developed in India, Britain gradually introduced forestry to its other colonies. 
By 1920, when the first of a series of British Empire Forestry Conferences was 
convened, the term ‘Empire Forestry’ was used to denote the model of forestry in 
use across the British Empire.38 In 1922 the British Empire Forestry Journal was 
established. In 1924 the Oxford Imperial Forestry Institute was founded for research 
and information-gathering about the colonies and to give specialised training to all 
foresters entering the Colonial Service. In the 1930s, standard statistical reporting 
forms were issued to all colonial forestry departments. The proponents of ‘Empire 
Forestry’ held that a standardised and centralised empire-wide approach to forestry 
was possible. They linked the concept to the economic and political model of a self-
sufficient, unified Empire.  
Conservation as wildlife or wilderness preservation arose alongside 
forestry’s model of conservation integrated with timber production. In Britain, the first 
formal institutions and reserves for nature conservation were established in the 
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nineteenth century.39 Concurrently, and on a larger scale, in the USA, the first 
National Parks were established to protect ‘wilderness’, which became a romantic 
ideal.40 Within the British Empire, the first protected areas for nature conservation 
were created in late nineteenth-century Africa, to conserve game for hunting by 
colonial elites.41 Growing out of this, the first international organisations to promote 
wildlife conservation were established in the early twentieth century.42 By the 1960s, 
international conservation organisations began to broaden their concerns from 
species conservation to the environment more broadly. The typical model of 
‘fortress’ conservation excluded local people from protected areas, just as forestry 
did.43 
While it was built upon prior epistemic concerns, drawing, for example, on 
ideas from scientific forestry, ecology emerged in the late nineteenth century as a 
named science.44 Closely aligned with the nature conservation movement, ecology 
provided a framework to underpin thinking about the environment and human 
impacts upon it. Early ecologists understood nature as, essentially, static, made up 
of ‘types’ of vegetation. Building from these foundations, Frederick Clements’ 
influential theory of succession and climax strongly influenced development and 
conservation thought in the twentieth century.45 For Clements, each vegetation type 
had a ‘climax’ state in which it was balanced and at equilibrium. Human activity was 
an external force that could act as a disturbance halting the succession of 
 
39 In Britain, for example, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds was established in 1893, and the 
National Trust in 1894. Sheail (1976); Adams (2009; 2013); Brockington, Igoe & Duffy (2012). 
40 The first National Park was Yellowstone, established in 1872. The romanticising of wilderness is 
evident, for example, in the writings and work of John Muir and George Perkins Marsh. Oelschlaeger 
(1991); Cronon (1996); Nash (2014).  
41 Neumann (1996); Adams (2009; 2013); Brockington, Igoe & Duffy (2012).   
42 The first, formed within the context of the British Empire in 1904, being the Society for the 
Preservation of the Wild Fauna of the Empire, today Flora and Fauna International. Adams (2009; 
2013); Brockington, Igoe & Duffy (2012).  
43 Brockington, Igoe & Duffy (2012).  
44 The term ‘ecology’ was coined by Haeckel (1866). See Worster (1994); Adams (2003, 2008).  




vegetation towards its climax state. Most ecologists in the early twentieth century 
subscribed to the paradigm of ‘equilibrium ecology’.46  
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many ecologists 
understood tropical savannas as solely climatic in origin.47 Clements’ succession 
theory sparked a new generation of ecological thought about savannas. The 
implication was that savannas were viewed as degraded forests, or in transition to 
forests, and not as an ’end-point’ in and of themselves.48 Though placing their 
emphasis on different factors, a variety of deterministic theories to explain the 
occurrence of savanna were put forward under the paradigm of equilibrium ecology. 
Savanna was generally defined as a characteristic vegetation structure (treeless 
grassland), and ecologists often used observations from certain localities to make 
general statements about savannas everywhere.49 In the 1940s and 1950s, it was 
popular to focus on edaphic factors. Some scholars focused on soil nutrient or 
drainage conditions, explaining the succession from forest to savanna as resulting 
from soil nutrient leaching.50 Others believed the converse – that the direction of 
succession was the converse, from savanna to forest, the result of soil enrichment.51 
Yet others placed emphasis on soil drainage, suggesting that the development of 
impervious layers in the soil caused the succession from forest to savanna.52 Many 
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ecologists, particularly after the 1950s, understood savannas as a ‘fire dis-climax’.53 
For example, for Edward Stebbing, professor of forestry at the University of 
Edinburgh, writing of West Africa in 1934, ‘even the “savannah forest”’ was ‘fully 
capable of being reconstituted into high forest by the two agencies of closure and 
strict fire protection’.54 
Equilibrium ecology strongly influenced conservation and development 
thought in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Ecology cast human activity as a 
degrading force, and the concept of the ‘ecosystem’, coined in 1935 and in popular 
use by the 1950s, provided the foundations for a new environmental managerialism: 
‘nature was a system whose state was maintained by processes of internal 
feedback, but it was also susceptible to external control. Human action could upset 
the machine, but fortunately the ecologist could predict how and where this upset 
might occur and diagnose how to put the balance right’.55 Training in ecology lent 
conservationists legitimacy as managers of nature. In that it contributed to ‘the 
rational use of biotic communities’, colonial and post-colonial states found ecology a 
useful framework in planning economic development.56 Ecology could be applied to 
maximise environmental production and extraction. 
Conservation and development were aligned in forestry and ecology. Yet, as 
development acquired new political agency after WWII, there was an evident 
epistemic divide between forestry, which became more intensive and plantation-
oriented, and environmental and nature conservation movements.57 By the 1960s 
and 1970s, environmental movements in the Global North were vocalising a growing 
dissatisfaction with modernisation and development amid fears of global 
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environmental crisis.58 Emerging grassroots social movements in the Global South, 
particularly in postcolonial settings, further criticised both development and ‘fortress’ 
conservation, for their exclusion of local people from the management and use of 
resources.59 In reaction, a new discourse of ‘sustainable development’ emerged in 
the 1970s and 1980s. This suggested that development should ‘meet the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
needs’.60 Sustainable development promised a ‘win-win’ in which conservation could 
and should be achieved alongside human use of the environment. It enshrined a 
discourse of ecological modernisation, positing that economic development was 
compatible with, or even beneficial to environmental protection.61 Since the 1980s, 
as the mandate of many international organisations, ‘mainstream’ neoliberal 
sustainable development has advocated less involvement by the state, a new 
reliance on market-based and technological solutions to environmental problems 
and for public participation in conservation and development.62  
A number of terms describing such ‘participatory’ approaches became 
commonplace by the 1990s, including ‘integrated conservation and development 
projects’ (ICDPs), ‘community-based conservation (CBC) or ‘community-based 
natural resource management’ (CBNRM), and protected areas co-management.63 In 
practice, these approaches varied a great deal in their underlying motivation and 
objectives, and as to the methods by which participation was conceptualised. In a 
review of participatory approaches in environmental management, Reed found 
approaches to differ in the degree of public engagement sought and in their 
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theoretical underpinning (some more strongly pragmatic and others normative). 
Pragmatic arguments for participation differed in their emphasis. Some argued that 
direct involvement in management brings benefits and engagement that make 
people more likely to agree with a largely externally devised intervention, and less 
likely to act unsustainably. Others emphasised that an understanding of local needs 
or priorities is necessary to adapt technical interventions to context. Yet others 
suggested that public knowledges themselves have something more fundamental to 
add in defining environmental problems or in finding technical solutions to those 
problems. Approaches underlain by normative arguments emphasised democracy, 
citizenship, equity, empowerment and resource rights.64 
After a burgeoning of ‘participatory’ conservation and development schemes 
in the 1990s there was growing disillusionment with the concept both from 
academics and funding agencies (which will be explored further in Section 2.5).65 It 
is important for this discussion of the recent evolution of mainstream sustainable 
development, that participatory approaches often failed because they were pursued 
concurrently to the increasing ‘professionalisation’ of the development industry.66 As 
is discussed further in Section 2.7, the valorisation of technical expertise in 
‘development professionals’ (to the extent that even ‘facilitating participation’ came 
to be considered an area of technical expertise in its own right) limited the extent to 
which local knowledge could truly inform development. Paradoxically, entering the 
twenty-first century, the reaction of many development agencies to the failure of 
participatory development projects was an attempt to make development more 
‘accountable’. This was often by introducing stricter monitoring and evaluation 
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requirements that narrowed the terms on which a development project can be 
considered ‘successful’ and further limited local participation.67   
From the 1970s, there was also a transition in mainstream ecology away 
from the equilibrium model towards understanding ecosystems as non-equilibrium 
systems. Within this, still dominant, paradigm in ecology, disturbance and variation 
are viewed as inherent to ecosystems, change being ‘without any determinable 
direction and [going] on forever, never reaching a point of stability’.68 Disturbances 
are understood to produce heterogeneous effects and ecosystems to be comprised 
of ‘dynamic patches’.69 With the transition to non-equilibrium ecology, ecologists 
began to understand tropical savannas as ecosystems or biomes in their own right; 
inherently dynamic and maintained by fire and herbivory.70 The boundaries between 
vegetation types within the savanna mosaic, and between savanna and continuous 
broadleaf forest, are subject to continual change.71 Presently popular theories to 
explain the occurrence of savanna relative to broadleaf forest combine climatic or 
edaphic factors with disturbance by fire or herbivory using the concept of ‘fire-
vegetation feedbacks’.72 In such models, climatic and edaphic factors (the strength 
of which vary locally) act only indirectly, in that they alter the counteracting rates of 
canopy closure (woody growth) and frequency of disturbance (the fire regime and 
herbivory) that directly control savanna distribution. The relationships between 
climatic or edaphic factors and savanna distribution are, therefore, not linear or 
deterministic: positive feedbacks exist between fire and savanna vegetation 
structure. The mechanisms by which these positive feedbacks exist are many: 
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competition favouring grasses over trees in post-fire nutrient, moisture and light 
conditions, direct mortality or propagation effects of fire on grasses vs trees, and 
flammable grass establishment.73 Because species traits create these positive 
feedbacks, the savanna vegetation and its links with fire are reinforced on 
evolutionary timescales: ‘The natural fire regime is therefore not simply an 
exogenous, climate-initiated disturbance … but is modified by biotic components 
that are intrinsic, and often endemic’.74  
The tension between stability and instability remains difficult for ecologists to 
resolve and there is little theoretical agreement in non-equilibrium ecology.75 There 
is, for example, much contention in savanna fire ecology, rooted in a diversity of 
methods of study and their differing temporal and spatial scales of consideration.76 
Experimental or plot-based studies have allowed for detailed measurement of 
particular and diverse variables, but have often been at a small spatial scale and few 
studies covered more than a few decades.77 Palaeoecological studies allow for 
longer term analysis but spatial extent or resolution may be limited, as are the 
factors available for analysis. 78 GIS and computer modelling studies have allowed 
analysis at regional or global scales, but are often constrained by the availability of 
data to no more than a few decades and as to the factors that can be included. 79 
Cross-scale analysis of fire patterns demonstrates that interpretation is dependent 
on the scale of analysis, but few studies have integrated findings on various scales 
for savannas.80 The result of these different scales of consideration is that different 
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factors have been emphasised, different levels of universality sought in theory, 
differing levels of emphasis placed upon historical contingency, and different 
baselines set for ‘natural’ vs ‘degraded’ savannas.    
Non-equilibrium ecology has been slow to influence environmental 
management. The notion of an inherent balance in ecosystems remains a major 
influence in nature conservation, which has traditionally sought preservation or 
restoration of certain target environmental states.81 Non-equilibrium ecology has, 
nonetheless, found expression in some notions of ‘rewilding’ landscapes by 
restoring processes of environmental disturbance, rather than aiming towards a pre-
determined environmental state.82 
I have broadly and briefly reviewed the history of the notions of 
‘conservation’ and ‘development’, their changing relationship, and their articulation 
with the science of ecology. This history provides a basis, in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, 
for an exploration of how land managers in Europe, European colonies and North 
America have designed fire’s management in the name of conservation and/or 
development, and for understanding contemporary diversity in fire management 
approaches.83  
 
2.3 Forestry’s fire management  
Fire was once used by rural labourers across Europe in a variety of shifting 
fire-fallow, or ‘swidden’ practices, that combined cropping and livestock rearing, and 
was used by nomadic pastoralists, particularly in the Mediterranean. As Europeans 
settled new colonies from the fifteenth Century, they there too used fire for land 
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clearance and agriculture, and encountered and often assimilated the fire-use 
practices of indigenous peoples.84 From the seventeenth century, in line with new 
conceptions of rational land-use, new attitudes towards fire, and justifications for its 
control by state institutions, appeared in Europe and in its colonies.85 Swidden 
agriculture and nomadic pastoralism did not sit easily with European notions of 
rational agrarian improvement: ‘swiddeners, pastoralists, long hunters, trappers, 
settlers - all exploited fire as part of seasonal or secular travels that shredded 
principles of fixed property ownership and that mocked a social order in which, as 
with garden crops, everyone has his time and place’.86 Particularly in the colonies 
where Europeans encountered highly flammable environments, such as tropical 
savannas, fire also came to represent environmental degradation. For example, fire 
use was blamed for environmental degradation by the French administration in 
eighteenth-century Mauritius.87 
The use of fire, either by European peasants and colonial settlers or by 
indigenous peoples in the colonies, became the scourge of the state forestry 
institutions established from the seventeenth century. In forestry, fire was a 
disturbance: ‘It saw something that threatened trees, degraded soils, destabilised 
rivers and climates. It saw a social and, perhaps political, failure because, for 
temperate Europeans, fire existed on the land only because people chose to put it 
there. It saw fire as unnatural’.88 The technical methods of forestry developed in 
eighteenth and nineteenth-century France and Germany, included measures of fire 
management. Forestry legislation forbade the use of fire in and adjacent to 
reserved, planted and managed forests. Foresters surrounded forest blocks with fire 
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lines and stationed guards in towers to watch for forest fires. Some foresters used 
controlled fire as a tool to fight wildfire. In nineteenth-century France, foresters 
created the practice of ‘petit-feu’, firing defined strips of forest in rotation, as a 
protective measure against future fires.89  
When it was less ‘close to home’, and involved indigenous peoples, more so 
than in Europe, foresters could conceive of eradicating human fire use and pursued 
ideals of fire exclusion from forests. In nineteenth-century British India for example, 
efforts were made to eradicate shifting agriculture and the construction of fire 
protection lines was taken to new levels.90 By the twentieth century, the model of fire 
suppression that originated in Europe had become dominant in forest management 
and had left its mark in the reduction of wildfire activity globally.91 Fire management 
was a key topic for discussion at the British Empire Forestry Conferences, the first of 
which was held in 1920.92 At these conferences most foresters advocated policies of 
complete fire suppression. Clements’ theory of ecological succession provided a 
new way of articulating the rationale for fire suppression: to ‘recover’ forests, which 
were generally deemed to be the natural vegetation climax in most environments.93   
In the early twentieth century, and influenced by European models, the USA 
too developed a system of state-managed forestry. A policy of total fire suppression 
was issued by the US Forest Service, particularly following the devastating ‘Great 
Fires’ of 1910, which burned large areas of National Land in the western USA.94 The 
Forest Service was a ‘benign hegemon’ with strong moral authority.95 It managed 
huge areas of public land and sponsored most fire research. Anti-fire mascot 
 
89 Pyne (1997, 2003); Bennett (2015).  
90 Barton (2002).  
91 Pechony & Shindell (2010).  
92 Pooley (2014).  
93 Pyne (1997); Kepe & Scoones (1999); Kull (2004); Kepe (2005); Pooley (2014).  
94 Pyne (2003, 2015). 




‘Smokey the Bear’, who first appeared in 1944, was a powerful symbol around which 
public opinion was shaped.96  
By the mid-twentieth century a gradual revolution was occurring in fire 
management, especially in the USA and some British colonies. There had been 
some critics of complete fire suppression from the nineteenth century. For example, 
in 1877 and 1895, in British India, the forester Dietrich Brandis had advocated for 
controlled burning, akin to the French practice of ‘petit-feu’.97 In 1890s South Africa, 
the forester David Hutchins deemed fire a natural process that only got out of hand if 
poorly managed.98 In the first half of the twentieth century the critics of complete fire 
suppression became increasingly vocal. Some ecologists suggested to the state 
forestry agencies that fire was inherent and ‘natural’ to certain ecosystems. Field 
staff of some forestry agencies were noting that the increasing fuel loads that 
followed fire suppression in forests made fires increasingly difficult to manage.  
The question of whether to allow policies of controlled burning received 
repeated attention at the British Empire Forestry Conferences between 1920 and 
1950.99 Gradually, some state agencies began to accept controlled or ‘prescribed’ 
burning. It was in use in Australia by the 1920s, and in Florida, where there 
remained a strong culture of fire use, state agencies were granted exemption to 
allow fire into protected areas from the 1930s.100 General policy and public opinion 
proved difficult to shift, however, and not until 1978 was full reform effected in the 
fire policies of the US Forest Service. Prescribed fire policies were also instituted 
elsewhere, such as in South Africa, by the 1970s.The use of prescribed fire by fire 
technicians became an acceptable means to reduce fuel loads and prevent 
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catastrophic wildfire.101 As Stephen Pyne argues, the term legitimised only a certain 
form of human fire use: scientifically-directed, pre-designed and the sole domain of 
specialist technical agencies.102 The US Forest Service took the global lead in 
developing technologies and methodologies for prescribed fire management, with 
military-like organisation, specialised equipment, large numbers of personnel, and 
aircraft. As I review in the following section, prescribed burning evolved differently in 
pursuit of different management aims. Certainly, the amount of planning, 
mathematical modelling, and use of mechanical equipment for prescribed burning 
differ significantly in different contexts today.  
Since the 1970s, prescribed fire has, nevertheless, failed to take strong 
cultural hold in the US and elsewhere.103 In the public imagination, fire is strongly 
associated with degradation and destruction, and there is still a strong culture of fire 
suppression, particularly surrounding residential areas. For example, in South 
Africa, although controlled burning policies were already advocated by the Forestry 
Department in 1948 and implemented in some areas by the 1970s, opposition from 
the public and local government have prevented its implementation on a large 
scale.104 In the late twentieth and early twenty-first century the paperwork and 
liability surrounding prescribed fire use mounted following several catastrophic 
incidents of escaped prescribed fire in the US.105 The late twentieth century and 
early twenty-first century have also seen frequent ‘megafires’, exacerbated under 
changing climatic conditions, and consuming the dense fuel built over a century of 
fuel suppression.106 These megafires have elicited state responses of measures of 
fire suppression on new scales.  
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2.4 Fire management for nature conservation and sustainable development 
State and non-state nature conservation institutions in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries deemed fire unnatural in and attempted to exclude it 
from the wilderness and wildlife protection areas they managed. Yet, in the USA, the 
National Parks and Fish and Wildlife Services, like the Forest Service, gradually 
came to realise that fire might be ‘natural’ in some of these areas. These agencies 
adopted prescribed burning by the 1960s, and, again, set a global example. As with 
the US Forest Service, prescribed fire use for nature conservation was deemed to 
be the sole remit of technical land management agencies. For these agencies, 
although prescribed fire could substitute for ‘natural fire’, ‘it derived its legitimacy 
from lightning fire’.107 Fire use by indigenous people, or the acceptance of human 
fire use as a historical shaper of ecosystems, did not initially fit into this model.108 
Although conservationists became increasingly aware of the historical role of 
human-set fire in the environments they aimed to preserve or restore, they remained 
divided in their interpretations of when human use of fire should be cast as a 
‘degrading’ force. The level to which human-set fires are considered ’degrading’ 
continues to depend upon where baselines or targets for an ecosystem are set, and 
which time periods are considered. For example, contemporary assessments 
carried out for carbon offsetting schemes may consider human fires in tropical 
savannas as degrading because they reduce tree cover (and hence carbon 
storage). Meanwhile, ecologists advocating the preservation of savanna biodiversity 
consider fire suppression to degrade savannas because it results in tree growth.109 
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As ecologists began to understand fire as inherent within non-equilibrium 
ecosystems, some environmental managers integrated this thinking into prescribed 
fire management schemes aimed at re-creating an ‘ecologically-appropriate’ fire 
regime. Accompanied by the mantra ‘pyrodiversity begets biodiversity’, ‘patch-
mosaic burning’ emerged in the late 1990s, in reference to attempts to create 
heterogeneous patterns of fire in the landscape.110 In the early twenty-first century, 
reintroducing fire as an ecological process was considered a form of ‘rewilding’ in 
some places.111 In recent decades, many of those fire managers who attempted to 
put non-equilibrium theory into practice have been confounded by practical 
challenges and the underlying theoretical diversity in ecology.112 It has been 
questioned whether prescribed fire management regimes can recreate the 
randomness of natural or historical fire patterns. The existence of positive feedbacks 
between vegetation and disturbance processes means that simply applying a 
historical or ‘ecologically appropriate’ form of prescribed fire, be that by changing its 
seasonality, frequency or patchiness, does not necessarily lead to a return to a 
historical or ecologically appropriate vegetative state or fire regime. In grasslands, 
for example, prescribed fire may not reverse the encroachment of woody vegetation 
following fire suppression.113 
Despite an awareness of the historical role of human fire in ecosystems, 
contemporary local fire users have not necessarily been called upon to participate in 
the design or implementation of fire management. In Pilanesberg National Park in 
South Africa patch-mosaic burning is designed using mathematical modelling 
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techniques and is carefully recorded and monitored.114 Nonetheless, aligning with 
the rise of sustainable development and participatory environmental management, 
new fire management models emerged in attempts to consider the needs of and the 
involvement of local fire users.115 Today, the terms ‘integrated fire management’ and 
‘community-based fire management’ are applied to such approaches.116 ‘Integrated 
fire management’ brings together ‘(1) the three technical components of fire 
management: prevention, suppression and use with (2) the key ecological attributes 
of fire, i.e. the ecologically appropriate fire regime and (3) the socio-economic and 
cultural necessities of using fire along with the negative impacts that fire can have 
on society’.117 Although the terms are not discrete, ‘community-based fire 
management’ more explicitly refers to cases where communities are envisaged as 
active participators in fire suppression and prescribed burning.118 There was no 
single underlying rationale for a move towards such approaches. In some cases, 
there was recognition that local, often indigenous, fire users possessed their own 
’expertise’ in fire management, one that aligned with efforts to recreate ’ecologically-
appropriate’ fire regimes, or with biodiversity conservation. For example, fire 
management in the Kakadu National Park in Australia, has, since the 1990s, aimed 
to recreate traditional Aboriginal land management.119 In other situations, local fire 
use practices were deemed degrading, and the rationale for engaging and involving 
people was changing practices through training. Given the variety of ecological and 
cultural contexts globally, attempts to involve local people in fire management have, 
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unsurprisingly, taken diverse approaches. For example, in contemporary Mexico, 
where the agricultural fire-use practices of different rural peoples differ in their 
ecological consequences, integrated fire management projects engage differently 
with different groups in quite localised areas.120  
Local ’participation’ in fire management has thus involved different levels of 
recognition of local knowledge. In the Canaima National Park in Venezuela, for 
example, while Pemon people have long been employed as staff and have thus 
‘participated’ in fire management, only recently has their knowledge affected the 
design of that management.121 Programmes have often remained highly technical 
and so risked treating local people as ‘workers executing plans developed by 
others’.122 The different conceptions and priorities of different stakeholders have not 
proved easy to integrate.123 While it is undoubtedly a key part of historical and 
contemporary human fire regimes, ‘the recreational nature of fire has received little 
attention from serious researchers, perhaps because they themselves are so 
serious’.124  
Both non-equilibrium ecology and ‘integrated fire management’, while 
popular concepts in the contemporary academic literature, have yet to influence 
many fire management institutions. The fire management models of complete fire 
suppression or prescribed burning to restore a desired ‘natural fire’ or to reduce fuel 
loads, remain dominant both in managed nature conservation areas and forestry 
plantations globally.125 Historical patterns of thought are important; fire policy is often 
shaped by ‘received wisdoms’ that assume that fire, and in particular fire of human 
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origin, is a cause of environmental degradation.126 As demonstrated by a long 
history of different prescribed fire management approaches in the Kruger National 
Park, most fire management has rarely been informed by direct empirical 
measurement of its effects within that ecosystem.127 There have been few long-term 
studies to monitor the effects of fire management on savanna ecology, and few land 
managers have the resources to conduct such studies.128  
In academia, in recognition of the importance of human fire in shaping fire 
regimes, there are recent commitments to integrate the natural and social sciences 
in fire ecology in a ‘holistic, ongoing, interdisciplinary and international scholarly 
framework for fire research’.129 In my research, in taking a political ecological 
approach, my central focus is the socio-political aspects of wildfire, and the power 
relations of fire management regimes in Belize. In studies that have explicitly 
attempt to integrate social and physical aspects of fire, there are disagreements 
over approach, rooted in different understandings of social theory, and historical 
debates over how to describe cultural evolution.130 I turn now to reviewing the social 
theory and literature that ground my research.  
 
2.5 Knowledge and power in environmental governance 
The history examined above demonstrates that fire management has often 
been an element of wider environmental governance and management regimes, 
designed by state and non-state institutions, that have shaped how local people are 
viewed, and altered their relationships with land and resources.131 From the 
 
126 Fairhead & Leach (1996); Kull (2000, 2004); Laris & Wardell (2006); Veldman (2016); Moura et al 
(2018).  
127 Van Wilgen et al (2004). 
128 Furley et al (2008).  
129 Scott et al (2016), p. 3. 
130 See the extended debate between Bowman et al (2011), Coughlan & Petty (2012, 2013), Roos et al 
(2014) and Coughlan (2015). 
131 Kepe & Scoones (1999); Kull (2004); Kepe (2005); Kosek (2006), Ch. 6; Eriksen (2007).  
62 
  
viewpoint of a political ecologist, I am interested in the power relations inherent to 
such regimes, which have privileged certain representations of the environment and 
certain environmental users. At the same time, it should not be assumed that the 
broad ideologies or policies here described have, in practice, necessarily been 
implemented successfully to control or manage fire or suppress local fire use. 
Studies of the history of fire management in diverse settings demonstrate the 
continued human use of fire, despite official policies aiming to restrict it.132 The 
remainder of this chapter examines some of the social theory from which political 
ecology has drawn in approaching the relationship between ideology/policy, and 
materiality/practice in environmental management, a central focus of my study in 
Belize.  
Since the 1980s, many studies of environmental governance, have drawn 
inspiration from Michel Foucault’s writing on the relationship between knowledge 
and power.133 Foucault understood linguistic representations of material and 
ideational phenomena to derive their social meaning from wider ‘discourses’, 
interrelated sets of understandings, texts and gestures that determine what it is 
possible to say about entities in the world in a given social context.134 The term 
‘epistemic community’ has been used to describe groups that work to create and 
maintain discourses, and to communicate them more widely. This work is inherently 
political, ‘in the sense that it involves contestable, value-laden choices – about 
profound issues pertaining to what is “normal”, “interesting”, “relevant”, “good”, 
“right”, “permissible” or “moral” for us and other people. These are also choices 
about what not to represent’.135 As an example, Anker examines the emergence of 
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two broad and competing schools of ecological science in the early twentieth 
century: British ‘mechanism’ and South African ‘holism’.136 Each sought to explain 
scientifically the human place in nature, but each was linked fundamentally to a 
particular social context, and used to further a certain administrative purpose: the 
first, centralised control of a diverse colonial empire, the second, justification for the 
social division of different human ‘races’.  
What Anker’s study demonstrates, and what was critical for Foucault, is that 
discourses can produce change. When knowledge is applied – in environmental 
management for instance – this involves shaping the world in line with certain 
hegemonic representations, at the expense of others. If ‘power’ is, broadly, the 
capacity to produce or prevent change, then discourses created by epistemic 
communities can have social power.137 Foucault understood discourse as a means 
by which power is exerted and diffused throughout society. This is a form of ‘soft 
power’ that seeks to ‘elicit cooperation without commanding it’.138 For Foucault, 
governance involves this indirect ‘conduct of conduct’ as much as it involves direct 
rule: a discourse creates ‘subjects’ and empowers and disempowers them as it 
produces their realms of action.139  
Foucault’s texts do not lay out a clear research methodology and his ideas 
have been taken on in diverse ways, often only tangentially, or in combination with 
other philosophies.140 A broadly-defined poststructuralist political ecology has 
examined the discourses of hegemonic institutions in environmental governance, 
including colonial states and development and conservation organisations. This 
work has often drawn upon the postcolonial literature that has posited that 
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specifically colonial discourses have been a key enabling component of such 
regimes.141 A seminal example is Edward Said’s work exploring the discourse he 
terms ‘Orientalism’, which he suggests, in its representation of a romantic and 
timeless Orient and its people as the ‘other’, created a sense of detachment that 
enabled the colonisation of Asian and Middle Eastern territories.142 Many scholars 
note the perpetuation, following decolonisation, of such colonial discourses and 
relations, including within international conservation and development.143 Some 
have built upon Said’s work to suggest that orientalist discourse was objectified by 
scientific discourse, to appear as ‘a set of factualised statements about a reality that 
existed and could be known independent of any subjective, colonizing will’.144 This 
argument has been applied, more generally, to examine how the authority afforded 
to science in European and North American ideology, grants states and other 
hegemonic organisations the power to employ scientific simplifications of reality in 
the form of data or maps – the ‘administrative ordering of nature and society’ – to 
remake those socionatures.145 Scott terms this ideology ‘high modernism’:  
a strong, one might even say muscle-bound, version of the self-confidence about 
scientific and technical progress, the expansion of production, the growing 
satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature (including human nature), and, 
above all, the rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific 
understanding of natural laws…. High modernism must not be confused with 
scientific practice. It was fundamentally, as the term "ideology" implies, a faith that 
borrowed, as it were, the legitimacy of science and technology.146  
 
While discourse analysis has revealed important insights regarding power in 
environmental governance, some political ecology, with the post-development and 
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postcolonial literatures, has come under criticism for treating ‘development’, 
‘colonialism’, ‘science’ and other entities solely as discourse. To illustrate the basis 
of these criticisms, let me focus on the treatment of development in the 1990s post-
development literature, which treated ‘development’ as a discourse.147 For Arturo 
Escobar, the ‘discourse of Development’, similarly to Said’s Orientalism, has been a 
‘mechanism for the production and management of the Third World … organizing 
the production of truth about the Third World’.148 The post-development scholars 
posited that it is possible to reject the notion of development while promoting 
‘alternatives to development’ in localised grassroots movements, cultures and 
knowledge. Even when grounding their analysis in certain contexts they still treat 
development as a discursive entity independent of those contexts.149   
Critics contend that treating development as discourse risks ascribing it too 
much power.150 They argue that the post-development literature presents 
development as homogenous, monolithic and unchanging. They point to a tendency 
to romanticise and essentialise indigenous or local knowledges. In making these 
generalisations, the post-development literature re-inscribes false binaries between 
‘the West’ and ‘the rest’, colonial centre and periphery. It is charged with not 
attending to the relations between and within these categories. In parallel, in recent 
decades, an academic critique of participatory approaches in sustainable 
development has termed ‘participation’ ‘the new tyranny’.151 Critics of ‘participation’ 
argue that such approaches essentialise, homogenise and inscribe false 
dichotomies between ‘local’ or ‘indigenous’ versus ‘scientific’ or ‘Western’ 
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knowledges.152 This may be particularly problematic in post-colonial settings. 
Various case studies and critiques trace to pre-existing colonial discourse those 
notions of community and trusteeship seen as central to participatory approaches.153 
Participatory approaches often aspire to overcome traditional power relations 
between the ‘expert’ and the ‘layperson’, the ‘developed’ and ‘developing’. In reality, 
in the often public settings for participation, power relations based on class, race, 
gender, age or other social categories may alter the abilities of different actors to 
participate meaningfully, or to capture benefits at the expense of others.154 Gayatri 
Spivak’s work raises an important challenge to post-development scholars who have 
sought to retrieve the voice to the ‘other’ as a strategic reversal of power. For 
Spivak, any such attempt is fundamentally constrained by the discourse in which the 
subject is constructed as sub-altern: ‘”being made to unspeak” is also a species of 
silencing’.155 A similar critique argues that in participatory development the very act 
of inclusion and definition of categories of knowledge for participation symbolises an 
exercise of power.156 
As Aram Ziai observes, critics of the post-development literature have, 
perhaps, been unfair in their treatment of this as a singular body of work.157 The 
ambivalence of post-development notwithstanding, its criticism has provided 
important foundations from which recent literature has developed more nuanced 
treatments of power, knowledge and practice in environmental governance. My 
research on fire management in Belize speaks to this literature. It follows in political 
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ecology’s tradition of interrogating the relationship between the ideational and 
material, plans and practice.  
 
2.6 The ideational and material, plans and practice in environmental 
governance 
Cooper argues that poststructuralist scholars emphasising discourse have 
been  
content to let unchanging and unmediated images of reason, liberalism, and 
universality stand in for a much more convoluted trajectory, in which the status and 
the meaning of such concepts were very much in question. The not-so delicious 
irony is that the critique of modernity aimed at destabilizing a smug, Europe-centred 
narrative of progress has ended up preserving this category as a defining 
characteristic of European history to which all others must respond. Only a more 
precise historical practice will get us out of the involuted framing of such a debate.158  
 
In reaction, in recent decades, scholars have examined the relationship between 
ideologies/discourses and material practices of ‘development’, ‘colonialism’ and 
‘science’ in specific historical contexts. For example, the ‘new imperial history’ and 
scholarship on the history of colonial science from within science and technology 
studies and historical geography examine the tensions inherent to colonial 
discourses and development policies, the networked nature of knowledge 
production within empires and the practices of colonial scientists and officials.159 
They have also engaged more seriously with the content of colonial environmental 
science as ‘an exciting field of practice and research, which has left historians a 
legacy of concepts, and documentation, for the exploration of environmental 
change’.160 Meanwhile, anthropologists have examined practices of conservation 
and development, including the practices by which dominant development narratives 
 
158 Cooper (2005), p. 6.  
159 Beinart & Hughes (2005); Beinart, Brown & Gilfoyle (2009); Folke Ax et al (2011); Goldman, Turner 
& Nadasdy (2011); Bennett & Hodge (2015); Hodge (2016).  




are maintained by development actors.161 Political ecologists have borrowed from 
these fields to empirically examine practices of environmental management.  
Derrida has provided a foundation for some scholars interrogating the 
tensions inherent to discourses of development and colonialism. For Derrida, 
discourse is inherently unstable and provisional. The meaning of a text is never 
closed, because it is not drawn from a stable centre, but rather from a whole host of 
separate texts and images. Ruling rationalities have a ‘constitutive outside’.162 This 
instability drives the constant reworking of discourse and materiality, even if it is to 
maintain the semblance of coherence. Ann Stoler draws on Derrida in her 
examination of the colonial ‘anxieties’ evident in the records of the Dutch 
administration in the nineteenth-century East Indies. For Stoler these archives are 
filled with the tension between ‘rationality’ and ‘affect’: ‘if an homage to reason was a 
hallmark of the colonial, it was neither pervasive nor persuasive, nor was it empire's 
sole guiding force. Dutch colonial authorities were troubled by the distribution of 
sentiment, by both its excessive expression and the absence of it’.163 As another 
example, much as it ideologically aspired to universalism, nineteenth- and twentieth-
century forestry was hindered by what it left out of its models and explanations. 
Some German foresters, to whom the silvicultural model of forest plantation is 
attributed, themselves saw and debated the potential effects of monoculture to 
increase risk of pests, heavy winds and drought.164 Leading foresters in British India 
disagreed fundamentally about the rights of local people to use state forests.165 
British foresters in Malaya argued fiercely about the value of artificial plantations 
over ‘natural regeneration’ in protected areas.166 
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Other studies have demonstrated that discourse and knowledge are 
dynamically shaped within networks of assimilation and resistance. These replace 
the ‘diffusionist’ hypothesis of knowledge flow from ‘centre’ to ‘periphery’ in empires, 
or from ‘the west’ to ‘the south’ in international development, with models that 
recognise multiple and more dispersed centres of knowledge production, and 
reverse or sideways flows of knowledge.167 Richard Grove, for example, 
demonstrated in his examination of the origins and development of ‘Western’ 
environmentalism that knowledge production by both colonists and indigenous 
people at the peripheries of empires was often crucial in shaping the identity of the 
centre.168 Peder Anker examines how the early-twentieth-century science of ecology 
was shaped by dialogue between opposing schools in South Africa and Britain.169 
Detailed empirical studies by historians of science and the ‘new imperial 
historians’ demonstrate that colonial or development ideologies, science and 
policies were expressed differently in different ecological, economic and political 
contexts. Vandergeest and Peluso, for example, examining colonial forestry in a 
diversity of settings in British South-East Asia, find that forestry was shaped by 
specific political contexts that determined the nature of territorial control over forests, 
state budget allocations and the nature of control of the means and labour for forest 
production.170 Pooley, examining colonial fire management in South Africa, points to 
the discrepancies between colonial ecologists’ ‘abstract’ theories and their thinking 
and practice in the field and between official land management policies and real land 
management practices.171 Other studies demonstrate the constant reworking and 
application of ‘indigenous’ knowledges and practices in relation to changing socio-
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economic, political and environmental contexts. Bedouin communities in Egypt have 
changed their farming knowledge and practice from dry to wet farming in changing 
conditions.172 Q’eqchi communities in Belize have entered into and out of 
subsistence farming, marketed agriculture and wage labour in response to changing 
economic conditions.173 Botanical knowledge in Himalayan villages differs in relation 
to the different harvesting methods employed by different social groups.174 
Just as this historical literature attends to the specific practices of 
development and colonialism, so the anthropology of development examines the 
practices by which policies and projects are enacted. The ethnography of 
development overcomes an ‘instrumental view of policy as rational problem solving’ 
and ‘a critical view that sees policy as a rationalizing discourse concealing hidden 
purposes of bureaucratic power or dominance’, asking instead ‘not whether but how 
development projects work; not whether a project succeeds, but how success is 
produced’.175 As David Mosse argues, policies and plans are not ‘implemented’ in 
development projects. Rather, project actors must constantly work to maintain the 
image that a project’s outcomes represent the implementation of policy, interpreting 
and presenting events through their predefined measures of ‘success’ and ‘failure’, 
constructing ‘interpretive communities’ that can represent the project as required.176  
For Mosse, the role of policy is to mobilise and maintain political support: 
‘development policy ideas are important less for what they say than for who they 
bring together, what alliances, coalitions and consensuses they allow’.177 For 
example, Mathews examines the ‘public secret’ that official fire suppression policy in 
Mexico is not adhered to either by the Forest Service or fire users. The policy 
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nevertheless serves a purpose, in that it allows the Forest Service to maintain 
influence and justify its control of forests.178 Similarly, Vandergeest and Peluso 
argue that forestry policies in Indonesia were maintained after the Dutch colonial 
period in part because civil officials and foresters could use them to make both legal 
and illegal personal gains.179  
Anthropologists of development have also examined how development 
actors values and relationships shape development practices and outcomes.180  
Some of this literature examines the role of development actors’ personal values 
and personal reflections on development processes.181 As Fechter emphasises,  
aid practitioners are not only well aware of what they do, but expend substantial 
efforts reflecting on what they are doing, why they are doing it, and what they should 
be doing. In this sense, the realm of beliefs, motivations and commitments 
represents a veritable underbelly of professional development discourse. Comments 
and deliberations on these issues typically appear in informal conversations, at 
social gatherings and on the margins of workshops and meetings, while remaining 
excluded from policy documents, consultants’ reports or programme 
documentation.182 
In a similar way, historians of colonial development and colonial science have 
focused on individual officials and scientists. Pooley, for example, explores the 
deliberation and insecurity over fire management policies as evident in the writing of 
colonial officials and scientists in South Africa.183 Anthropologists have also 
emphasised the importance of personal relationships and friendships between 




178 Mathews (2005, 2011). See also a similar argument by Kull (2004). 
179 Vandergeest & Peluso (2006a).  
180 Fechter & Hindman (2011); Lewis (2011). Literature is also beginning to examine in conservation 
actors in a similar way (Kiik, 2018).  
181 Eyben (2012, 2018); Fechter (2012).  
182 Fechter (2012), p. 1393.  
183 Pooley (2018).  
184 Eyben (2006); Girgis (2007); Heuser (2012).  
72 
  
2.7 Knowledges, expertise and authority in environmental governance 
This thesis examines how fire management policies came to be instituted in 
Belize, including recent policies that call for local participation in fire management. 
Central to this are questions of why and how certain knowledges have been 
privileged as ‘expert’ and granted the authority to inform policy and practice. In this 
section I briefly review sociological and anthropological literature regarding what 
constitutes ‘expertise’ and examine how changing notions of expertise and authority 
relate to the emergence of ‘participatory’ conservation and development. 
Fleischmann and Briske define ‘knowledge’ as a ‘combination of 
experiences, values, contextual information, and intuition, which provides a 
framework to evaluate and incorporate new experiences and information’.185 Many 
categorisations of knowledge domains exist in the academic literature, but many of 
them recognise a broad spectrum between ‘scientific’ and ‘local’ knowledges.186 
Fleischmann and Briske define scientific knowledge as that which ‘is derived from 
organized, systematic inquiry and aims for generalizable objectivity, explicitness, 
abstraction, mechanistic description, and transferability across contexts’, while local 
knowledge is ‘developed through resource users’ experiences and informal 
observations of resources’, and tends to be ‘subjective, holistic, place based, 
problem oriented, but highly implicit thus complicating attempts to define, encode, 
and transfer this knowledge’.187 To these broad ecological knowledge domains, 
Fleischmann and Briske add a third, which they term ‘professional ecological 
knowledge’, that is ‘founded upon codification of broad ecological principles, but not 
necessarily scientific evidence, to legitimize agency programs, support operational 
efficiency, and encourage user compliance’.188 They stress that this differs from both 
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scientific and local knowledge in that it has fewer and less direct information 
feedbacks to create new knowledge about the environment. In this thesis I examine 
the role of these three broad knowledge domains in the creation and evolution of fire 
management policies in Belize.  
The knowledge of ‘experts’ is often granted authority in any given society. 
The sociological and anthropological literature provides two broad ways of 
understanding ‘expertise’: as something socially constructed and as something real. 
Anthropologists argue that expertise should be conceptualised not only as 
something people possess, but also as something achieved socially, as ‘something 
that people do’.189 Expertise must perpetually be enacted, be it through the 
undertaking of institutionalised training or the employment of language to naturalise 
particular forms of knowledge.190 For example, Uma Kothari charts how, in the 
transition from colonial to international development, development actors no longer 
came to derive their authority from the cultural capital associated with the colonial 
‘centre’, but, rather, as professional technical experts.191 If expertise is socially 
constructed it follows that the contestation of expert knowledge can be about more 
than an interrogation of the knowledge they are deemed to possess, and a rejection 
of the social practices by which they enact their expertise.192 Similarly, the 
acceptance of expert knowledge can be a pragmatic social response, one not based 
upon the quality of the knowledge itself.193 
Ideology and discourse can play a part in defining certain forms of 
knowledge authority as ‘expertise’. Above I presented Scott’s argument that an 
ideology of ‘high modernism’ lends authority to scientific discourse. The wider 
 
189 Summerson Carr (2012), p. 18. 
190 Wynne (1992); Shapin (1994); Mitchell (2002); Li (2007a); Mosse (2011).  
191 Kothari (2005).  
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implications of such an argument are that environmental narratives can ‘become 
accepted as 'fact' in the absence of what most natural scientists today would 
acknowledge as the praxis of science, the standardised and 'transparent' collection 
of data to explore propositional or 'testable' statements’.194 This is akin to the 
process by which the ‘professional ecological knowledge’ that Fleischmann and 
Briske describe comes to guide institutions.195 As another example, for previously 
colonised peoples, their active positioning as possessors of ‘indigenous knowledge’, 
thus framed by discourses of indigeneity, can be a strategic alignment, to win 
benefits within participatory sustainable development projects for instance.196  
While expertise may in part be socially constructed, sociologists Harry Collins and 
Robert Evans stress that expert knowledge is also something real. They argue that 
becoming expert involves developing tacit knowledge that can only be gained 
through deep social immersion in groups who possess it.197 This can be the 
‘ubiquitous tacit knowledge’ common to a society (for example, the ability to speak a 
language or understand cultural norms) or ‘specialist tacit knowledge’ gained 
through enculturation and deep experience within a specialised group and context 
(for example, an ecology department at a university, or Cumbrian sheep farming). 
 Collins and Evans’ typography provides a broad conception of the types of 
knowledge that can constitute expertise, beyond the scientific. For them, some 
‘local’ knowledge should be considered expertise. Their work, with studies of the 
social construction of expertise, can be understood within a broader movement, 
since the latter twentieth century, that has challenged the assumption that technical 
experts should direct policy making and implementation.198 This is linked, as 
 
194 Sullivan (2000), p15. See also Forsyth (2011). 
195 Fleischmann & Briske (2016).  
196 Sundberg (2004); Wainwright (2008); Li (2004, 2007a).  
197 Collins & Evans (2008).  
198 Fischer (2000); Kleinschmidt, Böcher & Giessen (2009).  
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discussed in Section 2.2, to the emergence of ‘participatory’ conservation and 
development in the 1980s. As I discussed there, it has been argued that the 
‘professionalisation’ of the mainstream development industry has undermined 
participatory development. For Kothari, ‘although the intentions of many participatory 
advocates and practitioners are concerned with decentring the authority of the 
development professional, its co-optation into mainstream development discourse 
and practice and incorporation onto the neoliberal development agenda has 
ironically reinforced the centrality of Western knowledge and expertise’.199 In this 
thesis I am concerned with identifying the forms of knowledge and expertise that 
have directed fire management in Belize. This enables me to analyse the extent to 
which contemporary ‘participatory’ fire management in Belize represents a departure 
from previous approaches by decentring technical expertise. In conducting my 
research I thus aimed to identify real, tacit, expertise in understanding fire and its 
management, as well as the social contexts and practices which have granted 
authority to certain fire managers at the expense of others. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined fire management since the seventeenth century 
in the context of the history of conservation and development in European and North 
American thought. Wildfire was deemed adverse to the environmental conditions 
desired by foresters and nature conservationists. Since the mid-twentieth century, if 
only gradually, some environmental managers have come to accept fire as an 
inherent element of ecosystems. They have begun to make use of prescribed fire in 
environmental management. Some have also recognised the cultures of local fire 
users and enrolled them in fire management. Fire suppression, nonetheless, 
 
199 Kothari (2005), p. 437. See also Green & Lund (2015); Lund (2015); Scheba & Mustalahti (2015).  
76 
  
remains dominant in environmental policy worldwide. The broad narrative I have 
presented, of a century of fire management globally, demonstrates that historical 
approaches to fire management have left discursive, environmental and social 
legacies and thus have contemporary relevance.   
This analysis demonstrates that fire management policies have been 
influenced by ideology and discourse. Historians and anthropologists show that 
environmental management in practice is the outcome of local ecological, political 
and economic contexts. Speaking of fire management, Eloy et al call for more 
research to ‘understand fire policies, norms, sciences and use practices in the 
context of the territories in which they are enacted, each with its own dynamics and 
logics’.200 My contribution to this literature in this research is from empirical study of 
the specific context to Belizean fire management policies and attention to their 
workings in practice. As noted, I did so through a combination of ethnographic work, 
oral history and archival research. The following chapter details how this research 
methodology enabled me to study present-day Belizean fire management in its 
historical context, critically assessing the relevance of historical sources to historical 
fire management in practice.
 




Research methodology: retrieving ideas and practices of fire 
management in Belize 
 
The paradoxical 'resolution' of the realist-constructivist contradiction … lies 
not in choosing sides nor in searching for some elusive balance, but rather in 
admitting, in true paradoxical fashion, that both sides are basically correct as 
they stand yet neither is fully correct without the other. It is thus a resolution 
that defies resolution. Paradox suggests that many important truths have 
their shadow, and that they and their shadow constitute a more whole - 
though certainly also a more tense and twisted - truth (Proctor, 2001, 235). 
 
The past exists not only in records of the past, but survives in buildings, 
objects and landscapes of the present day (Cohn, 1987, 4). 
 
This chapter discloses my research process, and attends to the production, 
transcription and interpretation of the various lines of evidence that I turned to. I 
visited archives in the UK and Belize. I conducted 26 interviews with officials, 
scientists and NGO staff from Belize, the UK and the USA, 42 interviews with 
farmers and 367 household surveys in the villages of Bladen, San Isidro and Trio. I 
spent a cumulative thirteen months living in Belize to conduct the research and work 
part-time for the Darwin Project. During this time, I was able to make ethnographic 
observations of the Project activities, TIDE’s fire management work and local fire 
use.  
My research questions required me to take seriously both the ideological 
construction and justification of fire management in policies, plans and reports and 
the materialisation of fire management in the practices of different actors. I examine 
what these questions demanded and depended upon ontologically and 
epistemologically: the paradoxical combination of realist and constructivist positions. 
The chapter stresses the importance of carefully and critically comparing different 
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sources to draw conclusions about the past. For the earlier history, particularly, I 
drew predominantly upon archival material. The addition of oral histories and 
ethnography to my research methodology shaped my analysis of these archived 
texts, enabling me to avoid over-emphasising the importance of ideas and policy in 
shaping fire management on the ground. The chapter demonstrates the important of 
reflexivity throughout my research process. 
 
3.1 Epistemology and research ethics 
For Paul Robbins, 
political ecology occurs at that moment when the human–environment accounts that 
we assemble become precarious and unstable. There is always a need to 
empirically explain important outcomes in land change, human vulnerability, 
environmental hazards/risk, and human health, especially relative to the role of 
power in causing these outcomes. But this need, or drive, is inevitably accompanied 
by the necessary counter-urge to advance scepticism about any such explanation, 
its implication in perverse systems of power, and its complicity in reproducing the 
very systems of power it seeks to unmask. The name we give to these simultaneous 
urges … is political ecology…. Political ecology is a symptom of the larger problem 
inherent in the rigorous pursuit of knowledge in a world filled with contradictions.1 
 
Political ecology thus works in and emerged from explicit study of the entanglements 
between nature and culture, the material and ideational. Wainwright and Barnes 
suggest that, faced with such dualisms, we should not aim to collapse them, but 
should make it our explicit aim ‘to call into question the effect of that distinction on 
our thought’.2 Borrowing from Derrida, Wainwright uses the term ‘aporia’ to describe 
the resulting position in which a researcher critiques yet ‘inhabits intimately’ certain 
discourses.3 
In this thesis I acknowledge the importance of understanding the ways in 
which people know and discursively represent their environments but do not rule out 
 
1 Robbins (2015), p. 97-8.  
2 Wainwright & Barnes (2009), p. 968. Also Braun & Wainwright (2001).  
3 Wainwright (2008), p. 269.  
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a separate reality that shapes and constrains those ways of knowing: I combine 
ontological realism with epistemological relativism. I understand the social 
construction of nature to include the ways in which societies materially produce their 
environments. This position has been variously termed ‘soft’, ‘weak’ or ‘mediated’ 
constructivism.4 While not suggesting that knowledge can ever be purely objective, it 
allows for limits to its construction, allowing for knowledge claims to have differing 
levels of subjectivity. It draws attention to the ways in which scientific knowledge is 
socially produced but accepts the scientific method as a useful approach in many 
contexts. This form of constructivism aligns with the stratified notion of reality of a 
critical realist ontology.5 Employing a critical realist ontology in my research meant 
that, while most of the sources with which I worked were textual or oral and so 
inherently infused with the social, I took seriously the reality of the savanna 
ecosystem, and the academic theory that has engaged with its ecology. 
For Robbins, political ecologists have a ‘Jekyll and Hyde persona’, carrying a 
critical ‘hatchet’ to take apart certain accounts of environmental change, but 
simultaneously sowing ‘seeds’ for alternatives.6 This dual persona makes for a 
philosophically and ethically challenging position. That political ecologists are often 
activists, with aims towards environmental justice, means that they must constantly 
negotiate critical and normative positions. In conducting this research, I gradually 
found a position as critic. My resultant thesis dissects the way in which Belizean fire 
management has been treated in policy as apolitical and attends to the political 
dynamics that nonetheless shaped fire use and management in practice. I critically 
examine the ways in which fire management policy and practice privileged certain 
users and uses of the savanna and of fire at the expense of others. In highlighting 
 
4 Proctor (1998); Demeritt (2001, 2002). 
5 Proctor (1998); Forsyth (2001).  
6 Robbins (2012), p. 20. 
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these dynamics, I hope to open the possibility to stakeholders of a more just 
approach to Belizean fire management: one that accounts for the needs of local fire 
users and for the ecological necessity of fire in the savanna ecosystem. Yet the 
thesis is not a prelude to policy recommendations. Following Tania Li’s approach in 
The Will to Improve, I do not believe that   
every critical scholar should also be a programmer, coming up with new plans to 
improve the world … I made an argument for keeping the roles of programmer and 
critic distinct. I think both are valid and important, and the same person can do both 
over a lifetime, or perhaps on different days of the week. But if I had been obliged to 
end the book with a prescription for how to do development better, I could not have 
stood back far enough.7 
 
This is not to say – as I note in the concluding chapter – that I don’t think this thesis 
‘useful’ to stakeholders in Belizean fire management, both in the research process, 
and in its written form.8 
In my research I inevitably faced an ethics of choice in how I presented and 
discussed material. As Li notes, there is ‘no pure space from which to speak or 
write, and no avoiding the consequences’.9 A reflexive awareness of researcher 
positionality, and the way that it limits research practically, epistemically, and 
discursively is the basis from which research ethics proceed. Since the late 1980s, 
feminist and postcolonial studies in particular have stressed the importance of a 
researcher explicitly acknowledging her positionality.10 They note that researcher 
positionality is not fixed but constantly reworked in the process of conducting 
research.11 Before visiting Belize for the first time in 2016, I did not comprehend the 
ways in which such journeys ‘transport us over enormous distances [and cause] us 
 
7 Li, pers. comm. to Robbins in 2010 (Robbins, 2015, p. 227.).  
8 On what ‘useful’ might mean in political ecology research see Blaikie (2012).  
9 Li (1996), p. 522.  
10 Within feminist geography, for example Harding (1987); Stacey (1988); Mc Dowell (1992); Katz, 
(1994); Nast (1994); Sundberg (2015); within postcolonial studies for example Spivak (1999); Sidaway 
(1992).  




to move a few degrees up or down in the social scale…. the colour and flavour of 
certain places cannot be dissociated from the always unexpected social level on 
which we find ourselves in experiencing them’.12 My personal research experiences 
were influenced particularly by my gender, by being white and British in an ex-
colony where US and European tourism is now the largest sector of the economy, 
by my connections with the DFID Darwin initiative project and NGO TIDE, and by 
my ambition of writing a thesis within a British academic institution. On a material 
level, positionality influences the kinds of texts, people and situations to which 
researchers have physical access and shapes our social encounters with these 
sources. Positionality influences our ability to comprehend, access or combine 
knowledges. We may wish to ‘recover’ the knowledges of our research subjects: yet 
their ways of knowing the world may not accommodate our own epistemologies. 
Briggs and Sharp provide an example in relating how their understandings of the 
concept of distance were challenged by their research with the Bedouin in Egypt.13  
Faced with the ‘aporia’ of critiquing that which we ourselves ‘inhabit 
intimately’, Spivak’s writings call for a ‘hyper self-reflexive’ deconstructivist 
approach, which looks for the ways in which our own discursive categories are 
constantly subverted in our everyday research experiences.14 Spivak calls this 
‘unlearning’: ‘to learn to read anew, to learn apart from knowledge production in the 
mode of empirical data collection’.15 In this way we might see research as a two-way 
process in which we do research ‘with’ and not ‘on’ our research subjects.16 This 
leads us to question our notions of research ‘impact’ or ‘dissemination’ to 
understand that research shapes us and can ‘give back’ to or influence other actors 
 
12 Levi-Strauss (1989) in Sidaway (1992), pp. 403-404.  
13 Briggs & Sharp (2009). See also Nadasdy (1999) and Cram (2009) for discussion of the 
incompatibility of particular indigenous knowledges with Western research epistemologies 
14 Kapoor (2004); Wainwright (2008); Asher & Wainwright (2018).  
15 Spivak (2006) in Wainwright (2008), p. 202. 




throughout, and not just in its final written form.17 It may make what is traditionally 
considered research ‘failure’ a central part of what it means to do research.18 It 
might also mean attending to the ways in which our emotions shape and drive our 
research; attending to our emotional reactions can enable us to interrogate the 
moral arguments with which we and others align.19 As De Leeuw demonstrates, 
these emotional reactions may not only be to people and contexts that we access 
face-to-face’, but also to material in the archive.20 In the following sections, I 
illustrate some of my own ‘unlearning’ experiences in conducting this research, and, 
from this use, reflect on the research process, and indeed, upon the later writing of 
the research in this form.21  
 
3.2 On my research methodology 
This study draws upon historical and contemporary evidence of ideas and 
practices of fire management in Belize: ecological and archaeological research 
(accessed secondarily via the limited academic literature); political or institutional 
texts and newspaper articles; surveys and interviews and ethnographic observations 
undertaken by me. As noted in Chapter one, the direction for my research emerged 
in reaction to my experiences in Belize working as the Project Officer for the Darwin 
Project. As my interest in the history of Belizean fire management emerged and 
grew throughout the research, so too did the relative importance of archival material 
to my analysis. I spent a total of thirteen months in Belize conducting this research 
alongside the Darwin Project work: in 2016 from January to April and August to 
September; in 2017 from January to June; in 2018 from January to April. I also 
 
17 Pain, Kesby & Askins (2011); Staddon (2014).  
18 Harrowell, Davies & Disney (2018).  
19 Anderson & Smith (2001); Bondi (2005); Smith (2014); Askins & Blazek (2017). 
20 De Leeuw (2012).  
21 I found the personal and honest reflections of a series of PhD students in the collection of essays 




visited UK-based archives. During this time in Belize, my time spent attending 
activities and writing reports for the Darwin Project took on average two or three 
days a week.  
I conceive of my access to ‘knowledge’ about fire management in three 
stages. The ‘raw’ material with which I worked had an initial creation (sometimes 
elicited by me), and subsequently, possible decay, reworking, reordering and 
preservation. Secondly, I chose elements of the material to attend to in making my 
own transcription of it. Finally, I made interpretations from the combined 
transcriptions. These three stages were not necessarily chronologically or 
completely distinct from one another and sometimes underwent several iterations. 
Each stage involved ‘performative’ elements on behalf of human actors as well as 
exposure to ‘stochastic’ elements.22  
The following sections outline my research methodology by following the 
textual, oral and ethnographic material that informed this thesis through these three 
stages. That allows me to present and understand something of the constraints and 
the ‘room for manoeuvre’ I was afforded in conducting and presenting this research. 
For several reasons, my methodology was not clearly outlined before the research 
began. As I described in Chapter one, I had not visited Belize before my PhD began 
in 2015, and the direction of my research emerged gradually from my experiences 
there. Moreover, I have no formal training in the social sciences. I developed an 
understanding of the processes of conducting archival research, research interviews 
and ethnography through iterative reading and practice during the research. I thus 
present my methodology in the past tense to reflect that it could only be articulated 
as such as I came to write this thesis. Let me demonstrate with a ‘vignette’ the 
 
22 Matthews (2016), p. 214.  
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initially unplanned nature of my research process as it shaped the knowledge I 
present in this thesis.  
Determined to ‘understand’ local culture and fire use and early into my first 
visit to Belize in 2016, I arranged homestays for myself in the five villages targeted 
by the Darwin Project. Over my first breakfast in Bladen village, my host, a village 
leader, also one of TIDE’s rangers, explained to me that in his village most ‘people 
won’t know how to talk to you’. He described the process of acculturation by which 
he learned to follow and contribute to the type of meetings he was frequently 
required to attend with the Maya Leaders Alliance, TIDE and external organisations. 
At the time, I did not fully comprehend what he meant; I had met plenty of English 
speakers in Belize (such as my host), and felt that, with their assistance in 
translation from the languages of Q’eqchi or Spanish, I should be able to answer 
questions I had: Why did local people use fire? How frequently was fire used for 
hunting?   
These homestays, and work with the Darwin Project, enabled me to develop 
friendships and working relationships in the villages. Many insights had already 
followed from my conversations and observations: Yet, by 2017, perhaps influenced 
by my background in natural science, I felt that to have more ‘conclusive’ evidence 
of fire use in my thesis, I needed to employ a more ‘formal’ research methodology. I 
designed a short survey to administer to most households in the villages of Bladen, 
San Isidro and Trio. Knowing that use of fire for hunting (being illegal) was 
something that people were unlikely to want to confess to me, among other 
questions, I included one specifically designed to give people anonymity using an 
‘unmatched list’.23 Half of the households would be shown and read the items in the 
 
23 The ‘unmatched list’ technique is used to give respondents anonymity when answering sensitive 
questions. Among its applications it has been used in conservation science to obtain data, for example, 
about illegal hunting. See Glynn (2010); Nuno et al (2013); Nuno & St. John (2014).  
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list to the left in Figure 3.1, and half of them those on the right (which contained, in 
addition to the other items, the ‘sensitive’ item: fire use for hunting). I would then ask 
them to indicate only the total number of the statements on the list that applied to 
them. With a large enough sample size, data from questions like this can be used to 
obtain an estimate of the fraction of respondents to whom the sensitive item applies. 
I designed the question carefully: To avoid the likelihood that a respondent had to 
answer ‘0’ or ‘5’, I balanced items so that at least one item would generally apply to 
both poorer and richer, Q’eqchi and Spanish-speaking, households; I used pictures 
to accompany statements for illiterate respondents; I worked with local people to 
translate the statements and questionnaire instructions into Spanish and Q’eqchi. I 
found and trained local research assistants as translators and lived in the villages for 
a month while I conducted the survey with over 350 households.  
This ‘fire use for hunting’ question proved incredibly difficult to administer. 
Most respondents did not understand that I did not want them to indicate directly 
which of the items on the list applied to them; they failed, in other words, to 
understand that I was trying to give them anonymity. Q’eqchi respondents, 
particularly, found it difficult to answer the question posed, with a single total number 
of items. My translators frequently had to reframe each statement as a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
question, which negated the purpose of using an unmatched list technique. 
Suspicion of any kind of survey, particularly among Spanish-speaking respondents, 
meant that some respondents simply said ‘none’ to any list they were shown. 
Nevertheless, I persevered with the survey as planned, because of the other 
questions, and because I did not want to admit ‘defeat’; I felt a sense of 
accountability to my research plan. After a month of intense and tiring fieldwork, I 
had collected demographic and agricultural fire use data (which, as described in 
Section 3.4, I used to identify households for follow-up interviews), but my survey 





‘Unmatched list’ question from my fire use survey. Households in group A were shown the uppermost 
list, and those in group B the lower list. Households were asked to give the total number of items on the 
list that applied to them.  
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households used fire for hunting. By the time I came to write my thesis, I had 
nonetheless gained ample insight into local social relations and fire use. These 
insights were gained not via pre-conceived statistical methods, but by building trust 
and making more intuitive and spontaneous observations and conversations with 
people in Belize.  
My use of the unmatched list technique was a research ‘failure’ in the 
traditional sense, but an unexpected source of insight into the dynamics that operate 
similarly when activities are pre-conceived in development projects. The barriers 
between me and my respondents were greater than language. Methods that, to me, 
seemed simple and well-meaning, did not provide easy channels for respondents’ 
participation. Similarly, development project proposals often contain activities that, it 
is assumed, will enable the participation of local people, but which may exclude 
certain groups or individuals.24 The experience made me more attentive to gaps 
between policies and plans and practices in development; ultimately, a phenomenon 
of importance in this thesis. By implication, just as my research methodology could 
not be pre-conceived, the research questions articulated and addressed in this 
thesis emerged and evolved through the research.  
 
3.3 Using archival traces 
Postmodernism has overthrown the ‘archival myth’ that we can turn to 
collections of documents as neutral repositories of information.25 This paradigmatic 
shift from viewing ‘archive-as-source to archive-as-subject’ demands a new attention 
to the agency, and therefore power, involved in the practices of creation, collection, 
reworking, ordering and displaying of records.26 It broadens our notions of the 
 
24 Nadasdy (1999); Mohan (2001); Mosse (2001); Lund (2015); Van Kerkhoff & Lebel (2015). 
25 Cook (2001); Schwartz & Cook (2002); Withers (2002); Lorimer (2009); Mills (2013). 
26 Mills (2013), p. 2.  
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archive itself, both drawing attention to the ‘topological’ (physical) sites in which 
records are located, as well as the wider ‘nomological’ (discursive) spaces that they 
occupy and that attribute them meaning.27 The archive, is after Derrida and 
Prenowitz, ‘spectral’, removed from the events and objects to which we make it 
speak: a ‘trace always referring to another whose eyes can never be met’.28  This 
section makes explicit the processes behind my encounters with the archival traces 
drawn upon in my research. See Table 3.1 for a summary of the archives and digital 
sources accessed.   
Each of the documents I drew upon in my research had undergone an 
iterative process of inscription, from its original creation, to possible reworking, 
ordering, decay, preservation and cataloguing. I could not always know much about 
the production and archivisation of the sources I accessed, but it was important to 
understand as much as possible about these processes.29 To do so, where 
available, I referenced published research guides to particular archival sites and 
spoke with staff and other researchers who knew the collections.30 If the archive is 
both a topological site and nomological space, then there are many elements of an 
archival trace that can be influenced by its processes of creation and archivisation, 
and, thus, many ways in which these processes can present themselves in 
research. A record has more than content. It has a certain form. It is physically 
located in a site, which can include structures, such as searching aids or filing 
cabinets that influence access to it.31 It is situated within the discourses of its 
creators and official or unofficial archivists. 
 
27 Osborne (1999).  
28 Derrida & Prenowitz (1995), p. 54.  
29 As a demonstration of why this is important, Portuondo (2016) describes how the original purpose or 
‘telos’ of a record collection can survive subsequent re-working.  
30 The one case where a published research guide existed was for the Colonial Office records at the 
UK National Archives: Banton (2008).  
31 See DeSilvey (2004); Lorimer (2009) and Cresswell (2012) for discussion of archival sites. 








Type of material of held and time spanned 
by collection 
State of ‘archivisation’ and 
implications for finding relevant 
material 







Holds records of the British government, 
including those relating to the British Empire. 
The material is organised by government 
department, and then by type of record into 
chronological series. While various 
government departments may have created 
and collected material about Belize, most 
important are the records of the Colonial 
Office. This material is voluminous and 
includes series of despatches received from 
Belize (within which reports, small maps etc. 
may be included), records of legislation 
passed, sessional papers from government 
in Belize, some annual reports of government 
departments, ‘blue books’ of statistics. The 
series’ of material under the Colonial Office 
and specifically about Belize variously span 
the dates 1630-1977 (though the Colonial 
Office was not founded until 1854, earlier 
material pertaining to overseas territories 
from the Privy Council and War and Colonial 
Office is labelled as ‘Colonial Office’ 
material).  
Official government archive, with an 
online catalogue called ‘discovery’. The 
Colonial Office material is mostly 
catalogued in series’ by ‘type’, e.g. 
general correspondence, legislative 
records, and many of the records are not 
catalogued online in any detail beyond 
their date (though following the 
introduction of system of filing despatches 
by subject in 1927, the very general topic 
of a series of despatches is summarised 
in one or two words in the online 
catalogue). The indexes to the record 
books, as created by the Colonial Office, 
aid searching a large record book (which 
may cover up to several years of records) 
once it has been ordered in the archive. 
Due to the huge volume of material in the 
national archives, the archivists are can 
only be familiar with a small fraction of the 
records and could only give me general 
information about the Colonial Office 
records. 
I consulted a wide range of material in this 
archive (see also Bibliography). Most records I 
looked at were from the Colonial Office series, 
though the online catalogue threw up an 
occasional record from another department, 
such as several economic advisory reports 
created for the Treasury.  
The most useful records for my research were 
the despatches, which do not go past 1951, in 
which I found miscellaneous reports from the 
Forest Department and could read something of 
the Colonial Office’s reaction to and funding of 
fire management programs. I accessed the 
annual reports of the Forest Department in a 
series of administrative reports. I found much 
material pertaining to savanna fires after 1920 
(owing to the establishment of the forest 
department, and initiation of governmental fire 
management): it was by consulting earlier 
records that I was able to choose this date as the 
‘natural’ starting point for the detailed narrative in 
my thesis.  
27 – 29/10/2016 
06/12/2016 
10/12/2016 
13 – 16/12/2016 










Holds records of local administration during 
colonial period, of government after 
independence, and other miscellaneous 
reports deposited by organisations and 
individuals. Early colonial records are sparse, 
and many were destroyed in 1962 by the 
colonial administration (Cobain, 2016). Few 
documents have been deposited by 
government since independence. The 
archive also holds near complete collections 
of most Belizean newspapers (at least post 
1900).  
This is a state-managed national archive, 
though depositing material in it is not 
attempted seriously by any government 
departments. There is a digital catalogue 
of the archive, though it is available only 
at the site and not online. There is 
sufficient detail in the catalogue that it 
was possible to use keyword searches to 
find relevant material. The exception was 
for the newspaper archive, which is 
catalogued only by date, and many of 
which are on microfiche. The staff of the 
archive have familiarity with many of the 
records and were able to assist me with 
contextualisation.  
I consulted a wide range of material in the 
archive, in particular minute papers from the 
Colonial Secretary’s office (for the limited years 
where material remains- the 1920s and 1950s 
only), miscellaneous governmental and non-
governmental reports from the second half of the 
twentieth century and newspapers. Because the 
newspapers are catalogued only by date, I often 
had to work my way through whole years of 
material to find particular events of which I only 
knew the year, and not a more precise date.  
13 – 14/03/2017 
20 – 24/03/2017 
27 – 28/03/2017 
19 – 23/06/2017 
29/06/2017 








Holds various publications pertaining to 
Belize, including some governmental reports. 
Also holds newspaper collections (though 
more limited in scope that those held by the 
Belize Archives and Records Service) 
A digital catalogue for the collection was 
available onsite but not online and 
contained sufficient detail for me to use 
keyword searches to find relevant 
material.  
A handful of miscellaneous reports, particularly 
from development projects in the 1980s and 











Oxford, UK Among its extensive collections, Oxford 
University holds in its Commonwealth and 
African Collections material deposited for 
various reasons by individuals, including 
several foresters or politicians that studied in 
Oxford and later served in the Colonial 
Service in Belize. 
There is an online catalogue, in which the 
material itself is not described in detail, 
beyond its volume. The catalogue gives 
detail about the careers of the people 
who deposited the material, and I located 
material of potential relevance by finding 
individuals where ‘Belize’ or ‘British 
Honduras’ featured in a description of 
their careers, and then using my 
judgement as to whether their described 
connection with Belize made it worth 
looking at the material for a mention of 
fire management.  
This material was a useful complement to the 
material in the UK and Belize national archives 
for understanding the early history of the Forest 
Department. Records left by Duncan Stevenson, 
Assistant Conservator of Forests in Belize in the 
1920s, included various reports and concession 
agreements and his handwritten daily work 
diaries for the years 1924-27. The records of Neil 
Stevenson, his brother, Conservator of Forests 
in Belize in the 1930s and 1940s, included draft 
forestry development plans and copies of his 
correspondence in the 1970s and 80s with 
researchers writing of the political history of 
Belize. The records of the forester Colin Eric Duff 
included a draft history of forestry in Belize 













Archives of British interactions abroad from 
missionary societies, NGOs and campaign 
groups, and business organisations, as well 
as the papers of individuals, including 
diplomats, campaigners, and academics. Of 
relevance is the (Wesleyan) Methodist 
missionary society collection, holding letters 
and reports from Belize covering 1804-1950 
The Wesleyan Methodist missionary 
society collection does not have a 
catalogue online. At the archive, a paper 
catalogue orders the letters sent from 
missionaries to the Society by country (so 
the Belize letters are collected together) 
and then by year, by the name of the 
missionary and the town in which they 
were stationed. The catalogue does not 
contain information about the contents of 
the letters. The handwritten letters have 
been preserved on microfiche, making 
them laborious to read. I had little in the 
way of a search strategy at this archive 
and could only order material for certain 
dates.      
I read descriptions of urban fires in Belize City, 
and the occasional description of indigenous 
communities, but the letters largely discussed life 
in towns, and particularly around the church. I 
did not, therefore, continue to look at the whole 
collection, and ultimately did not use any of this 








Cambridge University holds in its Royal 
Commonwealth Society Collections, textual 
and photographic material on the 
Commonwealth and Britain's former colonial 
territories. 
There is an online catalogue ‘Janus’, 
which gives brief descriptions of the 
material. These vary in detail. I searched 
this for ‘British Honduras’ and ‘Belize’ and 
was able to locate a number of collections 
of potential relevance, including 
photographic collections and the records 
of various British colonial administrators 
in Belize. 
I looked largely at the collections of George 
Arthur, Superintendent in Belize in the early 
1800s (records spanning 1803–1837) and 
Frederick Hardiman Parker, Registrar of the 
Supreme Court, Provost Marshal and Keeper of 
Records in Belize in the late 1800s (records 
spanning 1775-1890). Both were useful, 
containing transcripts of early legislation in 
Belize, including regulations around fire use in 
Belize City from 1806. I also looked at several 
photograph collections made for the British 
government, which included imagery of the pine 
industry in Southern Belize in the 1950s.  








The RGS collection includes manuscripts of 
papers from the Geographical Journal and 
presented at the Society, as well as travel 
writing and maps.  
There is an online catalogue, which 
includes brief descriptions of the material, 
which I searched for ‘British Honduras’ 
and ‘Belize’ to find material of potential 
relevance to the research.  
I looked at travel writing and manuscripts by 
several collectors and colonial administrators in 
Belize. Though fascinating insights into 
nineteenth and early twentieth century 
impressions of Belize by British visitors, these 
largely had no direct relevance for the research. I 
also looked at several maps. Unfortunately, I 
was not able to take photographs of these, and 
my visit came too early in the research to take 
very useful notes from them. Luckily, I was later 









The Kew Gardens archive includes letters 
from the Directors of Kew Gardens to 
scientists and collectors abroad (spanning 
1809-1928), as well as miscellaneous reports 
and correspondence and rare publications.  
There is an online catalogue, which 
includes brief descriptions of the material, 
which I searched for ‘British Honduras’ 
and ‘Belize’ to find material of potential 
relevance to the research. The Directors’ 
letters have been digitised (though only 
some have been transcribed) and can be 
accessed online. 
This collection was useful for insights (in the 
director’s letters) into early interest in savanna 
species, such as Caribbean pine, by Kew 
Gardens. I also found many of the Forest 
Department’s annual reports, and other official 
reports on forestry and agriculture in Belize in 
the early twentieth century. There was some 
correspondence with the Colonial Office over the 








The British Library holds rare publications 
and newspaper collections.  
There is an online catalogue for the 
British Library. I searched this for specific 
publications I had already seen reference 
to but that I had not been able to access 
elsewhere.   
Most of the publications I read in the British 
Library were journal articles that I had not been 
able to find online. The Belizean newspapers in 
the collection are identical to those in the Belize 
Archives and Records Service in Belmopan 
(which were copied from the British Library), 








As many of BEC’s lands were bought by 
Bowen and Bowen, the company’s records 
are held in a warehouse at the Belikin beer/ 
Coca Cola Factory. There are four metal 
boxes of material including financial records, 
annual reports from managers in Belize, 
meeting minutes of the board and other 
miscellaneous letters and reports, dating 
from the 1870s to the 1960s.  
I obtained access to the material by 
permission of the factory manager. There 
is no catalogue of the material. It was 
sorted by type – e.g. financial reports 
were all together, but they were not in 
date order.  
Of relevance to the research were several 
reports of visits to Belize by company board 
members in 1904 and the 1930s, as well as 
board meeting minutes from the 1940s and 
1950s, from which I was able to track something 









At the Forest Department’s main office are 
the remnants of the Department’s library of 
books and journals as well as a host of 
reports, data, aerial photographs. The 
material spans the past century.  
I obtained access to the material by 
permission of the Forest Department. 
There is no catalogue of the material 
(though stickers on the older books 
suggest the library was once organised 
and catalogued) and it is unsorted on the 
shelves. None of the staff I spoke to knew 
of the contents of the material. I went 
through all the material. I also supervised 
an intern from the University of Belize’s 
Environmental Research Institute (ERI) in 
May and June of 2017, to create a 
catalogue of the material. The ERI may at 
a future date scan certain reports for their 
digital repository of material about the 
Belizean environment.  
Looking at this whole jumbled collection (even 
the material that was not of direct relevance to 
my research) was an interesting insight into the 
history of the Forest Department as an institution 
and of its external influences. Alongside colonial 
reports and publications written by the Imperial 
Forestry Institute, were manuals, for example for 
fire management, from the US and Canadian 
Forest Services, dating from 1960-80. I found 
much of interest among the reports I found.  











At Augustine I found a huge array of records 
of the Forest Department’s work, including 
piles of exercise books containing the daily 
work diaries of Forest Guards and Forest 
Officers, financial records, correspondence 
with other forest offices, reports, maps, aerial 
photographs, datasheets and copies of 
scientific journals. The material spans a 
period from the 1940s to the 1990s. 
I obtained access to the material by 
permission of the Forest Department. 
There is no catalogue of the material. It is 
completely unsorted and in condition of 
decay in several abandoned buildings 
and in a back-room of the current office 
(Figures 3.3 – 3.6 show these conditions). 
None of the staff I spoke to knew of the 
contents of the material. There is a lot of 
material, and I was not able to look 
through more than a fraction of it in the 
time I had there.  
Looking at these records of local administration 
of the Forest Department was a very useful 
complement to the more official reports I viewed 
at the UK National Archives. It gave me an 
insight into the administrative structure of the 
Forest Department in the colonial period. Their 
decay was also evidence of the irrelevance 
placed on these records by the present staff of 
the department. Though much of the material 
pertained to the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest 
Reserve rather than the Southern Coastal Plain 
(which was under the administration of Melinda 
Forest Station, now closed, and from which no 
records remain), there was nonetheless some 
very useful material about the Southern Coastal 
Plain, particularly in correspondence with other 
Forest Stations discussing development or 











At Machaca I found records of the Forest 
Department’s work, including 
correspondence with other forest offices, 
reports, maps and datasheets. The material 
spans a period from the 1930s to the 1990s. 
I obtained access to the material by 
permission of the Forest Department. 
There is no catalogue of the material. It is 
unsorted and in condition of decay in 
several filing cabinets and boxes in a 
back-room at the Forest Station (Figure 
3.2 shows an example of such material). 
None of the staff I spoke to knew of the 
contents of the material. I looked through 
all of the material and examined things of 
relevance in more detail.  
Looking at these records of local administration 
of the Forest Department was a very useful 
complement to the more official reports I viewed 
at the UK National Archives. Their decay was 
also evidence of the irrelevance of these records 
to the present staff of the department. Though 
much of the material pertained to the area 
around Machaca rather than the Southern 
Coastal Plain (which was under the 
administration of Melinda Forest Station, now 
closed, and from which no records remain), there 
was nonetheless some very useful material. 
Some records from the 1930s were particularly 
interesting, including field data and a report of a 





Oxford, UK Neil Bird worked in Belize for 6 years in the 
1990s for a UK-funded development project 
with the Forest Department. He has a 
collection of records of that project and 
earlier material relating to forestry in Belize 
that he collected during his time there.  
Neil Bird kindly shared his collection with 
me and discussed its contents to me. I 
went through all the material, examining 
items of relevance in greater detail.  
Neil’s collection contained many reports I had 
already seen elsewhere (the visit being late in 
my research), but I found several useful reports 
from the 1990s about the establishment of the 
















There are several travel accounts of Belize 
from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries 
available online.  
Most of the e-books I accessed online I 
had searched for specifically, having seen 
reference to them elsewhere.  
I used a variety of seventeenth to nineteenth 














Visiting scientists, and colonial forestry staff 
published about Belize in the Empire 
Forestry Journal, Geographical Journal, 
Tropical Woods, and other scientific journals.  
Most of the journal articles I accessed 
online I had searched for specifically, 
having seen reference to them 
elsewhere. 
I used a variety of journal articles in the 
research. These were useful for understanding 
changes in scientific accounts of the savanna 
over the past century, and for understanding the 







Online TIDE, the Ya’axche Conservation Trust, the 
Statistics Institute of Belize and other 
organisations have pdfs of reports and other 
documents on their websites. 
I accessed this material on an ad-hoc 
basis, when it came up from internet 
searches, or when recommended to me.  
For the more recent decades, organisation 
websites were generally a more useful source of 
project reports and other documents than the 





Let me illustrate, by reference to records I examined of the Colonial Office at 
the UK National Archives, the importance of the form of a record in shaping 
encounters with it. At various points, the Colonial Office introduced new systems or 
issued instructions for record creation. In 1868, ‘minute sheets’ were introduced, 
which were attached to series of incoming correspondence to track discussion within 
the Office about successive despatches. Prior to this, decision making was, on the 
whole, by personal discussion rather than a matter formally recorded on paper; any 
written comments by Colonial Office personnel were generally written directly onto 
the incoming despatches.1 The presence of minute sheets shapes the interaction a 
researcher has with the material, because it foregrounds the thoughts of the 
Colonial Office personnel as the topmost sheet in any file.   
Each element of an archival trace is the result of a tension between a 
‘performative’ element of human intent, and exposure to stochastic processes.2 My 
interaction with records in various states of decay in the unofficial archives of 
various offices of the Forest Department in Belize was a stark reminder of the 
stochastic loss and decay of records. In conversations I had with staff at these 
offices, it was clear that most were not aware of the content of the records and had 
neither interest in nor motivation for their preservation. The records that remain are 
mostly unsorted, and undergoing gradual decay, as evident from the insect damage 
to the map in Figure 3.2. Other offices, such as that depicted in Figures 3.3 - 3.6, 
have been completely abandoned. The regional Forest Office of Melinda, that had 
administrative oversight of my focus area of the savanna in the Toledo District, was 
closed in 2004. I was told in an interview that none of its records remain: ‘We have a 
place that we call Melinda and after I retire, you know, everything that they didn’t 
 
1 Banton (2008). 




want in there, turn up everything, give away the books them. I checked back there 
last few months ago because I find it open. Nothing in there’.3 There has also been 
repeated loss of governmental records to fires and hurricanes in Belize.4 
The performative element to record creation and keeping has been 
particularly emphasised in the literature about official state and colonial archives.5 
The records of the Colonial Office that I accessed at the British National Archives 
were left purposively for use by future staff of the Colonial Office, as evidence of 
past decision making on certain issues, and to set a precedent for future decision 
making. As Stoler writes, they were ‘reference guides to administrative thinking’: 
establishing what, or whose word, counted as proof.6 In the Colonial Office records, 
a file containing a series of despatches on an issue draws on the testimony of 
experts, and lays out the process by which a decision was reached. In being 
preserved, it defines the ‘expert’, the necessary evidence, and, crucially, justifies an 
action. As Schwartz and Cook put it, archives are ‘justification for the society that 
creates them’.7 The extent to which this particular society was aware of this is borne 
out by the recent exposure of Operation Legacy, by which the Colonial Office, in 
1961, issued instructions to diplomats in colonies that had, or were soon to reach, 
independence, to dispose of documents of local administration from the colonial 
period that ‘might embarrass members of the police, military forces, public servants 
(such as police agents or informers)’ or which were ‘likely to be interpreted, either 
reasonably or by malice, as indicating racial prejudice or bias’. 8 This took place in  
 
3 Interview 47.  
4 For example, in 1918, when the Government buildings were destroyed by fire [TNA CO 123/292, FO 
106]. Before they were moved to Belmopan, marine flooding of Belize City during Hurricane Hattie in 
1961 also destroyed significant amounts of material in the Government archives (Peter Furley, pers. 
comm. 18th February 2019).  
5 See for example Cooper & Stoler (1989); Schwartz & Cook (2002); Stoler (2002, 2010); Berger 
(2013). 
6 Stoler (2002), p. 98.  
7 Schwartz & Cook (2002), p. 12.  

















Insect damage to a map in storage at the Machaca Forest Station, Toledo, Belize.  




Abandoned office at the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Station, Cayo District, Belize. 
































Box of old maps in abandoned forest office at the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Station, Cayo District, 
Belize. 





Box of aerial photos (probably from the 1950s) in abandoned forest office at the Mountain Pine Ridge 
Forest Station, Cayo District, Belize. 






Piles of unsorted records in the active forest office at the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Station, Cayo 
District, Belize.  
Source: Author, 2017. 
 
Belize, where large amounts of material were burned in 1962. Staff at the Belizean 
National Archives suspect this explains, in part, the absence of decades of records 
in the Belizean collections.   
It is important to consider my own agency in the construction of a ‘Belize fire 
archive’ to which to apply my research questions. I faced initial choices about how to 
search for relevant collections that I might access (involving searches online, and 
conversation with other researchers). The contested nature of the territory of Belize 
means that there are writings from both Spanish and British occupation, in diverse 
collections and locations. I was not able to access all of these archives, and had to 
acknowledge my limits, in terms of time, distance and Spanish language skills, when 
deciding which to visit.  
Once at an archive, I faced choices about how to search for relevant 
material, and how to persevere. Some archives, such as the Belize National 
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Archives, have catalogued much of their collections, allowing for more strategic use 
of search terms: ‘fire’, ‘forestry’, ‘savanna’, for example. In others, much of the 
material of interest was not catalogued to a level of detail that allowed me to use 
such search terms. In the UK National Archives, for example, most material is 
organised chronologically and by type (for example letters between the Governor of 
Belize and the Colonial Office, or annual reports from government departments in 
Belize, are bound together), but the catalogue gives only the months covered by the 
material bound in a volume, and not an indication of the themes of its content. I 
relied on a ‘snowballing’ knowledge of the years that were of interest, and, once I 
had ordered a volume in the archive, on reading through its index. At other sites I 
faced completely unsorted and uncatalogued shelves and cabinets of material, and 
decisions of how much of it to trawl through in my searches (see for example the 
quantity of records in Figure 3.6).  
In this respect, my searches did not follow a precise methodology (because 
they could not), but were, largely, intuitive, always influenced by prior encounters 
with records and a gradually increasingly understanding of what was important. Let 
me illustrate this with the example of my searches for material in the Belizean 
newspaper collection at the Belize National Archive. This collection is not 
catalogued in detail: I was only able to order bound volumes of a newspaper by year 
of publication. At the time when I examined this material, I had already gained some 
knowledge of the history from other records. I was thus able to create a list of years 
in which I deemed events I had an interest in might have been covered in the press, 
and to prioritise these in my searches. I searched, for example, for evidence of 
public discontent with the Forest Department in the late 1920s, for the catastrophic 
wildfires following Hurricane Hattie in 1962, and worker’s strikes in the pine industry 
in the early 1960s. Often I did not know the date of an event with great precision, 
and thus had to skim most of the newspapers from that year to search for it.  
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I faced choices about what to attend to in a record, and if intuiting that 
something would be relevant, I faced a decision about how to transcribe the trace. 
These transcriptions captured, whether consciously or unconsciously to me, some 
elements of the content or form of a record, or of the wider site. These transcriptions 
took the form of photographs of the records or sites themselves, of direct textual 
quotes from the records (drawn directly from the record or, later, from photographs), 
of written reflections and, of course, of memories. My choice of a medium of 
transcription was not always my own. In some archives, such as the Belizean 
National Archives, use of cameras is not permitted. Certain elements of a trace lent 
themselves better to preservation in certain forms of transcription: the physical form 
of a record was more present in a photograph, or written descriptions that attended 
to its form, than in selected textual fragments.  
I used Excel spreadsheets to record basic details about records I had looked 
at in each collection and on each date. For each day spent at an archive, I created a 
file on my computer, in which I stored photographs and a single word document with 
text fragments and reflections written that day. I then transferred the text fragments 
and written reflections to the Nvivo 11 software, creating a new record for each 
individual source. This allowed me to connect information to each record, such as its 
date of creation, its creator, where and when I had accessed it, any reference it had 
within the collection, and so on. This provided a platform by which I could look at the 
traces together, using text searches and queries, and add my own interpretative 
codes and memos. In making these iterative choices that resulted in a transcribed 





3.4 Using oral testimonies 
In interviews and conversations, I accessed further evidence of past and 
contemporary fire use and management. I conducted 26 interviews with NGO staff, 
government officials and other individuals both from Belize, the UK and the US 
(Table 3.2 summarises and numbers these research interviews). I also conducted 
surveys of 367 households and interviews with 42 farmers in the villages of Trio, 
Bladen and San Isidro in Belize’s Toledo District. The nature of my access to these 
different individuals was influenced by our relative positionalities, accompanying 
power relations, and by behavioural choices I felt able to make within these 
constraints.  
Given the small size of Belize and the strong network of contacts I had 
developed through my position working for the Darwin project and within the 
University of Edinburgh, it was usually easy to contact officials, NGO staff, and 
scientists with a view to interview; nobody I contacted declined. I made it clear when 
requesting an interview that it was for my PhD work and not for the Darwin project. 
In 2017, I began by interviewing colleagues from the Darwin Project and, in that I 
asked each respondent to suggest other potential respondents, my list of potential 
contacts snowballed. I continued to conduct interviews throughout 2017 and 2018 
as opportunities arose. For each of these interviews I prepared potential questions 
in advance, from my prior knowledge of the respondent and their work, but I aimed 
to make these interviews as open-ended as possible, while focused on savannas 
and fire management. Interviews with several USA-based fire technicians were 
conducted on Skype.  
When making contact in the villages for my research I faced choices of how 




Table 3.2 Interviews I conducted during my fieldwork 
 
Number Date Gender Nationality Description 




Dual interview with Protected Areas Manager for TIDE, and his 
friend and fire management consultant, formerly Fire Manager 
with TNC and US Parks Service. 
2 28/02/2017 Both 
male 
Belizean Logging concessionaires for DRFR (father and son). 
3 23/03/2017 Male Belizean Forest Department staff member from 1973 to 2004, Chief 
Forest Officer from 1999 to 2004. Now consultant forester to 
private interests. 
4 14/04/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 
Farmer in San Isidro in his 40s. Interview with translation from 
spanish.  
5 15/04/2017 Male Belizean 34-year old farmer and community health worker in San Isidro. 
Community participant in the Darwin Project’s fire management 
training, and community business development. TIDE ranger 
since 2017.  
6 26/04/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 
15-year old farmer in Bladen. Interview with translation from 
Q’eqchi. 
7 26/04/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 
45-year old farmer in Bladen. Interview with translation from 
Q’eqchi. 
8 26/04/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 
44-year old farmer in Bladen. 
9 27/04/2017 Male Belizean 25-year old resident in Bladen, participant in Darwin Project’s 
fire management and ecological monitoring in PCNP. 
10 27/04/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 
48-year old farmer in Bladen. Interview with translation from 
Q’eqchi. 
11 27/04/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 
45-year old farmer in Bladen. Interview with translation from 
Q’eqchi. 
12 28/04/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 
40-year old farmer in Bladen. Interview with translation from 
Spanish. 
13 28/04/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 
37-year old farmer in Bladen. Interview with translation from 
Q’eqchi. 
14 28/04/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 
35-year old farmer in Bladen. Interview with translation from 
Q’eqchi. 
15 28/04/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 
57-year old farmer in Bladen. 
16 29/04/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 
40-year old farmer in Bladen. Interview with translation from 
Q’eqchi. 
17 29/04/2017 Male Belizean 47-year old farmer in Bladen. 
18 30/04/2017 Male Belizean 35-year old resident in Bladen, and TIDE ranger.  
19 30/04/2017 Male Belizean 75-year old farmer in Bladen. Interview with translation from 
Q’eqchi. 
20 01/05/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 
48-year old farmer in San Isidro. Interview with translation from 
Q.’eqchi. 
21 01/05/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 
43-year old farmer in San Isidro. Interview with translation from 
Q’eqchi. 
22 02/05/2017 Male Born in El 
Salvador 
63-year old farmer in San Isidro. Interview with translation from 
Spanish. 
23 02/05/2017 Male Belizean 67-year old farmer in San Isidro. 
24 02/05/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 




25 02/05/2017 Male Born in 
Honduras 
65-year old farmer in San Isidro. Interview with translation from 
Spanish. 
26 05/05/2017 Male Belizean 24-year old farmer in San Isidro. 
27 05/05/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 
61-year old farmer in San Isidro. Interview with translation from 
Q’eqchi. 
28 05/05/2017 Male Belizean 28-year old farmer in San Isidro. Interview with translation from 
Q’eqchi. 
29 05/05/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 
35-year old farmer in San Isidro. 
30 08/05/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 
50-year old farmer in Trio. Interview with translation from 
Spanish. 
31 08/05/2017 Female Born in 
Guatemala 
58-year old farmer in Trio. Interview with translation from 
Spanish. 
32 09/05/2017 Female Born in 
Guatemala 
74-year old farmer in Trio. Interview with translation from 
Spanish. 
33 09/05/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 
25-year old farmer in Trio. Interview with translation from 
Spanish. 
34 09/05/2017 Male Born in 
Honduras 
70-year old farmer in Trio. Interview with translation from 
Spanish. 
35 09/05/2017 Male Born in 
Honduras 
62-year old farmer in Trio. Interview with translation from 
Spanish. 
36 09/05/2017 Male Belizean Farmer in his late 20s in Trio. 
37 09/05/2017 Male Belizean 26-year old farmer in Trio. Interview with translation from 
Spanish. 
38 10/05/2017 Female Born in 
Guatemala 
59-year old farmer in Trio. Interview with translation from 
Spanish. 
39 10/05/2017 Male Born in 
Honduras 
55-year old farmer in Trio. Interview with translation from 
Spanish. 
40 10/05/2017 Male Born in 
Honduras 
28-year old farmer in Trio. Interview with translation from 
Spanish. 
41 10/05/2017 Male Born in El 
Salvador 
42-year old farmer in Trio. Interview with translation from 
Spanish. 
42 10/05/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 
71-year old farmer in Trio. Interview with translation from 
Q’eqchi. 
43 10/05/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 
18-year old farmer in Trio. Interview with translation from 
Q’eqchi. 
44 11/05/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 
44-year old farmer in Trio. Interview with translation from 
Spanish. 
45 11/05/2017 Male Born in 
Guatemala 
Farmer in his 30s in Trio. Interview with translation from 
Spanish. 
46 15/06/2017 Male Belizean Forest Department forest ranger at Savanna Forest Station in 
1962. 




Two former Forest Department staff working mostly in Toledo 
district, one started in 1973 as a forest guard, was promoted to 
forest ranger in 1989 and retired in 2006, the other started in 
1973 as a forest guard, was later an assistant carpenter and 
retired in 2004.  
48 20/06/2017 Male Belizean Forest Department staff member from 2003 to present, 
currently Forest Officer.  
49 20/06/2017 Male Belizean Forest Department staff member from 1980 to present. 
Currently Deputy Chief Forest Officer.  
50 21/06/2017 Male Belizean United Democratic Party (UDP) politician and Cabinet Minister 
from to 1988 to 2015, including serving as Minister of Public 
Utilities and Transport and Communications. His family owned 
mahogany cutting operations in Toledo district throughout the 
twentieth century.  
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51 01/07/2017 Male Belizean Forest Department staff member from 1977, recently retired. 
Led fire management in the Mountain Pine Ridge forest 
reserve during his career. 
52 04/07/2017 Male Belizean Agriculture Department staff member from 1988 to present, 
acting Chief Agricultural Officer at time of interview. 
53 05/07/2017 Male Belizean 1990s staff member for conservation NGOs the Belize 
Audobon Society and Programme for Belize. Official in Ministry 
of Natural Resources from 2003 to 2005. Chief Forest Officer 
in 2005. Independent consultant to NGOs and government in 
natural resources management since 2005. 
54 19/12/2017 Male British Retired soil scientist professor in geography department at 
University of Edinburgh. Conducted research in Belize, from 
1966 to mid-2000s. Particular interest in tropical savannas, 
which he also studied elsewhere in Latin America. 
55 31/01/2018 Male US Fire manager with TNC, its Director of Fire Management since 
2009. Fire management consultant in Belize under GFI in the 
2000s. 
56 05/02/2018 Male Belizean Forest Department staff member from 1976 to 1995. Chief 
Forest Officer from 1991 to 1995. Ministry of Natural 
Resources policy coordinator from 1998 to 2004. Thereafter 
natural resources management consultant and official at Belize 
National Climate Change Office.  
57 15/02/2018 Male Belizean Ranger with TIDE since 2010. 
58 15/02/2018 Male Belizean Worked with Toledo Maya Cultural Council and then as a 
ranger with Belize Audobon Society in the 1990s, as a ranger 
with TIDE from 2004 to 2016. Sustainable Agriculture 
Coordinator for the Ya’axche Conservation Trust since 2016.   
59 24/02/2018 Male US Fire manager, formerly of the US Parks Service and TNC, now 
retired. Connection with Belize since his graduate work here in 
the early 1990s. Consultant fire manager in Belize from early 
2000s, first via the GFI, and independently since it ended in 
2009, working particularly with TIDE. 
60 27/02/2018 Male US Land Manager and specialist in prescribed fire management 
with TNC from 1987 to 2017. Consultant in fire management in 
Belize during the GFI in the 2000s, continuing independently 
as a consultant to Belizean NGOs including TIDE, for several 
years after the close of the GFI in 2009.   
61 01/03/2018 Male US Ecologist working in Belize since 1984 (largely in North West 
Belize). Currently professor at University of Puerto Rico.  
62 01/03/2018 Male Dutch Resident and consultant ecologist in Belize since the early 
1990s, with TNC since 2000.  
64 15/03/2018 Female Belizean Executive Director of TIDE from 2007 to present. 
65 23/03/2018 Male Belizean Forest Department staff member from 1959 to 1993, Acting 
Deputy Chief Forest Officer in his late career.  
66 11/06/2018 Male British Forester who led the six-year UK Government funded Forest 
Planning and Management Project in Belize in the 1990s. 
67 04/10/2018 Male British Former Development Director at TIDE, who wrote the Darwin 
Project Proposal. 
68 15/12/2018 Male British Employee on the UK Government funded Stann Creek Land 
Resources Assessment in the late 1980s and the six-year 






grant me access.9 I chose to live in the villages for the periods of time in which I was 
conducting surveys and interviews there, in order to build better contextual 
understanding, and to demonstrate my willingness to learn in the village, and not to 
come in solely to ‘extract information’. Importantly, my research took place alongside 
my attendance at meetings in the same villages, under the auspices of the Darwin 
Project, and at the same time as I was developing social relationships with those 
individuals in the villages who were active participants in the project. Though I tried 
to explain that I had this dual role, it proved impossible to communicate clearly to 
everyone. Perhaps the distinction between the two roles was also not one that most 
people could understand.  
Although all three villages contained a mixture of indigenous and Spanish 
language speakers, the leadership structure of the villages differed, with all 
possessing a Chairperson (the state’s representative), but only two also possessing 
an indigenous leader called an Alcalde (the representative of the Toledo Alcaldes 
Association (TAA) and Maya Leaders Alliance (MLA)). Under the TAA and MLA’s 
framework for engaging with Toledo’s Maya communities, a researcher should 
always engage first with the Alcalde, rather than going directly to individual villagers, 
and trust that he/she will represent them to the village.10 The relative power and 
position of the Alcalde and Chairperson differed in each village. These leaders were 
also re-elected between my second and third trips to Belize, which meant that I had 
to build new relationships and negotiate access for a second time. In both 2016 and 
2017 when I spent time conducting research in the villages, I initially met with the 
leaders in each village and asked them to find me a host family and translators (and 
therefore hoped that there would be general satisfaction in the village). By my 
 
9 See Toomey (2016) on the influence of the people with whom we choose to make contact for access 
for research.  
10 Toledo Alcaldes Association & Maya Leaders Alliance (2014). 
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second visit to Belize I had made connections, via the Darwin Project, with certain 
individuals in the villages, who I hoped might act as research assistants, and 
suggested these individuals to the village leaders myself.  
I designed my household survey in the three villages with two purposes in 
mind. Firstly, I aimed to collect basic demographic information, and to quantify the 
numbers of households using fire for farming and hunting (as described in Section 
3.2). Secondly, I used the survey data to choose a representative sample of farmers 
(aiming for a variety of ages and nationalities) to interview in more detail about their 
fire use.11 In Bladen and San Isidro I surveyed all households where adult family 
members were at home at the time of my visit. In Trio, a larger village, I conducted 
the survey with two out of every three households. The household survey was 
structured, with eleven standard questions that generally took less than five minutes 
to administer (see questions in Figure 3.7). My more detailed interviews with farmers 
took between fifteen and thirty minutes. These were semi-structured: I aimed to 
keep the interview as close to a natural conversation as possible but included some 
standard questions that I asked in each interview, though not always in the same 
order (see questions in Figure 3.8).  
In the villages I sometimes encountered difficulty in ensuring prior informed 
consent for interviews. When conducting sound-recorded interviews, I followed the 
University of Edinburgh’s guidelines, and used consent forms, translated into 
Spanish or Q’eqchi by my research assistants. I sometimes found that this raised, 
rather than lowered, social barriers, particularly with interviewees in the villages, 
some of whom could not read and write, and for whom signing paper was a rare 
occurrence and aroused suspicion.12 Several people in the villages said they were  
 
11 As is discussed in Chapter six, Section 6.1, being largely settlements of immigrants, the villages are 
very culturally diverse.  
12 See Ntseane (2009) for a discussion of how consent forms may be unsuitable in certain contexts. 
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Figure 3.8 Standard questions used in interviews with farmers in Trio, San 









happy to participate but not to sign anything, which placed me in a dilemma (I chose 
not to interview them).  
My interactions with my respondents were influenced by our relative 
positionalities. This made every research encounter different. In some situations, I  
felt myself to be in a position of power (particularly when interviewing rural villagers) 
which perhaps forced my participants to accede to being interviewed. Such 
interviews often elicited very short answers; attempts to discuss fire use for hunting 
or arson were futile. In others, particularly where I was interviewing officials, the 
conversation was often easier, and felt more ‘natural’.13 Though English/Creole is 
the official first language in Belize, many of my research participants in the villages, 
particularly recent immigrants, spoke Spanish, Q’eqchi or Mopan as a native 
language. I do not speak any of these languages, and so relied both upon 
translation of surveys in which I asked standardised questions (and which I did not 
always administer), and of interviews in which I asked more open-ended questions. I 
worked with research assistants to translate and trial my standardised questions 
before conducting the surveys. 
The presence of research assistants and translators introduced a ‘triple-
subjectivity’ to my surveys and interviews in the villages.14 I chose in each village to 
work with research assistants from that village, which meant that I had to spend 
more time preparing them for what we were going to do, but which provided me with 
a wealth of specific social information as a result.15 In informal conversations with 
my research assistants I learned general contextual information about the villages, 
how they had interpreted research interviews, or had felt participants to be lying, and 
 
13 Oglesby (2010), Gent (2014) and Perera-Mubarek (2014) describe how they experienced different 
relative positionalities with different research participants.  
14 Temple & Edwards (2002). 




how they felt that other villagers were viewing me (drawing my attention to the ways 
in which my positionality connected me with money). These discussions also helped 
me to understand the ways in which their connection with me and my research 
challenged my research assistants.16 I was particularly aware of this after a research 
assistant expressed her discomfort to me about visiting certain houses in the village.  
Translation is, of course, on a basic level, about the words chosen. With one 
translator, in some of my interviews, where my limited Spanish meant that I was 
understanding some of what was said, I had a sense that I was getting shortened 
translations and losing some content. I asked my translator in the next village to 
listen to my recordings and to provide her translation. The differences between the 
translations were clear evidence of the role of the individual translator. I was, 
however, unable to have multiple translations of most of my interviews. Translation 
is more than a simple exchange of words, but it also alters the social and discursive 
positioning of what is said.17 It is important to remember Gayatri Spivak’s argument 
that discourse can silence those who are represented.18 I came to understand this 
through conversations with certain research assistants, who, despite being native 
speakers of the indigenous languages they were translating for me and who were 
able to communicate with me in English, expressed their frustration in 
communicating the meaning of what I was trying to ask. Most of my research 
assistants were able to act as ‘knowledge brokers’ because they, unlike other 
villagers, had had extensive experience outside their villages, and of interacting with 
foreign researchers or NGO staff. Those research assistants that expressed their 
difficulties in conveying my meaning did not have such prior experience.  
 
16 Mistry et al (2015) and Turner (2010) discuss the challenging ethical positions in which research 
assistants are placed as knowledge brokers. 
17 Temple & Edwards (2002); Temple (2005); Leck (2014); Drozdzewski (2018).  
18 Spivak (1988).  
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I sound-recorded all interviews and then fully transcribed them. As with my 
transcriptions from archival records, I entered my interview transcripts into Nvivo 11 
as a platform for analysis. Many of my research participants and translators used 
elements of grammar from Creole when speaking in English with me. When quoting 
these participants in this thesis, I use [sic] once only, to signal that the entire quote 
is presented verbatim.  
 
3.5 Using ethnography 
I observed and gained insight of four things through ethnography: the 
general social and political context of Southern Belize; practices of contemporary 
fire use and management; the social processes through which the Darwin Project 
was carried out; those contexts in which and processes by which I accessed 
archival material and interviews. It was always important to be mindful of the ways in 
which my presence and participation shaped these contexts.   
In 2016, during my first visit to Belize, I spent a week in each of the five 
villages targeted by the Darwin Project, with the sole aim of gaining socio-cultural 
contextual understanding.19 As mentioned, I found and contacted my host families 
via the village leaders in each village. I spoke with a diversity of people in each 
village, spent time observing farmers on their milpas and spent two days of 
participant observation on two of the commercial banana farms that provide 
employment for many people in these villages.20 In 2017 I returned to three of the 
villages, (Trio, Bladen and San Isidro), where I spent a further total of six weeks, 
during which I conducted the surveys and interviews described above. During these 
stays I continued to gain social and cultural insights. I was also able to observe 
several farmers conducting burns to clear their milpas for planting. I was unable to 
 
19 As is further elaborated in Chapter six, each village possesses its own social and political dynamics.    
20 A milpa is a small corn and bean farm. 
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gain access and directly observe fire use for hunting. Throughout these periods of 
observation my inability to understand Spanish, Q’eqchi or Mopan sometimes 
limited my insights. In some of my host families the heads of household did not 
speak English, although, having learned it at school, their children were confident 
English speakers and able to aid me in communication.  
Through my work as Project Officer for the Darwin Project I gained a tacit 
understanding of social relations in a development context. As described in Chapter 
one, Section 1.2, throughout each of my visits to Belize I was actively involved with 
organising and facilitating, and thus able to observe, most of the meetings and 
activities associated with the Darwin Project. This included participation in six 
prescribed burns with TIDE’s rangers in the Payne’s Creek National Park and Deep 
River Forest Reserve. It also included participation in activities, such as community 
business development, which are not discussed in depth in this thesis, but which 
helped me to develop a tacit understanding of social relations in a development 
context.    
Most people with whom I interacted during my research were aware that I 
was a PhD researcher: I made an effort to explain this, and my research topic, when 
I was introduced to somebody. However, I could not always obtain prior informed 
consent for ethnographic research.21 For example, it was easiest for me to observe 
if I did not emphasise my identity as a researcher during every Darwin Project 
activity or meeting. My decision to focus on the workings of the Darwin Project, and 
interactions between NGO staff and villagers emerged during the research, and 
during work for the Darwin Project. Thus, the observations I am calling ‘ethnographic 
evidence’ were sometimes transcribed to memory and not inscribed in the moment, 
 




but, later, in some different site and time. I was certainly not always attentive to the 
boundary between ‘doing ethnography’ and ‘not doing ethnography’. 
When conducting what was for me consciously ‘dedicated’ ethnographic 
work (during stays in the villages in 2016 and during Darwin project meetings and 
activities), I followed the approach outlined by Emerson et al. 22 I took quick jottings 
of single words or phrases to trigger my memory later, during conversations or 
observations (when I deemed that writing something down was appropriate in the 
context, or as soon as possible afterwards). I would then spend time later that day 
writing up my notes, in journal form, using quotation marks only for direct quotations, 
and brackets to mark my thoughts or interpretation of events. As with my 
transcriptions from documentary records and interviews, I entered my ethnographic 
notes into Nvivo 11 as a platform for analysis. In Chapter six, I use pseudonyms 
when writing about individuals from my ethnographic experience. 
 
3.6 Interpreting and interweaving multiple lines of evidence 
It was from these diverse sources of evidence that I was able, in their 
analysis and in their combination, to write a narrative and present an analysis. I also 
referenced other published histories, themselves interpretations, to inform my 
reading of the primary material.23 The evidence I drew together was time-limited in 
different ways. This means that I used different combinations of material for the 
different chapters of my thesis, which are ordered chronologically. Chapter four uses 
archival and textual traces only, Chapter five primarily uses archival and textual 
traces, but draws also, for its more recent history, upon interviews with current and 
 
22 Emerson, Fretz & Shaw (1996). 
23 I used, for example, published histories of Belize (e.g. Bolland (1977, 2003); Bulmer-Thomas & 
Bulmer-Thomas (2012); Shoman (2012)); more thematic writing and memoirs of Belize (e.g. Wilk 
(1991); Moberg (1997); Wainwright (2008); Godden (2009)); histories of colonial forestry and 
environmentalism (e.g. Drayton (2000); Barton (2002); Bennett (2015)); development policy (e.g. Furse 
(1962); Constantine (1984); Adams (2008)); fire management (e.g. Pyne (1997)).  
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former Belize Forest Department officials and on my own ethnographic 
observations, Chapter six uses some textual traces but predominantly my surveys, 
interviews and ethnographic observations. Being interested in the relationship 
between the two, my challenge was to afford both texts/plans about fire 
management and actual practices of fire management their due weight throughout 
my analysis, despite my differential access to textual and oral or ethnographic 
evidence for different parts of the narrative.  
Nightingale distinguishes three forms of triangulation, all of which applied as 
I combined different lines of evidence.24 In some cases, I employed a realist stance 
to my data, and looked for convergences between sources to verify certain findings. 
This was the case, for example, when I wanted to confirm who held the logging 
permit for a certain forest reserve in year X, or what years had particularly frequent 
fires. From a constructivist position I would not expect certain elements of different 
sources to converge. Instead of convergence I sometimes looked for 
complementarity between sources to enrich my analysis. This was, for example, the 
case when I combined archival traces to lend context to one another, or when I used 
the results of a structured survey to select participants for more open-ended 
interview. In this research I was precisely interested in the implications of differences 
in perspective for the production of fire management practices. I thus frequently 
attended to the divergences between sources, sometimes using oral histories 
precisely because I hoped that they could present a different understanding from the 
colonial or government record.25   
I drew in my interpretation of texts on Derrida’s ‘deconstruction’: ‘an 
approach to reading that constantly and rigorously challenges the possibility of 
 
24 Nightingale (2009). 




achieving closure of meaning, since there is no centre or core from which meaning 
radiates’.26 The historical texts I could access give voice strongly to the Colonial 
Office in London and Colonial Administration in Belize, to foreign ecologists, 
foresters and conservationists. They were rarely produced by less powerful actors. 
Yet, following Derrida, I could search for the presence of these other actors in the 
text, within what was hidden, marginalised or conspicuously invoked as pure or 
ideal. Here it was important to try to distinguish, as Stoler writes, between ‘what was 
“unwritten” because it could go without saying and “everyone knew it,” what was 
unwritten because it could not yet be articulated, and what was unwritten because it 
could not be said’.27 For example, sections covering fire suppression in the annual 
reports of the Forest Department from the 1950s and 1960s, speak, in terms of 
numbers of fires fought, miles of fire breaks constructed and so on, a rhetoric and 
discourse of apparently intense control, in keeping with legislation that sought to 
eliminate fire from certain areas. Yet, the staff lists for the Forest Department, and 
maps of the coverage of Forest Reserves they managed reveal that they cannot 
have had much control in most of the forested areas in the country or reached most 
of its people. Into the way in which these Forest Department reports quantify the 
technical measures taken without contextualising what they meant in terms of 
reducing the occurrence of fire in Belizean forests, I read a need to mask the 
inadequacy of the Department’s methods in practice.  
I became more and more interested in this distinction between detailed plans 
of proposed fire management, reports of fire management and material practices of 
fire management. In archived evidence I was presented with plans and reports but 
had no direct access to the fire management practices themselves. My ethnographic 
experiences and interviews in contemporary Belize shaped my ability to read this 
 
26 Braun & Wainwright (2001), p. 48.  
27 Stoler (2010), p. 3.  
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unbalanced historical material in ways that did not attribute undue power to the 
ideas inscribed in fire management plans. Here, I present two examples to illustrate. 
In the first example it was ethnographic attention to the sites in which I 
accessed documents and conversations with their curators that provided important 
insights. The Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Station in the Cayo District was at one 
time a small settlement housing staff of the Belize Forest Department and their 
families. Today, several of the buildings still function as an office for the Forest 
Department, but most of the site lies derelict. In 2017, I sieved through some of the 
paperwork that is strewn in abandoned offices and in unsorted piles at the back of 
the Forest Station (see Figures 3.3 - 3.6). Among the records were jumbled maps, 
aerial photography and pages and pages of handwritten numbers; data divorced 
from explanation of a collection methodology or purpose.28  
As it was the weekend, there were only two members of staff keeping watch 
of the site. One, young and recently employed with the Department, let me into the 
buildings to look at the records. He said that they were never used for anything and 
that he had no idea what they contained but he would sometimes leaf through some 
of them when there was nothing else to do on a boring shift. The other employee, 
one of the longest-serving at the Department, told me that he had been involved in 
data collection with a British team on monitoring plots established in the 1990s. 
From my reading of the project’s documentation and a later interview with the 
(British) leader of the project, I know this to have been the Forest Planning and 
Management Project funded by the British Overseas Development Administration, 
which aimed to develop the capacity of the Forest Department to conduct research, 
among other things. Yet my conversation at the Mountain Pine Ridge made it clear 
that this staff member at least had seen the data collection as a task carried out for 
 




a British project. The monitoring plots were not maintained after the project ended. 
Some eighty years earlier than my visit to the Mountain Pine Ridge, but speaking to 
similar dynamics, a circular letter was sent from the Belize Forest Department’s 
(British) Conservator of Forests to all Forest Officers on the subject ‘preservation of 
records’: 
The use of books or old records for scrap paper has recently resulted in the 
destruction of some valuable increment records and observation for a period of 
seven years. All records of work done have a very definite value and they must be 
carefully preserved.29 
 
In 2018, I met with the leader of the 1990s Forest Planning and Management 
Project in Oxford. In the library at his home he kindly allowed me to look through a 
collection of boxes of records from his six years in Belize. Looking at these carefully 
preserved reports, data, newspaper articles and photocopies of historical documents 
felt like a parallel experience to an earlier visit to Oxford, when I had examined Neil 
Stevenson’s (Conservator of Forests in Belize in the 1930s and 1940s) personal 
records in the Weston Library’s Special Collections. These collections, curated by 
British foresters, and removed from Belize, stood in stark contrast to those in decay 
in Belize.  
These experiences and textual fragments together led me to understand that 
the collection and preservation of data about the Belizean environment has been an 
enterprise largely driven by foreign scientists and administrators.30 While Belizeans 
have been involved, they have not always owned the ‘vision’ or purpose behind data 
collection. There has often been a form of institutional ‘memory loss’ as records of 
research have been destroyed or forgotten. These were conclusions I reached by 
taking an ethnographic approach to the archives and record collections I visited. 
 
29 Circular despatch from Neil Stevenson to all Forest Officers, 13th February 1941, [Machaca Forest 
Station, Toledo District, Belize, uncatalogued in storage]. 
30 Note that this is changing, with the work of Belize’s Environmental Research Institute (ERI), 
established at the University of Belize in 2010. The ERI is curating a digital archive of historical data 
and reports about the Belizean environment, available at http://eprints.uberibz.org/.  
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Examining the maps and data that have been created about the Belizean 
environment in isolation might have led to false assumptions about their relevance 
and use in Belize.  
In a second example, it was my own experiences working in the Darwin 
Project that shaped my reading of the experiences of Martin Johnson (now 
deceased), a British forester who was, in the 1970s, seconded from the British 
Overseas Development Ministry (ODM) to the Belize Forest Department. In 2017, I 
found a copy of Johnson’s Southern Coastal Plain Fire Protection Scheme among 
the jumbled ‘archive’ of material at the Belize Forest Department headquarters in 
Belmopan.31 This publication by ODM’s Land Resources Division was the output of 
Johnson’s second assignment in Belize; a single month’s consultancy in 1973. 
Johnson had earlier spent three years, 1968 to 1971, working on forest inventories 
in Belize, including of the Southern Coastal Plain savanna.32 He had gone to 
considerable lengths to research the history of the Department and its work on the 
Southern Coastal Plain. Both of his publications are rich in detail. I felt a sense of 
affinity with Johnson; he had read many of the reports and documents that I have 
read in conducting my research. He had felt that an understanding of the history of 
the Department was essential if he was to write useful policy.  
A few months later, among the decaying records at the Mountain Pine Ridge 
Forest Station, I stumbled across several letters written by Johnson. These dated 
from several years after his consultancy for the writing of the Southern Coastal Plain 
Fire Protection Scheme, when Johnson returned to Belize for several years’ 
secondment as a member of staff with the Forest Department. He was tasked with 
writing working plans for several areas, including the Southern Coastal Plain. 
 
31 Johnson (1974). 
32 Johnson & Chaffey (1974).  
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Johnson clearly believed that these plans would be of importance to the Forest 
Department: in a letter to the Chief Forest Officer he wrote 
I hope that the plans I produce will function as policy documents for the next 10 
years or so for the areas involved. I think that they should be approved by and 
signed by the highest possible authority. There was a time when working plans in 
the French Forest Service were signed by the President of the Republic himself. I 
am not suggesting that they should go as far as the Hon. Premier here, but I think 
they should go as far as the Hon. Minister of Trade and Industry.33 
 
Johnson’s secondment to Belize ended before the draft working plans could 
be finalised or, indeed, adopted. Back at ODM in 1977, he wrote to Nick Woods, 
another British member of staff in Belize with the Forest Department, to enquire as 
to what progress had been made with the working plans: 
Nearly seven months have passed since I left Belize…. My main reason for writing is 
to enquire what has happened to the draft management plans for Chiquibul, 
Mountain Pine Ridge and the Southern Coastal Plain. They were in manuscript only 
when I left Belize. When I visited Henry Flowers the day before I left, I understood 
him to have agreed to send a copy of the typescript of each one to me for 
corrections and additions. I have so far received nothing. On two occasions when I 
was at Oxford, I wrote to Henry Flowers sending details of nursing career 
opportunities in the UK for his daughter and asking about the management plans. I 
also, when sending Eustace Bradley details of a BBC broadcast about match 
manufacture in Pakistan he had requested, asked him about the management plans. 
I have not received an answer to any of the three letters.34 
 
In 1978, Nick Woods and others finalised the Southern Coastal Plain 
Working Plan. Neither the Working Plan, nor Johnson’s 1974 Fire Protection 
Scheme, were put into practice by the Forest Department.35 A former staff member 
with the Forest Department who I interviewed recalled the fate of the various 
studies, including Johnson’s, published by ODM/ ODA’s Land Resources Division: 
‘when those reports were published, they made, of course, hundreds of copies…. 
 
33 Letter from Martin Johnson to Chief Forest Officer, 25th November 1976, [Mountain Pine Ridge 
Forest Station, Cayo District, Belize, uncatalogued in storage]. 
34 Letter from Martin Johnson to Nick Woods, 30th December 1977, [Mountain Pine Ridge Forest 
Station, Cayo District, Belize, uncatalogued in storage].  
35 Letter from Nick Woods to the Chief Forest Officer on subject ‘Southern Coastal Plain Working Plan’, 
9th February 1978, [Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Station, Cayo District, Belize, uncatalogued in 




these are things that you are supposed to distribute to every office and everybody 
who is interested. And here they were stored away and stacked away in that old 
storage shed somewhere’.36 I saw parallels with my own experience working in 
Belize. During and after my time as Project Officer for the Darwin Project I sent 
many unanswered emails requesting updates from Belizean project partners.  
I encountered and understood Martin Johnson’s relationship to the Belize 
Forest Department, not only in his words, but also through my own experience of 
researching the history of the Forest Department and working for an international 
development project in Belize. The emotional and intellectual connection I felt with 
Johnson helped me understand those between my own position and that of former 
British development workers in Belize. As Sarah de Leeuw argues, looking at 
colonial settlers in Canada, such emotional connections are important: we are not 
distant observers but deeply implicated in the histories that we research and write.37 
 
3.7 Conclusions on writing the thesis 
‘Writing up’ is difficult when one has been an ‘insider’ in ethnographic 
research. This proved true in my case, of working within the Darwin Project while 
also attempting to research how the project worked (and not always whether it 
worked). As David Mosse recounts, from such a position, exiting the ‘field’ for the 
‘desk’ is challenging, not only because written accounts continually seem incomplete 
but also 
because ethnographic writing begins to have significant social effects of its own. The 
detachment of writing is now socially experienced by others. Of course, those 
reading about themselves may be intrigued, amused, or pleased; but turning 
relationships into data, and placing interpretations in public, can also disturb and 
break relationships of fieldwork. It may be “anti-social”. Those interlocutors -
neighbours, friends, colleagues, or co-professionals - who directly experience 
 
36 Interview 3.  




ethnographic objectifications now surround the anthropologist at her or his desk; 
they raise objections, make new demands to negotiate public and published 
interpretations.38 
 
Writing and editing could thus be conceived of as part of a research methodology. 
Just as they were challenged constantly in the ‘field’, so too were my interpretations 
shaped and refined in sharing my text with my colleagues.  
In choosing what to take ‘as read’ in analysis, and thus what to present as 
‘historical fact’ in writing, I faced ‘the meaningful tension disclosed in the archive’, of 
choosing ‘how to deal with subjectivity — whether kept at arm's length or allowed 
just that little bit closer’.39 Ultimately, in thematic analysis and in constructing a 
narrative, I gave my own structure to a messy reality.40 It is my hope that the 
reflexive elements in this chapter will enable the reader to ‘work along the grain’ of 













38 Mosse (2006), p. 937.  
39 Lorimer (2009), p. 258. Emphasis original.  
40 Cronon (1992); Baker (1997). 
41 To reference Stoler’s (2010) approach to archival traces, which aims to treat them as subjects and 




Fire protection: ‘British Empire forestry’ in the Belizean savanna, 1920-
1941 
 
By the nineteenth century British fire history had largely moved to the 
empire’s overseas dominions. Britain's own containment and occasional 
expulsion of fire perhaps made all the more intense the shock of 
rediscovering free-burning fire as an endemic and elemental phenomenon 
elsewhere. To travel to India, Africa, America, Canada, New Zealand, or 
Australia was to step back into British history to the early centuries of 
landnam and to engage environments where, unlike sodden Britain, nature 
could escalate bonfires into holocausts (Pyne, 1997, 360).  
 
Colonial governors and missionaries, settlers and technocrats, cast their 
gaze across the globe, but the question remains: to what extent were their 
visions clear or powerful enough to remake it? (Cooper & Stoler, 1989, 620).  
 
This chapter explores the origins of the Belizean state Forest Department 
and of its attempts to manage savanna fires. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 provide context, 
introducing Belize’s lowland savannas and sketching some of Belize’s historical 
political economy. While my focus is on the period after 1920, because this was 
when state fire management was instituted, developments in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries set the stage for patterns of land distribution and management 
that persisted into the first decades of the twentieth century.42 I address, particularly, 
how development of the colonial state affected human activity in the lowland 
savannas before 1920. In Section 4.3 I interrogate the ‘problem’ of savanna wildfires 
in Belize, and its proposed solutions, as they were articulated in an influential report 
of 1921, by the Department’s first Conservator of Forests, Cornelius Hummel. In 
Section 4.4, to understand the report’s influence, I examine the discourses and 
 
42 Bolland & Shoman (1977); Wainwright (2008, 2015, 2018).  
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practices that lent Hummel authority with the British Colonial Office. The final 
sections examine how, in the decades following 1921, fire management was not 
‘implemented’ by the Forest Department as it had been envisaged in Hummel’s 
report. In practice, fire management was frustrated by a poorly-understood ecology, 
hurricanes, different fire users and schismatic politics. The evidence presented 
speaks of a messy and emergent reality in dialogue with – but often divergent from – 
official colonial texts and ideals.  
 
4.1 Belize’s lowland savannas 
Belize’s subtropical to tropical climate has a mean monthly 
minimum/maximum temperature of 16/28 °C (winter) and 24/33 °C (summer).43 
Lowland savannas extend along the Belizean coast and further to the north and 
south on the Central American isthmus, bordered by mangrove swamps to the sea, 
and dense broadleaf rainforest inland (see map Figure 4.1).44 These savannas have 
a patchwork mosaic of habitats: grassland with pine, oak or no trees, and pockets of 
broadleaf forest (see views of the savanna, Figures 4.2 – 4.5).45 Wildfires are 
common in the savanna in the dry season, from February to May. In Chapters five 
and six, the emphasis is on the savannas of the southern coastal plain in the Stann 
Creek and Toledo Districts.  
Climatic and edaphic factors broadly control the vegetation distribution in 
Belize. The savanna is underlain by an Eocene-Cretaceous limestone platform, 
overlain by clay and topped with silty and sandy Pliocene deposits derived from the 
older rocks of the Maya Mountains inland, or, in some places, with Quaternary  
 
43 Stuart, Barratt & Place (2006).  
44 Cameron, Stuart & Goodwin (2011).  Though not the subject of this thesis, it is important to note that 
there is also a small area of upland savanna in Belize. This are further inland and is named the 
Mountain Pine Ridge area. The upland savanna has a different ecology to the lowland savanna. It is, 
however, similarly subject to frequent fires and fire management has been carried out there by the 
Forest Department.  





Source: Map created in Arc GIS by author, using Belize Ecosystems 2015 version shapefile (Meerman, 






Savanna in Deep River Forest Reserve near Payne’s Creek National Park, showing the patchwork 
mosaic of vegetation types in the savanna: open grassland with some shrubs (to front); grassland with 
pine (circled in red); broadleaf (circled in purple); a dense ‘island’ of palmetto (circled in yellow). 
Source: Author, 2018. 
Figure 4.3 
 
View over the savanna to the north of the Deep River Forest Reserve from the abandoned Las Lomitas 
fire lookout tower. The image shows the patchwork mosaic of vegetation in the savanna: grassland 
with and without pine interspersed with inclusions of broadleaf. 





Smoke from an ongoing savanna wildfire at the north of the Placencia peninsula. 




Savanna to the north of the Placencia peninsula following a wildfire 




coastal deposits.46 These are, for the most part, heavily weathered acidic and 
nutrient poor soils. Together with the clay layer, which determines poor drainage 
and seasonal inundation (given the marked seasonality in rainfall), these factors, 
broadly, explain the occurrence of savanna. By contrast, the richer soils inland, 
calcareous outcrops and alluvial deposits along rivers that cut down from the Maya 
Mountains support dense broadleaf rainforest (patches of broadleaf also occur 
within the savanna mosaic). At a local level, differences in slope, drainage and soil 
underly the mosaic of vegetation types within the savanna. For example, the gently 
undulating topography of the coastal plain leaves drier ridges and wetter 
depressions, and the higher and drier ridges generally support more pine and oak.47 
At a finer scale, it is feedbacks with disturbances that control the shifting vegetation 
boundaries. In Central American pine savannas, fire and hurricanes are the main 
disturbance agents given the lack of large, grazing herbivores.48 Today, human 
agency is the cause of most fires in the coastal savannas (although the presence of 
grassland, pine and fires pre-date human presence in Belize).49 Since their arrival in 
Central America, approximately 10,000 years ago, human use of fire may have 
aided the expansion of grasslands, and, coupled with erosion, have allowed pine to 
expand its distribution.50  
Many plant species of the Belizean coastal savannas are adapted to some 
level of frequent fire. Burning triggers flowering for a rich ground flora of grasses and 
 
46 Wright et al (1959); Donoghue et al (2019). 
47 Wright et al (1959); Stuart, Barratt & Place (2006). 
48 Myers & Morrison (2006); Myers (2009). 
49 The first known record of fire in Belize is from a charcoal fragment in the Mountain Pine Ridge, dated 
by Kellman (1975) to 11210 ±330 BC. Most writers have believed that the majority of fires are human in 
origin, with only occasional fires resulting from lightning strikes (Hunt, 1962; Wolffsohn, 1967; Johnson 
& Chaffey, 1974; Arnold & Armitage, 1989). There is no existing data regarding the number of lightning 
fires in the coastal savannas. The only evidence I found in this regard was in the Forest Department’s 
annual report for 1963 (Forest Department, 1964), which notes that of the fires fought that year on the 
coastal plain, 19% were due to lightning strikes and 81% were human in origin. This is surprising given 
that three years later, Wolffsohn wrote that ‘in the coastal pine forests lightning fires are unknown’ 
(Wolffsohn, 1967, p. 233).  
50 Myers & Rodríguez-Trejo (2009).  
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herbs. Pinus caribaea, the dominant pine species, has shade intolerant seedlings 
and requires post-fire sunlit conditions for regeneration. Fires kill the oldest 
individuals, bringing light and space to new seedlings. Pine seedlings with less than 
one year’s growth will often be killed by fire, although the likelihood of mortality is 
also highly dependent on site-specific variables. Once pines reach maturity they will 
generally survive low-intensity fire, having a thick protective bark and a ‘self-pruning’ 
capacity to shed and quickly regrow crown needles and re-sprout from stems (see 
Figure 4.6).51 Dense ‘islands’ and scattered individuals of the palmetto 
Acoelorrhaphe wrightii are also found throughout the savanna. This species, like 
other palmetto palms, is adapted to fire, with fire-induced flowering and large 
underground organs from which it sprouts clonally, as well as the ability rapidly to 
refoliate post-fire. Its leaves contain a volatile wax which burns intensely, 
propagating fire and killing neighbouring competing species (Figure 4.7 shows 
palmetto burning).52  
Myers and Morrison loosely characterise an ‘ecologically appropriate’ fire 
regime for the pine savannas of Honduras, which are very similar to those in Belize, 
as one of low intensity surface fire with a return interval of one to ten years.53 Recent 
analysis of satellite imagery suggests that the present fire return interval in the 
coastal savanna of southern Belize is under three years.54 The ecological role of fire 
in the Belizean coastal savanna has, however, received very little empirical 
research, especially in so far as it may guide management.55 
 
 
51 Myers & Morrison (2006); Myers (2009); Rick Anderson (pers. comm. 16th December 2018). 
52 Milne (1997); Furley (2008). 
53 Myers & Morrison (2006). 
54 Roper (2016). 
55 The feedbacks between fire, soil nutrients and vegetation in the upland savannas of the Mountain 
Pine Ridge were subject to extensive experimental study by Martin Kellman and students from the 
1970s to 1990s (see in particular Kellman (1984); Kellman & Sanmugadas (1985); Kellman, Miyanishi 






Pinus caribaea re-sprouting from a stem after fire. 




A highly flammable palmetto palm (Acoelorrhaphe wrightii) burning during a prescribed burn in the 
Deep River Forest Reserve. 
Source: Author, 2018. 
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Various writers describing the Belizean savannas earlier in the twentieth 
century tried to fit the vegetation boundaries they saw into the framework of the 
theory of ecological succession and equilibrium ecology (as described in Chapter 
two). Stevenson (1927), saw an ecological succession from treeless savanna to 
pine forest to climax broadleaf forest; Bartlett (1935) saw pine forest and broadleaf 
as separate climaxes.56 Conversely, Charter (1941) and Beard (1953) believed there 
to be a succession from broadleaf forest to pine to treeless savanna, and thought it 
to be controlled by the gradual weathering of alluvial soils, and impedance of 
drainage, not fire.57 Wright et al (1959) upheld the importance of soil drainage on 
surface vegetation, but also understood fire to play a role.58 So too, Lamb (1950) 
and Hunt (1962), pointed to edaphic factors and to the importance of fire.59 Munro 
(1966) and Budowski (1966) understood fire as the most important factor controlling 
the occurrence of savanna, and believed human agricultural fire use in broadleaf 
forests to have been a major driver of ‘savannisation’ of formerly forested areas.60 
While these writers emphasised different factors, each failed to theorise the 
feedbacks between different factors and to explain the inherent disequilibrium of the 
system. In searching for a theory to account for all Belizean savannas, these writers 
did not appreciate that, given the ecological variety that exists in savannas in Belize, 
different factors might be important in different areas. In this, and the next chapter, I 
will show how this limited understanding of the complex ecology of the savannas 
influenced their management by the Forest Department from 1920 to 1986.   
 
 
56 Stevenson (1927); Bartlett (1935).  
57 Charter (1941); Beard (1953).  
58 Wright et al (1959). 
59 Lamb (1950); Hunt (1962).  




4.2 Belize’s political economy: A brief history to 1920 
Though it is thought that humans had reached Central America by 10,000 
BCE, the first evidence of settlement in Belize is at 2600 BCE at Cuello.61 What is 
now Belize was within the area occupied by the Mayan civilisation, and contained 
various major population centres, many of which reached their peak populations in 
the Early Classic (AD 250-600).  Many sites declined into the Post-Classic (from AD 
1000).62 In 1504, Columbus encountered the Gulf of Honduras on his fourth voyage, 
initiating the Spanish conquest of the Central American mainland. The Spanish did 
not establish a permanent presence in what is now Belize but raided, enslaved and 
attempted to ‘pacify’ the indigenous Maya of three linguistic groups occupying the 
area. The British entered the Caribbean in 1560, condoned by the British Crown’s 
attempt to break Spain’s embargo on foreign trade: British buccaneers used the 
Cayes on Belize’s coast as a base to pillage Spanish vessels.63 When buccaneering 
was outlawed by the Treaty of Madrid in 1667, some former British buccaneers 
founded logwood cutting settlements on the mainland in what is now Mexico’s 
Yucatan at Campeche, and also in ‘the Bay’ (modern-day Belize City). Logwood was 
certainly being exported from the Bay, via Jamaica, by 1670, and it is likely that the 
British were importing African slaves to the settlement.64 By 1735 the Bay settlement 
grew in importance after the Spanish cleared the British logging camps in the 
Yucatan. The Spanish first granted the British limited rights to occupation, and for 
logwood cutting only, in the Treaty of Paris of 1763. By then mahogany was already 
 
61 Hammond et al (1976). 
62 Coe & Houston (2015). 
63 The Cayes are the islands that run the length of Belize’s coast along its barrier reef. 
64 Though the first written evidence of African slaves in the Belize settlement dates to 1724. See 





superseding logwood cutting and export, but this was not legally sanctioned by the 
Spanish until the 1786 Convention of London.65  
Before 1763 the British settlers had no formal system of land ownership, but, 
following official recognition of the settlement by the Spanish, the British 
Government sent a Vice-Admiral to encourage the settlers to develop a basic set of 
laws for the settlement, which were known as ‘Burnaby’s Code’. This included the 
first ‘location law’, which established the principle that occupation of a logwood 
‘work’ equated to ownership of it. The law specified that no man should occupy more 
than two works, but the settlers did not adhere to this. The same principles soon 
applied to mahogany works. Mahogany cutting demanded more land and labour 
than logwood and thus land was rapidly concentrated in the hands of a dozen 
powerful settlers. They owned the largest number of slaves, controlled the ‘public 
meeting’, the settlement’s only legislative body, and having established connections 
with London merchants for their timber export, controlled the imports upon which the 
settlement depended.66 
When the Spanish empire was dismantled after 1821, Britain negotiated its 
rights to the settlement with newly-independent Guatemala and Mexico. The treaties 
with Spain had only allowed British timber extraction as far south as the Sibun, but 
the settlers had ignored this, and mahogany operations reached the Sarstoon River 
(at what is now the southern border of Belize) by 1825. This uncertainty as to the 
nature of the British right to the territory (which, as Figure 4.8 shows, had a small 
population) made the British Government reluctant to openly assert a claim to 
sovereignty throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. Britain’s interest in the 
settlement was largely economic: besides the logwood and mahogany trades, Belize  
 
65 Bolland (1977), chs. 3 and 4; Thomson (2004), chs. 2 and 3; Bulmer-Thomas & Bulmer-Thomas 
(2012), ch. 2; Shoman (2012), ch. 2. 
66 Bolland & Shoman (1977); Bulmer-Thomas & Bulmer-Thomas (2012), ch. 3.  
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(1) Belize Census of 1901**, [BARS Census-11]. 
(2) Belize Census of 1911, [BARS Census-12]. 
(3) Belize Census of 1946, (BARS Census- 16]. 
(4) Belize Census of 1931, [BARS Census-14]. 
(5) Belize Census of 1960, [BARS Census-16 and Census-17]. 
(6) Belize abstract of statistics 1973-4, [BARS AR117].  
(7) Belize abstract of statistics 1991, [shared by the Belize Government’s Statistics Institute].  
(8) Belize Census of 2000, [raw data shared by the Belize Government’s Statistics Institute]. 
(9) Belize Census of 2010, [raw data shared by the Belize Government’s Statistics Institute]. 
* These sources did not follow consistent census methodologies.  


































































































































was the base for a flourishing entrepôt trade with the Central American mainland. 
From 1786 the British government had installed superintendents in the Bay, but they 
had little power over the local elite. One, Superintendent George Arthur, attempted 
and failed in 1817 to end the ‘location’ system and break the land monopoly. He 
succeeded only in passing several new resolutions, one of which named all 
unclaimed land as ‘Crown Land’, disposable by grant. In practice, over the following 
decades the location system remained in force. The Crown made few land grants 
and no attempt to regulate the use of Crown Lands. In the early nineteenth century, 
some of the dominant settlers went bankrupt and their lands secured by ‘location’ 
were bought out by several British metropolitan companies who came to own most 
of the private land. By 1882, the Belize Estate and Produce Company (BEC), owned 
over half of the private land in Belize, with secure title under the Land Titles Act. 
BEC’s lawyers had strong influence with both the British Government and Belizean 
legislative assembly and were thus able to bias the Belizean legislation in their 
favour.67  
When the settlement became an official colony in 1862, and a crown colony 
in 1871, the British Government and its Governors appointed to Belize took a 
stronger ruling stance.68 By then, the Caribbean colonies were declining in 
importance within Britain’s Empire, and Britain preferred to encourage capitalist 
investment rather than create a strong local administration.69 There was minimal 
public spending and little attempt to regulate private actors. For example, despite 
the publication of a report on the Forests of Belize in 1887 in a series commissioned 
 
67 BEC had immense political influence in Belize until after WW2. BEC’s largest shareholders, the 
Hoare family, included a Director of the Bank of England, and two members of parliament, one of 
whom served as British Foreign Secretary in 1935. Bolland & Shoman (1977); Bulmer-Thomas & 
Bulmer-Thomas (2012), ch. 3 and appendix 2; Shoman (2012), ch. 5. 
68 Crown Colony status was sought by the settlers in the hope that Britain would then lend greater 
support to the settlement in the Caste War with Mexico. Despite Crown Colony status, British 
assistance was not as forthcoming as had been hoped.  




by Kew Gardens for the West Indian colonies, which noted the unregulated and 
over-extractive nature of the mahogany industry, the suggestion to establish a 
Forestry Department to regulate forest use and extraction was not taken up.70 
Despite constitutional changes throughout the twentieth century, the 
influence of the Governor and his officials to direct affairs in the Colony remained 
constrained by the power of the metropolitan companies.  These major landowners 
had their headquarters in Britain, but their interests were protected locally by 
representatives or partners who often held positions in the legislature and doubled 
as merchants in Belize City. Between 1890 and 1892, this group succeeded in 
campaigning for an unofficial majority in government. As Governor Swayne 
lamented in 1910, ‘no other British Colony has a constitution like that of British 
Honduras, where we have a nominated unofficial majority practically appointed for 
life and considering themselves responsible neither to the people of the Colony nor 
to the Crown’.71  
In the later nineteenth century, the government made increasing efforts to 
encourage foreign capitalists to establish commercial plantation agriculture, for 
which labour was imported from the Caribbean and China. Slavery had been 
abolished in Belize in 1834 and the government had introduced a price for small 
land grants and a contract labour system. Many former slaves were thus inhibited 
from developing their own smallholder agriculture and remained bound into a 
system of debt servitude in the mahogany industry, which remained the economic 
backbone of the settlement.72 The Mayan population grew in Belize in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, in the north as a result of the Caste War, and in the 
south as Q’eqchi immigrants fled conditions of coercive labour on coffee plantations 
 
70 Hooper (1887). See also Richardson (2004), ch. 4; Wainwright & Zempel (2018). 
71 Governor Swayne to Crewe, 18th July 1910, [TNA CO, 123/265], in Ashdown (1981), p. 128. 




in Guatemala. Many lived largely ‘unseen’ by the state, but there were increasingly 
efforts to govern and gather revenue from the Maya. In 1872, the Crown Lands 
Ordinance provided for the creation of ‘Indian Reservations’, in which the Maya paid 
occupancy fees for usufruct rights to occupy Crown Land. The government sought 
to organise settled communities of agriculturalists, in which the state-formalised 
Alcalde leadership system gave them a means of indirect rule.73  
Bolland and Shoman summarise Belize’s political economy in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries as follows: 
This then is the circle of factors concerning land in Belize: the demands of the 
metropolitan market create the raison d'être for colonial occupation and settlement; 
the system of land tenure and the pattern of land use develop in relation to the 
changing demands of the market and the development of the Settlement's 
constitutional position; the growing colonial economy makes greater demands for 
labour, resulting in immigration, dispossession, and a variety of coercive measures 
to keep the labour force dependent; the monopolization of land and the 
dispossession of the people ensures the dependence of the labourers upon their 
employers for their subsistence; the underutilization of land resulting from its 
monopolization maintains the dependence of the entire country upon the metropolis. 
In this fashion the demands of Western European, and now North Atlantic, 
capitalism have created and perpetuated dependent satellite economies.74 
 
Thus, entering the period of focus of this thesis, Belize was ruled from Belize City; 
‘to all intents and purposes the capital was the colony’.75 In southern Belize, 
capitalist commodity production, labour markets and direct rule by state 
representatives or institutions was minimal.76 Most land was ‘undeveloped’ and 
possessed by a handful of companies based in London, or, as was the case for 
most of the savanna, held by the British Crown. These colonial legacies set the 
stage for persistent inequality: In 1971, three per cent of the freeholders still owned 
 
73 Wilk (1991), chs. 3 and 11; Moberg (1992); Bolland (2003), ch. 5; Wainwright (2008), ch. 1; Grandia 
(2012), chs. 1 and 3; Shoman (2012), ch. 6; Wainwright (2015). It is unlikely that the Maya chose to live 
in such ‘communities’ before Spanish and British colonial rule. The Alcaldes were indigenous leaders, 
whose positions of jurisdiction over village affairs were legally formalised by the colonial state. 
Indigenous villages in southern Belize still maintain biannually-appointed Alcaldes. 
74 Bolland & Shoman (1977), p. 8. 
75 Ashdown (1981), p. 16. 




95% of the private land in Belize.77 Land distribution has since remained highly 
inequitable.78 
 
4.3 The Belizean coastal savannas and human fire use before the twentieth 
century 
Little is known empirically about human fire use in Belize prior to European 
contact and in the early colonial period. Palaeoecological studies of charcoal and 
pollen records from lake sediment cores can provide evidence of human land and 
fire use, although these signals are not easily isolated from climate signals. There 
are only three charcoal records for Belize.79 None isolates a local charcoal record 
from savanna. These studies associate increased charcoal frequency, as a proxy for 
fire use, with times of population increase and higher farming intensity in broadleaf 
forest.  
Palaeoecological and archaeological studies give some limited insights into 
the use of the savanna prior to European contact. In some areas in northern Belize, 
the wettest savanna was used for ‘chinampa’ (raised field agriculture).80 There are 
archaeological remains of Maya hunting sites in the southern coastal plain 
savannas.81 In the Classical Period, the Maya operated an extensive salt industry in 
the coastal lagoons of Southern Belize, close to the lowland savannas (Figure 4.9 
shows a Maya site in the savanna associated with the nearby salt works).82 
Nevertheless, as today, the limitations of the soils for agriculture probably led to little 
inhabitation of the savanna, settlement instead  
 
 
77 Bolland & Shoman (1977), p. 104.  
78 Wainwright (2008, 2015, 2018); Shoman (2012), ch. 12 and 13.  
79 These are at different resolutions and timespans: Pohl et al (1996) cover dates from 6000 BCE to 
present; Rushton et al (2013) from 1500 BCE to 1500 AD; Walsh et al (2014) from 800 BCE to present.  
80 Siemens (1982); Baker (2003).  
81 Heather Mckillop, pers. comm. 21st March 2018. 





Maya site in the southern part of the Deep River Forest Reserve (circled in yellow). This earthen 
mound is likely associated with the salt works, and one of several remnant sites where brine was 
leached to enrich the salt content before it was boiled to make salt (Heather McKillop pers. comm.). 
Source: Author, 2018. 
 
favouring fertile river valleys and broadleaf forest further inland.83 Pine from savanna 
areas was traded and of importance in settlements located some distance from 
savannas, being used in construction, for fuelwood, and as wood ash from 
household refuse, to fertilise agricultural land.84 Pine was also of ritual and political 
importance. Pine torches feature in Classical Period Mayan iconography and it is 
found in ceremonial cave deposits throughout what is now Belize.85  
Palaeoecological records across the neotropics generally show a decrease 
in charcoal frequency associated with European contact, attributed to population 
decrease among indigenous populations encountering European disease and 
 
83 Thompson (1973); Dunham & Wanyerka (1994). 
84 Wyatt (2008); Rushton, Metcalfe & Whitney (2013); Rushton (2014). 




violence.86 The charcoal records from Belize each show different patterns and are 
too limited in number and location to make generalisations about the impact of 
European contact on fire use.87 European settlers and their African slaves certainly 
brought their own fire use practices to Central America, which subsequently both 
influenced and were influenced by indigenous practices. William Dampier’s account 
of the logwood settlements to the north of Belize at Campeche demonstrates 
settlers’ use of fire in savannas in their use as rangelands for cattle: ‘The Mould of 
the Savannahs is generally black and deep, producing a course sort of sedgy Grass. 
In the latter end of the dry time, we set fire to it, which runs like Wild-fire, and keeps 
burning as long as there is any Fewel’.88 Sluyter and Duvall suggest that this late dry 
season timing of fire use as described by Dampier shows the influence of African 
burning practices on the logwood cutters.89 Such early descriptions of fire use in 
savannas in Belize are few, but nineteenth-century sources suggest that fire use for 
hunting was commonplace, and associated with indigenous practices. The colonial 
forester Hooper noted in 1887 ‘I would add on the subject of the Pine ridges that 
those in the interior are burnt over yearly by Indian hunters’.90 The Maya, African 
slaves and European settlers used fire to clear land for agriculture in the broadleaf 
forest, but this, generally occurring at some distance from the savanna, is unlikely to 
have been a major cause of savanna wildfires.91 
While laws to control fires within Belize City to protect its mostly thatch 
buildings were passed as early as 1806, the Belizean legislation did not refer to fires 
outside urban areas until much later.92 In 1894, an Ordinance was passed to ‘render 
 
86 Nevle et al (2011). 
87 Walsh et al (2014). 
88 Dampier (1697), p. 58. 
89 Sluyter & Duvall (2015). 
90 Hooper (1887), p. 10.  
91 See description for example in Duval (1878), p. 67. 




more effectual the provisions for the protection of property from destruction or injury 
by fire’, which was aimed at controlling fire that might damage any ‘house, building 
or other property’.93 Under this definition, privately-owned land could be included. 
The Fire (negligent use of) Ordinance, passed in 1912 (see Table 4.1), made the 
first explicit reference to fires outside property boundaries: 
Every occupier or person who shall set, or who shall negligently, carelessly or 
improperly use or manage, or who shall permit or allow the careless or improper use 
or management of, any fire in or upon any land or place whatsoever, and every 
person who shall use or carry any lighted pipe cigar or cigarette or any lighted torch 
or other matter or thing in a state of ignition not sufficiently guarded or enclosed so 
as to prevent danger from fire, where by danger may or shall result to any building, 
land, forest, wood, cultivated or uncultivated tree, plant, or other produce whatsoever 
of the soil, engine, carriage, train, railway-line, fence or any property of whatsoever 
nature or kind.94 
 
 
Table 4.1 Legislation regarding fires in Belize (excluding legislation regarding 
urban fires) 
 
Year Legislation Effect 
1912 Fire (Negligent Use of) Ordinance Makes careless or ‘improper’ use of fire on any land 
or property illegal. 
1926 Ordinance for the Protection and 
Control of Forests and Forest Produce 
Enables the Governor to make rules regarding fire 
use in forest areas. 
1927 Forest Rules (Under 1926 Forest 
Ordinance) 
Rule 12 makes it illegal to set fires or leave fires 
burning in the Crown forests.  
1945 New Rules under Fire (Negligent Use 
of) Ordinance 
Fire traces must be created around vegetation 
before burning for agriculture. 
1958 Agricultural Fires Act Those wishing to burn to clear land for agriculture 
must apply for a license to the agriculture 
department first. All agricultural fires must take place 
within a fire trace (fire break) of at least 6 ft in width. 
1962 Forest Fires Act The Governor (later the Minister overseeing the 
Forest Department) can declare any area of Belize a 
fire control area, for which the Chief Forest Officer 
will write a fire protection plan. This must be 
followed through by the landowner or management 





93 Ordinance 11 of 1894, [TNA CO 125/6]. 
94 Ordinance 12 of 1912, [TNA CO 125/10]. 
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My analysis of surviving travel accounts and archival records gives some 
insight into the use of the savanna in Belize after European contact. Most of this 
activity initially took place in the northern savannas near Belize City. If the settlers or 
their slaves used the southern coastal plain savannas they did so after 1800, once 
mahogany cutting reached the area. Hunting and consuming a diversity of wild 
meats, including from savannas, was both a means of subsistence for the lower 
classes but also valued for sport and gastronomy by the white upper classes.95 The 
settlers used some savanna areas to graze cattle, but with limited success, owing to 
the lack of water in the dry season.96 The savanna also housed other resources, 
most still used today. Yellow-headed parrots, prized as pets, were ‘in large numbers 
… annually taken from their nests in the standing trees which are very often cut 
down for that purpose’.97 Palmetto stems and leaves were used in thatching and 
walling by settlers and indigenous people.98 The British and their slaves also used 
pine wood in construction, though lumber imported from the US was commonly in 
use by the nineteenth century.99 The logwood and mahogany cutters used pine 
shards as torches, without which ‘the hauling of mahogany, which, on account of the 
heat and the flies (mosquitoes), takes place chiefly at night, could not be carried 
on’.100  
Rights of access to savanna areas began to change in the nineteenth 
century. The British had privatised much of the broadleaf forest for its logwood and 
 
95 Uring (1726), p. 356; Wilk (2005, 2006).  
96 As described by Henderson (1811), p. 120; Swett (1868), p. 28. 
97 Memorandum of Surveyor General Usher, of 24th November 1903, enclosed in letter of 26th 
November 1903 from Colonial Secretary Cork to Colonial Office [TNA, CO 123/245], p. 4. See also 
Henderson (1811).  
98 Dampier (1697), p. 79; Henderson (1811), p. 17; Swett (1868), p. 31; Morris (1883), p. 56. 
99 Henderson (1811), p. 109; Morris (1883), p. 57-8; Memorandum of Surveyor General Usher, of 24th 
November 1903, enclosed in letter of 26th November 1903 from Colonial Secretary Cork to Colonial 
Office [TNA, CO 123/245], p. 4; Memorandum of Surveyor General Usher, of 1st February 1904, 
enclosed in letter of 4th February 1904 from Colonial Secretary Cork to Colonial Office [TNA, CO 
123/246], p. 1. 





mahogany resources, but most savanna areas had remained common access 
areas. In 1936, the Forest Trust noted how ‘an interesting entry appears in the 
Archives of the Colony dated 7th December 1793, when the Quarterly Court decided 
that the “Pine ridge aback of Poor Man’s Rest” was “a Common free for any of the 
inhabitants using and cutting pine in”’.101 Thus, when Superintendent Arthur, in 1919, 
proclaimed all unclaimed land to be Crown Land, he included most of the coastal 
savanna. In practice the government made few land grants and did not limit access 
to the savanna until the twentieth century. Government officials made few 
excursions out of Belize City, and the savanna was still un-mapped in 1903, the 
Surveyor General noting: 
When I say that about one-third of the bulk of Crown lands (estimated at 1956600 
acres) is pine ridge I am only speaking roughly – the same manner as the area of all 
other lands in the Colony has been arrived at- from personal knowledge of portions 
actually travelled over, of other parts seen at distance and from the tops of hills, also 
from what other travellers in remote and at present almost inaccessible places have 
recorded.102 
 
The reason for the change was a growing desire by the government to obtain 
revenue and encourage capitalist investment in commercial pine extraction (there 
had been awareness of the commercial potential of Belizean pine for timber, resin 
and turpentine in the nineteenth century103).  After 1860, pine sawmilling was started 
on two private estates (at All Pines and Regalia near the Sittee River), but this 
failed, ‘possibly from want of judgment and capital as much as from the unsuitability 
of the country at the time for any undertaking requiring skilled manipulation and 
management’.104 In 1886, an amendment to the Crown Lands Ordinance introduced 
 
101 Forest Department (1936), p. 10. 
102 Memorandum of Surveyor General Usher, of 24th November 1903, enclosed in letter of 26th 
November 1903 from Colonial Secretary Cork to Colonial Office [TNA, CO 123/245]. ‘Pine ridge’ 
denoted pine savanna.  
103 Henderson (1811), p. 109; Gibbs (1867), p. 125; Hooper (1887), p. 5. 




licensing to cut pine on Crown Lands, at a rate of 25 cents per tree.105 By the end of 
the nineteenth century the government began to consider how to encourage capital 
investment to ’make something’ of this resource on a larger scale.106 In 1904, the 
Government, backed by the Colonial Office, granted to a US firm, the Consolidated 
Naval Stores of Florida, a 30-year concession to harvest all pine on Crown Lands 
(‘the Chipley concession’).107 The firm also obtained the rights to harvest pine on the 
private lands of BEC, who owned the majority of the non-Crown savanna land.108 
From this point, access to the savanna was constrained, though the concessions 
remained unworked for another thirty years.109 
 
4.4 The formal beginnings of state fire management in Belize 
In 1922, a state forestry department was established in Belize, with fire 
‘protection’ of the pine savannas a part of its remit.110 This followed the publication of 
a ‘Report on the forests of British Honduras with suggestions for a far reaching 
forest policy’ by a German forester, Cornelius Hummel, by commission of the newly 
established British Colonial Research Committee.111 Hummel was appointed to head 
the new Forest Department as Conservator of Forests: ‘The Forest Dept. in British 
 
105 Rules made on 19th July 1886, enclosed in letter from Governor Goldsworthy to Colonial Office, 
[TNA CO 123/179].  
106 Governor Maloney, for example, addressing the issue in his opening speech to the legislative 
council in 1892, [Kew Gardens Archive MR/641], f. 12.  
107 Correspondence between Colonial Secretary Cork and the Colonial Office in 1903 and 1904, [TNA 
CO 123/246 and CO 123/247]; ‘Our pine woods’, The Clarion, 4th August 1904; ‘The pine concession’, 
The Clarion, 8th September 1904; ‘The pine concession’, The Clarion, 22nd September 1904; ‘Editorial’, 
The Colonial Guardian, 1st October 1904. 
108 Board meeting minutes, 3rd May 1905, [uncatalogued archives of the Belize Estate and Produce 
Company, Ladyville, Belize]. 
109 As noted in the press: ‘Letter to the editor’, The Clarion, 29th September 1904, and evident in 
requests for permission to cut pine in the Chipley concession area received by the Colonial Secretary 
in the following decades: Letter from Surveyor General to Colonial Secretary, 7th August 1916, [BARS 
MP2496/1916]; Letter from Acting Town Superintendent to Colonial Secretary, 8th June 1917, [BARS 
MP1948/1917].  
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Honduras started in 1922 with C. Hummel in charge and alone’.112 This section 
examines the content of Hummel’s text: the means by which it rendered fire a 
problem, the solutions it identified, and what this reveals of the governmental 
rationality for state fire management in Belize. Section 4.5 explores why Hummel 
and his report held authority with the British Colonial Office, such that his 
recommendations for state forestry were heeded. This entailed examining the 
evidence upon which his report rested and its discursive and socio-economic 
context. 
Hummel held that treeless savannas were aberrant, and fire an exogenous 
destructive force: 
The stock of the pine forests of this country, with only a few and very small 
exceptions, is in a sub-normal and unsatisfactory state; they are subject at present 
to a process of slow, but sure, destruction by fire…. On several places the pine 
forest has actually been destroyed so entirely that not a single living tree is left, and 
on large areas the destruction is so far advanced that the former forest can no 
longer be classed as a ‘forest’; it is now poor grass savannah with some pine trees 
on it and with numerous half-burnt trees lying on the ground, thus showing that there 
was a forest before.113 
 
This understanding of savannas was in line with succession theory from equilibrium 
ecology and parallels the perceptions of many of Hummel’s contemporaries in other 
European colonies, such as Madagascar and South Africa.114 
Hummel asserted that pine had potential as a valuable commodity and fire 
thus rendered the savannas ‘wasteland from an economic point of view’.115 In that 
savannas covered a large part of the Crown Land, he deemed fire an obstacle to the 
Colony’s development: ‘It is the large area of the British Honduras pine forests which 
 
112 Letter from Neil Stevenson to Peter Ashdown, 1st April 1980, [OWL MSS.W.Ind.s.56], f. 18. Hummel 
is similarly credited with the establishment of the Forest Department in other accounts. See for 
example Oliphant (1925); Duff C.E., ‘History of Forestry in British Honduras’, [unpublished, 1960s, 
OWL MSS.Brit.Emp.s.466].  
113 Hummel (1921), p. 48, emphasis added. Note that, Hummel, like other writers (see discussion 
earlier in this chapter), reserved the term ‘savanna’ for only treeless areas, which were presumed to 
have resulted from destruction of pine forests.  
114 Kepe & Scoones (1999); Pyne (1999); Kull (2004); Kepe (2005); Pooley (2014).  




makes it so important that they should be utilised and developed. A weighty 
additional reason for doing this is that the soil on that extensive area is so inferior 
that besides some poor grass, pine wood is almost the only one, and certainly the 
most valuable commodity, that can be grown there’.116 
Besides cattle pasture, which he acknowledged could be combined with pine 
forestry if properly managed, Hummel’s report mentioned no other ‘services’, 
species or resources of the savanna ecosystem. He attributed all potential value of 
the land to pine either as timber or resin. ‘Development’ of the savanna, with large-
scale capitalist investment in the establishment of a sustained pine industry, was 
presented to be in interests of the Colony at large.117 Only through fire suppression 
to conserve pine could ‘proper’ development of the savanna proceed: ‘If measures 
were taken for raising the stock of the British Honduras pine forests gradually to 
normal, there should be no difficulty in getting the whole pine area opened by simple 
railways at the expense of concessionaires’.118 Additionally, ‘the pine forests of this 
country should become valuable in about ten years hence, as it is well enough 
known that the present stock of pines in the United States is decreasing so rapidly 
that in about ten years an import to the United States instead of the present export 
must be anticipated’.119 
Hummel attributed savanna fire to human fire users, whom he portrayed as 
irrational, motivated only by their own desires and blind to the wider implications of 
their actions: 
I have been assured repeatedly that the majority of the people who set the grass in 
the pine forests on fire every year hardly realise that they do any damage. It is done 
practically by everybody and sometimes for very trivial reasons. There is some 
excuse in certain cases for burning the grass on limited areas for cattle grazing, but 
it is done too freely for hunting purposes, and even for pleasure.... grazing is only 
possible during a few months every year after burning the old grass. This burning is 
 
116 Ibid. p. 54. 
117 Ibid. p. 50. 
118 Hummel (1921), p. 49. 
119 Hummel (1921), p. 81.  
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done at present with no regard whatever to the pine trees, and in such cases, for 
instance, where a burning over 10,000 acres would be sufficient for the cattle, the 
fire is allowed to spread over 100,000 acres or so. It is this unlimited and wasteful 
annual burning that is objectionable and does so much unnecessary harm to the 
pine forest.120 
 
James Ferguson and Tania Li have suggested that development 
interventions must render the problems they would solve in technical and apolitical 
terms, to make their proposed ‘solutions’ appear necessary.121 In this way, 
Hummel’s framing of the fire problem led him to suggest certain solutions: ‘A proper 
system of protection from fire, as in other countries, is necessary, with 
systematically laid out fire lines under the control of a qualified forester, and with a 
special staff for patrolling during the dry season. A Forest Ordinance will also be 
required for this purpose’.122 For Hummel, Belize’s fires were materially no different 
to fires faced by foresters elsewhere and so could be managed by applying 
universal methods. Fire suppression was a technical problem that could be solved 
by forestry professionals with the correct training and expertise. Fire prevention 
required regulations, information and persuasion to convince fire’s human point-
sources to stop the burning. His proposed solutions were presented apolitically; the 
expertise and qualifications of foresters would legitimise fire protection in Belize. 
Guidance from forestry experts was as necessary for the Colonial Administration, 
who were to be forgiven for past errors and could not ‘be expected to have 
professional knowledge of forestry’, as it was for the enlightenment of the general 
public: ‘It is easy for anyone to see this effect of the destruction by fire, and 
everyone who has been with me in the pine forests (educated people and 
uneducated labourers) saw and realised the above facts quickly when their attention 
 
120 Hummel (1921), p. 48-50. 
121 Ferguson (1990); Li (2007a). 




was drawn to it. The only thing they wondered at afterwards was that they 
themselves had not noticed that before’.123 
In Hummel’s framing of the fire issue, the rational solution involved alignment 
between forestry officials, capitalist investors and state administrators.  His text 
established Hummel’s authority based on scientific rationality, presenting his 
analysis as ‘the facts’.124 To understand why this rationality had such salience at the 
time, we must examine the context and practices upon which it rested: British 
concerns for colonial development, pre-existing proprietorial concerns in the Colony, 
and, not least, Hummel’s background and his fieldwork in Belize.  
 
4.5 The evidence, expertise and authority behind Hummel’s call for fire 
management in Belize 
In part, Hummel’s text held sway with the Colonial Office and Governor of 
Belize because it spoke to existing developmental concerns within the Colony.125 
They sought to reduce Belize’s dependence upon mahogany exports, for which the 
market had, for decades, been unstable.126 Unlike the broadleaf forests, which were 
largely in private hands, a large proportion of the pine savanna was Crown Land, but 
these areas generated no revenue. Since the negotiation of the 30-year Chipley 
concession in 1904, the Government had waited, in vain, for capitalist investment in 
a pine industry. Moreover, in 1920, a representative of the concessionaires, named 
Kluge, made a proposal to the Government to reduce the area in question and 
 
123 Hummel (1921), p. 95 and p. 48.  
124 Hummel (1921), p. 48, 95. 
125 It is important to note that besides his recommendations for the pine industry, Hummel proposed the 
establishment of a Forest Department to impose regulatory measures on existing over-exploitative 
industries in the Colony, in particular mahogany. As Bulmer-Thomas & Bulmer-Thomas (2012, ch. 4) 
argue, the overexploitation of mahogany could no longer be ignored, with the Colony still economically 
dependent upon it.  




establish new terms for the concession.127 At the time of Hummel’s visit to Belize, 
the Governor was keen that the proposed area be specially examined. Before 
Hummel’s arrival in 1920 he requested of the Secretary of State that Hummel 
devote his attention to particular ‘economic question[s] of great importance’, among 
which he included ‘the Pine Wood Forests of the Colony, the value of which has 
recently increased’.128  
Over only one day of fieldwork in Belize, Hummel collected a small dataset 
of pine tree measurements from a single location in the savanna.129 From these 
data, Hummel extrapolated estimates of pine stocks on all Crown Land. Whether or 
not they were reliable, these estimates (and predictions of future yields) were 
powerful in making the case for fire management. Once the savanna could be 
expressed in the volumes of a potential commodity, it became a ‘field’ for capitalist 
and state intervention. The words of a staff member of the Colonial Office, speak to 
a specifically economic interest in Hummel’s work, and particularly in his data: 
This strikes me as an extremely valuable report, and it shows that the pine forests in 
British Honduras are of an actual and prospective value much greater than we would 
have anticipated…. Mr Hummel considers that the production of timber could be 
trebled merely by the adoption of well understood and routine methods of protection 
against fire. Under proper management the pine forests between Monkey River and 
Sittee River alone, which cover an area of about 200,000 square miles, could be 
made to yield at least 50,000 tons a year, and perhaps twice that amount.130 
 
Hummel was the first to publish a call for fire management, but not the first to 
problematise fire in relation to a potential pine industry. The issue of fire in the 
savanna had already been raised in 1904, as objections heard during the initial 
 
127 Letter from Governor Hutson to Colonial Office, 15th March 1920, [TNA CO 123/299], f. 440; 
Correspondence between Kluge and Colonial Secretary, May to June 1920 [BARS MP1697/1920]; 
Correspondence between Governor Hutson and Colonial Office, June to July 1920, [TNA CO 123/301]; 
‘Our pine woods and the Chipley contract’, The Clarion, 17th June 1920; ‘The Chipley contract’, The 
Clarion, 8th July 1920; Correspondence between Governor Hutson and Colonial Office, November to 
December 1920, [TNA CO 123/303].  
128 Letter from Governor Hutson to Colonial Office, 5th July 1920, [TNA, CO 123/301], f. 452-3. 
129 Report detailing the savanna reconnaissance of 16th December 1920, [TNA, CO 123/303].  
130 Colonial Office minute of 27th January 1921 on Hummel’s Report detailing the savanna 
reconnaissance of 16th December 1920, [TNA, CO 123/303], f. 155. 
150 
  
negotiation of the Chipley concession. Usher, the Surveyor General, had then 
cautioned that  
The pine land of this colony does not maintain itself in the same manner as the 
Mahogany forests in the propagation of plants by seed cast abroad from the tree, for 
the following reasons: when the seeds fall if they do not rot they are nearly all burnt 
up by the recurring annual fires – this may account for the isolated growth of the 
pines in the open pine ridges which to all appearances are very old- the majority 
being 8 inches and above that size. If the old trees are all cut down there seems no 
prospects of ever replacing them.131 
 
Eugene Campbell, Director of Belize’s Botanic Station, had warned that 
Considerable damage is done to these pine forests every year by the indiscriminate 
use of fire; hundreds of thousands of seeds and seedlings of pine are annually killed. 
If this goes on unchecked, I am afraid our pine ridges will in the course of time 
become a barren treeless waste.… it would be advisable to consider some measure 
by which these pine tracts would have some kind of protection; notice boards might 
even be placed about warning travellers against the careless use of fire especially in 
the dry season of the year. Forests like nations endure only at the expense of a 
constant succession of births and deaths. It is not an easy matter to regulate or 
control forest fires: but an effort might be made to mitigate this disastrous annual 
destruction of valuable pine forests.132 
 
Neither of these earlier calls was heeded by the Colonial Office or local government; 
they added no special measures for fire protection to the Chipley concession 
agreement. Yet fire remained a consideration in connection with the potential pine 
industry. In correspondence with the Colonial Office before Hummel’s arrival, the 
Governor noted with his request that Hummel report on the pine forests, that ‘Except 
in certain limited areas there is apparently every reason to believe that there is little 
or no natural reproduction of pine trees; the cause is alleged to be frequent fires in 
the pine ridges during the dry season of the year’.133 Fire was already a ‘problem’ in 
Belize before Hummel’s work. Yet, by the Colonial Office and Colonial 
Administration, Hummel’s perspective on savanna fires was deemed different – and 
 
131 Memorandum of Surveyor General Usher of 26th January 1904, enclosed in letter from Colonial 
Secretary Cork to Colonial Office, 28th January 1904, [TNA CO 123/246].  
132 Memorandum of Campbell of 1st February 1904, enclosed in letter from Cork to Colonial Office of 4th 
February 1904, [TNA CO 123/246]. Campbell was at the time one of the only scientifically trained 
officials stationed in the Colony. The Belize Botanic Station had been established in 1892 under 
direction from Kew Gardens (see Bulmer-Thomas & Bulmer-Thomas (2012), ch. 5).  
133 Letter from Governor Hutson to Colonial Office, 5th July 1920, [TNA, CO 123/301], f. 452-3. 
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superior – to local knowledge: ‘The frequent occurrence of fires is a matter of 
common knowledge in the Colony, but it has been left to the eye of the expert to 
appreciate the extent to which those fires have resulted in the destruction of 
seedlings, in damage to adult trees, and in the reversion of whole areas to 
savannah’.134 From this, it is appropriate to examine how Hummel’s perspective 
gained authority as ‘expertise’. As discussed in Chapter two, Section 2.7, expertise 
can be both real and socially constructed. Let me examine, first the forms of expert 
knowledge that informed Hummel’s report, before turning to the social construction 
of Hummel as the expert.  
Behind Hummel’s recommendations for fire management lay ten days of 
field inspection of the savanna between the Sittee and Deep Rivers, in southern 
Belize, remote from Belize City. This was the area proposed by Kluge for a 
renegotiated pine concession. Hummel’s recommendations were not made by 
scientific induction from quantification of savanna fires and their effects on the 
growth of pine growth. The only measurements Hummel made were those 
mentioned above, that were taken on one day (and from which he estimated the 
pine stocks). Sullivan and Forsyth assert that knowledge can derive authority from 
its discursive presentation as science, even if not derived from empirical scientific 
research.135 So too, the ‘science’ contained within Hummel’s report was limited to 
deductions using theory that he had learned during his training in forestry. We might 
therefore consider this, after Fleischmann and Briske, ‘professional ecological 
knowledge’.136  
 
134 Colonial Office minute of 27th January 1921 on Hummel’s Report detailing the savanna 
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Hummel asserted that before his inspection ‘very little was known with 
regard to the available quantity of wood; the pine forest in question was generally 
supposed to be the best of the Colony and to be well stocked with good trees’.137 
Yet his field report from 1920 makes clear that many local informants played a role 
in its construction: 
Before starting I collected information from various sources about the forest, the 
land, landing places, river, swamps etc. I was able to check afterwards the reliability 
of the greater part of such information by visiting several of the described localities 
and forests myself, and I found that most of that information was good; it could 
therefore be taken as valuable also for those localities which I could not see 
myself.138  
 
Hummel gathered local knowledge about the pine’s quality in different areas, and 
about the frequency of fire in the savanna: ‘an old man, who has known this part of 
the pine forest for 56 years, told me that as far as he remembers, it has been burnt 
over every year during that long period’.139 ‘On the strong advice of reliable men who 
had been there’, Hummel also changed his original plan to cross the savanna on 
horseback in the wet season.140 Hummel navigated and was shown the field by local 
people, including the owner of a mahogany camp in the area, who: 
seemed to know the country all round very well and has been over larger areas of 
the pine forest for shooting deer.… he drew my attention to another smaller good 
forest belt in the Southern part of Mr. Kluge’s proposed concession land, near the 
Ycacos lagoon. I decided at once to go there, as this appeared to be rather 
important, and Mr Winzerling was kind enough to offer me his services for showing 
me that forest belt and various other good patches.141 
 
Hummel’s fieldwork was also facilitated by field assistants who carried his 
equipment and conducted data collection. These field assistants feature in 
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Hummel’s fieldwork account only in a comment that one day he ‘did partly labourers’ 
work [himself] in order to get that timber survey completed’.142  
Hummel’s local informants possessed tacit knowledge of the savanna’s 
geography gained through extensive experience conducting their livelihoods in 
these areas. After Collins and Evans, we can consider this a form of expertise, even 
if it was not considered such at the time.143  Hummel could not have produced his 
report without drawing upon this local expertise. The contributions of local tacit 
knowledge and labour to assembling Hummel’s case for fire management, while 
hinted at in the fieldwork report from 1920, are not acknowledged in his 1921 
publication, nor were they considered ‘expert’ by the Colonial Office. This is often 
the case with ‘lay participation’ in scientific fieldwork.144 To understand why, let me 
now examine the social construction of Hummel as the expert on savanna fires in 
Belize in 1920.   
It is striking that those local informants that are directly referenced by name 
in Hummel’s report (such as Mr Winzerling) were male members of the colonial elite. 
Hummel, too, could speak with authority to the colonial administration in Belize and 
to the Colonial Office, in part, because of his position as a white male in a colonial 
context. Beyond this, his authority as an ‘expert’ was derived from his professional 
training in forestry. To understand why, let me examine the growing authority of 
forestry as a discipline and its relationship with colonial development at this time.  
In the early twentieth century, colonial ‘development’ meant ‘complementary 
development’: stimulating colonial economies by increasing revenue from private 
enterprise in the exploitation of raw materials or agriculture and thereby creating a 
greater demand for the export of manufactured goods from Britain.145 In the 
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nineteenth century, Britain’s Colonial Office had generally taken a passive approach 
to this, responding to proposals or queries from Colonial Governors, but deeming 
private enterprise largely responsible for bringing about colonial development. After 
1895, the Colonial Office began to see itself as responsible for facilitating an empire-
wide strategy of colonial development.146 Within the ideology that Scott terms ‘high 
modernism’, science was viewed as a tool by which the state would enable colonial 
development, initially through exploration and problem-solving and, latterly, through 
provision of technical services.147 Science’s universalism aligned politically with the 
notion of a unified empire.148 Between the wars, the Colonial Office reorganised, 
moving from departments oriented to particular geographical regions, towards 
specialist technical departments with an empire-wide focus. Training of officials for 
the Colonial Services was also unified.149 After the 1929 Colonial Development Act, 
an annual budget was put forward for colonial development by the Treasury, and 
after the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act, the amount was greatly 
increased (further detail follows in Chapter five). Nonetheless, Worboys asserts that 
the alignment between science and development was largely rhetorical: ‘What 
impact the work of colonial scientific and technical services had on the economic 
and material development of the Colonial Empire is impossible to say.... What is 
evident, however, is the importance of science in colonial development thinking and 
policy between the wars’.150 In this context, the Colonial Research Committee was 
established in 1919 ‘for the assistance of the poorer colonies and protectorates in 
conducting necessary researches’, and it was this Committee which commissioned 
and co-financed Hummel’s report.151 Hummel was directed to write ‘in the interest of 
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the local Government, but also in the interest of the Imperial Government’ and to 
focus principally on ‘economic questions of forest development’.152 
Forestry was one of the ‘sciences’ to have allied with colonial development, 
promising ‘progress’ by enabling capitalised resource extraction and state revenue 
collection, sustained by measures of conservation such as fire protection.153 
Although it lagged behind countries like France and Germany in instituting forestry, 
Britain had previously employed foresters trained in continental Europe to serve in 
colonial forest departments (like Hummel, who trained at Aschaffen in Germany and, 
prior to his position in Belize, had served in the British Federated Malay States).154 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, first in India and then in 
Edinburgh, Britain established its own schools of forestry. By 1920, aligning with the 
notion of universal scientific approaches for an economically unified Empire, the 
ideal of a unified British ‘Empire forestry’ had emerged (as I described in Chapter 
two).155 In this context, the Colonial Office called upon the testimony of experts such 
as Robert Scott Troup, who headed the Oxford Imperial Forestry Institute, and David 
Prain, the Director of Kew Gardens, in making Hummel’s appointment, and in the 
appointment of his successors as Conservator of Forests in Belize.156 Hummel’s 
qualifications and professional background in forestry, and his ability to frame 
Belize’s fire ‘problem’ in the language of forestry, played in part in his social 
construction as the ‘expert’ and lent him authority with the Colonial Office.157  
Hummel’s recommendations held enough authority with the Colonial Office 
that a Forest Department was established in Belize. Yet, as I demonstrate in 
examining the first decades of work by the Forest Department, forestry’s experts 
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and their methods, held less authority with powerful elites and fire users in Belize, 
and were not always suited to this ecological context.  
 
4.5 Fire management methods of the Forest Department, 1921-1941 
The Forest Department’s methods of fire management involved attempts to 
directly suppress fires and to prevent fires by modifying the landscape and by 
changing the behaviour of local fire users. Following the recommendations made in 
Hummel’s report in 1921, notices were published in the government gazette warning 
that the use of fire in the pine ridges was punishable by law (under the existing 
Negligent Use of Fire Ordinance), with rewards for information leading to the 
conviction of anyone found guilty of this offence on Crown Land.158 In 1926 and 
1927 the Forest Act and Forest Rules were passed (see Table 4.1), recapitulating 
that ‘Setting fire to any grass of undergrowth or leaving any fire burning in such a 
manner as to endanger tree or forest produce in any part of the Crown forests is 
prohibited’, and authorising the Governor to make additional rules regarding fire for 
any forest area.159 
Several forest reserves were established in 1923, the Crown Lands 
Ordinance of 1872 having already included provision for reservation of Crown Land. 
One of these, the Belize Pine Reserve, was an area of 64,000 acres of pine 
savanna between the Belize and Sibun Rivers (see map Figure 4.10 and Table 
4.2).160 Here the Forest Department made its first attempts to suppress fires. 
Annually in the dry season starting in 1923, they patrolled a small portion of the  
 
158 Notice published in the Government Gazette, May 21st 1921, [BARS MP602/1921], f. 10. 
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Source: Map created in Arc GIS by author, using Belize Basemap shapefile (Meerman & unknown 
sources, 2013), available at http://www.biodiversity.bz/ , [accessed 11/02/2019], and various historical 
maps. No historical map showing the boundaries of the Belize Pine Reserve was available. I thus 
estimated the possible boundary of the Belize Pine Reserve based on its description in several 
sources, which gave its size, place names within it, and described it as located between the Belize and 
Sibun Rivers (Forest Department, 2015); Field diary of Duncan Stevenson, [OWL MSS.W.Ind.s.28(1)]). 
I based the pine plantation boundaries and the Mango Creek reserve boundaries on the Land 
Resource Assessment of Stann Creek District map (King, 1987). I based the Grant’s Works boundary 
on a 1944 map of existing and proposed forest reserves [TNA CO 122/385/9]. This map is intended to 
show the boundaries of each reserve at the time of reservation. I was, however, not always able to find 






Forest Reserve Year reserved Year de-reserved Year re-reserved 
Belize Pine Reserve 1923 1933  
Grant’s Work A 1941   
Grant’s Work B 1941   
Deep River 1941   
Mango Creek 1960 1968 1977 
Swasey-Bladen 1960   
 
 
reserve and attempted to fight fires that threatened the area.161 A new telephone line 
and roads were constructed to improve access and fire warning communications.162 
From 1924 the Forest Department cleared vegetation to construct fire lines to 
protect part of the Belize Pine Reserve.163 For several years after 1924, the Forest 
Department also assisted a private company operating in the Corozal District by 
patrolling and constructing fire lines on their land.164 After 1929, as is explained in 
Section 4.5, the Department underwent retrenchment and was unable to expand fire 
protection further, although maintenance and patrolling of existing fire lines 
continued. 
The Forest Department also attempted to change local fire use behaviour. 
Notices in the Government Gazette and signage in the Belize Pine Reserve warned 
of the illegality of setting fires.165 The Postal Authorities issued a special fire-related 
 
161 Memorandum by Hummel 4th May 1923, [BARS MP149/1923], f. 12; Draft newspaper article 
enclosed in letter from Conservator of Forests to Colonial Secretary, 2nd July 1925, [BARS 
MP1894/1925]; see also annual reports of the Forest Department for following years.  
162 Draft newspaper article enclosed in letter from Conservator of Forests to Colonial Secretary, 2nd 
July 1925, [BARS MP1894/1925]; Forest Department (1926, 1929). 
163 Field diary of Duncan Stevenson, entries for 12th February 1924 and 30th January 1925, [OWL 
MSS.W.Ind.s.28(1)]; Forest Department (1925); see also annual reports of the Forest Department for 
following years.  
164 Forest Department (1925), appendix b; Forest Department (1926), appendix b. 
165 Notice published in the Government Gazette, May 21st 1921, [BARS MP602/1921], f. 10; 
Memorandum by Hummel 4th May 1923, [BARS MP149/1923], f. 12; Draft newspaper article enclosed 
in letter from Conservator of Forests to Colonial Secretary, 2nd July 1925, [BARS MP1894/1925]; 




postage stamp for the fire season of 1927.166 On patrols of the Belize Pine Reserve 
everyone met with was warned ‘of the danger of setting fires and the consequences 
attached to it if they were caught so doing’.167 In 1923, Hummel envisioned 
introducing a licensing system for hunters. He imagined police constables, alcaldes 
and schoolmasters registering the names of all hunters and issuing licenses. This 
would offer an opportunity ‘to get into direct touch with them’, as all licenses would 
have printed on them a warning about fire use and thus ‘to make them feel that in 
future they will be under control to some extent and that the Government does not 
consider the extensive Forest Fires as harmless and negligible as they do’.168 
Following the Colonial Secretary’s advice, he soon realised that this would not be a 
simple matter, and his, and future suggestions, to introduce licensing for hunters in 
1927 and 1930, were not followed through.169  
Although the Forest Department only attempted to protect a small part of the 
Belize Pine Reserve from fire, they repeatedly failed to do so. Fires, reportedly 
originating on nearby agricultural land, entered the protected area in 1924, 1927 and 
1933.170 The reserve was therefore closed in 1934.171 To understand why, we must 
consider the limitations of the Forest Department’s methods of fire protection as 
envisaged by Hummel and outlined above. Hummel’s assumptions that forestry’s 
fire management methods could be directly transferred from Europe to Belize and 
were the only necessary measure for pine regeneration, were undermined, in 
practice, by an unappreciated Belizean ecology and politics.  
 
166 Forest Department (1927).  
167 Draft newspaper article enclosed in letter from Conservator of Forests to Colonial Secretary, 2nd 
July 1925, [BARS MP1894/1925], p. 5.  
168 Letter from Hummel to Colonial Secretary, 9th January 1923, [BARS MP149/1923], f. 1. 
169 ‘A forest regeneration scheme for British Honduras’, draft by Neil Stevenson, 1944, [OWL 
MSS.Brit.Emp.s.366(1)].  
170 Forest Department (1925, 1927, 1933). 




The ecology and working conditions of the Belizean savanna frustrated the 
Department’s fire management. The explosive combustion of palmetto palms threw 
burning debris over fire lines (Figure 4.7 shows palmetto burning).172 Thick, tufty 
grass grew as a result of fire suppression and slowed pine regeneration.173 It 
became apparent that drainage or soil nutrients might also limit pine regeneration, 
even in the absence of fire.174 A bark beetle outbreak in 1939 caused pine mortality 
over large areas, increasing the amount of combustible matter on the landscape.175 
Most devastatingly, in Belize, hurricanes interacted with fire in the disturbance of the 
savanna; following a large hurricane in 1931, the blown-over dead timber fuelled 
widespread fire. This was partly responsible for the destruction of the protected part 
of the Belize Pine Reserve in 1933.176 Moreover, as Hummel’s fieldwork in 1920 had 
demonstrated, the savanna generally lacked infrastructure and working conditions 
were difficult.177 Swampy conditions early each year made it hard to construct fire 
lines before the dry season.178 In the 1920s the Forest Department thus devoted 
time to building roads in the Belize Pine Reserve, making it ‘possible to travel from 
the Belize River to Sibun River through these Pine Ridges at any time of the year’.179 
This had unforeseen consequences. By building roads, the Forest Department 
facilitated access to the area by local fire users. Roads also made the area more 
valuable for agricultural leases, which, when granted by government officials despite 
 
172 Draft newspaper article enclosed in letter from Conservator of Forests to Colonial Secretary, 2nd 
July 1925, [BARS MP1894/1925]; Forest Department (1939). 
173 Forest Department (1937).  
174 Forest Department (1935, 1939); ‘A forest regeneration scheme for British Honduras’, draft by Neil 
Stevenson, 1944, [OWL MSS.Brit.Emp.s.366(1)]. 
175 Johnson (1974). 
176 Forest Department (1933). See Wolffsohn (1967) for discussion of the interaction between 
hurricanes and fire in Belize.  
177 Report detailing the savanna reconnaissance of 16th December 1920, [TNA, CO 123/303], f. 160. 
178 Field diary of Duncan Stevenson, entry for 15th February 1924, [OWL MSS.W.Ind.s.28(1)]; Draft 
newspaper article enclosed in letter from Conservator of Forests to Colonial Secretary, 2nd July 1925, 
[BARS MP1894/1925]. 




protests by the Forest Department, was another contributory factor to the 1933 fires 
and closure of the Belize Pine Reserve.180  
The Department’s attempts to reach fire users had little effect. In the 1920s 
and 1930s, the Forest Department perpetuated a racially-oriented discourse around 
the ‘problem’ of indigenous shifting agriculture and made efforts to settle the 
indigenous population.181 No similar racially-oriented discourse could be created for 
savanna fires. There was no class or ‘race’ to whom corrective measures could be 
targeted: fire was used for hunting, land clearance and cattle grazing by diverse 
sectors of the population, including some government officials.182 Fires were mobile 
in the landscape; attributing individual fire events to certain individuals and enforcing 
the fire legislation was difficult. Most importantly, the foresters and their legislation 
did not command the same authority with the Belizean public as they did with the 
Colonial Office. The reasons for this are explored in detail in Section 4.6. 
For the Forest Department, fire management was part of a wider remit of 
work that took place with a limited budget and staff. The Department was thus more 
generally limited in capacity to undertake extensive fire management by economic 
and political factors that lead to its repeated retrenchment after 1929. The remainder 
of the chapter explores these factors.  
 
4.6 Economic and political challenges to the Forest Department, 1921-1941 
If the purpose of conservation was to enable exploitation, a paradox lay at 
the heart of the Forest Department’s mandate to conserve pine and other timber 
 
180 Forest Department (1935); Comments of Neil Stevenson on the resolutions of the fourth British 
Empire Forestry Conference, enclosed in a letter from Governor Burns to Colonial Office, 1st October 
1936, [TNA, CO 123/360/19]. 
181 See for example Forest Department (1933); Wainwright (2008).  
182 See for example accusations by Assistant Conservator of Forests Duncan Stevenson against Mr 




species in Belize.183 To justify and finance its work, the Department was dependent 
upon (and thus to some extent needed to appease) capitalist interests. 
Simultaneously, it needed to be able to regulate and speak authoritatively to these 
interests. Furthermore, these interests were strongly represented within the 
Legislative Council, upon which the Department relied to pass legislation and 
approve budgets. This section examines how the Forest Department was 
undermined by this tension in the 1920s and 1930s.  
Hummel’s justification for fire management relied on the prospect of a Belizean pine 
industry. After collapse of the market for mahogany in the late nineteenth century 
and early twentieth century, the Colony was, by the late 1920s, again heavily 
dependent on a booming mahogany industry. This was a dangerous dependency, 
and the Government placed hope on the development of a pine industry as part of a 
programme to diversify the Colony’s economy.184 In 1926, the Consolidated Naval 
Stores transferred the ‘Chipley pine concession’ to another US firm, the Tidewater 
Lumber Company, who did not work it.185 In 1930 the concession period was 
extended, but the concession lapsed in 1932 after the Company failed to pay 
occupancy fees.186 There was further interest in 1934, but no further pine 
concessions were granted until 1943.187 A small-scale pine industry developed on 
several private estates in the Stann Creek district in the 1920s (Figure 4.11 gives log 
 
183 Forestry science generally did see other reasons for conservation, besides exploitation, but these 
were not deemed necessary in Belize: ‘The so-called indirect utility of forests, i.e. their influence upon 
the feeding of springs and rivers, the preservation of soil in sloping ground, etc., which is sometimes 
very important in more open countries, hardly calls for special measures in British Honduras in its 
present wild and wooded state.’ [Hummel (1921), p. 90.  
184 Bulmer-Thomas & Bulmer Thomas (2012), ch. 4. 
185 Concession agreement of 24th April 1926 forwarded in letter from Governor Burdon to Colonial 
Office, 9th December 1926, [TNA CO 123/324].  
186 Forest Department (1931, 1933). 
187 Correspondence between Governor, Colonial Office and Troup of Imperial Forestry Institute, 




production data).188 A small amount of timber was exported in 1925, 1926, 1928, 
1930 and 1932, but most fed the local market (Figure 4.12 shows export data). 
Since this was far from enough to meet local demand, the Colony also continued to 
import (and re-export) pine from the USA.189 There are several reasons why the pine 
industry did not develop in Belize in the 1920s and 1930s on the scale hoped for by 
Government. There was no shortage of US pine on the market; the US pine industry 
overproduced in the late 1920s.190 For capitalists, development of this industry in 
Belize came with that high risk and initially high capital investment associated with 
working in a place lacking maps and infrastructure and without information regarding 
the properties and exchange value of this particular species of pine.191 The Great 
Depression in the 1930s also impeded investment.  
Aware of these barriers to the development of a pine industry, the Forest 
Department and Colonial Office made efforts to improve the information available to 
potential investors. In 1929, the Forest Department was awarded a Colonial 
Development Grant to enable it to conduct research ‘into the exploitation and 
marketing of secondary timbers with the view to taking prompt advantage of the 
recovery of world trade when the present depression lifts’.192 In 1932, samples of 
pine from Belize were shipped to the British Government’s Forest Products 
Research Laboratory at Princes Risborough for tests, which ‘proved’ in 1937 that it 
was ‘well suited to the usual uses of pitch pine’.193 The grant also covered the 
Department conducting ground and aerial surveys allowing topographic and 
 
188 The annual reports of the Forest Department describe sawmills processing pine at All Pines from 
1924-6 and in 1928 (operated by the Tidewater Lumber Company), at Regalia from 1926 through the 
1930s and at the Sapodilla Lagoon, from 1929 through the 1930s.  
189 See statistics in annual reports of the Forest Department. 
190 Forest Department (1928). 
191 Report by G. H. Barnett of BEC on a visit to Belize in 1935, [Uncatalogued BEC Archive, Ladyville, 
Belize]; Report by Hoare of BEC on visit to Belize in 1937, [Uncatalogued BEC Archive, Ladyville, 
Belize]. 
192 Forest Department (1933). 
193 Forest Department (1938), p16. Also Forest Department (1935); Letter from Princes Ridsburgh to 
Colonial Office, 2nd November 1932 and draft letter from Colonial Office to Governor of Belize, 21st 
November 1932, [TNA CO 123/339/9, items 14 and 17]. 
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For 1924-1945 I have drawn data from the annual reports of the Forest Department. From 1946 
onwards, the data is from the Belize Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP) (Arnold and Armitage, 1989, 
202-3), which was also compiled from the annual reports of the Forest Department. As the TFAP 
notes, the format in which the Forest Department presented annual data for pine production varied 
(sometimes reporting round timber production and sometimes sawn lumber production). They did not 
always make clear in which format and in which unit the figures were given. It is also likely that the 
production reported was incomplete for most years—the Forest Department is unlikely to have 
recorded all pine extracted on private and Crown Land. The TFAP team (as I have done for the earlier 
years) therefore attempted to convert this ‘messy data’ (converting between units and using conversion 
estimates between sawn lumber and round timber), into a standard format. The data is nonetheless 











































































































































Data compiled by Bulmer-Thomas (2012) from the Colonial records. I have converted the data from 
board feet to thousands of cubic feet.  Note that pine was exported in 1928, 1930 and 1932, but the 










































vegetation maps of the Colony to be produced. As part of this work, detailed pine 
enumerations were carried out on Crown Lands, including in the Toledo district.194 
Several companies interested in the pine also carried out their own surveys, some 
sharing their data with the Department.195 This work helped render the savanna 
visible and legible to administrators and potential investors, but was insufficient to 
kick-start a larger-scale pine industry in the 1930s. 
Despite the lack of revenue from a pine industry, the Colony might have 
been able to sustain fire management and other forestry work on a greater scale, 
had other forest industries generated ample revenue and had there been political 
support for the Department in Belize. This was not the case. The Belizean economy, 
which had struggled since 1900, was hit particularly badly by the Great Depression, 
which coincided with widespread devastation from the 1931 hurricane.196 The Forest 
Department also found itself compromised as it became embroiled in a political 
conflict of interests in Government. 
By the 1920s there was a change to the make-up of the unofficial majority in 
Belize’s legislative council. Before, the majority had represented expatriate 
landowners like BEC, but a new group of Belize Creole merchants and professionals 
had come to take most of the unofficial seats. These were aligned with American 
interests, following the Colony's strengthening import-export links with the USA. In 
the 1920s, this element of the unofficial majority began to push for a blanket land 
tax, which would greatly compromise British landed interests, in particular BEC, then 
in financial difficulty and considering sale of land to US interests. With BEC still well 
connected in the British Government however, the Colonial Office continued to 
 
194 Handwritten report by Phillips entitled ‘Short note on the pine cruising in the Deep River Area’, 
December 1935 and data in handwritten tables, [Machaca Forest Station, Toledo District, Belize, 
uncatalogued in storage].  
195 ‘A forest regeneration scheme for British Honduras’, draft by Neil Stevenson, 1944, [OWL 
MSS.Brit.Emp.s.366(1)]. 
196 Grant (1976), ch. 2; Ashdown (1981), ch. 7; Bulmer-Thomas & Bulmer-Thomas (2012), ch. 4.  
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defend it. This placed the Forest Department, with its mandate to encourage forest 
development and regulate exploitative forest industries, in a predicament. BEC held 
large tracts of land in speculation and was largely responsible for the Colony’s past 
and current overexploitation of mahogany, yet there was the risk that a US 
successor to BEC would be more exploitative.197  
The Department failed to take a strong regulatory approach, adopting 
instead a policy of ‘encouraging’ private landowners ‘to practise conservative 
management of their forests’: ‘the emphasis in dealing with landowners was always 
example and precept and the fostering of cooperation, not legal sanctions’.198 In the 
1920s, operating on this principle that expert example would change behaviour, the 
Department seconded most of its few staff to work with landowners including BEC. 
In 1924 Hummel left the Forest Department to become the local manager of BEC. 
This limited the capacity of the Department to work on Crown Land (for example to 
conduct fire management).199 It also immediately and publicly aligned the 
Department with BEC and the Colonial Office. Hummel, as BEC’s manager, argued 
against raising land taxes that would affect the Company.200  
Introducing a land tax did, however, align with the Forest Policy to curtail 
overexploitation and to encourage development of land held in speculation. While 
Hummel defended BEC, his successor as Conservator of Forests, John Oliphant, 
took a different position. He, with the Governor, was convinced that a land tax was 
necessary, though Oliphant did not support the blanket tax proposed by the 
unofficial majority. Oliphant called for a discriminatory system of land taxation, with 
some tax relief to compensate landowners that made efforts to introduce measures 
of conservation:  
 
197 Ashdown (1981), ch. 6.  
198 Letter from Neil Stevenson to Peter Ashdown, 1st April 1980, [OWL MSS.W.Ind.s.56], f. 19. 
199 Oliphant (1925).  
200 Ashdown (1981), ch. 6. 
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unless there is a reasonably near prospect of the Government being enabled to 
carry legislation for a scheme of discriminatory taxation of land…. without inclusion 
of the vitiating feature of the flat increase in the land tax demanded by the 
exploitative and mercantile interests in the legislature, it will be useless to retain the 
forest organisation in any form…. surrender to the Unofficial demand for the flat 
increase would be decisive against a policy of forest conservation, as the real motive 
underlying that demand, though possibly not definite in the minds of the rank and file 
of its supporters, is antagonism to the conservative treatment of the private 
forests.201 
 
Oliphant saw that, as things stood, in stalemate against the unofficial 
majority, there was little that he or the Governor could pass through the Legislative 
Council. He repeatedly called on the Colonial Office to change the constitution. The 
Colonial Office, fearing the unrest this might cause, felt it more sensible to ‘wait until 
an incident occurs’.202 Caught in this conflict, the Forest Department was unable to 
adopt a strong regulatory position against major landholders. They faced active 
public opposition, engendered by their political position against the unofficial 
majority, but also because of how they were financed and conducted their work.  
Aware of the financial restraints in Belize and of the likelihood of political 
opposition to the Forest Department from the unofficial majority in the legislative 
council, the Governor and Colonial Office had initially set up the Forest Department 
with a fixed annual budget of 60 percent of general forest revenue supplemented by 
a loan from the Colonial Office, devolved to a separate ‘Forest Trust’ chaired by the 
Governor.203 Its budgets were approved by the Colonial Office, which effectively 
‘shielded’ the Department’s finances from ’political pressure’ by the unofficial 
majority in the legislative council, and the loan acted as a ‘stabiliser’, reducing the 
Department’s dependence on forest revenue.204 From its inception the Department 
 
201 Memorandum of Oliphant, 5nd February 1929, enclosed in letter of 25th February 1929 from 
Governor Burdon to the Colonial Office, [TNA CO 123/330/8].  
202 Ashdown (1981), p. 193. 
203 Forest Department (1924).  
204 Letter from Neil Stevenson to Peter Ashdown, 1st April 1980, [OWL MSS.W.Ind.s.56], f. 19. 
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was touted as an ‘expert-led’ and technically-motivated body. This exacerbated the 
problems caused by the Department’s position in the dispute over land taxes. 
The unofficial members of the Legislative Council resented that they had no 
control over the Department’s finances and used this as public evidence that the 
Department was ‘imposed on the Colony by the British Government in its own 
interests’.205 They also nurtured a growing public resentment of the Department 
because its staff presented themselves as technical experts superior to other 
Officials in the Colony. To get ‘staff of the best quality’ to serve in Belize, forest 
officers were on salaries comparable with those in other British Colonies, and thus 
far higher than those of the other Government Departments in Belize.206 In the 
press, the Forest Department attributed lack of support for its Forest Policy to a lack 
of public understanding of forestry.207 It is clear that the officials of the Department 
conducted themselves with some arrogance. The Governor noted that ‘intellectual 
pride’ was one of the ‘causes for the public dislike of the Forestry Department’.208 
For example, Oliphant raised opposition to the suggestion in 1926 that the Colonial 
Secretary should replace the Governor as chairman of the Forest Trust on the 
grounds that it would be anomalous to subordinate ‘a highly qualified technical 
officer to an administrative officer of – on an average – a relatively low standard of 
education and judging by salary, of economic value…. The ‘average Colonial 
Secretary’ would find difficulty in explaining forest cases in Executive Council and 
would there cause trouble through misunderstandings’.209 Brian Wynne argues that 
institutional science often faces problems of legitimacy, not simply when it does not 
 
205 Pim (1934), p. 105. See also correspondence between the Governor and Colonial Office over the 
set-up of the Forest Trust in August and September 1926, [TNA CO 123/324].  
206 Letter from Neil Stevenson to Peter Ashdown, 1st April 1980, [OWL MSS.W.Ind.s.56], f. 18. 
207 ‘Mr Hummel’s Report’, The Clarion, 2nd August 1922; ‘The Value of Forestry’, The Clarion, 12th 
February 1925. 
208 Letter from Governor Burdon to Darnley of the Colonial Office, 11th August 1926, [TNA CO 
123/324], p. 6. 




incorporate local knowledge, but when its social practices alienate the public.210  So 
too, when the Forest Department’s senior staff enacted their expertise by calling 
upon their professional training, it did not command authority with the public in 
Belize in the way it did with the Colonial Office. 
Thus, in 1929, the unofficial members of the Legislative Council raised a 
petition calling for retrenchment of the Forest Department.211 Aware of economic 
difficulties in the Colony and fearing unrest being stoked by Oliphant, the Colonial 
Office, rather than amending the constitution to strengthen the Department’s 
position, reduced the Department’s annual budget and arranged for Oliphant’s 
transferral to another Colony: 
The Forest Trust is intensely unpopular, and its activities are thereby seriously 
hampered. This unpopularity is largely due to the personality of the Conservator … 
as the Governor indicates, he is by temperament uncompromising, intolerant of 
opposition, especially when it lacks intelligence, and not the type which succeeds 
when brought into contact with persons of inferior calibre. Of his personal 
unpopularity in the Colony, the local press affords abundant evidence. I have seen 
cuttings about an attempt recently made to burn down his house during his absence 
on leave.212 
 
The retrenchment effectively ended any hope of the Department regulating 
private interests. With a reduced staff and budget, it could no longer afford to 
second officers to private companies, and its work was heavily restricted to small 
areas of Crown Land. In 1929 the Colonial Development Act made provision for 
direct grants to Colonies for ‘aiding and developing agriculture and industry … and 
thereby promoting commerce with or industry in the United Kingdom’.213 With the 
 
210 Wynne (1992, 2003).  
211 Petition of 22nd January 1929, enclosed in letter of 25th February 1929 from Governor Burdon to the 
Colonial Office, [CO 123/330/8]; ‘An appeal for retrenchment’, The Clarion, 24th January 1929.  
212 Note of 15th August 1929 by a Colonial Office staff member on the minute sheet for correspondence 
between Governor Burdon and the Colonial Office over retrenchment of the Forest Department, [CO 
123/330/8]. Oliphant, in his next position with the Forest Department in Malaya and then as director of 
the Imperial Forestry Institute, continued, in character, to speak out in favour of radical policies. 
Vandergeest & Peluso (2006a, 2006b) use his views as illustration of the dissent among foresters as to 
the purpose of forest management. 
213 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1971), p. 6. See also Overseas Development Institute (1964); 
Constantine (1984).  
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award of such colonial development grants to the Belize Forest Department, the 
Colonial Office protected the Department’s existence while keeping its work securely 
outside of the political domain. This grant, as discussed above, provided for eight 
years of surveying and mapping of the Colony’s resources (as Figure 4.13 shows, 
even with the grant, Forest Department expenditure was heavily reduced after 
1930).   
The devastation caused by the hurricane in 1931, coincident with the 
collapse of Belize’s exports during the Great Depression, was the final ‘incident’ 
seized upon by the Colonial Office to change the Belizean constitution. As 
conditions attached to a grant for hurricane reparations, they insisted upon reserve 
powers to the Governor to pass legislation.214 Now, so long as the Colonial Office 
insisted upon its maintenance, the Forest Department could be protected from 
closure. The Department, however, remained unpopular. In a climate in which the 
people, in poverty, had begun to organise demonstrations, strikes and petitions, the 
question of further retrenchment or closure of the Department was raised again by 
the Legislative Council and successive Governors throughout the 1930s.215 In 1932, 
in the Colony’s depressed conditions, Governor Kittermaster found it difficult to 
justify expenditure on forestry: ‘Is Reason to be the only guide or is Sentiment also 
to be allowed to exert an influence? As I sit quietly writing in my office my 
intelligence tells me that Reason should be the only guide but when I pass out into 
the street and see the starving children Sentiment will thrust itself in…. when my 
people come to me clamouring for bread and I am fain to offer them – a tree, 
 
 
214 In practice, in the following decades, the Colonial Office was generally unwilling to back those 
Governors that sought to use these powers to oppose the local elite. See Grant (1976), ch. 2; Ashdown 
(1981), ch. 7; Bulmer-Thomas & Bulmer-Thomas (2012), ch. 4.  
215 See correspondence between Governor and Colonial Office in 1932 [TNA CO 123/339/9], 1934 
[TNA CO 123/349/12], 1936 [TNA CO 123/360/19] and 1938 [TNA CO 123/386/2]; ‘Retrenchment’, The 
Independent, 16th January 1935; ‘The Forest Trust’, The Independent, 25th September 1935. 
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All data is drawn from an unpublished report written in the early 1960s by C. E. Duff entitled 
‘History of Forestry in British Honduras’, [OWL MSS.Brit.Emp.s.466]. The data includes 
spending from colonial development grants. Duff compiled the data from the Forest 
Department’s records and is unlikely to have accounted for inflation. Nevertheless, the 
figures are sufficient to demonstrate the fall in spending after retrenchment from 1930 and 





































Sentiment intervenes’.216 This is a reminder that scientific ‘reason’ alone did not 
direct colonial rule.217 Yet in this case the Colonial Office, had sovereignty to dictate, 
and, keeping emotional distance from the poverty in Belize, reminded the Governor 
of the Colonial Development Grant that Belize had received: ‘Large grants have 
been made by the Imperial Government for research work and it would seem that 
under the circumstances it is incumbent on the government to keep this department 
in existence’.218 It also reminded him of Belize’s duty to contribute to trade within the 
Empire: ‘The virtual abolition of the Forestry Department cannot very well be 
discussed at the moment. Moreover, it ought not to be definitely considered by the 
local Government until they have had the circular despatch dated 12th July, 
regarding the advisability of training officers in timber utilisation and the prospects of 
securing a greater share of the home market’.219 
In 1934, a report on the Colony’s economic position by Sir Alan Pim, an 
economic advisor to the British Government, strongly re-asserted the position that 
Belize required its Forest Department: ‘Even if the Department is for some time to 
come not able to show substantial financial results from its work, the Finance 
Committee of 1932 were clearly right in considering it essential to retain a 
competent Forest Service’.220 ‘For many years to come … much the greater part of 
the Colony must remain under forests, and in the main, forest products must 
continue to form the most important element of its economic resources’.221 Though 
the Colonial Office shielded the Department from closure, it was decided in 1935 to 
close the Forest Trust, and make it a normal government department, as ‘the 
 
216 Letter from Governor Kittermaster to Colonial Office, 25th December 1932, [TNA CO 123/339/9, item 
20]. 
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218 Comments from the Colonial Office finance committee, [TNA CO 123/339/9, item 21]. 
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present impression that the Forest Department is beyond criticism is not good of the 
officers of the Department and unnecessarily irritates the public’.222 Entering the 
1940s, the Forest Department lacked finances and political support in Belize and 
was propped up by the sovereignty of the Colonial Office. In the process of 
retrenchment and abolition of the Forest Trust, it had lost any position of authority it 
might have had from which to regulate capitalist interests. Despite its challenges, as 
Section 4.7 examines, the Department’s annual reports throughout the 1920s and 
1930s ignored in their language mention of its political struggles, presenting its work 
in technical terms, while maintaining the ideology and practices of a wider ‘Empire 
Forestry’.  
 
4.7 Maintaining fire management as ‘Empire Forestry’ 
As noted, for the Forest Department, the practice of fire management in 
Belize entailed confronting a specifically Belizean ecology, economics and politics. 
These factors had barely featured in Hummel’s initial plans; he had assured the 
Colonial Office and Colonial Administration that technical methods of fire 
management, developed elsewhere, could be successfully implemented in Belize by 
qualified foresters. The Department was not unresponsive to the local challenges 
that it faced in fire management. As we have seen, after an initial engagement, the 
Department more or less ended its efforts to engage with fire users or with the pine 
industry, from which it might have demanded assistance with fire management. 223 
Limiting fire management to technical work on certain areas of Crown Land 
cocooned the Department from political resistance.  
Unlike with its political struggles, it was possible to confront the challenges of 
the local ecology by technical means. Evidence shows that the Department 
 
222 Letter from Governor to Colonial Office, 1935, [TNA CO 123/349/12, item 3]. 
223 Stevenson (1944).  
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experimented, sometimes unsuccessfully, to adapt and adjust its methods to the 
Belizean savanna. The foresters trialled different methods of clearing and 
maintaining fire lines, including hand-cutting with machetes, controlled burning and 
the use of weed-killing chemicals.224 They experimented with controlled fire to 
remove the high grass accumulating from lack of fires.225 Lacking other equipment, 
palmetto leaves from the savanna were found to be the ‘best weapon for fighting a 
fire’ by beating or smothering.226 Experiments were made with planting cashew trees 
along fire lines to block flying burning debris from crossing them.227 The Department 
also began to try to identify the factors affecting pine growth: in 1938 they 
established sample plots to examine the influence of different soil types.228 When 
the Belize Pine Reserve was abandoned in 1934, the fire protection ‘experiments’ 
were immediately moved, away from this populous area and re-located further 
south, to an area of Crown Land near Melinda, where a small-scale private pine 
timber operation was underway.229 In 1941 this area and surroundings became the 
Grant’s Works Forest Reserves (see Table 4.2 and map Figure 4.10). By moving the 
operations from a place of failure to a fresh locale, fire management could continue. 
The Forest Department maintained a particular textual representation of its 
coherent fire management programme in its annual report sent to the Colonial 
Office, newspaper articles and other publications. Fire management was presented 
in technical terms; no political challenges were mentioned. What were small-scale 
 
224 Field diary of Duncan Stevenson, entry for 12th February 1924, [OWL MSS.W.Ind.s.28(1)]; Draft 
newspaper article enclosed in letter from Conservator of Forests to Colonial Secretary, 2nd July 1925, 
[BARS MP1894/1925]; ‘A forest regeneration scheme for British Honduras’, draft by Neil Stevenson, 
1944, [OWL MSS.Brit.Emp.s.366(1)]. 
225 Field diary of Duncan Stevenson, entry for 22nd May 1925, [OWL MSS.W.Ind.s.28(1)]; Forest 
Department (1935).  
226 Draft newspaper article enclosed in letter from Conservator of Forests to Colonial Secretary, 2nd 
July 1925, [BARS MP1894/1925], p. 3. 
227 Forest Department (1939, 1940). 
228 Forest Department (1939).  




operations were given weight and described in detail for a Belizean and British 
readership that, for the large part, did not see the work on the ground.230 The Forest 
Department thus presented itself and its work within the context of a successful and 
wider ‘Empire Forestry’. The discourse of Empire Forestry implied that each colonial 
forest department was following standard approaches, developed, taught and 
monitored centrally in Britain. In 1927 Governor Burdon wrote that ‘the management 
of the forests is being brought into accord with proper silvicultural practice as 
established by experience in other tropical regions of the Empire’.231 Staff of the 
Department attended the Empire Forestry Conferences and published in the Journal 
Empire Forestry.232 After 1938, the Department’s annual reports contained tables of 
statistics in a standard format used by Forest Departments across the Empire.233 
There was thus a gap between texts and practices of fire management in Belize, not 
only because the planned methods did not anticipate local conditions, but also 
because the realities of fire management in practice were not easily reported in the 
discursive context of Empire Forestry.   
 
4.8 Conclusion 
As James Ferguson and Tania Li contend, any programme of government 
must frame problems such that its interventions appear as solutions to them.234 
Cornelius Hummel’s text problematised Belize’s savanna fires as an impediment to 
development, narrowly defined as capitalist investment in, and government revenue 
 
230 See for example ‘Our Forest Wealth’, The Clarion, 10th August 1922; ‘Importance of Forest 
Conservation’, The Clarion, 14th December 1922; ‘The Value of Forestry’, The Clarion, 12th February 
1925; Draft newspaper article enclosed in letter from Conservator of Forests to Colonial Secretary, 2nd 
July 1925, [BARS MP1894/1925]. 
231 Burdon (1927), p18. 
232 See statements prepared for the Empire Forestry Conferences in 1928 and 1935 [Oliphant (1928); 
Stevenson (1935a, 1935b)] and journal publications by Oliphant (1925), N. Stevenson (1927, 1938) 
and D. Stevenson (1928). 
233 Forest Department (1939).  
234 Ferguson (1990); Li (2007a). 
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from, a pine industry. To this problem he proposed a solution: the conservation 
measure of fire management, to be implemented by qualified foresters following 
technical methods developed by a universal British Empire Forestry. These 
proposed methods included constructing fire lines to protect areas of pine, 
firefighting, and passing legislation to penalise fire use.  
Hummel’s text had the power to instigate fire management and state forestry 
in Belize because it framed economic concerns in the colony within a contemporary 
discourse that linked development with sciences like forestry. Hummel’s 
professional training in forestry granted him authority as an ‘expert’ with the British 
Colonial Office. In following decades, Hummel, and the Forest Department’s other 
senior staff, found that such credentials stood for less in Belize. The Forest 
Department faced opposition from the local elite in Belize, who had the support of 
the public and the political power to limit its budget. Forestry’s aims for state-
managed conservation and regulation of the timber industry were in logical and 
financial competition with other priorities in colonial rule, of courting private 
enterprise and assuring (limited) social welfare in times of extreme hardship. The 
limited exports of pine lumber between 1920-1940 made fire management a costly 
investment, for little gain. The Department had neither the authority to limit fire use 
in Belize, nor the funding required to carry out fire management on a large scale. 
The ecological and infrastructural conditions in the Belizean savanna further limited 
the efficacy of the Department’s technical methods of fire management.  
Despite these challenges, fire management survived as a small-scale 
programme because of continuous work to maintain it despite the Belizean realities: 
methods were altered in response to the savanna ecology; work was re-located in 
response to failure; an initial social element of the programme attempting to engage 
directly with fire users or private landowners was abandoned. Through careful 
political adjustments made in London to protect British interests, the Forest 
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Department was kept in existence. Yet these adjustments compromised the 
Department’s ability to push for regulation of private industry and relegated it to 
technical work on Crown Land. As I show in the chapter following, this was a 
sufficient base from which to build a larger-scale programme of fire management 
from the 1940s to 1960. Yet, importantly for understanding its efficacy and influence, 
as I show in Chapter five, the Department remained reliant on impetus and funding 
external to Belize. Because it spoke to this wider context of Empire Forestry, the 
Department consistently presented fire management as a coherent and purely 
technical programme in its annual reports.  
The picture disclosed through this archival analysis of the Belize Forest 
Department in the 1920s and 1930s aligns with accounts of the practices that 
constituted ‘Empire Forestry’ in other British colonies, in that it was shaped in a 
specific context and did not follow a single governmental rationality imposed from 
Britain.235 As Tania Li argues, all governmental interventions are insecure. When an 
intervention is justified by rendering a problem in technical and apolitical terms, 
continuous work is required to maintain the intervention in the face of ecological and 
social realities.236 So too, the Belize Forest Department and Colonial Office worked 
to maintain a fire management programme in the Belizean savanna in the face of 
hurricanes, palmetto palms, opposition from the Belizean political elite and other 
challenges. Fire management in Belize was not translated directly from a plan, pre-
conceived by Hummel and following European ideology, into action on the ground, 
but emerged in the ecological, economic and political context of Belize.
 
235 See for example Sivaramakrishnan (1997); Vandergeest & Peluso (2006a, 2006b); Bennett 
(2011a); Hansen & Lund (2017). 




The Belize Forest Department’s fire management, 1942 to present: 
policies, projects and practice 
 
The emphasis on colonial development and welfare was ... essentially a defensive 
operation, to provide a new justification which would legitimise the perpetuation of 
colonial rule (Constantine, 1984, 259). 
 
There is no obvious sense of policy or direction, no determination that forestry can 
and will regain the place that it once had in the national economy, but this time 
through human effort rather than simply by the exploitation of a wild resource (UN-
FAO, 1982, report for project BZE 79/002 [BARS ASR-888], 16). 
 
This chapter examines how, between 1942 and the present, fire 
management by the Belize Forest Department was shaped by impetus and short-
term project funding from abroad. The chapter elucidates the continuities and 
discontinuities in the relationship between the Belizean Forest Department, the 
Belizean and British Governments, and other foreign development agencies during 
the period of transition from a colonial to an independent Belize. Sections 5.1 – 5.3 
examine the Department’s fire management practices and their funding sources and 
design across three time-periods.1 From 1942 to 1966, the Department’s work, 
including its fire management, was written into development schemes funded by 
UK-Government Colonial Development and Welfare (CDW) grants. These grants 
enabled fire management to cover a greater area and to become more technical in 
its use of equipment and methods of spatial planning. After this funding ended, and 
the Department was retrenched in 1960, it continued to receive short-term 
assistance from British, Canadian and US development agencies, but fire  
 
1 Table 5.1 provides a summary of the reports, projects and aid for fire management from 1942 to 
present that are referenced in this chapter. 
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Table 5.1 Reports, projects and aid with implications for fire management by 
the Belize Forest Department, 1943 to present 
 
Report or expert advice 
Proposal for development project (not funded) 
Development project or aid 
Year(s)  Funder(s) Report, plan or project Reference(s) 
1943-48 Belizean 
Government 
Grant’s Works Pine 
Regeneration Plan 
Forest Department, 1942, 1943, 1944 
1944  A Forest Regeneration Scheme 
for British Honduras 
Stevenson, 1944, [OWL 
MSS.Brit.Emp.s.366NeilStevenson(1)] 
1946  W. A. Robertson (Forestry 
Advisor to Secretary of State) 
visits Belize 
Forest Department, 1947; Lamb, 1950 
1948  Report of the British Guiana 
and British Honduras 
Settlement Commission 





Forest Development Plan Part 
1- Forest Regeneration at 
Grant’s Works and Machaca 
Stevenson & Lamb, 1947, [OWL 
MSS.Brit.Emp.s.366NeilStevenson(2)]; 






Forest Development Plan Part 
2- Adds extra provision for fire 
protection in Toledo and for 
rural fire service 
Lamb, 1950; Forest Department, 1953; 
Cree, 1957 
1955  Land in British Honduras (draft 
to Belizean Government) 
Forest Department, 1956; Wright et al 
(1959) 
1956  A Pine Regeneration Scheme 
for British Honduras 






Forest Development Plan Part 
3- Adds road building and 
natural and artificial 
regeneration at Mango Creek 
Forest Department, 1956; Cree, 1956b, 
[BARS ASR-1505-114] 
1959  Development Plan for Forestry 
1960-64 (Draft) 
Forest Department, 1959, [unpublished, 
viewed in unofficial archive at Forest 
Department Office, Belmopan, Belize]. 
1959  An Economic Policy for British 
Honduras 
Downie, 1959; 
Forest Department, 1960 
1961  Campbell Macleod of Canadian 
Forest Research Division 
advises on fire management 
after Hurricane Hattie 





Grant of fire-fighting equipment 
and training of personnel by 
Canadian expert Herbert Ball 
Forest Department, 1972, 1974; 
‘Government acquires specialised 
equipment for fighting forest fires’, British 
Honduras Newsletters, 25th June 1973 
 
1974  Inventory of the Southern 
Coastal Plain Pine Forests 
(ODM) 
Johnson & Chaffey, 1974 
1974  Southern Coastal Plain Fire 
Protection Scheme (ODM) 
Johnson, 1974 
1976  Southern Coastal Plain 
Working Plan (Draft) 
Johnson [unpublished, 1976] 
1976 UK Ministry of 
Overseas 
Development 
Grant of fire-fighting equipment Fellows, 1976, [unpublished report for 
CIDA, BARS ASR-955-74] 
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1989  Belize Tropical Forestry Action 
Plan (collaboration with team 
from UK ODA, CIDA, USAID 
and UN-FAO) 
Arnold and Armitage, 1989 
1991 UN-FAO Forest Conservation and 
Management Project (FO-
DP/BZE/87/009) 
Belize Tropical Forestry Action Plan First 
Quingennial Report, 1994, [unpublished 
report viewed in unofficial archive of Neil 
Bird, Oxford] 
1992-97 UK ODA Forest Planning and 
Management Project 
Forest Planning and Management Project 
Technical Proposal, 1991 [unpublished 
report, viewed in unofficial archive at 
Belize Forest Department Belmopan 
Office]; 





Montana Forest Service fire 
training and equipment 
Interviews 51, 55, 56, 66 
2001-09 The Nature 
Conservancy 
Training under the Global Fire 
Initiative 
Interviews 55, 59, 60 
2009  Wildland Fire Management 
Policy and Strategy for Belize 
(funded by TNC & Friends for 
Conservation and 
Development) 
Sabido & Green, 2009 
2014-19 The World 
Bank and GEF 
Management and Protection of 
Key Biodiversity Areas in Belize 
project 
World Bank, 2014 
2017  Forest Fires Communication 
Strategy 2018-22 (funded by 
the World Bank & GEF) 
Yorke, 2017 
 
management on the southern coastal plain gradually came to an end. After 1960, 
fire management as envisioned in various plans was not implemented. Since 1986 
the Department has had no active programme of fire management in the coastal 
savannas but has continued to receive fire management equipment and training 
under foreign aid projects.  
The final sections draw conclusions about the implications of foreign aid, 
reviewing the Department’s history in its entirety. Section 5.4 explores the ‘expertise’ 
that informed plans and policies for fire management. I argue that an authority 
afforded to foreign, and increasingly technical, ‘experts’ to devise fire management 
plans and policies inhibited the development of a long-term vision or capacity for fire 
management locally by Belizeans and limited the realisation of these policies. In 
Section 5.5, I examine how foreign funding limited the continuity, autonomy and 
efficacy of the Department’s work. The short-term nature of aid limited the 
development of a consistent programme of fire management. The technical 
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approaches to fire management that this funding supported limited the extent to 
which the Department attempted to regulate, or work with, the pine industry, other 
government departments, and importantly, fire users in rural locations. With foreign 
assistance, the Department avoided the need to have political support for its work 
within Belize. Foreign aid projects became a means by which local political elites 
could continue to derive benefits from savanna land and resources, while retaining 
an apparent commitment to conservation agendas. Unlike the previous chapter, the 
archival texts upon which this chapter draws are largely limited to official plans and 
reports. These sources provide far less evidence of the politics and practice of 
Belizean forestry. I draw what insight I can from a deconstructive reading of this 
evidence, from newspapers, and, for the later decades, from oral histories and 
ethnography. 
 
5.1 Technical expansion of the Forest Department’s fire management from 
1942-1959 
Entering the 1940s, the Belize Forest Department had few staff and little 
funding.2 Its active fire management was limited to a part of what, in 1941 became 
the Grant’s Works Forest Reserve in the Stann Creek District (see map Figure 
4.10). In response to its earlier precarious funding, a more directed ten-year plan 
was written in 1941, to commence in 1942, for ‘the regeneration of pine (Pinus 
caribaea) on 2000 acres of Grant’s Work Reserve by artificial and natural 
measures’.3 The plan involved the ‘artificial’ regeneration of 1000 acres of ‘pine-
hardwood transition forest’ by clearing and planting with ‘pure pine’. In 1942, the first 
15 acres of pine plantation were created, and until 1959, new areas of plantation 
 
2 It also lost labour to the British war effort. Between 1941 and 1944, over 800 Belizean forestry 
workers were sent to Scotland to work for the British Forest Commission (Ford, 1985). Many remained 
in Scotland after the second world war ended.  
3 Forest Department (1942), p. 1. 
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were created annually, eventually at three different locations on the southern coastal 
plain (see Figure 5.1 for the annual area planted with pine by the Forest Department 
in this period and Figures 5.2 – 5.4 for images of the pine plantations). As part of 
their artificial regeneration, these plantation areas were to be fully protected from 
fire. A further 1000 acres of existing pine savanna were to be protected from fire and 
to undergo what was termed ‘natural regeneration’.  
It took a year for the Grant’s Works plan to pass the Legislative Council, as 
some members were averse to funding it from the territorial budget.4 The Forest 
Department was, however, aware of new opportunities for funding by Colonial 
Development and Welfare (CDW) grants. In 1940, a decade after the 1929 Colonial 
Development Act, the British Government had passed the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Act. The 1929 Act had made only £1 million in grants available across 
all the British colonies annually: the 1940 Act increased this to £5 million.5 The 1940 
Act was in large part a response to political unrest in the Colonies in the 1930s, 
where poverty in the depression years exacerbated the growth of social movements 
calling for independence. Political organisation for riots and strikes in the West 
Indies from 1934-8 prompted the British Government to send a special commission 
to investigate conditions in the West Indian colonies, including Belize. Among the 
recommendations of the West India Royal Commission was a greater focus on 
colonial development.6 Many have argued that the 1940 Act and its successors 
were intended as means to subdue political unrest and perpetuate British colonial 
rule through ‘constructive trusteeship’.7 This colonial rationale for funding 
development was certainly applicable to Belize. Already in the late 1930s, Governor  
 
4 Forest Department (1943, 1944).  
5 ODI (1964); Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1971).  
6 Moyne et al (1945). 
7 Constantine (1984), p. 304, also Lee & Petter (1982); Havinden & Meredith (1993); Cooper (1996); 
Clarke (2007); Hodge (2016).  
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Figure 5.1 Area of pine plantation established by year 
 
Data source 







Pine nursery beds at the Grant’s Works in the Stann Creek District in 1947. 



























‘Broken pine ridge’ clear-cut and burned prior to planting with pine at the Grant’s Works in the Stann 
Creek District in 1947. 




Three-year old pine plantation, with cover-crop of cassava at the Grant’s Works in the Stann Creek 
District in 1947. 




Alan Burns had made application for colonial development grants as a direct 
response to political riots in Belize.8 Chapter four showed that a colonial 
development grant to the Belize Forest Department under the 1929 Colonial 
Development Act was a mechanism by which the Colonial Office enabled the 
continued existence of the Department in the face of political opposition within the 
country. In this chapter I show how CDW Grants to Belize after 1949 performed a 
similar role in defending the work of the Forest Department from a need for political 
support in Belize.  
In 1943, by recommendation of the Governor, Conservator of Forests Neil 
Stevenson prepared a ten-year scheme of forest regeneration work, with a specific 
focus on mahogany and pine, aimed at attracting CDW funding.9 The pine 
regeneration element of the scheme drew on the existing plan for the Grant’s Works, 
envisaging expansion of the work across the southern coastal plain. The Grant’s 
Work plan was for the creation of 100 acres of new plantation annually, but 
Stevenson’s plan increased that target to 1000 acres. He envisioned scaling-up the 
existing 1000 acres under ‘natural regeneration’, to the protection from fire of tens of 
thousands of acres of the southern coastal plain into the southern Stann Creek and 
Toledo Districts. The plan called for a more than tenfold increase on the expenditure 
of the previous decade (see Figure 4.13).10  
In 1944, Stevenson’s plan was sent to the Colonial Office, with a detailed 
report on the 1944 work at the Grant’s Works, followed by another progress report in 
1945.11 Stevenson’s scheme was deemed too costly to fund. In 1945, the new CDW 
 
8 Ashdown (1981), ch. 7.  
9 Forest Department (1944); ‘A forest regeneration scheme for British Honduras’, draft by Neil 
Stevenson, 1944, [OWL MSS.Brit.Emp.s.366(1)]. 
10 ‘A forest regeneration scheme for British Honduras’, draft by Neil Stevenson, 1944, [OWL 
MSS.Brit.Emp.s.366(1)]. 
11 1944 and 1945 reports on the Grant’s Works pine regeneration scheme, and Colonial Office minutes 




Act raised the annual budget available and called for a change in the submission 
format for development schemes. Colonies were now to integrate multiple individual 
schemes into single ten-year plans for the development of the whole colony.12 The 
Forest Department, under a new Conservator of Forests, Alan Lamb, submitted a 
new ten-year development plan for consideration by a development planning 
committee that had been established in Belize.13 Lamb scaled back his 
predecessor’s intentions, but took most of his text from Stevenson’s plan.14 After 
1940, the Secretary of State for the Colonies had dedicated technical advisors, 
including for forestry, who were involved in reviewing colonial development plans. 
Forestry Advisor Wheatley Robinson visited Belize in 1946, and commented of the 
plans for pine plantation and protection that he would not be surprised if they ‘when 
established, prove to pay the Colony better in the long run than the mahogany’.15 
The British Guiana and British Honduras Settlement Commission, visiting in 1948, 
was also supportive of ‘vigorous development’ of the country’s ‘latent resources, 
including through forestry’.16 These endorsements by the Colonial Office’s official 
experts aided the passage of Lamb’s scheme by the CDW committee in 1949.  
In the funding of the scheme, it was also undoubtedly important that there 
was, by 1948, a rapidly growing pine industry in Belize and thus a new substance 
behind the Department’s rationale for fire management as a conservation measure 
to enable sustained pine exploitation. For reasons explored in Chapter four, US 
concession-holders and BEC, the London-based company that owned a large 
proportion of the private land in Belize, had made no attempt to establish a large-
 
12 ODI (1964); Lee & Petter (1982). 
13 Correspondence between Governor of Belize and Colonial Office over development plans, 1946, 
[TNA CO 123/388/8]; Forest Department (1946).  
14 ‘A ten-year forest regeneration plan for British Honduras’, draft by Alan Lamb and Neil Stevenson, 
1947, [OWL MSS.Brit.Emp.s.366(2)]. 
15 In Lamb (1950), p. 219.  




scale pine industry in the 1930s. After WWII, the export timber harvest from the 
colonies rose dramatically in response to demands for reconstruction.17 In 
anticipation of this, the Colonial Office informed the Governor of Belize in 1942 that  
there should be good prospects for the development of a pinewood industry in 
British Honduras, since the tree apparently grows well and there is likely to be a 
large market for this type of timber in the West Indies for building purposes after the 
war. It would appear that British Honduras is the only potential source of local supply 
for export in that area, while there is the additional advantage that forest 
development is also in accord with the aptitude and inclination of a large section of 
the Colony’s population.18 
 
With prospects of a favourable market, BEC began pine extraction from its 
private lands and in 1943 negotiated a concession to harvest pine on Crown Lands 
in the southern part of Stann Creek, which was extended in 1949 for a further ten 
years.19 Other companies and individuals also began small-scale pine operations, 
many of them becoming contractors to BEC, which handled most of the export.20 In 
1948, BEC opened a sawmill at Mango Creek to process pine from the southern 
coastal plain (Figure 5.5 shows the sawmill’s stacking yard). The period between 
1941 and 1949 saw a thirty-fold increase in pine log production in Belize (data in 
Figure 4.11). By 1949, a good proportion of this pine was being exported (data in 
Figure 4.12). There was a strong market for Belizean pine in the other British West 
Indian Colonies, as the ‘dollar scarcity’ following WWII made it preferable for those 




17 Arnold & Armitage (1989); Hansen & Lund (2018).  
18 Letter from Secretary of State to Governor Hunter, 19th February 1942, [TNA CO 123/380/7].  
19 Letter from Martin Johnson to Nick Woods on subject ‘working plan prescriptions’, 25th November 
1976, [Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Station, Cayo District, Belize, uncatalogued in storage]; Forest 
Department (1950). 
20 ‘Forestry’, The British Honduras Government Gazette, 28th December 1950; Forest Department 
(1959); BEC board meeting minutes of 24th May 1953, 5th January 1955, 12th May 1955, 24th 
November 1955, 7th December 1955, 12th April 1956, [Uncatalogued BEC Archive, Ladyville, Belize]; 
‘Pommells and Pilgrim to operate in Swasey’, The Billboard, 19th March 1959.  





The stacking yard of the BEC sawmill at Mango Creek in 1956. 
Source: Belize Archives and Records Service [B7E173P3].  
 
After the 1949 grant, the Belize Forest Department continued to receive 
CDW funding, including specifically to finance fire management.22 Further CDW Acts 
in 1950, 1955, 1959 and 1963 progressively increased the annual grant amount 
available across the Colonies for development schemes, until by 1963 the annual 
allocation was £30 million. The last expenditure under the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Acts was in 1967.23 Belize was among colonies classed as ‘small 
territories which could make little or no contribution from local resources and could 
“afford to raise loans only for directly revenue-earning projects”’.24 It thus received a 
large allocation of CDW money with little need to demonstrate co-financing of its 
 
22 Note that fire management was funded both in the coastal plain savannas (my focus here) but also in 
the upland savannas of the Mountain Pine Ridge.  
23 ODI (1964); Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1971).  




development schemes from territorial budgets. Despite its relatively small size as a 
country, Belize’s Forest Department received £1,001,000 in CDW grants in the 
period 1948-66; 17% of the total granted for forestry schemes in that period across 
all British colonies.25 These grants, as well as increased allocation from the territorial 
budget, enabled a large increase in the annual spending of the Forest Department 
(Figure 4.13).26 In the decades that followed retrenchment in 1929, the Department 
had only three senior staff (having been cut from seven), but by 1959 the 
Department had a senior staff of eight, and had substantially increased numbers of 
junior and labouring staff.27  
The pine industry continued to grow, with extraction and exports peaking in 
the 1950s (Figures 4.11 and 4.12).28 In 1958, after four years of negotiation, BEC’s 
monopoly over the pine industry was re-affirmed as it was granted concessions to 
move its operations further south to the Swasey-Bladen and the Deep River areas.29 
As I will show, the Forest Department made little attempt to directly regulate the pine 
industry in order to control or manage the effects of exploitation, despite repeatedly 
noting the ‘serious overcutting’ taking place in the 1940s and 1950s.30 Rather than 
regulating the pine industry, with the assistance of CDW funding, the Forest 
Department expanded its parallel and compensatory programme of pine plantations 
and fire management. 
From 1949 to 1952, the first CDW grant to the Belize Forest Department 
enabled the plantation of approximately 150 acres with pine annually, including 
 
25 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1971), Table 1.  
26 Though this was also accompanied by an increased territorial allocation to forestry in this period. 
27 Colin Eric Duff, unpublished report entitled ‘History of Forestry in British Honduras’, early 1960s, 
[OWL MSS.Brit.Emp.s.466]. 
28 Forest Department (1967).  
29 Forest Department (1959); ‘Letter to the editor’, The Billboard, 20th June 1959; ‘Sawmilling begins in 
Swasey-Bladen area’, The Billboard, 21st June 1959; ‘Monopoly is the destruction of the economy of a 
country’, The Times, 22nd June 1959.  




experimentation with plantations at sites near Mango Creek and Machaca in the 
Toledo District.31 The area under fire protection using fire lines was expanded to 
include new areas at Mango Creek.32 From 1952 to 1955, further expansion took 
place, with an enlarged CDW allocation, again supported by the Secretary of State’s 
Forestry Advisor, who visited Belize in 1952 noting that ‘there is only some ten to 
fifteen years supply of British Honduras pitch pine in sight and the current planting 
and fire protection of pine are inadequate’, ‘there is a very strong case indeed for 
speeding up the current planting and fire protection. This is a matter of staff and 
funds’.33 Five hundred acres of pine plantation were now created annually at Grant’s 
Works, at Mango Creek and at Machaca, and the area covered by fire lines and 
under fire protection was increased to 3000 acres.34 The 1955 – 1960 development 
plan saw a final enlargement of the CDW grant allocated to forestry. Again, the 
findings of visiting experts, namely the British Honduras Land Survey team led by 
Charles Wright, lent support to the Forest Department’s programme; based on soil 
type, forestry was deemed the optimal form of land use for development of the pine 
savannas.35 The Forest Department increased pine plantation rates to 600 then to 
800 acres annually. Fire lines and logging roads were extended to the Swasey-
Bladen area.36  
Sabine Clarke has identified a ‘decidedly technocratic turn’ in the last 
decades of British colonial policy following the CDW Act in 1940.37 After 1940 more 
substantial funding was available for expert-led, technical, development schemes. 
The Colonial Office took a new interest in understanding the specificities of colonial 
 
31 At that time the Mango Creek plantations were on national land. The area became a forest reserve in 
1960.  
32 Lamb (1950).  
33 Scott, Richardson & Lamb, (1953), p. 4 & p. 15.  
34 Forest Department (1953).  
35 Forest Department (1956); Wright et al (1959).  
36 Forest Department (1956); Colin Eric Duff, unpublished report entitled ‘History of Forestry in British 
Honduras’, early 1960s, [OWL MSS.Brit.Emp.s.466].  
37 Clarke (2007), p. 453.  
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environments as the basis for ‘rational’ land planning and development. This 
research upon colonial environments did not explicitly make use of local knowledge 
but was directed by scientists using Anglo-American methods. These patterns are, I 
show, visible in the Forest Department’s increasingly technical fire management 
programme from 1942 to 1959: in the reams of paper dedicated to planning and 
describing the employment of new equipment, infrastructure and organisation; in 
debate and experimentation over technique; in the use of classification of the 
savanna landscape to plan and spatially segregate the Department’s work.   
From the 1940s the Forest Department increasingly made use of aerial 
photography and land classification schemes to plan its work on the southern 
coastal plain. By 1955, distinct methodologies of pine regeneration had been 
developed for different types of savanna. The ‘artificial regeneration’ at the Grant’s 
Works took place in ‘broken pine ridge’ (hardwood and pine scrub) by clearing and 
planting. Once hardwood competitors had been removed, this was deemed a 
suitable place for pine plantations, because the soil was generally better than that of 
the open savanna. By contrast, the ‘artificial regeneration’ at Mango Creek took 
place in sparse pine or open grassland areas, requiring furrowing and fertiliser use. 
Dense or medium-dense pine was preferred for ‘natural regeneration’ enabled by 
fire protection alone. In 1956, new aerial photography was used to delimit areas of 
savanna suitable for each of these three types of treatment, which took place under 
three separate schemes under the CDW funding after 1955.38 The Department 
repeatedly asserted that it could not be expected to manage fires outside of these 
delimited fire protection areas. For example in 1953, its annual report noted that 
‘although bush fires throughout the country cause great damage and are to be 
 
38 Cree (1956), ‘A pine regeneration scheme for the Southern Coastal Forests of British Honduras’, 




deplored, the Forest Department’s responsibility must be confined to its own areas, 
if these are to be effectively fire protected with the resources available’.39 During the 
1940s and 1950s the areas in which the Department conducted fire management 
included Forest Reserves such as the Grant’s Works, but also other areas of Crown 
Land. From the late 1950s, on the advice of the forestry advisor to the Colonial 
Office, new forest reserves were established, including the Mango Creek and 
Swasey-Bladen Forest Reserves (see Table 4.2 and map Figure 4.10).40 
Reservation gave the Department ‘security of tenure’ in these areas.41 From then 
onwards, fire management was confined to forest reserves (which now covered 
most of the savanna land on the southern coastal plain). This kept the work 
technical and amenable to development funding, but, as is explored in Section 5.5, it 
limited strategic engagement with the Agriculture Department, logging companies 
and rural fire users. 
The areas under fire protection were increasingly compartmentalised into 
ranges under control from different forest stations and visible from fire lookout 
towers manned during the dry season. These ranges were divided into ‘fire 
management units’ separated by fire lines. The Department’s ambitions for such a 
network of fire lines, controlling stations and fire lookout towers far exceeded their 
realisation on the ground. By 1956, a network of 255 miles of major and minor roads 
and 1358 miles of major and minor fire lines was envisaged on maps covering the 
whole southern coastal plain.42 On paper, the southern coastal plain was divided 
into eight ranges, to be under the control of three forest stations and with 17 fire 
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lookout towers.43 By 1960, however, only two of the forest stations and six fire 
lookout towers had been built.44 
In the early days of fire management by the Forest Department fire lines 
were constructed largely by hand, using machetes and controlled burns. Fires were 
attacked using palmetto leaves from the savanna.45 External funding for fire 
management enabled the Department to employ ever more sophisticated 
equipment. After 1942, the Department came to see mechanical equipment as a 
prerequisite for fire management. The Department’s annual report for 1948, for 
example, remarked that ‘proper control of fires awaits improvement of 
communication and the arrival of a Fordson tractor with rotary cultivator’.46  
The ten-year forest development plans written in the 1940s to attract CDW 
funding called for the purchase of new equipment, both to aid the construction of fire 
lines and direct attack on fires.47 The Department first used a tractor pulling a harrow 
to cut fire lines in 1945.48 In the years following, a variety of different jeeps and 
tractors, harrows and graders was put to work in the savanna.49 By 1950, the 
Department had acquired trailers to use as fire tenders, equipped with knapsack fire 
pumps for attacking fires, and drip torches for back firing.50 The Department was 
influenced in the choice of equipment by ‘the experience gained in Florida by the 
U.S Forest Service’.51 Equipment unavailable in Belize was ordered specially from 
companies based in the US: catalogues of fire equipment from the 1940s to 1960s 
 
43 Ibid.  
44 Colin Eric Duff, unpublished report entitled ‘History of Forestry in British Honduras’, early 1960s, 
[OWL MSS.Brit.Emp.s.466]. 
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1925, [BARS MP1894/1925], p. 3. 
46 Forest Department (1949), p. 5.  
47 Forest Department (1944); ‘A forest regeneration scheme for British Honduras’, draft by Neil 
Stevenson, 1944, [OWL MSS.Brit.Emp.s.366(1)]; ‘A ten-year forest regeneration plan for British 
Honduras’, draft by Alan Lamb and Neil Stevenson, 1947, [OWL MSS.Brit.Emp.s.366(2)]. 
48 Forest Department (1946); Lamb (1950).  
49 Lamb (1950).  
50 Ibid.  
51 Forest Department (1948), p. 1.  
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still remain among piles of old records at the Department’s main office in Belmopan 
(Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show examples). The equipment did not either always perform 
as hoped or increase firefighting efficiency. Fire lines cut by a disc harrow or a 
double-breasted disc plough tended to become flooded with water, making it difficult 
for firefighters and vehicles to move down them. Polydisc ploughs were more 
suitable, but heavier, and so needed to be pulled by larger tractors, which were 
cumbersome to manoeuvre on the waterlogged savanna landscape. In these 
conditions the vehicles used as fire tenders and bulldozers, were too slow to be 
useful during a direct attack on fires.52 
In the mid-1950s the Forest Department’s policy towards savanna fires 
changed. From its earliest days the Forest Department experimented with applying 
fire to help clear fire lines.53 Fire protection areas were not, however, subject to 
prescribed burning; the policy, following Hummel’s report, remained one of complete 
fire suppression.54 As noted in Chapter two, during the first half of the twentieth 
century, fire suppression was also the dominant policy in US forestry. From the 
1930s, however, some ecologists and land managers noted that fire suppression 
was causing fuel levels to build to dangerous levels and that fire played a necessary 
ecological role in certain ecosystems. With the Florida Forest Service at the helm, 
prescribed burning gradually made mainstream and became general US Forest 
Service policy by the 1970s.55  
The Belize Forest Department took note of the Florida Forest Service’s use 
of prescribed burning. In 1950, Conservator of Forests Alan Lamb suggested that  
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‘Forester’ fire-fighting equipment brochure from 1946 amongst unsorted records at the Belmopan office 
of the Forest Department, Cayo District, Belize. 








‘Forester’ fire-fighting equipment brochure from 1946 amongst unsorted records at the Belmopan office 
of the Forest Department, Cayo District, Belize. 






‘early burning’ of mature stands should be a future policy, after five to ten years of 
complete fire protection.56 In the field, Department staff began to take note of the 
build-up of fuel that followed fire protection: ‘Each year that protection is successful, 
the young pines grow well, but so does the stock of highly inflammable grass and 
weeds’.57 Then in 1955, following a year of severe fires, exacerbated by the excess 
fuel available because of fire suppression, Conservator of Forests at the time, 
Charles Cree, argued that the Department should adopt a policy of controlled 
burning:  
pine fire protection work was carried out in the last decade on the supposition that it 
would be possible and was desirable completely to exclude fire from regeneration 
areas…. In February 1955 a small plot of very well stocked pine 3-5 feet high in the 
Mountain Pine Ridge was early burnt. It was burnt again by the wild fires in May, but 
as the early burning had previously removed most of the inflammable grass, it 
showed nearly 95% survival, whereas adjoining areas of small trees which were not 
early burnt showed nearly 90% mortality after the May fires. These expensive 
lessons have been quite enough for us to reverse the previous policy of extensive 
complete fire protection and to early burn all our pine lands, except those actually 
under regeneration where there are young seedlings which any fire would kill…. The 
same error was made in the Southern States by the U.S. Forest Service, whose first 
policy of complete fire protection ended in disastrous fires. They now also ‘’winter-
burn’’ all their pine forests except for limited regeneration areas.58  
 
From then onwards, the Department’s policy was to give ‘protection areas’ 
(that is, new plantations or cut-over areas) five years of complete fire suppression 
followed by prescribed burning on a three-year cycle. Surrounding areas were also 
to be subjected to periodic prescribed burning.59 This change in policy did not 
represent a full recognition of the ecological role of fire in savannas. Like elsewhere 
in the British Empire where prescribed burning was being considered at this time, it 
was viewed as a ‘necessary evil’.60 Prescribed burning was an insurance against 
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uncontrollable fires caused by fuel build-up. Fire was still deemed to slow pine 
growth and regeneration (which remained the purpose of fire management).61  
In this section we have seen how between 1942 and 1959 sustained finance 
from CDW grants enabled the fire management programme of the Belize Forest 
Department to expand, across a greater area and in technical scope, to involve new 
mechanical equipment and spatial planning. The methods of fire management in this 
period included infrastructure to prevent fire from spreading across the landscape 
and to enable fire suppression, and, from the 1950s, prescribed fire use. These 
were technical approaches involving minimal engagement with fire users and limited 
to certain ‘protection areas’ only.  
 
5.2 The decline of fire management in practice from 1960 to 1986 
After the 1960s, for several reasons, fire management on the southern 
coastal plain gradually slowed down. New plans and policies were written, and 
equipment granted for fire management under various short-term foreign aid 
projects, but the area covered by active fire management became ever smaller. This 
section begins by exploring the factors that contributed to the general decline in 
funding for the Forest Department’s work in this period, and by which fire 
management became less of a priority. It then examines the work carried out in this 
period, both in planning and in practising fire management.  
The year 1959, marked the ‘anti-climax for the Forest Department’, when ‘the 
activities of the Department were examined in the cold light of the laws of 
economics’: Jack Downie, an economic advisor to the British Government, 
published a report suggesting that the Department’s annual budget be cut 
immediately.62 Arguing that there was ‘a strong prima facie presumption against a 
 
61  
62 Forest Department (1961), p. 1. 
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poor country investing a big proportion of its capital in a project which yields a return 
only after so long a period’, he advocated cessation of the pine plantation 
programme.63 In its draft form, the Department’s 1960-65 development plan had 
made a case for continued pine plantation and large-scale expansion of fire 
protection to cover the whole southern coastal plain pine savanna throughout Stann 
Creek and Toledo.64 The Conservator of Forests was now directly instructed to 
rewrite the development plan, halving the annual budget and ceasing the plantation 
programme.65 In 1965, in the first development plan written under full self-
government, the Government further reduced the annual budget of the Department, 
‘in keeping with the decreasing role which forestry now has in the economy of the 
country’.66 In 1966 the Department used the last of its final CDW grant. Its staff and 
budget were reduced, and its work restricted to fire protection of existing plantation 
and ‘natural regeneration’ areas, timber licensing and revenue collection.  
For the independent government it was symbolic and politically expedient to 
reduce the Department’s allocation from the territorial budget to a bare minimum, 
because the Department had, through its reliance on CDW funding and British 
leadership, retained a public image as a British institution. The strength of this 
connection was indicated to me by the way in which many former and/or older staff 
of the Department spoke to me in positive terms of their former British leadership 
and of the colonial period.67 Yet, at the time of independence, most Belizeans were 
keen to break from Britain and the institutions it had supported in Belize. A former 
 
63 Downie (1959), p. 16.  
64 Forest Department, unknown date, unpublished, draft Development Plan for Forestry, 1960-1965, 
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Belizean Minister explained to me that his support for forestry was unpopular with 
his nationalist colleagues: 
The system that the British put in were [sic] excellent systems … the British were 
fully into forestry.… You try to keep the system, and they attack you, saying “You still 
want to be British, you want to be a Colony’’. And that is what destroyed us when we 
became self-government. We got destroyed because we were so—all the politician 
have the fact that “we not British and we run our own thing”, that you couldn’t keep 
the good system that the British put in. So they threw away the baby and the 
bathwater, and that is what destroyed us.68 
 
After the 1950s, the pine industry in Belize diminished (see Figure 4.11), 
weakening the direct economic rationale for fire management that had existed in the 
1940s and 1950s. After 1958, when BEC was granted pine concessions for these 
areas, the Swasey-Bladen and Deep River Forest Reserves were successively 
worked, but several factors were conspiring to reduce the viability of a large-scale 
pine industry on the southern coastal plain. There were no longer sufficient stocks of 
pine: most of the area had been heavily worked, and, in 1961, Hurricane Hattie did 
great damage to the pine forests across Belize.69 By the 1960s there was also no 
longer a strong market for pine in the West Indies. These countries could again 
afford to buy pine from the USA, which was more desirable, having a higher quality 
of finish than could be achieved with the machinery available in Belize.70 BEC was 
simultaneously facing strikes and calls for higher wages from its labour force, which 
had been unionised from the 1950s.71 BEC thus closed its Mango Creek sawmill in 
1966 and ceased its pine operations.72 From 1966, pine extraction continued on a 
reduced scale for the local market, under annual licenses to a few individuals (see 
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reduced pine log production from 1966 in Figure 4.11).73 In the early 1960s, there 
was a short-lived industry to extract resin from pine stumps, and throughout the 
1960s and 1970s, hopes for a pulp and paper industry from the pine on the southern 
coastal plain did not materialise.74 
By the 1970s, Belize’s timber exports were greatly reduced. The 
independent Government sought to diversify the Belizean economy and forestry 
ceded its place as the major sector of the Belizean economy to agriculture and then 
to tourism.75 Agricultural development also took place in savanna areas, which were 
sometimes de-reserved for this purpose. In 1969, the entire Mango Creek Forest 
Reserve was de-reserved and granted to a US millionaire to make way for vegetable 
cultivation.76 In the 1970s, a state-managed banana industry was re-established in 
the northern Toledo District, including in savanna areas (with drainage 
improvements). These factors led me to examine the role of powerful Belizean elites 
in directing development at the expense of the Department’s work to regenerate 
pine in savannas. 
Simultaneously, the scope of the Department’s work was expanding; forestry 
in the sense of conservation to enable sustained timber production was no longer its 
sole purpose. In keeping with the rising global nature conservation movement, and 
the growing importance of tourism in Belize, the Belizean Government began to 
create new categories of protected areas. In 1966, a commission investigated the 
potential for National Parks in Belize. This was followed by the necessary legislation 
in 1981. In 1973, the Guanacaste Park was designated a ‘Crown Reserve’ and 
 
73 Johnson & Chaffey (1974); King et al (1986, 1989). 
74 ‘Hercules B.H begin operation October 1’, The Billboard, 17th Jul 1962; ‘Unforeseen difficulties cause 
closedown of Hercules’, The Times, 20th March 1965; Johnson (1974).  
75 Thomson, 2004, chs. 13 & 16; Bulmer-Thomas & Bulmer-Thomas, 2012, ch. 4.  
76 This proved an unsuccessful venture, and the Mango Creek Forest Reserve was ultimately re-
reserved in 1977. Letter from Martin Johnson to Nick Woods on subject ‘working plan prescriptions’, 





became the first protected area to be co-managed by the Government with Belize’s 
first conservation NGO, the Belize Audobon Society, (established in 1969). The 
1980s saw a proliferation of new conservation NGOs and protected areas in 
Belize.77 From the Government’s side, responsibility for the terrestrial part of this 
new protected areas system lay with the Forest Department.78 As the Department’s 
budget and capacity were reducing, its remit expanded to include nature 
conservation and the illegal wildlife trade.  
These factors gradually conspired to reduce the Department’s need for, and 
capacity to conduct, an active fire management programme aimed at pine 
regeneration on the southern coastal plain. By the early 1970s only four of the six 
fire towers were still being manned.79 By 1986, the Department lacked the sustained 
finances to maintain equipment, fire lines and dedicated firefighting teams and it 
ceased to conduct fire management in this area.80 During this phase of decline, 
sporadic bursts of activity and technical innovations did follow periodic grants of 
overseas aid. Both CIDA and ODA provided new firefighting equipment, fire 
management training and consultants to write new plans and policies for the Forest 
Department in the 1960s and 1970s.81 Yet none of these external funders provided 
consistent funding for fire management in practice, as had the CDW grants.  
An initial burst of activity was prompted by several years of widespread 
forest fires that consumed the debris blown-over during Hurricane Hattie in 1961. A 
Canadian agricultural development team was in Belize in 1961, and a request was 
made to the Canadian Forest Service to send an additional expert to advise the 
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Forest Department on tackling post-hurricane fires. A brief expansion in fire 
management work by the Forest Department did follow; new equipment and 
infrastructure were provided for with an emergency budget from the Government.82 
Walkie-talkie sets were introduced at the advice of the Canadian Forest Service to 
aid communication between firefighters, fire lookout towers and control stations.83 
The hurricane was also the impetus for new fire legislation: the Forest Fires Act of 
1962 gave the Governor the power to delimit ‘fire control areas’, with limited entry, 
for which the Conservator of Forests could write fire management plans, to be 
carried out at the expense of landowners or management agencies.84 This 
legislation remained after independence, but has not been implemented since the 
1960s.85 After the hurricane, for several years, the Government also financed anti-
fire propaganda campaigns, involving newspaper articles, posters and leaflets 
donated by the US Forest Service (which were dropped by aircraft over villages that 
were deemed by the Department to be offending particularly often in their use of 
fire), tours of a mobile cinema showing a fire prevention film, and the use of the US 
Forest Service’s ‘Smokey the Bear’ teaching materials in schools.86 This burst of 
activity dwindled after 1965 as the forest fires subsided. In their histories of fire 
management, both Stephen Pyne and Simon Pooley have highlighted that large 
wildfire events play an important role in driving the development of state wildfire 
 
82 Forest Department (1962). 
83 ‘New radio equipment aids in fire-fighting’, The Times, 15th April 1962; Forest Department (1963). 
84 Ordinance 20 of 1962, [TNA CO 125/21]; Forest Department (1963).  
85 McCalla (1994).  
86 Forest Department (1963), p. 5.; ‘Fire is now our only danger’, The Times, 12th December 1961; ‘Try 
to avoid forest fires, Premier urges’, The Times, 14th December 1961; ‘Prevent fire campaign planned’ 
and ‘Avoid forest fires!!!’, The Times, 17th December 1961; ‘Fire’, The Times, 6th January 1962; 
‘Disastrous forest fires begin’, British Honduras Newsletters, 3rd March 1962; ‘New radio equipment 
aids in fire-fighting’, The Times, 15th April 1962; ‘Forest fires take heavy toll of natural resources’, 
British Honduras Newsletters, 11th March 1963; ‘Government Information Service forest fire prevention 
campaign intensified’, British Honduras Newsletters, 8th April 1963; ‘Recapitulation on forest fire havoc’, 




policy.87 Their argument is supported by the Belize Forest Department’s response to 
the wildfires following Hurricane Hattie, and also those in 1955.   
In 1969, Lewis Lindo became the first Belizean Chief Forest Officer.88 By 
then, most of the senior staff of the Department were Belizean, yet the Department 
struggled to fill leadership positions with trained foresters, and in the 1970s and 
1980s, a series of British ODA/ODM staff were seconded to the Belize Forest 
Department for two – four-year periods.89 They had specific topics on which they 
were to provide technical advice and assistance. One of these, Martin Johnson was 
tasked, between 1974 and 1976, to write a fire management plan and a working 
plan for the southern coastal plain.90 Johnson had a good knowledge of the Belizean 
context: he had previously mapped the pine stocks of the southern coastal plain 
using satellite imagery and fieldwork.91 His plans demonstrate that he had also done 
extensive research into the history of the Forest Department. Johnson’s plan did not 
call for new policies or practices. He described the existing fire management 
infrastructure in detail and called for a renewal of the efforts of the late 1950s, with 
the resurrection of various fire towers that were now unmanned and funding to 
replace depreciating equipment. No such funding was forthcoming, and as noted 
(Chapter three, Section 3.6), Johnson’s plan was not put into practice.  
The equipment that was sporadically donated to the Department became 
increasingly sophisticated, yet as had been the case since the 1920s, approaches 
and equipment designed elsewhere were not always suited to conditions in the 
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Belizean savanna. For example, one visiting consultant noted in 1976 that the fire 
tenders that had been supplied by CIDA were ‘too light and too ”flimsy” for the job 
they were expected to do and too “fancy”’.92 In practice, the firefighters were often 
more nimble in following the furious pace of a fire if they left their mechanical 
equipment behind. Two former Forest Guards described firefighting in the 1970s: 
we do it [sic] with the young pine or palmetto. We cut that and lash…. Well water we 
never had that too much, right, because the vehicle that carry the water generally 
could not get into the place. Once we get pumps and then we spray with that, right. 
But that was too slow for the kind a fire that we had. Those kind a fire was moving 
like jet. And especially they done get caught up in a breeze. You couldn’t pump that 
fire, it just blow right past. You have to run.93  
 
Prescribed fire use remained part of the Department’s fire management 
policy after the 1950s. In the 1960s, the Forest Department’s annual reports mention 
prescribed burning in certain years.94 It is unclear whether prescribed burning was 
done annually, and on what scale it was carried out. The older forestry staff I 
interviewed were mixed in their recollections of how important prescribed burning 
was in the 1960s and 1970s. Two former Forest Guards remembered no prescribed 
burning of plantations, but recalled some use of controlled fire along roadsides to 
create fire breaks to prevent fires spreading from cigarette ends thrown out of 
vehicles.95 On the other hand, another staff member remembered that ‘prescribed 
fire was an accepted programme’.96 The purpose of prescribed burning was still to 
reduce fuel loads, and also, as the same staff member recalled, ‘to reduce the 
broadleaf species overcoming the pine’.97   
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While the rationale for prescribed fire use may have been known to the 
Forest Department staff, it did not have sufficient state support to develop as a 
programme, and the capacity and leadership to carry out prescribed burns gradually 
eroded. This parallels the experience elsewhere, such as in South Africa, where 
prescribed burning did not become commonplace, despite support from the Forest 
Department from the 1940s.98 In 1978, Nick Woods, an ODA staff member on a 
short-term secondment to Belize, wrote that prescribed burning was ‘in the 
experimental stage’.99 By 1986, there had also ‘been a lapse in the prescribed 
burning trials’ in the upland pine forests of the Mountain Pine Ridge (which had had 
a programme of fire management on a scale paralleling that on the southern coastal 
plain from the 1950s onwards).100 After 1986, the Department concentrated its pine 
regeneration work at the Mountain Pine Ridge only.  
 
5.3 New policies for fire management from 1986 to present 
Forestry’s funding and importance in Belize declined further after 1990. The 
USA’s economic policy increasingly directed development. Shortly after 
independence, the Belizean Government signed its first deal with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). As elsewhere in the Global South, the IMF directed Belize 
towards tariff reductions, reductions in social spending, greater dependence on 
imported food, and increased exports to industrialized countries.101 These demands 
pushed the Government to grant large areas of savanna on the southern coastal 
plain for citrus and aquaculture development.102 The forest reserves on the southern 
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coastal plain became even less of a priority for the Forest Department. At least on 
paper, nature conservation was now a major part of the Department’s work, and, 
throughout the 1990s, new protected areas were added to the area that was 
officially under its jurisdiction.103 Despite broadening its mandate, the Forest 
Department was further retrenched. In 1995, the IMF pushed for a reduction in 
employees across Government, which hit the Forest Department particularly 
badly.104 The Department gradually ceded management responsibility for 75 percent 
of Belize’s protected areas to conservation NGOs, or in some cases to community 
co-management, without being able to provide any financial support to these 
organisations.105  
On the southern coastal plain a small-scale pine industry continued, 
supplying the local market only. After several decades of granting only annual 
licenses for pine extraction, in the late 1990s, the Forest Department re-introduced 
long-term forest concessions for pine extraction from national lands and forest 
reserves, including Deep River and Swasey-Bladen.106 The Forest Department did 
not make fire management a condition of such concessions, but as I show in 
Chapter six, seeing the benefit in terms of pine regeneration, some of these logging 
concession holders began their own prescribed fire management programmes.  
Just as the local political elite undermined the Department’s work in the 
colonial period (see Chapter four), after independence, Belize’s powerful elites 
continued to direct land and natural resource use to their advantage. Belize’s 
politicians retained power through a system of patronage. Only when politically 
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expedient did politicians align themselves with the Department’s aims, policies and 
legislation, or with those of international conservation and development funders.107 
Positions within the Forest Department were granted to political supporters or family 
of the ruling party, not based on qualifications in forestry or nature conservation.108 It 
thus became difficult for staff to retain positions. The Department’s right to grant 
forest licenses became a tool for Ministers to garner political support.109 Further, 
after the 1960s, when the Government introduced new land leasehold and titling 
processes, ’the forest reserves started to be treated as land banks. So, it was a 
forest reserve until the land situation got so desperate, whether in truth, or just 
politically. Then it was ok to go in and chop off a piece and hand it out’.110 Ministerial 
decisions to excise and grant land from forest reserves as political favours were 
often made without informing the Forest Department, placing the reserve boundaries 
under dispute.111 Thus the aquaculture, citrus and banana industries could expand 
into savanna forest reserves on the southern coastal plain (compare the present 
boundaries of the Mango Creek Forest Reserve and Grant’s Work Forest Reserve 
shown in Figure 5.8 with the original boundaries in Figure 4.10).112  
Since 1986, the Forest Department has only conducted a limited programme 
of fire management in the Mountain Pine Ridge, but foreign organisations have 
continued to provide sporadic training or equipment for fire management under 
short-term projects and consultancies. In 1997, a training module in fire 
management was written for the Forest Department as part of the six-year, ODA-
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funded Forest Planning and Management Project.113 The Department was provided 
with firefighting equipment by the Montana Forest Service in the 1990s.114 Between 
2000 and 2009, Forest Department staff took part in fire management training with 
TNC under the Global Fire Initiative (GFI) (I discuss this in Chapter six in more 
detail). TNC preached a ‘gospel of fire management’ that departed radically from 
previous approaches in Belize.115 TNC’s approach of ‘integrated fire management’ 
accepted human fire in the landscape, and proposed that fire management could 
achieve nature conservation and timber regeneration aims while also being 
integrated with ‘socio-cultural realities’.116 TNC staff suggested that fire was 
ecologically appropriate in the Belizean savanna, and at suitable frequencies and 
intensities, could indeed be beneficial to pine regeneration. TNC strongly promoted 
prescribed fire use.117 TNC’s approach and rhetoric formed the basis of a Wildland 
Fire Management Policy and Strategy for Belize published by the Forest Department 
in 2009.118 Shortly afterwards, the funding for the GFI was cut, and TNC ceased its 
support for fire management in Belize.119 In 2014, the Forest Department received 
funding from the World Bank and GEF for the five-year Management and Protection 
of Key Biodiversity Areas in Belize Project (KBA).120 This provided the latest external 
support for fire management: training for staff by a Californian consultant, new 
donations of equipment (‘Kestrel’ pocket weather stations, GPS units and drones), 
and the creation of a Forest Fires Communication Strategy for the Department in 
2018.121   
On paper, Belize’s new fire policies, produced with TNC’s support and under  
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Source: Map created in Arc GIS by author, using Belize Basemap shapefile (Meerman & unknown 
sources, 2013), and Belize Protected Areas shapefile (Meerman, 2017), both available at 
http://www.biodiversity.bz/ , [accessed 11/02/2019]. While this map is intended to show the present 
reserve boundaries, it may not be entirely accurate, since, as noted in Chapters 5 and 6, Ministers 





A 1960s firefighting manual produced by the USFS, on the unsorted shelves of the Belize Forest 
Department office in Belmopan. 




the KBA Project, appear to reflect a radical change in the approach to fire 
management in Belize.122 Before TNC’s engagement in Belize, fire management 
was deemed the sole prerogative of Government agencies; the public’s use of fire 
was deemed a threat. Fire management was considered a technical exercise, to 
which numerous firefighting manuals written by the US and Canadian Forest 
Services between 1950 to 1980, that now lie among the unsorted archives at the 
Forest Department’s office in Belmopan, stand as testament (Figure 5.9, for 
example). Fire management was formerly solely directed towards maximising pine 
production and not towards nature conservation. As one of the TNC staff working in 
Belize in the 2000s remembered, before their work ‘there was not a great deal of 
receptivity at the agency level to fire—it was not believed that fire was good, or fire 
was a natural ecological—it didn’t have a place in the ecosystem and fire should be 
repressed’.123 Belize’s Wildland Fire Management Policy and Strategy thus appears 
to represent a major change from this previous approach in that it calls for 
consideration of the social and cultural, economic, environmental and institutional 
dimensions of fire management: 
Wildland fire will be used to protect, maintain, and enhance fire dependent 
ecosystems and, as nearly as possible, be allowed to function in its natural 
ecological role.124 
 
Fire is an important component of the Belizean rural and agricultural landscape and 
has been used as an important tool in the pursuit of rural and traditional livelihoods. 
When fire is used inappropriately and indiscriminately then it becomes a threat to 
rural livelihoods. Therefore, the appropriate use of fire will be promoted only in those 
circumstances where all the technical, legal, social, and safety parameters permit its 
use.125 
 
The management of wildland fire will be promoted and developed at the community 
level in general as an integral component of community resource management. The 
necessary technical, legal, and other necessary supportive structures will be created 
and maintained to enable community governance systems to spearhead local 
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wildland fire management initiatives including the capability for a quick response to 
wildland fire threats.126 
 
Similarly, the Department’s 2015 Forest Policy, written under the auspices of 
the KBA Project to replace the pre-existing policy of 1954, calls for collaborative 
forest management, community forestry and ‘equitable access to and use of forest 
resources by all persons within the confines of any over-riding public interest’.127 In 
2017, the Department’s Forest Fires Communication Strategy, also written with the 
KBA funding, devoted 151 pages to a ‘situational analysis’, eleven ‘communication 
principles’, twelve ‘communication strategic objectives’ with hundreds of sub-
activities, twenty-nine ‘communication approaches’ (including the creation of multi-
stakeholder fire management working groups, web-based outreach and a forest fire 
education curriculum) and, finally, seventy-five ‘key messages’, all aiming to 
encourage ‘a departure from the prevailing technical-focused, one-directional 
(traditional “top-down”) communication approaches often used by government 
agencies’. The Strategy promoted an approach that ‘essentially seeks to promote 
people as central to forest fire management’. This, it was deemed, would bring 
about ‘a “win-win” situation, engaging local community and indigenous people in 
determining how they would like to be included in forest fire management, 
interdisciplinary stakeholders in discussions and working together, and better 
collaboration both of internal and external stakeholders’.128 
It is hard to know what role these policies have played or will play in directing 
the Department’s work. The 2015 Forest Policy ‘still has not been discussed at a 
national level’, nor followed up with legislation through revision of the Forest Act 
(which stands more or less as it did in 1926).129 This echoes the experience in many 
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other countries, where community-based forestry has been endorsed in ‘soft laws’ 
such as international agreements and policies but not incorporated into forestry 
legislation.130 In practice, the Belizean Government shows little willingness to 
relinquish control of forest reserves to communities for timber production, let alone 
to support the establishment of community fire brigades (as I discuss further in 
Chapter six).131 Since the 1990s the Forest Department, with the Government of 
Belize, has repeatedly opposed the interests of the Mayan communities of the 
Toledo District in an indigenous land rights case.132 Despite the inclusion in policy of 
nature conservation as an aim of fire management, the Department shows no move 
towards this in practice. As far as a former Department employee could see: ‘right 
now you see that they [sic] only thinking about just collect revenue from loggers and 
things like that. Because I don’t know any plans that they have … I think everything 
just trickle down the drain’.133 In Section 5.5 I give further analysis to the role that 
these recent policies play, even if not it is not in directly informing the Department’s 
work.  
The Department retains a large amount of the fire management equipment 
that it has been donated, yet few of its staff retain the skill to put it to use. From 
informal conversations and interviews, few current staff of the Department, or its 
recent technical consultants, are aware that the Department conducted fire 
management before the 1980s.134 A TNC employee working in Belize under the GFI 
in the early 2000s remarked that at the Mountain Pine Ridge ‘they had tools, 
protective equipment, fire towers that were going unused. They could have 
equipped 30 or 40 people with safety gear. And it was all just there and they did not 
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have the staff’.135 TNC’s training did change the attitudes of some individuals in the 
Department towards fire.136 Today, a few of these individuals continue to push for 
the Department to conduct prescribed burns in the Mountain Pine Ridge.137 Yet, 
despite the capacity of these few individuals, the Department lacks wider staff 
capacity, or support in higher levels of Government to carry out consistent 
programmes of prescribed burning.138 In recent attempts to conduct prescribed fires 
in the Mountain Pine Ridge, the Department lost control of fires, a fact which carries 
a legal risk.139  
Thus, today, as with most protected area management in Belize, fires in 
protected areas, except for the Mountain Pine Ridge, are left to several local NGOs, 
such as the Toledo Institute for Development and Environment (TIDE), who have 
capacity for fire management (also largely developed through work with TNC under 
the GFI: see Chapter six). In recent years, TIDE’s staff have provided fire 
management training to Forest Department staff, cost-free to the Department, under 
an aid-funded fire management project of their own.140  
The final sections of this chapter draw conclusions about how foreign 
‘expertise’ and aid have shaped and limited the Forest Department’s fire 
management work throughout its history. They explore the reasons for the gaps 
between policy and practice in fire management in Belize.  
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5.4 Expertise in the design of fire management 
I have demonstrated that foreign ‘experts’ have played an important part in 
directing the Forest Department’s work from its inception. In the colonial period, the 
Department’s senior staff were British, and the word of special advisors to the British 
Colonial Office, such as Robinson, Wright and Downie, played an important role in 
directing the general fortunes of the Department. Since the 1970s, consultants have 
been called in from outside Belize, to give training and write policy under short-term 
projects. In 1957 it was suggested by a British advisor, that ‘the basic fault’ with the 
‘administrative machine’ in Belize lay with ‘the system of posting expatriate officers, 
with no previous knowledge of the country, for short tours only to this Colony’.141 
This section reviews the implications of this reliance on foreign expertise for the 
Forest Department’s fire management in policy and practice.  
If, after Collins and Evans, we take expertise as ‘real’, in the sense of 
involving the possession of deep tacit knowledge, we can examine the realms of 
knowledge in which these people might be understood to have possessed 
expertise.142 Despite the fact that the Department’s advisors were often granted 
authority as ‘scientific’ experts, as was the case of Hummel in 1921, scientific 
expertise and knowledge, in the sense of induction from empirical measurements, 
has rarely directed fire management. After Hummel’s initial measurements of pine 
volumes, the Department continued to monitor pine stocks, creating inventories of 
the southern coastal plain in the 1930s, 1950s and 1970s. Yet no scientific study 
was carried out to examine wildfire frequency and behaviour in the savanna, and, 
importantly, its effects on pine growth.143 In the Colonial period, the Department did 
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have a research division, which examined the effects of different methods of forestry 
on pine regeneration in experimental plots. Yet, as I have shown (using the 
vignettes in Chapter three, Section 3.6), the collection and preservation of data 
about Belizean forestry was an enterprise largely driven by foreign scientists and 
administrators. There was often a form of institutional ‘memory loss’ as records of 
research were destroyed or forgotten. A former senior staff member of the 
Department remembered experiments in the 1960s and 1970s, but he ‘didn’t see the 
results…. Research was just not used practically’.144 Later, under a five-year UK-
government funded project in the 1990s, British consultants to the Forest 
Department introduced long-term monitoring plots which were not maintained after 
the project ended.145  
We might thus consider the expertise that informed the Department’s fire 
management, rather than being ‘scientific’, to have been what Fleischmann and 
Briske call ‘professional ecological knowledge’. The institutions from which these 
experts derived, be they the Oxford Imperial Forestry Institute or TNC, understood 
fire’s proper role in ecosystems in a general way; their members were experts 
possessing knowledge as codified their institutions’ ‘best management practices, 
procedural manuals, and technical guides that often come to be thought of as 
verified scientific knowledge’.146 These experts applied established ecological 
principles and fire management methods and ecological principles to Belize, rather 
than deriving them within the Belizean context.  
The foreign experts guiding the Forest Department’s fire management 
throughout its history have all been technical experts with professional qualifications 
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in forestry and fire management. Yet the extent to which they have also had 
experience and expertise regarding the ecological and socio-political specifics of the 
Belizean context—in other words, also possessed local knowledge—has changed. 
This is related to the trend towards ever shorter consultancies. Colonial 
Conservators of Forests in Belize spent up to fourteen years resident in the country 
(as in Neil Stevenson’s case). From the 1970s to the 1990s, foreign consultants to 
the Department under projects such as the ODA-funded Forest Planning and 
Management Project were not Department staff but did live in-country for several 
years as project staff. Today, foreign consultants to projects make only brief visits to 
Belize. The Californian fire management consultant that provided training to the 
Department staff under the KBA project in 2017 spent only several weeks in Belize.  
Based upon interviews with colonial officials whose careers later turned to 
international development, Uma Kothari has recorded changes in the type of 
knowledge valued in development experts as part of the trend to spend less time in-
country.147 International development has become increasingly ‘professionalised’, 
such that technical expertise and qualifications are valued above local contextual 
understanding gained through extended residency in a country. These patterns are 
evident in Belize. Colonial Conservators of Forests wrote and oversaw the 
Department’s budget and work in its entirety, and for this it was deemed necessary 
to reside in Belize and develop a contextual knowledge of the Belizean environment. 
Thus, it was possible in the 1950s for observations gained through practical 
experience of managing the savanna to inform the introduction of prescribed burning 
in Belize. Today, foreign fire management consultants to the Belize Forest 
Department fulfil only specific project objectives related to their technical expertise in 
fire management. In-depth understanding of the Belizean context is not deemed a 
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pre-requisite to such a consultancy. As was reported to me of the KBA Project’s fire 
management consultant: ‘they imported somebody from California, which couldn’t 
be more different to Belize, to do the training here. And I’m sure they did an … out-
of-the-box type of job’.148 There has thus been an increasing reliance on 
professional ecological knowledge to direct fire management policy in Belize.  
From the 1950s, there were efforts to develop technical expertise in forestry 
among Belizeans, and Belizeans gradually came to take senior positions within the 
Forest Department. After 1955, a handful of Belizeans received scholarships to 
study forestry in Cyprus, the UK and Puerto Rico.149 These individuals trained within 
European and North American institutions developed similar professional ecological 
knowledge to their British counterparts. The first senior position in the Department 
(as an Assistant Conservator of Forests) to be filled by a Belizean was in 1953, and 
the first Belizean Chief Forest Officer was appointed in 1969.150 Training in forestry, 
like the training in fire management given to staff under various aid projects, was 
available only as long there was external funding; there was no school of forestry in 
Belize. Further, those individuals that had obtained degrees abroad often preferred 
to use the status this afforded them to take better paid positions than were available 
with the Forest Department.151 There was thus always a shortage of qualified 
Belizeans to fill senior positions within the Department. British staff were still being 
called in to fill temporary vacancies in the 1990s.152 In recent decades, those 
Department staff who have degrees and professional training, have generally not 
studied forestry, but rather, in keeping with the rise of nature conservation, have 
studied environmental science or management. Since 2012 there has been a 
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degree in environmental resource management available at the University of Belize, 
and some of its graduates have obtained positions in the Forest Department.  
Though qualified Belizeans have held positions of leadership within the 
Department, they have struggled to use their expertise to direct the Department’s 
work. This has been, in part, because of limited and inconsistent funding (see 
Section 5.5), but it has also been because staff commonly gain and lose positions 
because of their political allegiance.153 ‘Qualifications were taken into account when 
employing staff up to a point, but it was very much what party your family was 
associated with. This made it difficult for people running the Department to discipline 
people’.154 Furthermore, the Department has never had a staff member dedicated to 
leading the fire management programme. Today the task is managed alongside 
other priorities by staff members who do not necessarily have training in fire 
management.155 Many of the Department’s policies are still written by external 
consultants, often as part of funded projects. In recent decades, the Department has 
sometimes employed Belizeans as consultants. They have had knowledge of the 
local context but have still been employed because of their technical expertise.  
Until recently in the Department’s history, local fire users have not been 
deemed to possess a form of expertise that should inform fire management. 
Throughout the twentieth century, the Department’s attempts to engage with rural 
fire users were limited and, largely, took the form of propaganda campaigns, such 
as those that followed Hurricane Hattie. These campaigns gave a strong anti-fire 
message: ‘hunters must not set fires, farmers must be careful…. You can prevent 
fires. The future is in YOUR hands’.156 In these campaigns, the Forest Department 
was presented as the only agency with the technical expertise to manage fires. Fires 
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set by the rural population had no place in forests; even after fire was accepted as a 
management tool for forestry in the 1950s, only prescribed fires set by the 
Department were permissible. The Department’s recent policies suggest a radical 
change in approach: there is an appreciation of the role of fire in local livelihoods, 
calls for community fire brigades and for an end to ‘top-down’ approaches in 
communicating messages about fire management.157 These policies, and the 
experts that wrote them, follow the latest technical discourse of ‘participatory’ 
approaches in international development. So far, the Department shows little real 
commitment to these policies.  
As Fleischmann and Briske note, professional ecological knowledge has 
more limited feedbacks with real ecological and social conditions than does either 
scientific or local knowledge.158 Most foreign experts advising the Belize Forest 
Department inflexibly ‘operated with a particular vision of the world’.159 As we have 
seen throughout Chapters four and five, the kinds of policies and plans that these 
experts produced were often unsuited, in practice, to Belizean fire management. Not 
only was such expertise practically limited in its relevance in Belize, but, critically, it 
also held limited authority in Belize. Foreign, technical expertise derived its authority 
to direct fire management in Belize from the cultures of colonial Britain and 
international development. The authority of these experts to write plans and policies 
within the context of international development projects was not disputed, but 
powerful Belizean elites, the general public, and some Department staff, did not 
attribute to these people and their plans the same authority. As technical experts 
were employed for ever shorter consultancies, so their expertise had less ability to 
direct fire management in practice. Together, the patterns that I have identified 
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mean that while professional ecological knowledge in forestry and fire management 
has directed policymaking throughout the Forest Department’s history, it has had a 
declining influence on fire management in practice. 
 
5.5 The implications of international funding for fire management 
In beginning this chapter, I presented an argument made by various 
scholars, that the 1940 CDW Act and its successors were intended as means by 
which to subdue political unrest and perpetuate British colonial rule through 
‘constructive trusteeship’.160 For Tania Li similarly, international development project 
funding today enables development agencies’ ‘interventions into the affairs of 
sovereign nations to be framed in technical terms, avoid diplomatic upset and evade 
political questions they cannot resolve’.161 Such a logic, I contend, is applicable to 
funding received by the Forest Department for fire management projects since the 
1949 CDW grant. CDW and international development funding have protected fire 
management as a project, but it has not had direct political support in Belize.  
As noted, before the first CDW grant was allocated to the Forest 
Department, the Belizean Legislative Council was reluctant to fund the Grant’s 
Works Pine Regeneration Scheme from the territorial budget. The Department’s 
unpopularity in Belize carried onwards from the 1920s and 1930s. The Department’s 
claim to authority based on technical expertise, the high salaries of its senior, British, 
staff, and its connections with the British Colonial Office, all lay behind the dislike 
expressed towards it by the labour movement and Belizean elites pressing for self-
government. In 1944, for example, the Independent called for the Department’s 
retrenchment, arguing that: 
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The establishment of a department of forestry in the Colony has been rather 
expensive and while it may be contended that what had been done in the past was 
necessary (a contention with which we entirely disagree) every care should be 
exercised over expenditure to avoid extravagance and waste, which was so 
pronounced in the past that substantial reduction has had to be instituted. And if it 
was found necessary to institute reduction in expenditure in the past, it should be still 
more necessary for the simple reason that there is only routine work to be done, 
which means that the need for a bunch of highly paid technical officers no longer 
exists.162 
 
While it had sustained CDW funding, the fire management work of the 
Department could not be touched by such arguments, but, as we have seen, after 
this ended, the independent Belizean Government did not prioritise funding for the 
Forest Department in its budget. International development funding nevertheless 
continued to sustain the Department. As a former Minister explained to me, there 
has been political impetus to maintain a Forest Department because international 
conservation agendas bring the promise of project funding to the Government: ‘it is 
only because the world … they make lot a [sic] noise, and all do radical in Europe, 
starting to make noise about climate and environment and conservation, is why they 
beginning to make token gestures in Belize, and forestry, ‘’yes, boy, you need to do 
this’’’.163  
This situation, in which the impetus for fire management ebbed and flowed 
with the availability of foreign aid, limited the Department’s work practically. While 
international funding drove technical expansion and innovation, its short-term nature 
after the 1950s limited the coherence of the Department’s work. ‘Hand-to-mouth’ 
dependency on aid made the Department unable to develop a long-term programme 
or institutional vision for fire management.164 As a visiting UN-FAO consultant noted 
in 1982, ‘there is nothing wrong in the acceptance of aid, but … too indiscriminate 
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an acceptance of offers can simply serve to thwart local initiative … there is a 
tendency to accept the situation that all acknowledge is unsatisfactory until a new 
machine comes along to solve it’.165 The high turnover of senior staff limited the 
quality of reporting and the consistency of the Department’s work: ‘there is always 
one or two people who, you know because of their interest in something can—and 
maybe the contacts they have—can trigger off things. The unfortunate thing is that 
when they go, then everything just kind of dies away and you go back to no-
where’.166 The equipment and vehicles sporadically donated to the Department have 
usually been types for which it is impossible to find replacement parts in Belize.167 In 
1989 when fire management ended on the southern coastal plain, this was 
attributed to ‘the lack of replacement of equipment, which had been provided by 
donors’.168  
As we have seen, the culture of colonial and international development has 
favoured approaches that have treated fire management as a technical exercise. In 
planning projects for grant funding, the Department thus delineated purely technical 
programmes of work and the socio-political context to fire management was largely 
omitted. In 1952, for example, as the Department began planning its CDW grant 
application for 1955-1960, Department staff questioned whether to limit plantation 
work to the Stann Creek District, given that existing fire protection work in the 
Toledo District was limited. On the other hand, it was feared that they ‘could not very 
well desist entirely from plantation work in Toledo as it would raise political issues 
over unemployment and disbursement of Government funds between Districts’. The 
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Colonial Secretary responded that ‘Colonial Development and Welfare grants are 
not designed to take care of political issues. The aim is to develop the economy of 
the Colony. If the only reason for dividing the project between Stann Creek and 
Toledo is a political one, then I think we will have to think again because it is obvious 
that it will be more costly to undertake two projects rather than one’.169  
When the Department conducted active fire management, it was with limited 
ability to reduce the number of savanna fires in Belize, because the work did not 
attempt to engage with the socio-political context from which wildfires emanated. 
The fire ‘problem’ was, of course, still a political one. Fires did not necessarily 
originate within ‘protection areas’. Fires were started by human actors. Fire 
management was being justified to prop up the pine industry, in which most rural fire 
users had no stake; it benefitted a few individuals, and, from the 1940s to the 1960s, 
was monopolised by a single British company. Let me specify how the Department 
was limited in its engagement with relevant stakeholders in the pine industry, the 
Agriculture Department and rural fire users in particular. 
The Forest Department did make occasional suggestions that BEC, and 
others in the pine industry should accept some responsibility for the sustainability of 
the industry, for example by financing fire management. In 1947 it was suggested to 
charge pine licensees with the cost of constructing fire lines in production areas.170 
At the Departmental Conference in 1955 the need to place more responsibility for 
fire management on landowners and concessionaires was raised.171 Finally, in 1957, 
the pine license agreement with BEC for the Swasey-Bladen and Deep River Forest 
areas included a term requiring them to provide labour to assist with fire 
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management in the concession areas.172 In reality, the Department enforced no 
regulations on the pine industry, and companies like BEC did not finance fire 
management. In 1952, the Department’s annual report noted that it was ‘misleading 
to show license areas as being under a management plan of any kind’.173 By the 
1970s, the Department was conducting some fire management on private land, at 
no expense to the owners.174  
Those pine concessions granted to BEC secured the Company’s monopoly 
of the pine industry, ensured the flow of capital to Britain and largely prevented local 
capital accumulation from the pine industry before the resource had been heavily 
over-exploited: ‘everything was for England’.175 This did not go unnoticed in Belize. 
In 1961, for example, the Times asserted that ‘whatever economic help the BEC has 
given the country in the way of low wages, salaries, harsh working conditions and 
bad labour relations, all this has been outweighed by the fact that it has failed to 
contribute sufficiently to the development of the country. On balance it has not put 
back what it has taken out’.176 Worker’s unions were legalised in Belize in 1942, and 
the General Workers Union took frequent strike action against BEC to call for fairer 
wages and better living conditions, including at the Mango Creek sawmill.177 The 
strikes prompted little change to working conditions from BEC.178 In 1957, the 
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Hillbank’, The Billboard, 19th March 1964; Bolland (2003), ch. 8; Alexander & Parker (2004), ch. 2. 
178 Reading the Company’s Board meeting minutes throughout this period I found note of the strikes 
and tribunals that resulted, but responses were largely in the form of official statements rather than 




People’s United Party (PUP) made a promise to grant the Swasey-Bladen pine 
concessions to another company as part of its election campaign.179 After the 
concession had been granted to the other company, it failed to meet its promises, its 
manager was exposed as fraudulent, and the concession was transferred to BEC.180  
 The politicisation of the pine concessions is invisible in the pages of the 
Forest Department’s annual reports for this period. In 1959, the Department merely 
noted that the Government’s priority should be to ‘encourage the investment of 
foreign capital in forestry’ and that it had ‘been necessary to assure the main 
producer of Pine a future supply of pine sufficiently large to justify the installation of 
modern machinery…. Although a monopoly in the Pine industry might be regarded 
as undesirable, the government has found it necessary to grant an option for one 
large Pine area and agree to the transfer of a license in another area, to one 
company which now hold concessions covering almost the whole southern coastal 
area’.181  
 Just as the Department avoided serious engagement with the pine industry, 
it did little to engage with the Agriculture Department, which shared an interest in fire 
management. From the 1950s, the use of soil survey to plan ‘optimal’ land use 
meant that areas best suited for forestry were distinguished from agricultural 
development areas. Regardless of these land classification schemes, fires 
sometimes escaped from agricultural land, mostly into broadleaf forests, but 
occasionally also into the savanna. For this reason, in the 1940s and early 1950s, 
 
179 ‘Ned Davis to pay 50 cts. Per hour: Ned Davis and associates to operate in Toledo’, The Times, 
17th September 1957; ‘‘Ned Davis to build church, school, theatre at timber works’, The Times, 27th 
October 1957.  
180 ‘Ned Davis Pulp, plywood, pine schemes hit snags; new terms on pine sought’, The Billboard, 25th 
October 1957; ‘Ned Davis sued for $81,000 US’, The Billboard, 21st December 1957; ‘We Lose’, The 
Billboard, 6th June 1958; ‘British American Pulp and Paper Co may lose Swasey-Bladen Timber 
Concession. Company said failing to observe terms of contract’, The Billboard, 5th July 1958; 
‘Pommells and Pilgrim to operate in Swasey’, The Billboard, 19th March 1959.  




the Agriculture and Forest Departments cooperated to address agricultural fire use. 
In 1946, following a hurricane, the Departments collaborated on a fire prevention 
campaign, visiting farms to check whether farmers were constructing fire traces 
before burning.182 In 1952, with CDW funding, a Rural Fire Service was established 
and administered by the Forest Department. It patrolled farming areas to oversee 
the construction of fire traces.183 In 1953, however, the Department handed the 
administration of the Rural Fire Service over to the District Administration, and the 
initiative lapsed.184 The Department argued that responsibility for overseeing 
agricultural burning should fall to the Agriculture Department alone, since the Forest 
Department had ‘quite enough to do protecting Forest Reserves from fire’ and any 
additional responsibility would ‘reduce its efficiency’.185 
 In 1958 the Agricultural Fires Ordinance made it illegal to burn for agriculture 
without a fire trace or a permit from the Agriculture Department (see Table 4.1).186 
When, in 1962, the Forest Fires Ordinance was passed, the existence of these 
separate pieces of legislation reinforced the artificial separation between ‘agricultural 
fires’ and ‘forest fires’.187 This legislative structure is retained today. Despite recent 
wildland fire policies that support a more integrated approach to managing fire, and 
specifically call for cooperation between these Departments, the Agriculture and 
Forest Departments still have little dialogue around fire.188  
Throughout the twentieth century, the Department’s attempts to engage with 
rural fire users largely took the form of propaganda campaigns (besides the several 
 
182 Forest Department (1947). A fire trace connoted a fire line around a milpa. 
183 Forest Department (1953); Correspondence between Conservator of Forests and Colonial 
Secretary on subject ‘Reports on the effects of forest fires’, July and August 1953, [BARS 
MP861/1953].  
184 Forest Department (1954).  
185 Minutes of Forest Department Conference of July 1955, [Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Station, Cayo 
District, Belize, uncatalogued in storage]. 
186 Ordinance 4 of 7th June 1958, [TNA CO 125/20].  
187 McCalla (1994). 
188 Sabido & Green (2009); Interviews 2, 3, 49 and 52.   
230 
  
years of work by the Rural Fire Service in the 1940s). In that wildfires remained 
frequent, these campaigns appear to have had limited effect. In fact, several former 
Department staff remembered that in the 1960s and 1970s, local fire users reacted 
to the Department’s fire management work by deliberately setting fires: people who 
had ‘a little grudge with the department, you know, because you stop them from 
hunt [sic]’ said ‘”you guys are sitting there resting ok, we’ll give you some work’’, and 
they would be gone, and next you know there is a fire’.189 Today fire use continues 
to be widespread in the savanna, in part, because fire users are aware that the 
Forest Department will not punish fire use.190 As a logging concession-holder told 
me, he does not expect any assistance from the Forest Department to prevent fire 
use in his concession: ‘Forestry get info who is taking care of it [sic], who is doing 
these illegal activities…. but they would tell you plain and straight: “sorry we cannot 
help you, because the Ministers need the votes”.... And it’s the same thing 
happening with fire at the present moment. They say they will do something about it 
but until such time, Lord help us’.191  
I have argued that many of the plans and policies for savanna fire 
management in Belize have not been put into practice because of a lack of political 
support in Belize. Let me conclude this section by reviewing how the creation of 
such policies within foreign development projects nevertheless benefits powerful 
actors in Belize. As Li contends for Indonesia, the project set-up in international 
development benefits government officials because they can divert funding towards 
themselves.192 Let me recount an experience by which this became clear to me in 
Belize. In January 2018, I joined TIDE’s protected areas manager at the launch 
 
189 Interview 51. Also similar recollections in interview 47.  
190 Kull (2002, 2004) makes a similar observation in Madagascar, as does Mathew (2005, 2011) in 
Mexico.  
191 Interview 2.  




event of Belize’s recently published Forest Fires Communication Strategy.193 This 
was a ceremonious affair, funded under the KBA project budget and held at Belize 
City’s most expensive hotel, the Radisson Fort George. No expense was spared; all 
attendees received free KBA project merchandise and a lavish lunch afterwards. 
The majority of the Forest Department’s staff and even the Minister of Agriculture, 
Forestry, Fisheries, the Environment, Sustainable Development and Climate 
Change were in attendance, along with NGO staff, like my colleague from TIDE, 
who had contributed to developing the Strategy. Violet Yorke, the ‘communication 
consultant’ who had written the Strategy, gave a PowerPoint presentation. Fire 
awareness videos made for the KBA project were shown. Several copies of the 
Strategy were available for me to look at. Copies were, however, not available for 
the launch attendees to take away, so I exchanged email addresses with Violet 
Yorke and asked whether she would send me a pdf copy.  
Several weeks later, given that none of the Department’s policies or key 
documents are available on its website, and having had no response to my follow up 
email with Violet, I was in Belmopan and made a visit to the Department’s Office to 
see if I might obtain a copy of the Strategy there.194 Violet was not in office, but I 
asked the staff there whether anybody could share the Strategy with me. Despite 
having attended the launch event, nobody I spoke to possessed a copy or could 
locate it on the Department’s server. Finally, the Department’s receptionist was able 
to find the document in the email chain in which she had been sent it for printing. 
Through this experience, I understood that the production and celebration of the 
Strategy functioned to satisfy a project output and the project funders but was not 
 
193 The event was also a launch for the Department’s new ‘Sustainable Forest Management 
Communications Strategy’, and the new ‘SMART’ software tool for protected areas management, also 
both outputs of the KBA Project. 
194 Wainwright & Zempel (2018) also note the lack of availability of documents on the Forest 




really intended to orientate the Department’s work in practice. In September 2018, 
my colleague at TIDE confirmed that none of the actions set out in the strategy had 
yet materialised.195 
A former Minister described how, to qualify for project-funding, ‘you have to 
write this ponderous amount a [sic] volumes of crap’.196 Today, Belizean politicians 
are aware that the Forest Department lacks the resources to implement most of its 
policies and legislation. Ministers use gestures such as creating new policies, 
legislation or protected areas ‘to get some brownie points’ with the environmental 
aid agencies, and sustain their funding, but ultimately, if environmental policy or 
reserve boundaries do not align with their personal interests, or those of their 
political supporters, they are ignored.197 ‘Good plans … are just sitting on shelves 
because politicians don’t want to do anything that would upset voters’.198 The 
situation is similar in many other countries, where Forestry authorities have created 
‘soft laws’ to gain benefits from donor support, that have seen little realisation in 
practice.199 As we have seen there are at least three reasons why implementing fire 
management policies and legislation is not a political priority in Belize. First, 
punishing fire use may threaten votes. Second, the savanna is viewed as an asset 
by politicians primarily as land that can be disbursed for political favour. When the 
savanna is merely considered as land, there follows little reason to conduct fire 
management. Finally, as I explore in greater detail in Chapter six, incentivising 
community fire management (as is called for in recent policy) would demand that 
local villagers were given a form of tenure that enabled them to benefit from the 
savanna. This would pose a threat to political control over the savanna areas.  
 
195 TIDE’s protected areas manager, personal communication, 11th September, 2018.   
196 Interview 50.  
197 Zisman (1998); Interviews 1 and 68.  
198 Interview 1.  






This chapter has argued that after 1942, the Belize Forest Department was 
enabled to conduct savanna fire management, by virtue of short-term, CDW and 
then international development project funding. Given the lack of local political 
support for forestry in Belize, it is unlikely that the Department could have continued, 
and initially expanded, its fire management programme in the absence of this 
external support. The Department’s association with British colonial rule made it an 
easy target for retrenchment by nationalist and independent Governments. External 
support enabled fire management to become more technical, providing new 
equipment and methods. Yet, particularly after the final CDW funding in 1966, the 
short-term nature of aid and the rapid turnover of staff and consultants made the 
Department’s work inconsistent and made it difficult for a local vision or training 
programme for forestry to develop in Belize. Expertise in fire management has 
largely been imported from abroad to write policy and plans.  
There are evident continuities in the way that the Forest Department’s work 
has been shaped by colonial and international development. Development projects 
have been one means through which foreign agencies have pushed their agendas 
for the Belizean environment, including for fire management, despite resistance or 
lack of political interest from the unofficial members of the Legislative Council, and 
later, the independent Government. This is a more common issue. As Uma Kothari 
and Joseph Hodge among others note, international development emerged 
gradually from within the context of colonial development.200 Many of the British staff 
employed by ODM/ODA after it replaced the Colonial Office in 1966 were former 
colonial officials. In Belize, where independence came later than for many other 
 
200 Kothari (2005, 2006); Hodge (2010, 2011b, 2016).  
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former British colonies, British overseas development staff on secondment to Belize 
in the 1970s still worked in a colonial setting. There are also discontinuities. After the 
1980s, the Belize Forest Department no longer employed foreign experts within the 
Department. The trend has been towards ever shorter consultancies, involving less 
time spent in Belize. International development has become increasingly 
‘professionalised’ such that technical expertise and qualifications are valued above 
local contextual understanding gained through extended residency in a country.  
There has also been a change in the types of agenda being pushed by 
external funders of fire management. Before the 1980s, fire management was 
supposed to achieve the ‘conservation’ of pine timber to compensate for the 
exploitative pine industry. This was to benefit (mostly foreign) companies, the 
Belizean Government in the form of revenues, and, ostensibly, the Belizean 
population in the form of opportunities for wage labour. While timber conservation is 
still the primary rationale for fire management in Belize, the agenda it is supposed to 
address (in policy terms) has become far broader, and includes nature conservation, 
climate change, human health, and sustainable rural livelihoods. The Department’s 
understanding of the role of fire in the savanna has also changed. From the 1920s 
to the 1950s, any fire was deemed destructive to pine, and the Department aimed 
for total fire suppression in the areas it protected. After the 1950s, the Department 
changed its policy and accepted that prescribed fire could reduce the risk of 
catastrophic wildfires by preventing dangerous levels of fuel accumulation. Its most 
recent policy, published in 2009, went further, suggesting that fire at certain 
frequencies and intensities is ecologically appropriate in savannas and beneficial to 
pine regeneration.  
Plans and policies for Belizean fire management have rarely corresponded 
with fire management in practice, nor been effective at reducing the incidence of 
savanna wildfires. Since the 1950s, rather than funding an active fire management 
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programme, external aid has provided equipment, training and consultants to write 
plans and policies. There has been insufficient funding, capacity and will within 
Belize to make use of this support. The technical approaches described in fire 
management plans have made them amenable to international development 
funding, but in practice they have not been suitable for confronting political and 
ecological realities in Belize. They have been ineffective at reducing the amount of 
wildfire because they have not engaged with fire users (who have had little benefit 
from the pine industry that justified fire management). Conservation and 
development projects and policies have not posed a threat to local elites, who 
subvert them when necessary in order to benefit from the savanna land and 
resources. Political elites benefit from maintaining the flow of foreign aid, by 
ostensibly supporting new conservation policies, such as those recently written for 
fire management.  
As I explore in Chapter six, it may be that the local means and justifications 
exist by which Belizeans can organise fire management in pursuit of their own 
objectives. For now, however, the Belize Forest Department, as an agency, lacks 
the capacity and political will to catalyse such a programme. History suggests that 







































Burn bosses: NGO and community-led fire management 
 
Every fire manager in The Nature Conservancy understands that fire is such an 
important component that we are sort of prone to evangelism and are ready to jump 
up and go to wherever anybody wants us to go to preach the gospel of fire 
management (USA fire management consultant who worked in Belize in the 2000s, 
Interview 60). 
 
Unruly objects of development, these people strive to be modern when we want 
them to be indigenous, chaotic when we demand order; they present themselves as 
our clients and employees when we call them partners; dependent when we insist 
on their autonomy (Mosse 2004, 654). 
 
This chapter examines how, from the late 1990s, a Belizean NGO, the 
Toledo Institute for Development and Environment (TIDE), became a leader in 
savanna fire management in Belize. TIDE’s work has been influenced by The 
Nature Conservancy’s (TNC) approach of ‘integrated fire management’, aiming to 
allow fire-dependent ecosystems to flourish and to facilitate recognition of different 
human cultures of fire use. In theory, this approach represents a departure from the 
Belize Forest Department’s twentieth-century fire policies which aimed to benefit the 
pine industry by suppressing rural fire use. In Chapters four and five, I presented 
evidence to show that the Forest Department faced limitations in reducing local fire 
use and suppressing fires, in part, because it operated within the constraints of the 
structure of colonial or international development funding, which supported short-
term projects and technocratic approaches. TIDE, like the Forest Department, is 
also reliant upon such foreign development aid. This chapter examines how, despite 
different proposed aims and beneficiaries of fire management, similar structural 
limitations have operated within TIDE’s work. Unlike those previously, this chapter 
primarily uses ethnographic evidence. The focus area for this chapter is narrowed to 
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the savanna and villages within and surrounding three protected areas in the Toledo 
District: The Deep River and Swasey Bladen Forest Reserves and the Payne’s 
Creek National Park (see map Figure 1.2). This approach and scale of study make 
possible greater insight into the agency of individuals within broader structural 
limitations.1 It demonstrates the importance of personal relationships in shaping why 
and how fire management is practised.  
Sections 6.1 and 6.2 provide socio-political context to the villages targeted 
by the Darwin Project in northern Toledo. Section 6.3 describes how the Payne’s 
Creek National Park came to be designated and managed by TIDE, and how TIDE 
developed a programme of fire management in collaboration with TNC under its 
Global Fire Initiative (GFI). Section 6.4 explores how the multiple aims and 
beneficiaries of the ‘integrated fire management’ promoted by TNC trade-off in 
northern Toledo. Sections 6.5 and 6.6 examine how the context of international 
development has shaped TIDE’s fire management work, firstly by examining 
intersections of foreign and local expertise and, secondly, by examining how the 
structure of short-term funded projects has limited TIDE’s work. Finally, Section 6.7 
highlights how, because of sustained personal relationships, individuals within 
NGOs and civil society have been able to take steps towards realising some of the 
aims of integrated fire management, despite the structural limitations imposed by the 
funding context.  
 
6.1 Social dynamics in Toledo’s coastal savannas  
Before European colonisation, the Manche Chol Maya occupied the area 
that is now southern Belize. The Spanish rounded many Maya in Southern Belize 
into communal settlements, but after revolts, the majority were forcibly moved to 
 
1 Note that the names of the individuals referenced in this chapter have been pseudonymised.  
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settlements in the Guatemalan highlands by the 1690s. British official sources later 
suggested that British settlers encountered a Belize empty of indigenous people, but 
there is evidence of continuous occupation by the Maya in both northern and 
southern Belize.2 In the early 1880s, a German capitalist, Bernard Cramer, bought 
large tracts of land and established plantations on the southern border of Belize, for 
which he imported Q’eqchi Maya workers from the Verapaz region of Guatemala. 
Coincident with this, widespread privatisation of land in the Verapaces forced the 
migration of Q’eqchi people northwards, including into southern Belize. This has 
remained a migration route, particularly during times of government oppression in 
Guatemala, such as during the Guatemalan civil war from the 1960s to 1990s.3 
Throughout the colonial period, Toledo, remote from Belize City, and with its large 
indigenous population, was considered the ‘least developed’ district in Belize. It 
remains the district with the greatest levels of poverty, with minimal investment in 
social welfare from the state.4  
Until the latter twentieth century, Mayan people mostly settled the southern 
portion of the Toledo district and not near the coastal savanna, which was not 
suitable for corn cultivation. The people using these savanna areas for hunting were 
the (largely Creole) population of Monkey River Town, its tributaries, and the 
surrounding coast. In the late nineteenth century, a banana-exporting industry 
developed in this area. After the industry collapsed following the introduction of 
Panama disease in 1914, the population of Monkey River Town declined (see 
population data in Table 6.1).5 A settlement was created at Mango Creek (re-named 
Independence in the early 1960s) with the establishment of the BEC sawmill in  
 
 
2 Thompson (1932); Grant (2005); Bolland (2003), ch. 4; Jones (2005); Shoman (2012), ch. 1 
3 Wilk (1991); Moberg (1997); Wainwright (2008); Grandia (2012).  
4 Wainwright (2008, 2015); Caribbean Investment Bank (2010).  
5 Moberg (1997).  
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1901(1) 1911(2) 1921(3) 1931(4) 1946(3) 1960(5) 1970(6) 1980(7) 1991(7) 2000(8) 2010(9) 2016(10) 
Monkey River 
Town 
333 nd 424 396 421 406 279 190 186 176 196 nd 
Mango Creek/ 
Independence 
ne ne ne ne nd 881 827 1474 1890 2881 3739 nd 
Bella Vista ne ne ne ne ne ne ne ne ne 710 3508 6000 
San Isidro ne ne ne ne ne ne ne ne ne ne 375 756 
Trio ne ne ne ne ne ne ne ne 301 383 899 nd 
Bladen  ne ne ne ne ne ne ne ne 158 391 466 538 
Medina Bank ne ne ne ne ne ne ne ne 148 93 237 273 
 
nd – No data available 




(1) Belize Census of 1901, [BARS Census-11]. 
(2) Belize Census of 1911, [BARS Census-12]. 
(3) Belize Census of 1946, (BARS Census- 16]. 
(4) Belize Census of 1931, [BARS Census-14]. 
(5) Belize Census of 1960, [BARS Census-16 and Census-17]. 
(6) Belize abstract of statistics 1973-4, [BARS AR117].  
(7) Belize abstract of statistics 1991, [shared by the Belize Government’s Statistics Institute].  
(8) Belize Census of 2000, [raw data shared by the Belize Government’s Statistics Institute]. 
(9) Belize Census of 2010, [raw data shared by the Belize Government’s Statistics Institute]. 
(10) Data obtained by personal communications with village leaders in Bella Vista, San Isidro, 
Bladen and Medina Bank. The figures are estimates or derived from census conducted 
independently by the village leaders.  
* There were people in this area of southern Stann Creek and Toledo before 1901, but population 
estimates are not available. From 1901 onwards, there are also figures for smaller settlements along 
the branches of the Monkey River, south along the coast from Monkey River Town, and in the area 
where Mango Creek was established. There is, however, no consistency in the way in which these 
were grouped, and so I have not presented those figures here. 










1948, and a resin plant in the early 1960s.6 After the resin plant was closed in 1965 
and BEC’s operations ended in 1966, the population of Independence declined (see 
Table 6.1).7   
From the 1970s, coincident with humanitarian crises in Guatemala, 
Honduras and El Salvador, new settlers were attracted to the northern Toledo 
District’s savanna areas. They and others from southern Toledo were drawn north 
by prospects of wage labour following infrastructural development and the 
establishment of new industries on the southern Coastal Plain. In the 1970s, the 
banana industry was re-established in the northern Toledo District.8 As I described 
in Chapter five, from the 1980s the Government granted large areas of land on the 
coastal plain for citrus and aquaculture development. The banana, citrus and shrimp 
industries attracted settlement along the Southern Highway (running north from 
Punta Gorda through Toledo and Stann Creek), which was paved in the 1990s.9 
These new settlements include those targeted in the Darwin Project: the villages of 
Medina Bank, Bladen, Trio, Bella Vista and San Isidro. These villages were all 
established after 1989 (Trio and Bella Vista explicitly to house banana farm workers) 
and are growing rapidly (see the village locations in map Figure 1.2, and population 
data in Table 6.1). A handful of people, particularly in Medina Bank and Bladen, are 
employed in the pine industry, which continued on a small scale after 1966. Until the 
1990s, pine licenses were renewed annually, but there has been a move, since the 
Forest Planning and Management Project in the 1990s, and under pressure from the 
 
6 ‘Report on the annual accounts covering period 1st January 1948 to 30th June 1949’, [Uncatalogued 
BEC Archive, Ladyville, Belize]; ‘Hercules Factory starts operations at Big Creek’, The Times, 7th 
December 1962. 
7 ‘Unforeseen difficulties cause closedown of Hercules’, The Times, 20th March 1965; Forest 
Department (1967); Moberg (1997). 
8 A buying deal was signed with Fyffes in 1973, and the company still monopolises the export of all 
bananas from Belize. Moberg (1997).  
9 The Southern Highway was first built in the 1960s. Until the 1990s it remained a dirt road, but was the 




IMF, to issue long-term forest licenses.10 Three forty-year pine concessions covering 
the Deep River and Swasey-Bladen Forest Reserves were granted in the early 
2000s.11  
Since Belizean independence, there has been a widening wealth gap in 
Belize. Competing claims to ‘native’ Belizean identity have been implicated in 
access to land, employment and resources.12 These ‘myths of ethnicity and nation’ 
are both imposed and invoked strategically.13 For Wilk, ‘the modern [ethnic] 
categories have resulted from both the imposition of categories by government and 
educational authorities from above, and the efforts of people themselves to find 
common interest and assert their rights’.14 As Shoman explains, colonial ethnic and 
class relations persisted after independence: ‘Belize City and what it had come to 
represent culturally remained dominant, the centre of decision-making despite the 
physical move of the government offices to Belmopan. And so the new nation was 
imagined as Creole: people that spoke English, were anglicised in other cultural 
ways, and practiced a unique ''Belizean way of life'', which could be interpreted best 
by members of the Creole elite’.15 The Creole upper class (an ever smaller 
proportion of the population), attempted to maintain its position of privilege by 
asserting descent from Belize’s ‘original’ population (white settlers and African 
slaves), representing other Belizean peoples as immigrants.16 For example, the 
claim of Belize’s Q’eqchi and Mopan Maya to land rights, and to ‘native’ Belizean 
identity on the basis of indigeneity to Central America, is frequently undermined by 
 
10 Interview 49; Wainwright (2008).  
11 Interview 2 
12 Moberg (1997); Medina (1998); Shoman (2012), ch. 13. 
13 To use Mark Moberg’s (1997) phrase. 
14 Wilk (2006), p. 77.  
15 Shoman (2012), p. 362. 
16 In Belize’s 2010 census, 26% of Belize’s population identified as Creole. 53% of Belize’s population 
is Spanish-speaking (Statistical Institute of Belize, 2013). Immigration from across Central America has 




assertions that these linguistic groups did not occupy Belize before European 
contact, but immigrated from the 1880s.17 Attitudes towards the Maya from within 
and outside Belize continue to be shaped by colonial discourses which represented 
theirs as a bounded and primitive or exotic culture.18  
Q’eqchi and Mopan Maya are a minority within the Belizean population (11 
percent) but make up 65 percent of the population of the Toledo District.19 A further 
20 percent of Toledo’s population is identified as ‘Mestizo’ (Spanish-speaking); 
mostly households of immigrants from Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador since 
the 1980s.20 Mayan and Spanish-speaking people make up the majority of people in 
the villages of Bladen, San Isidro, Trio, Medina Bank and Bella Vista, in and around 
the coastal savanna in northern Toledo (see demographic statistics in Figure 6.1). A 
large proportion of households in these villages, both Mayan and Spanish-speaking, 
are headed by immigrants, who have spent less than twenty years resident there 
(Figure 6.2 gives statistics for years of residence by heads of household and Figure 
6.3 for birthplace). Many people in these villages work as wage labourers on the 
banana, citrus or shrimp farms, sometimes temporarily before returning to other 
parts of Central America.21 This is work most Belizean nationals are unwilling to do: 
working conditions are among the poorest in Belize, and workers are paid at or  
 
17 It is often argued against Q’eqchi and Mopan claims to indigenous rights that the Manche Chol 
Mayas were the linguistic group that inhabited what is now Belize at the time of European contact. 
Nevertheless, since the 1990s, a Q’eqchi and Mopan Maya land rights movement in Toledo has won 
court cases against the Belizean Government, at the Belizean Supreme Court, and, in 2015, at the 
Caribbean Court of Justice. The lands claimed by the Maya have, however, been neither clearly 
delimited nor explicitly recognised by the Government. The Government appointed a ‘Maya Land 
Rights Commission’ in 2016, which is charged to find ways to uphold the CCJ’s ruling. The 
Commission has thus far produced nothing in the way of a resolution, and upholds, in the words of a 
member of the Commission at a consultation meeting at which I was present in Trio village in 2016, 
that ‘it is still the Government that has the power to deal with the lands in Belize. No one else’.  
18 This is evident, for example, in the way that a stream of development projects has defined and 
attempted to ‘modernise’ the ‘Mayan farming system’, (Wainwright, 2008). Or in the way that Mayan 
culture is produced and presented for the tourist industry, (Medina, 1998).  
19 Statistical Institute of Belize (2013). 
20 Ibid. Coloured with an anti-immigrant discourse, the term ‘Mestizo’ is generally applied to all of 
Belize’s Spanish-speaking population, despite their diverse origins.  
21 Moberg (1997).  
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Data source: Survey of 77 households in Bladen (approx. 85% of households), 126 households in San 




















Figure 6.2 Years spent resident in the village by head of household for 






Data source: Survey of 77 households in Bladen (approx. 85% of households), 126 households in San 




































































Figure 6.3 Country of origin for head of household for households surveyed in 






Data source: Survey of 77 households in Bladen (approx. 85% of households), 126 households in San 
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below the Belizean minimum wage.22 For Maya people particularly, wage labour 
forms part of a diversified livelihood alongside smallholder agriculture and natural 
resource use.23  
The social dynamics of ethnicity, class and nationality I have described are 
important in these villages targeted by the Darwin Project. For Creole, Garifuna and 
Maya residents of Punta Gorda town, where most of the District’s NGOs and 
Government offices are based, 'just moving to one of those communities would 
immediately brand you as non-Belizean. That’s the type of stigma that is associated 
with them’.24 People living in Punta Gorda might not make much distinction between 
these villages, yet the villagers themselves make competing claims to 
‘Belizeanness’. Leaders in Medina Bank, San Isidro and Bladen, which have larger 
numbers of Mayan families that have moved from further south in Toledo, assert 
that theirs are more ‘Belizean’ villages relative to Trio or Bella Vista.25 These three 
villages impose entry fees on new residents, whereas Trio and Bella Vista do not. 
As they are considered non-Belizean, many immigrants retain Central American 
identities; maintaining economic and social networks across the border, hanging 
national flags in their houses.26 Ethnicity, nationality and recentness of immigration 
are reasons for social division within the villages. One Mayan woman of Belizean 
origin living in Trio felt ‘there are too many immigrants and they just walk in free of 
cost’.27 Mayan and Spanish-speaking people often segregate themselves within 
villages, will not commonly work together, and consider their cultures different. In the 
words of a Trio resident, the Spanish-speaking people want land to grow 
pineapples, to raise cattle: ‘we want development’, while Maya villagers ‘they just 
 
22 Moberg (1997).  
23 Wilk (1991); Zarger (2009).  
24 TIDE staff member, pers. comms 15th March 2016.  
25 I base this on various conversations with village leaders.   
26 Moberg (1997). 




want to grow corn’.28 As the following sections show, these dynamics influence 
resource use and access and attempted interventions in the form of ‘community-
based’ conservation and development.  
 
6.2 Modern human use of resources and fire in Toledo’s savannas 
Today, different social groups understand the geography of the savanna 
landscape in the northern Toledo District in different ways. For conservation and 
development agencies, the most significant lines on the landscape appear to be 
those colonial Forest Reserve and National Park boundaries that are prominent on 
maps, but, in reality, these overlap with unmapped agricultural leases, private 
holdings and mutually understood village land boundaries. Government ministers 
have de-reserved land to turn it to agricultural development as well as for leases or 
land grants to smallholders.29 Often, this is done without consulting the Lands or 
Forestry Departments so that the reserve boundaries appearing on maps are 
uncertain (such as in Figure 5.8).  
Surrounded as they are by protected areas and, in some cases, the lands of 
absentee landowners, most people in villages in and around the savannas have 
insecure tenure over the lands they farm and use. Trio village and its farmlands, for 
example, exist partially on a large piece of land owned, but unworked by a foreign 
landowner: 'We are bordered by all these borderlines, so whatever we do looks like 
a criminal act. But what can we do? We can’t sit around doing nothing’.30 Given this, 
villagers align themselves strategically with politicians to attempt to secure land 
access. Assad Shoman writes, ‘People align themselves to parties, even militantly 
support them or run for office, not because they are blind to the corruption and 
 
28 Spanish-speaking resident of Trio village at a meeting with the Maya Land Rights Commission, 20th 
August 2016.  
29 Walker & Walker (2009); Interviews 3, 58, 62.  
30 Pers. Comm. 17th March 2016.  
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uselessness of the parties, but because they know that ''in Belize if you don’t belong 
to one of the parties you can't get a job or other assistance''. Electors in Belize have 
learnt to play the game; they make material demands on candidates for political 
office, haggling their votes in the electoral bazaar’.31 Village leaders in San Isidro 
and Bladen both previously secured lands for their community members to farm (in 
one case inside a forest reserve) via government ministers: ‘they worked through 
politicians’.32 More recently, these villagers aligned themselves with the Maya land 
rights movement to secure their claim to these lands. Multiple phases of land 
leasehold and titling, the overlapping Mayan claim to indigenous land rights, 
unregistered sales of land titles and leases and poor recordkeeping mean that the 
status of tenure of much land in the Toledo District is disputed.  
Conservation and development actors working in Toledo have generally not 
engaged directly with these political realities of land use and access.33 One 
approach they have taken has been to add their own overlapping layers to the map, 
convincing the Government to create new legal categories of land within protected 
areas, such as community concession areas (with rules governing use and access). 
Another approach has been attempts to create ‘alternative livelihoods’ for villagers, 
on the basis that this will reduce their use of protected areas.34 As long as such 
interventions do not seriously challenge political control over land and resources, 
they may be officially endorsed by the Government to appease international funders. 
This, as I show of elements of the Darwin Project in Section 6.6, does not mean that 
Government agencies will contribute to realising such policies and interventions.  
 
31 Assad Shoman (2012), p. 329. In Belize there are, to all extents and purposes only two political 
parties and these do not clearly represent different political ideologies.  
32 Villager in Medina Bank, pers. comm. 2nd April 2016.  
33 Zisman (1998).  
34 See Wright et al (2016). 
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Today, people living in and around the savanna make use of a variety of its 
resources, including from reserved areas. This includes hunting (particularly deer 
and gibnut), collecting housebuilding materials, firewood, palmetto berries (which 
since 2000 have been sold casually by individuals to a single Belizean buyer based 
in the Belize District who has a license to export) and capturing yellow-headed 
parrot chicks for (illegal) sale to the pet trade. With use of fertilisers and drainage 
improvements, some farmers make use of savanna areas to grow pineapple, 
watermelon or vegetables, but most assert that corn, plantain and other commonly 
grown crops cannot be grown on the poor savanna soils. Those making agricultural 
use of savanna areas are mostly immigrants from heavily deforested parts of 
Central America where there are extreme shortages of land for farming. For them 
‘here in Belize it’s Mr Freedom. It’s here you could do anything what [sic] you 
want’.35 Despite these casual uses of the savanna and its resources, there is a 
general perception that the savannas, with their poor soils, are areas of low value 
relative to the richer broadleaf forests: ‘a lot of people see it as wasteland … it’s a 
non-productive area’.36 
People use fires directly within savanna areas for various purposes. Fire 
brings fresh grass and ash that attracts grazing deer for hunting. Burning clears 
dense vegetation and aids access to, for example, fishing areas or palmetto 
patches, and ‘some people say that there are snakes in there, so they have to get 
rid of the grass so that they could [sic] see far’.37 Shrubs and trees killed by fire can 
be used for firewood. People travel from villages other than those directly bordering 
the Deep River and Swasey-Bladen forest reserves to use these areas to hunt and 
 
35 Interview 5.  
36 Interview 51. 




fish. I was frequently told that people set fires in the savanna ‘for fun’.38 Even TIDE’s 
protected areas manager, Oscar, openly admits that as a youth, he ‘used to like to 
see fires in the savannas, especially in the palmettos’.39 
Some worry about savanna wildfires, with some justification. Some people 
fear that heavy smoke that commonly hangs over the savanna areas in the dry 
season many be a risk to their health. Some palmetto harvesters are conscious that 
dry season fires destroy palmetto flowers, preventing the formation of berries and 
reducing their harvest for that year. Those with houses directly bordering the 
savanna can risk losing their homes to wildfires. On the occasions that this happens 
(maybe every five to ten years in each village), not only have few households had 
support from the fire service in Independence, but most also doubt that that service 
would help as most houses are constructed from wood and many are thatched 
(Figure 6.4 shows an example): ‘if you look at the houses in 20-30 minutes it [sic] 
goes to ashes’.40 This notwithstanding, fires in savanna areas removed from their 
villages, while deemed a problem by conservationists or pine concession-holders, 
are generally not deemed problematic by local people. These villagers have little 
incentive to care about fires in these areas because they lack clear access rights to 
the savanna, most do not have crops in the savanna, and most do not directly 
benefit from the pine industry that uses the savanna lands.  
Farmers frequently use fire to clear land for agriculture; a practice learned at 
a young age from watching and participating in fires with parents or grandparents 
(statistics regarding farming and fire use are given in Figures 6.5 and 6.6). Many 
practise ‘milpa’ agriculture: a cycle repeated between March and October annually,  
 
38 This came up in many conversations and interviews. 
39 Interview 1.  





Smoke from a nearby wildfire over thatch houses in the savanna at the edge of Trio village.  
Source: Author, 2017.  
 
of clearing, burning, planting with corn and beans and fallowing small rainforest plots 
(sometimes after multiple years of planting).41 Burning the milpa clears debris and 
reduces competing vegetation and pests (Figure 6.7 shows a milpa fire). Fire is also 
used to clear land for longer-term repeated use for growing pineapple or plantain or 
for cattle pasture. Immigrants have gained their farming experience in diverse 
places, so farming practices and fire use vary.  
Aiming for a hot and ‘clean burn’, many farmers choose to burn around 
midday on days of good weather. Such hot burns, when not carefully managed, can 
escape, and can also destroy milpa soil ecology and reduce soil organic matter. Low 
temperature carefully-managed milpa fires can, however, contribute to long-term soil 
fertility.42 Farmers in Belize have experienced a series of attempts to ‘settle’ their  
 
41 Wilk (1991); Cortez (2009). 
42 Nigh & Diemont (2013).  
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Figure 6.5 Percentage of households farming for households surveyed in 





Data source: Survey of 77 households in Bladen (approx. 85% of households), 126 households in San 















Figure 6.6 Percentage of farming households using fire for any form of 




Data source: Survey of 77 households in Bladen (approx. 85% of households), 126 households in San 

















Milpa fire in one of Bladen village’s farming areas. 
Source: Author, 2017. 
 
shifting farming practices, and to reduce their use of fire. The desire to ‘improve’ 
milpa farming originates with colonial discourse positing this as a ‘primitive’ system, 
in which ‘fire is troped as an elemental, as opposed to a refined, form of power’.43 
Colonial, and later government and NGO-led development projects, have attempted 
to introduce cover cropping, ‘slash and mulch’, agroforestry and intensive farming 
practices, all of which can replace fire use.44 As a result, many farmers are uncertain 
of whether using fire is or is not beneficial to milpa soils. 
This history of attempts to dissuade agricultural fire use, combined with 
changes to the social organisation of agriculture that have resulted under immigrant 
settlement and as farmers combine smallholder agriculture with wage labour, has 
created conditions not conducive to careful agricultural fire management. For some 
 
43 Wainwright (2008), p. 82.  
44 Wainwright (2008); Cortez (2009); Interview 58.  
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immigrants, Belize is the first place in which they have had access to forested land 
that needs clearing to farm: ‘this is my first time seeing a lot of broadleaf forest, and 
it makes me excited because I haven’t seen as much [sic] trees like this in 
Guatemala. Most of the areas, my surrounding areas, is pasture of cows’.45 Many 
migrants from further south in Belize remember community-level organisation of 
agricultural burns, with farmers working in groups to burn and plant together, but this 
was felt to be less common in recently-established villages near the savanna:  
Not round here but out there to the back, yes, still we have people them [sic] do that, 
them cooperate together and say ‘’well I going for burn my farm’’, “we going burn so 
much farm”. Maybe fifteen men, alright, everybody going. One burning, maybe one 
50 acres, everybody protect that and them work together.… Not this time. They just 
see one li piece a dry bush, pssshhhht set fire, gone. They no care, they no work.46 
 
Where farms are close together, some farmers construct fire lines around 
their land and inform neighbours before burning, but many conduct their burns alone 
and fires sometimes escape into neighbouring farms. Legally, the Agricultural Fires 
Act still requires farmers to apply for a permit before burning, but this is not, in 
practice, expected or upheld by the Agriculture Department.47 Indeed most farmers I 
interviewed were unaware of either the Agricultural Fires Act or the Forest Fires Act. 
As most smallholder agriculture takes place on the fertile soils of the broadleaf 
rainforest, agricultural fires only occasionally escape to cause savanna wildfires.48 
As villages near the savanna expand, however, and farming increasingly takes 
place close to and within the savanna, this is likely to be increasingly a cause of 
savanna wildfires.  
An understanding of the social and political dynamics I have described in 
northern Toledo – local fire use practices; power dynamics based on class, ethnicity 
and immigrant status; a lack of ‘community-level’ cohesion; overlapping 
 
45 Interview 6.  
46 Interview 15.  
47 Interview 52. 
48 Interviews 2, 3 and 57.  
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understandings of access rights to savanna areas – is not merely context setting for 
the remainder of this chapter. It is an important inclusion in that it is the ‘reality’ that 
local NGOs and internationally-funded conservation and development projects 
seeking to enrol local villagers in fire management did not engage with. The 
remainder of this Chapter will examine the disjunct between these projects and the 
social and political dynamics I have described.  
   
6.3 TIDE, TNC and fire management in the Payne’s Creek National Park and 
Deep River Forest Reserve 
As noted in Chapter five, the global discourses of biodiversity conservation 
and sustainable development were institutionalised in Belize by the 1990s, as a 
mandate of the Forest Department, and of increasing numbers of grassroots NGOs 
and local chapters of global NGOs.49 There was pressure on the Government to 
designate new protected areas to win green credentials with international funders.50 
In 1991, after lobbying by villagers from Monkey River Town, who hoped to establish 
local ecotourism enterprises, the Government declared an area of savanna 
bordering Monkey River Town, the ‘Monkey River Special Development Area’ 
(MRSDA).51 With funding from USAID, a management plan was written for the area 
by the Belize Centre for Environmental Studies (BCES). In 1994, in the face of 
potential sale to a US cruise ship developer, the area was extended and renamed 
Payne’s Creek National Park.52 For conservationists the designation of the Park 
 
49 Zisman (1998); Young & Horwich (2007).  
50 Zisman (1998); Interview 68.  
51 The SDA designation was derived from an ‘afterthought’ in the Land Utilisation Act, which stated that 
a Minister could declare an area an SDA and stipulate the types of development that may take place 
within it (McGill, 1994). Though other SDAs were declared in the 1990s, and ODA’s ‘Forest Planning 
and Management Project’ (FPMP) and USAID’s ‘Natural Resources Management and Protection 
Project’ (NARMAP) both tried to mainstream SDAs as a means to enable community protected areas 
management, none of the SDAs survived under this designation.    




served several purposes. The Park bordered Port Honduras, an area of marine 
conservation interest, which was threatened by the potential for cruise tourism, and 
for coastal aquaculture development. There was also particular interest in mangrove 
conservation and in protecting a ‘corridor’ from the Maya Mountains to the sea. In 
the designation of Payne’s Creek as a protected area, neither conservation of 
savanna biodiversity per se, nor wildfire management, were priorities.53  
By the mid-1990s, there was no management of the National Park and 
community organisations formed for this purpose were inactive.54 Community 
management did not have sufficient governmental support: ‘that was not something 
that the politicians were too comfortable with. Because they wanted to be the ones 
to control all of this. And so, to have a group of stakeholders, kind of taking the lead 
and planning, developmental planning, I think they probably felt that their authority 
was being undermined’.55 In 1997, the Government handed the management of the 
park to recently-established local NGO, the Toledo Institute for Development and 
Environment (TIDE), based in the town of Punta Gorda. In 2004, the reserve was 
extended to its present boundaries and included an area excised from the southern 
Deep River Forest Reserve (Figure 5.8 shows the present protected area 
boundaries). TIDE signed a formal co-management agreement for the Reserve with 
the Government.56  
In the decades since it was established, TIDE has, in addition to 
management of the Payne’s Creek National Park, developed various programmes of 
work, including management of a network of private protected areas and the Port 
Honduras Marine Reserve and community education and outreach. Though all of 
TIDE’s protected areas management staff, its Director, and most office staff are 
 
53 Interview 68.  
54 Zisman (1996). 
55 Interview 3.  
56 Mcloughlin (2015).  
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Belizean, the NGO is sustained by short-term international conservation and 
development funding opportunities, and it usually employs several foreign office staff 
as well as a stream of six-month unpaid interns from Europe and the USA. The 
organisation’s scientific direction and reporting has largely come from foreign staff, 
interns and other foreign consultants.57 Generally, TIDE has found it easier to 
access funding and built a reputation for its work in marine protected areas 
management and research diving, than for terrestrial management. For TIDE, as ‘an 
organisation that looks towards the sea’, the Payne’s Creek National Park is 
something of ‘an afterthought’.58 
As I discussed in Chapter five, in the early 2000s, The Nature Conservancy 
(TNC) changed Belizean government policies towards fire when it brought its 
approach of ‘integrated fire management’ to Belize with workshops and training 
funded under its ‘Global Fire Initiative’ (GFI). In the USA, TNC has been a pioneer in 
prescribed fire management for the integrated purposes of nature conservation and 
timber-production since the 1960s, when it acquired frequently burning landscapes 
in the Upper Midwest and in Florida (famous for its culture of fire use).59 ‘The 
Conservancy was unique: it was a private landowner with a public purpose. It 
showed private landowners why they needed to burn and demonstrated how to burn 
with care and sensitivity to ecological goods and services. And it showed public 
agencies how nimbleness and skill could make up for hordes of personnel and big-
number budgets’.60 In the late 1980s, TNC made Ron Myers its national director for 
fire management in the USA. Myers’ extensive experience working with fire 
combined employment with US federal fire suppression agencies and ecological 
 
57 Interview 59 and pers. comm. TIDE’s Science Director. 
58 Interview 59. Also Interview 67. 
59 Interviews 55 and 60. 




research in Central America and the Caribbean, where he had encountered diverse 
rural cultures of burning. He established TNC’s approach of ‘integrated fire 
management’ and pushed for the extension of their fire work outside the US with the 
GFI.61  
Myers’ pamphlet Living with Fire summarised his guiding philosophy for fire 
management under the GFI. It is, to Stephen Pyne, ‘the clearest expression of 
modern thinking about fire in the literature’.62 In keeping with the trend among some 
environmental managers to assimilate insights from non-equilibrium ecology, Myers 
held that many ecosystems worldwide are fire-dependent. He asserted: 
More sophisticated fire management technologies are not likely to solve the problem 
of destructive wildfires, nor are they going to be effective in re-establishing 
ecologically appropriate fire regimes in places that need to burn. There is a need to 
integrate socio-cultural realities and ecological imperatives with technological 
approaches to managing fires.… integral is the recognition that in many societies, 
burning is an essential tool for people in securing their livelihoods. Understanding 
the ecology of fire in a particular landscape informs assessments as to whether 
people are burning too much, too little or inappropriately to meet both conservation 
goals and to maintain the ecosystems on which they depend. Identifying and 
understanding society’s needs as well as the ecological constraints of an area will 
lead to the design and application of more effective fire management programs.63 
 
With the GFI, he aimed to empower small networks of fire managers worldwide, ‘to 
which outsiders might offer guidance but would not administer’, with basic training in 
prescribed fire management to suit their local conditions.64 This philosophy fitted 
within the wider Western discourse of ‘participatory’ conservation and development.  
Myers’ connections and specialism in Caribbean and Central American 
ecology meant that this region received special attention. TNC already had a small 
local section in Belize, and when the GFI was launched, there was an in-country 
request for assistance.65 Under the GFI, Belize hosted regional fire management 
 
61 Pyne (2016b).  
62 Pyne (2015), p. 401, on Myers (2006).  
63 Myers (2006), p. i.-ii. 
64 Pyne (2016b, p. 116.  
65 Interviews 55 and 59.  
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workshops and training events, attended by Government Agencies, NGOs, including 
TIDE, and private interests, such as pine logging concession holders. As we have 
seen, Myers’ texts laid the framework for a new Belizean Wildland Fire Policy and 
Strategy.66 Unfortunately, in 2009, TNC ended the GFI, because of the global 
financial crisis and with a new leadership, which was less encouraging of small-
scale projects and fearful of the liability associated with fire work. Myers was made 
redundant and staff were told ‘‘’no more Belize trips … it’s done’’’.67  
After the GFI ended, most Belizean agencies that had been trained by TNC 
did not retain the capacity for prescribed burning programmes. TIDE was an 
exception.68 Before attending TNC’s workshops, TIDE’s rangers were aware of fires 
as a possible management issue in Payne’s Creek, but did not conduct fire 
management.69 The Environmental Impact Assessment written for the area in 1995 
suggested that treeless areas were expanding and that it was important ‘this 
process of “savannization”’ be reversed’, which could only be achieved ‘by an active 
policy of fire-prevention’.70 TNC’s approach departed from this perspective but 
resonated strongly with TIDE’s protected areas manager, Oscar.71 Importantly, 
Oscar developed strong working relationships with several TNC staff, and 
continued, even after the closure of the GFI, to seek their assistance (independently 
of TNC) to train his team further, including on exchange visits to the US. By 2014, 
many of TIDE’s rangers had been trained to ‘burn boss’ level in prescribed fire 
 
66 Sabido & Green, 2009.  
67 Interview 55, also interviews 59 and 60.  
68 It should be noted that one other NGO, Programme for Belize (PFB), which manages areas of 
savanna in the Rio Bravo protected area in northern Belize, has also conducted some prescribed 
burning since 2009. Like TIDE, PFB staff received further assistance from former TNC staff in this 
period. TIDE’s staff have re-trained staff from PFB in prescribed fire management. PFB has, however, 
struggled to maintain a continuous programme of prescribed fire management like that of TIDE.  
69 Interview 1. 
70 Meerman (1995), p. 32.   




management, making them capable of planning and leading prescribed burns and 
training others to do so.72   
On the southern coastal plain, TNC fire experts had to adapt more technical 
approaches from the USA for the Belizean context: ‘Initially we didn’t have tools, we 
had to make our own tools. We used palmetto fronds for beaters and lit with 
palmetto and lighter pine’.73 Soon TIDE found funding for fire management 
equipment, and today its rangers use purpose-made clothing, drip torches, rakes, 
fire-swatters, water tanks and bladder bags when they conduct prescribed burning 
(Figures 6.8 and 6.9 show some of this equipment in use). The infrastructure and 
means of communication available to TIDE for fire management are far less 
sophisticated than what is used in the USA. They improve, however, on what was 
available to the Forest Department when it managed fire on the southern coastal 
plain. The paved Southern Highway enables quicker access to some of the savanna 
and there is signal for mobile telephone communication across the area.  
TNC emphasised networking between land managers, and Oscar, inspired 
by Florida’s ‘Fire Councils’, joined together with several other land managers in 
southern Belize (the pine concession holder for Deep River Forest Reserve and the 
Ya’axche Conservation Trust), to form a ‘Southern Belize Fire Working Group’.74 In 
2009, together with TNC staff, this group wrote an integrated fire management plan 
for the savanna landscape in Toledo. The plan suggested, ‘based on history, 
anecdotal evidence, and technical input from local and international expertise’, that, 
‘with rapidly increased human activity on the southern coastal plain’ in recent 
decades, the present fire return interval was between six and twelve months, but  
 
72 ‘Burn boss’ is a term used in US fire management to denote somebody capable of leading a 
prescribed fire or attack on wildfire. The term is a vestige from the slave days when many firefighters 
were conscripted from agricultural work crews or prisons where leaders of any kind were called ‘boss’ 
(Rick Anderson, pers. comms. 05/10/2018). 
73 Interview 60.  





A TIDE ranger demonstrates how to use a drip-torch and bladder bags during fire management training 





A prescribed burning team holding the fire line, with bladder-bags, rakes and fire-swatters. 




that a more ecologically appropriate fire return interval would be three to five 
years.75 This became TIDE’s rule of thumb for how frequently to apply prescribed 
fire in each ‘management unit’ of Payne’s Creek and the neighbouring Deep River  
Forest Reserve (where they work with the long-term pine concession holder to 
conduct prescribed burns).76  
As an organisation reliant on short-term grant funding, TIDE has struggled to 
find a consistent funding source for its fire management.77 Thus, in 2014, TIDE’s 
development director, one of the British staff members at the organisation, began to 
devise a project aimed at finding market mechanisms to finance fire management. 
He considered carbon markets, sustainable logging and community participation as 
possible approaches to pitch to a potential funder he had identified- the UK 
DEFRA/DFID co-funded Darwin Initiative. Darwin generally required a British partner 
organisation, and TIDE contacted a University of Edinburgh staff member who had 
previously led ecological research in Toledo’s savannas. Together, they successfully 
won a Darwin grant for a three-year project for the Payne’s Creek National Park and 
neighbouring forest reserves and villages, envisaging the outcome that ‘biodiversity 
of pine woodlands in southern Belize is conserved by developing community-based 
wildfire management, with local communities incentivised to participate through a 
more just and sustainable use of woodland resources’.78 The project proposed to 
combine ecological monitoring for fire effects in the protected areas, training in 
prescribed fire use for villagers, ‘small forest enterprise’ development with groups of 
villagers, and partnership with the Forest and Agriculture Departments to revise 
national fire legislation and pilot a community concession agreement for the harvest 
of palmetto berries from the protected areas. The remainder of this chapter 
 
75 TIDE, (2009), p. 13 and p. 17.  
76 Interview 1.  
77 Interview 67.  
78 Project proposal for Darwin Initiative 22-013.  
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examines TIDE’s work, the GFI and the Darwin Project to examine how ‘integrated 
fire management’ in Belize is shaped in practice, by the structure of international 
development funding and Belizean ecology and political relations.  
  
6.4 Integrated fire management as a ‘win-win’? 
The approach to fire management envisioned in Belize’s national fire policy, 
TIDE’s management plan for Payne’s Creek National Park, and in the proposal for 
the Darwin Project departs, on paper, from colonial forestry’s singular capitalist 
imperative to optimise pine growth for extraction. It suggests that ‘integrated’ fire 
management can fulfil multiple objectives including ecosystem or biodiversity 
conservation, pine regeneration for extractive use, securing property, securing 
human health, and benefitting local ‘communities’ including in the recognition of 
cultures and livelihoods dependent upon fire. In Table 6.2, I summarise how I 
understand these objectives to differ in terms of desired savanna ecosystem states, 
types of fire deemed ‘good’ and ‘bad’, accepted human fire users and beneficiaries 
of ‘good’ fire management. Here I explore the implications of these differences. I 
contend that there are logical and practical incompatibilities between prescribed fire 
management and these multiple objectives in the Belizean context. In Section 6.6, I 
explore how certain incompatibilities between objectives emerge specifically when 
integrated fire management is attempted within the context of pre-designed 
international development projects.  
TIDE does not presently extract pine from the Payne’s Creek National Park 
(and is not permitted to do so under the current management agreement), but it is 
still presumed, perhaps as a vestige from colonial forestry, that a primary outcome 
of ‘good’ savanna fire management should be ‘pine regeneration’.79 Based on his  
 
79 Interviews 1, 59, 64.  
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Table 6.2 Competing objectives within ‘integrated’ fire management 
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involvement with writing Belize’s National Protected Areas System Plan, one 
ecologist surmised that this reflects a lack of understanding of the savanna as an 
ecosystem: ‘For savanna, our conservation target always focused on pine  
production. While for the other areas, there was “wildlife this”, and there was “this 
animal that” … I found it very interesting. We don’t know enough about savanna to 
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value it for its own intrinsic value. No, it’s a pine resource’.80 TIDE’s institutional 
objectives of ecosystem and biodiversity conservation are reduced in fire 
management plans for Payne’s Creek to management for two ‘keystone species’: 
the Caribbean pine and the yellow-headed parrot.81 TIDE’s staff believe that pine 
regeneration will be good for yellow-headed parrot populations as well as general 
ecosystem health and biodiversity.82 There is, however, no empirical evidence to 
support this relationship. Indeed, non-equilibrium theories in ecology would suggest 
that a more biodiverse savanna might include areas of low pine density within a 
mosaic landscape. Belize’s new Forest Policy suggests a potential revision of the 
present legislation to permit the extraction of pine from Nature Reserves.83 If TIDE 
begins forestry in Payne’s Creek, the organisation will need to do so with an 
awareness that this may trade-off with conservation objectives. The same ecologist 
told me: ‘I honestly believe that forestry and yellow-headed parrots are not 
compatible.… I think you have to set those goals first and be honest about it. Do we 
want to set aside certain areas aside to be managed for parrots, do we want to set 
areas aside to be managed for pine?’84  
Both forestry and a ‘traditional’ conservationist mentality seek a certain target 
state for an ecosystem or species, be that aiming to maximise timber growth or to 
return to a more ‘natural’ or historic state. Being influenced by equilibrium ecology, 
both generally seek a static target. As we have seen, TIDE has similar management 
targets for Payne’s Creek. This position is not easily reconciled with non-equilibrium 
ecology in which ecosystems are understood to be inherently in flux.85 If, instead, 
 
80 Interview 62. See Driscoll et al (2010) discussion of the limited capacity of current empirical scientific 
research generally to answer key questions required to inform fire management for biodiversity 
conservation.  
81 Mcloughlin (2015).  
82 Interviews 1, 64.  
83 Forest Department (2015). A report was created under the Darwin Project to assess potential 
locations for sustainable extraction within Payne’s Creek (Anderson & Tricone, 2018).  
84 Interview 62.  
85 Zimmerer (2000); Adams (2003).  
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conservation of the savanna is informed by non-equilibrium ecology and understood 
as a shifting patchwork of different vegetation types maintained by fire, then a more 
appropriate aim for management might be to restore a more ‘natural’ fire 
disturbance process. This might involve aiming to create a highly irregular pattern of 
fire on the landscape. TIDE’s management plans target a fire return-interval of three 
to five years, and in 2017, former TNC employee, Felix, noted that he worried they 
might be sticking too rigidly to this rule: ‘They burned a good part of a four-year fuel 
accumulation this year’. He felt that TIDE should instead aim for more of ‘a mix of 
fire regimes, and timing and seasonality’.86 Yet the approach of prescribed burning 
requires careful planning and is conducted within particular ‘burn units’ from which 
fires will not escape. There are limits to the randomness with which prescribed 
burning can be conducted in pursuit of a highly irregular fire regime.87 
As noted above, prescribed fire may benefit local communities in that it 
brings security in terms of protection of property and health and in preventing the 
loss of palmetto berries. Yet, for two reasons, these are generally insufficient 
incentives to encourage local participation in fire management. Firstly, this is 
because fire management is beneficial only in that it offsets possible future losses, 
and not in that it brings direct gains.88 Moreover, a few individuals bear the costs of 
fire management, in terms of time and effort, but the benefit is to all. There is thus 
little direct incentive for individuals to volunteer to participate in fire management. 
Aware that it would be difficult to encourage attendance otherwise, we paid stipends 
to villagers for participation in fire management training under the Darwin Project. 
We also suggested the potential to establish community fire brigades to villagers in 
 
86 Interview 59.  
87 See Parr & Brockett (1999) and Parr & Andersen (2006) for discussion of the incompatibilities 
between the practice of prescribed fire management and non-equilibrium ecology.  




project meetings. It was soon clear, however, that in the long-term, the likelihood of 
villagers volunteering their time to a community fire brigade was unlikely: ‘no-one 
wants to do things for free’. 89  
Although TIDE’s Executive Director contends that ‘the main goal’ of fire 
management in Payne’s Creek is ‘to maintain the ecosystem for the benefit of 
communities’, legislation, reserve boundaries and long-term logging concessions 
limit community access to savanna land, its pine resources and game for hunting.90 
Local participation might be more likely if villagers had clear access rights and the 
means to use these resources.91 As Oscar told me, for local villagers: ‘If there’s 
something for them in it, I’m sure they’ll be willing to participate, and get involved. 
But for that to happen you need some decentralisation at the government level, 
giving the powers into local government in these communities’.92 If local villagers 
were truly to benefit from the savanna, this would involve recognition of the 
inequitable distribution of land and resources in the Toledo District. It would 
challenge reserve boundaries and logging concessions. Yet as we have seen, the 
system of patronage in Belize means that political elites are unlikely to relinquish 
their control over land and the issuance of forest licenses. Similar dynamics of 
political control have also limited the realisation of community-based natural 
resources management policies in other countries.93 Further, some forms of 
community access, and the recognition of some local fire use in savannas, such as 
for hunting, are not compatible with the forestry and conservation objectives of local 
land managers.94 One TNC staff member’s recollection encapsulates the 
perspective that Toledo’s land managers have of local fire users: ‘I didn’t know how 
 
89 Interview 9.  
90 Interview 64, also interview 2.  
91 As Kull (2002) writes of community-based fire management in Madagascar.  
92 Interview 1.  
93 See for example Ribot, Lund & Treue (2010); Lund (2015).  




to help at first, when I went down there, because the main problem was that the land 
managers didn’t have control of the fire frequency or the fire regime. And so, how do 
you get that back? How do you get it away from the hunters, and the people who are 
burning the woods?’95  
It was primarily from this perspective that local participation was envisaged in 
the Darwin Project. The channels for local participation in the project were aimed at 
reducing forms of local fire use deemed inappropriate by the managers of protected 
areas in the savanna. The project sought to enrol and train locals to conduct ‘proper’ 
prescribed fire use, involving planning, teamwork and use of equipment. This 
training was conducted in the context of management for pine forestry in the Deep 
River Forest Reserve. We emphasised the transferability of the training to the 
context of a milpa burn, but not to use of fire for hunting. By the project’s logic, 
support to develop small businesses dependent upon savanna resources would 
incentivise communities to become ‘stewards’ of the savanna, reducing their 
inappropriate use of fire and possibly volunteering to participate in future fire 
management with local land managers. This was an ‘alternative livelihoods’ 
approach, seeking to reduce the prevalence of activities deemed to be 
environmentally damaging by substituting them with lower impact livelihood 
activities.96 As I show in Section 6.6, we struggled to find and support business 
concepts that were both legal uses of Forest Reserves and dependent upon 
savanna resources (and thus linked clearly to fire management to protect those 
resources).  
While recent policies and project proposals in Belize suggest that integrated 
fire management can benefit wildlife, ecosystems and various local agencies and 
local people, the reality is that these multiple objectives may trade off against each 
 
95 Interview 60.  
96 Wright et al (2016).  
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other. By posing fire management as a ‘win-win’, these texts do not account for the 
ecological dynamics of the savanna and the political dynamics in Belize. I argue 
below (Section 6.6), that these policies and projects cannot engage 
comprehensively with these Belizean realities, because they are constrained within 
the context of international conservation and development.  First, in Section 6.5, I 
look at TIDE’s work to explore the extent to which foreign technical expertise plays a 
role in NGO-led ‘integrated’ fire management in Belize.  
 
6.5 Expertise and authority in integrated fire management 
As we have seen was the case with the Forest Department after the 1960s, 
most of TIDE’s staff, including all protected areas management staff, have been 
Belizean. Many of TIDE’s rangers are from villages close to the savannas and 
Payne’s Creek, including the villages targeted in the Darwin Project (indeed three 
rangers were recruited because they proved themselves as keen participants in the 
Darwin Project activities). Unlike in the case of the Forest Department, where 
appointments based on political allegiance bring rapid staff turnovers, TIDE’s core 
protected areas management staff have longer tenure with the organisation. Oscar 
has worked for TIDE since the 1990s. This has allowed the organisation to retain 
skill in prescribed fire management gained through training and experience. 
Nevertheless, as has the Forest Department, TIDE has relied upon external 
expertise to provide training and assistance with planning fire management. For 
example, Felix, a former TNC GFI staff member, has remained a friend and advisor 
to Oscar, and was employed as a consultant to design and deliver fire management 
training and fire effects monitoring under the Darwin Project.  
Let me explore the implications of this in terms of the forms of expertise that 
inform TIDE’s fire management. As with the Belize Forest Department, the expertise 
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and training provided by external consultants to TIDE has largely been technical. 
Similarly, this has been expertise in fire management methods (how to plan 
prescribed burns and use specialist equipment) and in general ecological principles, 
as codified by organisations such as TNC: what Fleischmann and Briske term 
‘professional ecological knowledge’.97 TIDE’s consultants thus have expertise 
largely based upon experience and theory developed outside Belize. As one of 
TNC’s staff recalled, ‘I don’t think we relied on any scientific research or actual fire 
monitoring in savannas, but there was other scientific work that showed the 
influence and the importance of fire in tropical savannas. Maybe not specifically in 
Belize, but in very similar habitats in other places…. I don’t think that [Myers] relied 
on his or other scientists work in Belize, to develop the philosophies that directed us 
to do the education and work that we did’.98 Though TNC’s staff made efforts to 
adapt some of their techniques to the Belizean context, in Section 6.6 I show some 
of the practical limitations of TIDE’s use of fire management techniques largely 
developed in the USA.  
This generalised technical expertise is in dialogue with other forms of 
expertise informing TIDE’s fire management. TIDE’s rangers have a tacit local 
knowledge of the geography of the savannas they manage, and of fire’s behaviour 
within this ecosystem. Being local to the area, they also understand local social 
relations, politics and fire use well: Oscar, himself, set fires for hunting as a young 
man.99 After Collins and Evans, we can consider this local knowledge as a form of 
expertise guiding TIDE’s work, even if it is not generally regarded as such.100  
 
97 Fleischmann & Briske (2016).  
98 Interview 60.  
99 Interview 1.  




There are also recent attempts to guide TIDE’s management using scientific 
expertise, gained by empirical measurement of fires and their effects in the Belizean 
savanna. Some research has used satellite imagery to link different management 
regimes to fire frequency.101 There have also been attempts to introduce long-term 
fire effects monitoring for adaptive fire management. In 2016, TIDE established 
long-term monitoring plots in Payne’s Creek, designed by Felix and with funding 
from the Darwin Project. Let me briefly recount how these efforts, like earlier 
collection and preservation of data about the Belizean environment have been 
largely driven by foreign scientists.102   
Between 2016 and 2018, I joined and observed Felix and French ecologist 
Chloe, as they established the long-term vegetation monitoring plots in Payne’s 
Creek, collected data biannually, analysed the data and produced a report of fire 
management implications for the savanna. They worked painstakingly with Oscar, 
his rangers and a handful of local community members, allowing them to collect the 
data, despite errors that this introduced (which necessitated repetition of the data 
collection). The data was shared with TIDE’s office staff, but Felix and Chloe also 
quickly copied it onto their own hard drives. Both had had past struggles trying to 
obtain or recover data from TIDE’s staff and server. As TIDE’s former Science 
Director (one of the organisations two non-Belizean staff, whose work was in marine 
research and who therefore did not manage or use the terrestrial data) told me, the 
server is not backed up, which has multiple times, during tropical storms, resulted in 
the loss of years’ worth of data records. Felix and Chloe were aware that scientific 
reports they wrote as Darwin Project outputs were unlikely to speak directly to Oscar 
and his rangers. Instead, as I demonstrate in Section 6.7, their scientific findings 
 
101 Michelakis et al (2016); Roper (2016).  
102 Note that this is changing, with the work of Belize’s Environmental Research Institute (ERI), 
established at the University of Belize in 2010. The ERI is curating a digital archive of historical data 
and reports about the Belizean environment, available at http://eprints.uberibz.org/.  
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were communicated successfully to Oscar because of his strong personal 
relationship with Felix. TIDE’s rangers could, theoretically, continue to independently 
collect data on these monitoring plots: the process is time and cost efficient. Yet 
there is no Belizean ecologist specialising in fire ecology and no staff member at 
TIDE capable of statistical analysis of the data.  
The history covered in chapters four and five tells us that science, in the 
sense of empirical data collection about the environment, has rarely informed 
Belizean savanna management in practice. When scientific research has been 
conducted, Belizeans have not been those with the ‘vision’ driving data collection. It 
remains difficult to bridge scientific expertise with the local expertise of land 
managers like Oscar. Yet, drawing more on these forms of expertise might make 
TIDE’s fire management more responsive to local conditions. As Fleischmann and 
Briske point out, both scientific and local knowledge possess stronger feedbacks 
with real social and ecological conditions than does professional ecological 
knowledge.103 Let me explore the social context in which professional ecological 
knowledge comes to be the primary form of expertise to direct TIDE’s fire 
management.  
Professional ecological and scientific knowledge retains authority in the 
context of international development. This is despite the rhetoric for local 
empowerment and cultural recognition within ‘integrated fire management’. For 
example, in the proposal for the Darwin Project, the success of the project was 
deemed to rest upon the assumption that ‘personnel with required expertise for 
biodiversity / resource monitoring, and design / provision of training courses remain 
committed to the project’.104 The funder demanded monitoring and evaluation of the 
project’s impact and outcomes, giving authority to evidence in quantifiable formats. 
 
103 Fleischmann & Briske (2016) 
104 Proposal for Darwin Initiative Project 22-013 (December, 2014), p. 23. Emphasis added. 
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For example, in a mid-term review by the funder, it was noted (in negative terms) 
that the project could only present Oscar’s word, and not data to demonstrate that 
fire use and wildfire incidence had reduced as a result of project activities. Oscar 
and his rangers have an internalised local knowledge of the history of fires in the 
areas they manage (which informs their management work), but their word alone did 
not count with the project funders.   
Let me consider the implications of this valorisation of technical expertise 
and quantifiable evidence for ‘participatory’ fire management. It has been noted that 
participatory forestry, in the tradition of forestry, continues to promote technical 
expertise and ‘professional’ practices, which, paradoxically, inhibits local 
participation.105 I argue that this applies to participatory fire management in the 
Darwin Project, where ‘participation’ consisted of attending training delivered by 
technical experts. In a context where foreign experts deliver training and access to 
benefits within international development projects, Belizeans who have developed 
expertise in communicating with ‘outsiders’ have a relative power in their villages. 
One such individual was my host in Bladen, discussed in Chapter three (Section 
3.2). In 2016, under the Darwin Project, a ‘basic-level training’ was given to fifteen 
villagers from each of Bladen, San Isidro, Trio, Bella Vista and Medina Bank. In 
2017, a week-long ‘burn boss’ training was given to five of these villagers, chosen 
by Oscar. These five individuals had grasped the principles of the training quickly 
and communicated easily with Oscar and Felix who led the training. Each of these 
individuals already held positions of leadership in their villages. Each spoke good 
English and had prior experience working with external agencies. Frederico, for 
example, had worked for several years as an assistant to biologists from the USA 
doing research in a nearby protected area. Frederico could quickly develop technical 
 
105 Nightingale (2005) Green & Lund (2015); Lund (2015); Scheba & Mustalahti (2015). 
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expertise in prescribed fire management because he had developed a tacit ability to 
communicate with outside experts. Integrated fire management in the context of the 
Darwin Project thus involved the participation of certain powerful individuals in each 
village, rather than the ‘communities’ in general. These individuals benefitted from 
their participation because they received stipends for attending training events, and 
because three of them, with the training they had received and social connections 
they had forged, went on to gain employment as rangers with TIDE. Similar patterns 
of elite capture have been commonly identified in critiques of ‘participatory’ 
conservation and development.106  
 While professional ecological and scientific expertise commands authority in 
the context of international development, it holds less authority within Belize’s social 
context, as also noted in previous chapters. Instead, class and ethnicity are of more 
importance in granting authority to certain voices in Belize. For example, in Toledo’s 
rural villages most people cannot afford to run a car. So, when we, as the Darwin 
Project staff arrived in the villages for meetings and training events in TIDE’s air-
conditioned trucks, it was with connotations of elite status and authority. When Felix 
and Oscar gave fire management training in these Spanish-speaking and Mayan 
villages, they commanded authority, in part, by virtue of being white and Creole 
(respectively), rather than through local evaluation of their technical or scientific 
expertise in fire management. Similarly, when it comes to the management of land 
and resources in Belize, as we saw in Chapter five, and as I explore further in the 
following section, policies designed by scientific experts take less precedence than 
do the priorities of political elites.  
 
 
106 Agrawal & Gibson (1999); Mosse (2001); Berkes (2004); Nightingale (2005); Dressler et al (2010); 
Green & Lund (2015); van Kerkhoff & Lebel (2015).  
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6.6 Integrated fire management in the context of international development 
Some of the dynamics identified in the previous sections derive specifically 
from the context of international conservation and development. This section 
explores the structural limitations that international funding places upon the fire 
management practised by TIDE. We have seen how international development 
projects in Belize often favour methods and general principles that have been 
designed outside Belize. As throughout the history of the Belize Forest Department, 
the fire management methods introduced to TIDE under short-term aid funding have 
not always been suited to the specific social and ecological context of Belize.  
Under the GFI, without time for detailed ecological study in Belize, TNC’s 
staff left TIDE with generalised rules for prescribed burning which may be 
insufficiently irregular to mimic a ‘natural’ fire regime for these savannas. Similarly, 
even when downsized, the USA ‘military’ style approach to leadership and 
communication in fire management was not immediately suited to Belize. As a 
former TNC staff member recalled, in Belize ‘there was a lot of communications 
problems on burns that we participated in and that we conducted down there with 
them … I wasn’t really very successful at controlling—that’s kind of a cultural thing 
of how they interact was not very conducive to American style order. It was pretty 
foreign to me, and that was a cultural thing that was an impediment to successful 
burning’.107 The same TNC staff member secured funding to bring Oscar and some 
of his rangers to take fire management training in the USA. Returning from this 
exchange, the TNC staff member recalls how Oscar mimicked approaches from the 
USA that were not suited to the context in Belize: 
I brought several people up here from Belize, to see how we do it here, and that was 
almost an unfortunate decision, because they saw us, you know, how we rely on 
roads and how easy it is to burn when you have roads and all. So I think [Oscar], 
when he went back, after I quit … he had them, you know, bulldoze some roads and 
stuff through Payne’s Creek. And I was really opposed to that, you know, I thought it 
 
107 Interview 60.  
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would really be unfortunate to put roads through that pristine, 30,000-acre savanna. I 
mean there was already one or two roads, but I was trying to get them to focus on 
using blacklining, you know, temporary fire breaks. And using the natural fire breaks, 
and the weather conditions to create prescribed fire areas, you know. But that was 
toward the end of my work down there, and I didn’t really get to carry on 
experimenting with that at the level I wanted.108  
 
Such situations arise because TIDE’s consultants have had limited funding and time 
to design fire management and work specifically within the Belizean context. When it 
is Belizean savanna ecology that is poorly accounted for, empirical scientific 
approaches can help overcome these limitations, to some extent. For example, after 
seeing prescribed fire management in North Carolina, other assumption that Oscar 
transferred from the USA to Belize, was that prescribed fire should be used to limit 
encroachment of hardwood scrub because this will enable pine regeneration.109 Yet 
preliminary results from two years of data collection on the monitoring plots that 
Felix and Chloe established during the Darwin Project ‘highlighted different effects of 
fire on pine seedling survival according to vegetation type’ and also suggest that in 
Belize hardwood scrub may facilitate rather than inhibit pine regeneration by 
protecting pine seedlings (Figures 6.10 and 6.11).110 As I demonstrate in Section 
6.7, when communicated successfully by scientists to land managers, empirical 
scientific measurement like this can help organisations like TIDE work past some 
limitations of general approaches and methods introduced with short-term 
funding.111 However, when, as it often is, the political context is poorly accounted for 
in international development projects, science is less helpful.  
 
 
108 Interview 60.  
109 Interview 59.  
110 Tricone & Anderson (2018), p. 1. Ecological research in the Mountain Pine Ridge upland savanna in 
Belize in the 1970s and 1980s also suggests that broadleaf shrubs act to concentrate nutrients in the 
soil which may enable pine growth: Kellman (1979); Kellman & Hudson (1982); Kellman, Miyanishi & 
Hiebert (1987). 
111 Sullivan (2000), similarly, argues that empirical science can help land managers to work past 





Pine seedlings in the Payne’s Creek National Park killed by a severe (prescribed) burn the previous 
year.  





Pine seedling (circled in yellow) in the Payne’s Creek National Park protected by broadleaf shrub from 
mortality during a severe (prescribed) burn the previous year. 
Source: Author 2018. 
 
James Ferguson and Tania Li have argued that international development 
actors frame the problems they would solve as technical, which makes their 
proposed technical interventions appear desirable and possible.112 In so doing they 
avoid reference to the political dimensions of the problems that they cannot address, 
but which nonetheless frustrate interventions on the ground. In part, the logic of 
integrated fire management developed in the USA as a reaction to the ecological 
and social problems caused by previous technically- and scientifically-informed fire 
management approaches that did not engage with the culture and politics of human 
fire use (such as the fire management practised by the Belize Forest Department 
throughout the twentieth century).113 Yet, as the GFI and Darwin Project both 
demonstrate, when integrated fire management is itself rendered technical in the 
 
112 Ferguson (1990); Li (2007a).  
113 Pyne (2015).  
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context of international development, engagement with the socio-political 
dimensions of fire management remains limited.  
The GFI and the Darwin Project took ‘building capacity’ through technical 
training as a central approach to engaging local people and government in fire 
management. As we have seen in Section 6.5, this approach reinforced the 
authority granted to technical experts in fire management.114 Further, as was clear in 
Section 6.4, even with such training, people are unlikely to reduce their use of fire or 
conduct their own fire management, both because fire management, at best, 
reduces the likelihood of future losses, rather creating direct benefits, and because 
they do not have ownership over or rights to access many resources from the 
savanna. The Darwin Project intended to create benefits for local villagers to 
incentivise fire management but sought to do so without challenging the reserve 
boundaries or political control over land and resources. Consequently, nothing we 
could do in the project represented a new benefit for villagers that was clearly linked 
to (and thus an incentive for) fire management of the savanna landscape beyond 
their villages.  
Firstly, the Darwin Project engaged with the issue of community access to 
the savanna by attempting to negotiate with the Forest Department for formal 
community palmetto concessions for protected areas. In the project proposal, 
palmetto concessions were a concept that was easily rendered logical for the project 
funder. They were compatible with the protected area boundaries visible on maps 
and required little understanding of how local people negotiate the landscape. They 
were a clear and quantifiable technical output. The Forest Department had just 
published its new Forest Policy, which pointed towards enabling community benefits 
 
114 Nightingale (2005); Bruges & Smith (2008) and Lund (2015) argue, similarly, that the logic of 




from forest reserves.115 The palmetto concessions would have been the first 
community-level concession to harvest a non-timber forest product from forest 
reserves in Belize. Yet had palmetto concessions been granted to the communities, 
they would not have represented a substantial new benefit for the palmetto 
harvesters themselves, nor a surrender of power by politicians or local logging 
concessionaires. This was because all parties were aware that the villagers were 
anyway making unrestricted use of the palmetto resource in the savanna both inside 
and outside protected areas. If, instead, there had been suggestion of granting 
community concessions to harvest pine in the savanna, that would have 
represented a substantial new benefit for them. This was never discussed. This 
case supports Ribot, Agrawal and Larsen’s assertion that in many countries, state 
authorities have sought to maintain their control over natural resource management 
despite policies calling for its decentralisation, by authorising small community 
concessions that do not represent a significant transferral of rights.116 Ultimately, in 
Belize, we were unable to negotiate for even the palmetto concessions because of a 
lack of serious commitment from the Forest Department and an insecure market for 
the palmetto.117 
As a second approach to incentivising fire management the Darwin Project 
offered training and mentoring in business development to groups from each village. 
When, initially, we openly asked villagers what businesses they might like to develop 
in the savanna, some hoped to obtain land in the forest reserves for cattle ranching 
or to construct tilapia ponds. These are not, however, legally compatible uses of 
forest reserves. Ultimately the businesses the project could support (an ecotourism 
project, a restaurant, pig-rearing and chicken-rearing) were based in the villages or 
 
115 Forest Department (2015).  
116 Ribot, Agrawal & Larsen (2006).  
117 In 2016 and 2017 the sole buyer of the palmetto did not purchase palmetto from the villagers, 
ostensibly because his (Canadian) market was insecure.  
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removed from the savanna, and thus without a direct link to fire management of the 
savanna landscape. Moreover, the business development work was treated as 
separate from the fire management work, in that they were distinct project 
‘outcomes’, and, beyond myself, separate project staff were responsible for 
delivering each. 
The pre-designed interventions in the Darwin Project relied upon 
participation by ‘communities’ and the Forest Department. This was presented as 
unproblematic in the project proposal: there was no reference to the power 
dynamics between different local resource users and the Government. As is often 
the case in development texts, the project documentation used the term ‘community’ 
to represent the diverse and incohesive villages described earlier as homogeneous 
and cooperative.118 It was assumed that initial research into the context of each 
village would enable success by allowing us, the project staff, to tailor our work to 
each village. In practice, as noted in Section 6.5, because of their experience and 
social status, certain community members were able to engage with and benefit 
from the project, whereas others were not. We also struggled to get mixed groups of 
Spanish-speaking and Q’eqchi villagers to cooperate. Most of the business groups 
that formed were made up either of Spanish or Q’eqchi-speakers: only a limited 
demographic within each village.   
The Darwin Project made efforts to collaborate with the Forest Department. 
Yet, as we saw in Chapter five, the system of patronage in Belize limits the 
willingness of the Forest Department to engage with conservation agendas, even if 
supported in official policies. Fire use is widespread in the Belizean savanna, in part, 
because villagers are aware that the Forest Department is unlikely to punish fire 
users (for risk of losing political favour). Villagers are also aware that the Forest 
 
118 See Li (1996), Agrawal & Gibson (1999), Mosse (1999) and Mohan & Stokke (2000) on use of the 
term ‘community’ in conservation and development texts.  
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Department is unlikely to act in their favour unless it is politically expedient. Political 
elites value the savanna, primarily, as land to grant to political allies. Managing 
savanna fire is generally not a priority. Further, as we have seen, politicians are 
unlikely to relinquish their control over this pool of land by granting tenure over it to 
entire communities (in such a way as might incentivise community-based fire 
management of the wider savanna landscape). Belize seems to support the case 
that in many countries, political patronage and corruption create incentives for 
central actors to maintain control, limiting meaningful shifts of authority associated 
with participatory natural resource management policies.119   
These things were also understood by the Belizean project staff, but they 
maintained that ‘anything we do, the Forest Department has to be involved’.120 The 
Project proposal suggested that the Department’s staff would take training, work 
with TIDE and communities to enable community fire brigades to be established, 
develop a legal category for community concessions for palmetto harvesting and 
work with the Agriculture Department to revise the fire legislation. In practice, while 
Forest Department representatives attended project events and meetings, they 
made no effort to institute legal reforms or to support community fire management. 
To secure funding, international development projects must be pre-designed, and 
propose a solution to a problem defined in such a way that an external technical 
intervention could solve it. Yet, just as pre-designed prescribed fire management 
has limited potential to mimic random fire effects in an ecosystem, externally-
designed formats of local participation are limited in their ability to engage with local 
power dynamics and politics. This limits the extent to which the goals of benefit-
 
119 Ribot, Agrawal & Larson (2006); Larson & Ribot (2007); Nelson & Agrawal (2008); Poteete & Ribot 
(2011). 




sharing and recognition of local fire use can be achieved in integrated fire 
management projects.121 
Despite the limitations posed by socio-political realities on the realisation of 
the Darwin Project’s desired outcomes, I, with my colleagues, was required to make 
efforts to present the project as successful in project reporting. In reports, the Forest 
Department was described as a partner committed to the technical execution of 
project activities: ‘Like many government departments in developing countries, the 
Belize Forest Department manages areas rich in biodiversity but has very limited 
resources to implement policies such as its national wildfire management 
strategy.… At the local level, participation from the Forest Department remains 
strong, with two staff attending our fire management training programmes this 
year’.122 When the project failed to negotiate community palmetto concessions, our 
reports pointed to ‘a number of factors, outside our control’, such as the insecure 
market for palmetto, and ‘various changes in the socio-political situation over land 
rights in southern Belize since the proposal was written’.123 When it was clear that 
some outputs would not be met, as described in Chapter one, at the end of the first 
and second years we amended the project’s reporting framework to replace them 
with outputs that were realisable. For example, the negotiation of palmetto 
concessions was replaced with the production of a report examining the potential for 
such concessions in the future. All changes were approved by the funder. David 
Mosse described similar dynamics in his ethnographic research on international 
development; textual adjustments like these enable projects to succeed (but on their 
 
121 See Brosius, Tsing & Zerner (1998); Nadasdy (1999); Cleaver (2001); Mosse (2001); Mosse (2004); 
Berkes (2004); Kothari (2005) and Brockington, Duffy & Igoe (2008) on the limits of ‘participation’ within 
the structural limitations of international development.  
122 ‘Darwin Initiative Project 22-013 Second Annual Report’, submitted to UK DFID/DEFRA in April 
2016, p. 3. 




defined and revised terms).124 Yet, by upholding simplistic representations of the 
relationship between the Forest Department and other project partners, the project 
continued to obscure the political realities that preclude reform in fire 
management.125 
As was the case for the Forest Department in the twentieth century, the 
short-term nature of conservation and development funding has limited TIDE’s 
ability to develop a long-term programme of fire management responsive to 
Belizean ecology and politics. The organisation must repeatedly devote attention to 
new projects and funders and cannot always continue with work started under a 
project once the funding ends: ‘It’s conservation attention deficit disorder. It’s the 
crisis of the day. It’s the grant of the year. And it’s understandable to chase that’.126 
The business groups and long-term monitoring plots established with the Darwin 
Project funding, for example, had no guarantee of continued support after the 
project ended, although project staff attempted to secure further funding for them.127 
The Darwin Project was not able to fulfil TIDE’s Development Director’s initial aim of 
enabling long-term financing for fire management based on a carbon credit scheme 
or pine logging in Payne’s Creek National Park.128 In recent years TIDE has, 
however, found additional funding and a market for its fire management training to 
other NGOs and agencies in Belize, and elsewhere in the Caribbean. The 
organisation seeks to promote itself as a technical consultancy for fire management. 
This may support financing the organisation’s fire management, but it also upholds 
the emphasis on capacity building in technical fire management methods rather than 
attention to the socio-political context to wildfires.  
 
124 Mosse (2004); Lewis & Mosse (2006).  
125 See Li (2016) for discussion of similar dynamics.  
126 Interview 59.  
127 Several funding proposals for the business groups submitted during the final year of the Darwin 
Project failed to attract funding, but modest follow-up funding was secured by TIDE in the months 
following the end of the Project to continue work with two of the four groups. 




6.7 The human relationships in building fire management 
Even if absent from project reporting, social and political relations shape how 
conservation and development projects take place.129 The foregoing section showed 
how this can frustrate project activities which have necessarily been pre-designed to 
persuade funders. Yet strong social connections can also facilitate change despite 
those structural limitations with which development actors operate. As 
anthropologists of development emphasise, personal relationships can bring 
continuity where project funding is sporadic and create dialogue between different 
knowledges and approaches.130 I argue similarly, that where the GFI and the Darwin 
Project catalysed modest change toward some of the aims of integrated fire 
management it was because TIDE’s staff had lasting friendships and working 
relationships with external consultants, logging concession-holders, other NGO staff 
and local villagers.  
One of TNC’s staff described how personal relationships were central in the 
GFI: 
Fire management is really so dependent upon individuals and what they are 
motivated by and what they believe … some people were just more inspired, you 
know by what they had learned from our trainings and maybe what they already 
knew. They didn’t start from zero these guys, you know, they already knew a lot 
about fire. So I kinda [sic] went wherever I found a person who wanted to do fire, you 
know, clicked on fire in their belly, and if they didn’t have that, you know, you 
probably didn’t go very far with them.131  
 
TIDE’s prescribed fire programme continued to grow after the GFI ended because 
several of TNC’s staff had developed strong friendships with Oscar and his rangers, 
and both parties were committed to continuing a working relationship, even at their 
own expense: ‘The Nature Conservancy had pretty much done with fire in Belize 
 
129 Mosse (2004, 2011); Fechter & Hindman (2011). 
130 Eyben (2006, 2012); Girgis (2007); Fechter (2012); Heuser (2012).  
131 Interview 60.  
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and [Felix] was trying to put a training together, so we sat down over beers and 
made a plan to put one together. I took vacation time and bought myself a flight and 
we did a week and a half of burn training for the non-profit there.... that was just me 
going down once—but he did it year after year’.132  
I described earlier how monitoring plots established under the Darwin Project 
yielded results that demonstrated the limitations of some methods of prescribed 
burning transferred directly from the USA to Belize. Felix shared the results with 
Oscar in informal conversations as they worked together: the scientific data was 
communicated to Oscar and his rangers and began to influence their management 
of Payne’s Creek, not because of the technical reports written by the Felix and 
Chloe as project outputs, but because of their strong personal relationship with 
Felix. Felix described how important his relationship with Oscar was to this success: 
we only have a few years of monitoring data, and we already have the operational 
people, the people who make it happen on the ground, discussing the data … 
perhaps I’ve built some credibility by being shoulder to shoulder with these folks, and 
then once we had the opportunity through the Darwin funding, to do quantitative 
photo monitoring, following the species that were important to local land managers, 
this is one of the most responsive incidents I’ve ever seen, and I think it’s—my bias 
would be it’s because of the trust and the relationship in the data.133  
 
As we saw in Section 6.5, the fire training that TIDE gave to villagers during 
the Darwin Project had reach to individuals such as Frederico, who, through prior 
experience and social standing, were well positioned to develop strong relationships 
with the project staff (including myself). In dialogue with Felix, Oscar and myself, 
Frederico examined the potential to create fire breaks around his village of Bladen. 
In the early dry season of 2018, he, together with Sebastian, one of TIDE’s rangers 
and a resident of Bladen, borrowed equipment from TIDE and, led a small group 
from their village to conduct a prescribed burn to create a burned area to protect the 
 
132 Interview 55.  
133 Interview 59.  
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buildings in the village from fires. Here, where there was a clear benefit to the 
village, and because they were respected by other villagers, Frederico and 
Sebastian were able to convince others to give their time, unpaid, to conduct fire 
management. In this case, the basic model of a project providing training had some 
effect, because it reached individuals who saw the potential benefits of fire 
management in their context and were socially positioned to make it happen.    
TIDE has also developed strong working relationships with other non-
governmental agencies in Toledo who have a stake in fire management: logging 
concession holders, and another NGO, the Ya’axche Conservation Trust (YCT). 
Through these organisational bridges, TIDE has been able to move, unlike the 
twentieth-century Forest Department, beyond consideration of the management of 
individual protected areas, to think about fire in savanna areas of different legal 
designation, and even in farmland areas outside savannas. Oscar was able to begin 
prescribed burning within the Deep River Forest Reserve, in collaboration the 
logging concession-holder, George, because of his strong friendship with George’s 
son, Denver. Oscar remembered how, through sustained conversation, he gradually 
built enough trust with George to begin prescribed burning in his logging 
concession: 
at first, I approach [sic] [George] as our neighbours, on the issue of fire, and in his 
view, fire was all bad, so, I turned to [Denver], his son [laugh], who was—is more or 
less in my age group. And I started talking to him…. He said ‘look we need to 
address fire’, he said, ‘but the old man’ –that’s his dad- ‘is the real man that we need 
to get on board’…. [George] had some little areas blocked off near the sawmill, with 
excellent pine regeneration, and he didn’t want to lose them in a wildfire so I said ‘let 
us burn it for you then’, and he was there thinking for a long time and he says ‘you 
know what, go ahead man, and let me see what you guys gonna do, because if a 
wildfire comes then something will happen anyway, so let’s see’. So we just picked 
the right time. He brought out his wife, the kids, everybody, to see this burn, and 




134 Interview 1. 
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With assistance from TIDE, YCT (an NGO which works with local farmers), 
has developed a programme of assistance with milpa burning. Strong personal 
relationships enable Oscar to work shoulder-to-shoulder with YCT’s staff, despite 
the strain on cooperation that exists at higher administrative levels between TIDE 
and YCT, who are in continuous competition for very limited conservation and 
development funding. One of YCT’s staff described his relationship with Oscar and 
his rangers: ‘we look at ourselves as a team … on the ground, right’.135 These 
relationships between organisations began with strong personal relationships 
between their staff members, but have also been formalised with the establishment 
of the Southern Belize Fire Working Group.136 To TNC’s current Director of Fire 
Management, because of this social organisation, within Central America and the 
Caribbean, when it comes to fire management, Belize as a country ‘is pretty 
advanced—I’d say that in the region they’re advanced. It’s mostly because of the 
Southern Belize Working Group’.137 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined fire use and management by NGOs and civil 
society in Belize’s northern Toledo District, using evidence drawn from primary 
ethnographic enquiry. Here, a variety of people, immigrants of diverse origin, and 
migrants from further south in Toledo, use fire in the savanna to enable hunting and 
physical access, and for ‘fun’. They also burn to clear land for agriculture, which, 
occasionally, starts savanna wildfires. Lacking secure land access for farming, and 
with only poorly-paid employment available, people opportunistically employ a 
mosaic of livelihood strategies including hunting and fishing, for which fire is used in 
 
135 Interview 58, emphasis added. See Brechin & Salas (2011) on competition between conservation 
NGOs in Belize.  
136 Interviews 1, 2 and 58.  
137 Interview 55. 
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savanna areas. The savanna areas these people use are mostly state land and 
protected areas managed by long-term pine logging concession holders and 
conservation NGOs. As part of aims of nature conservation or maximal pine growth, 
these land managers seek to control the fire regime in the savanna and reduce the 
fire frequency in the savanna to an approximate fire return rate of three to five years. 
The Forest Department, which is ostensibly the co-manager of these protected 
areas, does not conduct active fire management or uphold legislation forbidding fire 
use. This is apparent to villagers. Despite government policies calling for more 
equitable community benefit from protected areas, it is common practice for 
government officials to grant land and resource access to villagers based on political 
allegiance. Local people thus have little direct stake in fire management for the 
purposes of nature conservation or pine forestry, though there may be some benefit 
to them of reducing wildfire incidence near their homes.  
As an approach, integrated fire management attempts to facilitate 
recognition of the social and ecological dimensions of fire particular to different 
places. In Belize it promises fire management informed by an understanding of 
savannas as ecosystems dependent upon fire, and in collaboration with local fire 
users. Its framing suggests that fire management can fulfil economic and 
conservation objectives and support local livelihoods. The evidence presented here 
shows that advocates of integrated fire management have failed to directly engage 
with the ecological and political realities that cause trade-offs between these 
objectives in Belize. This is in part because of the structural limitations placed on 
NGO-led fire management funded by international conservation and development 
organisations. Funders seek solutions that can be framed in technical terms, 
valorise technical professional expertise, and generally fund short-term 
interventions. This limits the extent to which work within such funded projects can 
engage with local ecology and politics. Where small successes have been built by 
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TIDE and other agencies and villagers in Belize towards some of their aims for fire 
management, they have been through strong personal relationships that have 
interfaced with technical projects and helped overcome some of their limitations. 
Such relationships enable different bodies of expertise to interface and sustain work 
over longer time periods, despite the short-term nature of funding.  
What is needed in northern Toledo is open discussion of the trade-off 
between different aims for fire use and management. Experience elsewhere 
suggests that if local people are truly to participate in fire management this will 
require institutions at the village level, and the political will of the Government to 
enable community benefit from savannas and create some mechanism to 
compensate communities for conducting prescribed burning.138 Building fire 
management networks like this in Belize would take strong cooperation between 
Government, NGOs and villagers. Without these relationships, technical training and 
legislative instruments will have limited impact. For now, although successful 
relationships for fire management are building between NGOs and civil society in 
Belize, support from the Government is lacking. This limits the extent to which 
external funding and actors, and Belizean people can build a more just approach to 
Belizean fire management that accounts for the ecology of the savanna and for the 
needs of local fire users.
 
138 Kull (2002); Rodríguez-Trejo et al (2011); Petty, DeKoninck & Orlove (2015); Mistry, Bilbao & 







Renewal doesn’t have the cultural cachet of restoration, particularly in the 
sense of rewilding. It doesn’t come with the moral radiance surrounding 
redemption, and its aura of attrition and promise of atonement. But it is a way 
to keep fire on the land in ways that will allow the future to recover and to 
draft from flame in new and unanticipated ways. The land does far worse 
unburned than burned poorly. If it holds fire, it will remain malleable enough 
to be resilient and allow future fire practices to evolve (Pyne, 2016b, 147). 
 
This thesis has examined wildfire management in Belize’s coastal savannas 
from 1920 to the present. The research it reports upon sought to examine the 
relationship between ideologies and plans of fire management, and fire 
management in practice. This research grew out of my observations of working 
within a three-year UK Darwin Initiative Project in Belize. I found that the Project’s 
documentation lacked attention to the historical and political context of fire 
management. The Project proposed technical solutions to Belize’s fire ‘problem’, 
which it presented in apolitical terms. Politics and human relationships limited and 
shaped the project’s outcomes in practice, but this was rarely acknowledged in 
project reports. In this research I made it my explicit aim to study these political 
dynamics and to examine how contemporary Belizean fire management is a 
consequence, planned and not, of previous fire management regimes in Belize. 
In focusing on the politics of fire management, I situated my research within 
political ecology. My research, like most political ecology, borrowed theory and 
methodologies from multiple academic disciplines. I drew substantively from 
historical geography and also anthropology and science and technology studies. 
Thematically, the research speaks to literatures examining fire management (and, 
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more generally, environmental management), and the changing nature of colonial 
and international conservation and development.  
In Chapter one I laid out five research questions. I addressed each question 
in Chapters four, five and six. In this chapter I integrate these findings. In Section 
7.1, I address each research question in turn and relate my findings to literatures on 
fire management and colonial and international development. Section 7.2 returns to 
my research aims and draws conclusions about the continuities and discontinuities 
between past and present fire management in Belize. Section 7.3 points to broader 
theoretical implications of the research for the study of environmental management 
within political ecology. Section 7.4 examines how the research might be useful to 
stakeholders in Belizean fire management. In Section 7.5, I conclude by suggesting 
that Stephen Pyne’s concept of ‘renewal’ might be a constructive way to imagine 
future fire management in Belize’s savannas.  
 
7.1 The political ecology of fire management in Belizean savannas, 1920 to 
present 
My first research question asked which organisations and actors have 
funded and organised fire management in Belizean savannas over the past 
century. Broadly, we may attribute this fire management to two Belizean 
organisations, the state Forest Department and the NGO TIDE. This makes Belize 
like many former European colonies, where forestry departments often instituted fire 
suppression and management.1 Belize also follows a global trend in which 
environmental management and development have in the latter twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, increasingly been the prerogative of NGOs.2 The Belize 
Forest Department and TIDE have both obtained funding from international 
 
1 Pyne (1997); Kull (2004). 
2 Jasanoff (1997); Lewis & Kanji (2009).  
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organisations and employed foreign staff and consultants, who have generally been 
those who have designed fire management plans and policies. Fire management 
has thus been assembled by international networks of actors, bridging different 
organisations. Let me review the work of the Forest Department and TIDE in turn, to 
draw conclusions about how these networks have operated and evolved.  
The Forest Department was established in 1921, in colonial Belize, by 
recommendation of Cornelius Hummel, a forester commissioned to report on the 
forests of Belize by the British Colonial Research Committee. From its origins, the 
Forest Department was as much a child of the British Colonial Office as a part of the 
Belizean state. The Forest Department was considered one of many colonial state 
forestry departments within a wider British ‘Empire Forestry’.3 Its senior staff were 
appointed on recommendation by special advisors to the Colonial Office. These staff 
were trained in forestry in Britain and were British.4 The Department had limited 
funding from forest revenue gathered by the state and depended upon finance by 
loans from the Colonial Office and from the 1930s to the early 1960s, from colonial 
development and welfare (CDW) grants. There was a constant struggle for control 
over the Forest Department and the broader Belizean state apparatus between the 
British colonial administration and local political elites, who comprised a majority in 
the Legislative Council. These elites opposed the Forest Department because the 
forms of state regulation the Department advocated threatened their private 
interests. The Department was constrained in its ability to regulate private industries 
because of its mandate from the Colonial Office to appease British private interests 
in Belize. The Forest Department was thus beholden to two different interest groups, 
both through the placement of personnel and its funding.  
 
3 Barton (2002); Powell (2007).  
4 With the exception of Hummel, who was German, and had first been employed by the British state at 
a time when Britain lacked British foresters.   
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As the Belizean state moved to independence from Britain (reaching full 
independence by 1981), British influence over the Forest Department, through 
providing funding and personnel, diminished. By the 1970s, the Department’s senior 
staff were mostly Belizean. Staff increasingly gained positions by virtue of their 
political connections within Belize. Yet obtaining qualifications in forestry or 
environmental management was still a factor in procuring senior positions. These 
qualifications were, by necessity, gained abroad with funding from international aid 
organisations. These scholarships were limited, and, as late as the 1990s, the 
Department was still forced to fill vacancies with British foresters. The Department’s 
funding from the Belizean state was repeatedly cut after 1960, and it remained 
reliant upon international aid funding, sourced from Britain, but also from Canada 
and the USA. This funding came with training and advice from international 
consultants. The Department has, thus, remained obligated both to local and foreign 
interests.  
This tension between outside and local control that has characterised the 
operation of the Department throughout its history has been evident in its 
organisation of fire management. The Department’s policies and practices of fire 
management have waxed and waned with the availability of funding from the 
Belizean government and colonial and international aid. In the 1940s and 1950s, 
when there was a successful pine industry and greater control over government 
budgets by the Colonial Office, the Department had a large allocation from the 
government budget. In this period it received sustained CDW funding specifically to 
finance fire management. After 1960, the CDW funding ceased and government 
funding diminished. Fire management was curtailed, and new equipment, training 
and policy-development were sporadically financed by short-term international 
development projects.  
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Throughout the past century, international funding, staffing and 
consultancies have meant that the Department’s fire management policies have 
predominantly been designed by foreign actors: from Forest Department staff, like 
Cornelius Hummel and Charles Cree, to shorter-term British consultants like Martin 
Johnson, to USA fire managers with the Nature Conservancy. The labour-intensive 
practice of conducting fire management has, however, always been done by junior 
staff and contracted labourers, generally Belizean. The extent to which fire 
management has been organised following the policies written by international 
actors has increasingly been subject to the interests of local political elites, with 
whom Forest Department staff have often been aligned. Fire management has not 
necessarily been contrary to the interests of political elites, but for reasons reviewed 
later in this section, neither has it been their priority.  
As with the Forest Department today, the NGO TIDE’s protected areas staff 
are all Belizean. TIDE, like many grassroots NGOs in the Global South, also relies 
upon international aid funding and is advised by foreign consultants. TIDE’s fire 
management grew out of the Nature Conservancy’s (TNC) Global Fire Initiative 
(GFI). Former TNC employees from the USA continue to advise TIDE’s protected 
areas staff on fire management. TIDE has continued to finance fire management 
through aid projects like the Darwin Project, which had UK government funding.  
Unlike the Forest Department, TIDE conducts fire management in 
collaboration with a network of actors across civil society: The ‘Southern Belize Fire 
Working Group’ (SBFWG). This fire management network leveraged by TIDE’s staff 
includes not only international advisors, but also other Belizean actors: staff from 
other NGOs, logging concession holders and local villagers. Although this parallels 
similar situations elsewhere, in that local stakeholders are involved in fire 
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management, unlike elsewhere (in Madagascar, Australia or Brazil for example) 
state agencies have had minimal involvement.5  
TIDE’s fire management is less the product of TIDE as an organisation, or of 
any one funding opportunity, and more the result of sustained relationships between 
individuals from different organisations. In TIDE’s case, I was able to identify the 
importance of these personal relationships from my experience of working with the 
people involved. I can speak less about the role of personal relationships in the 
Forest Department’s fire management over the past century. I have no doubt, 
however, that connections forged by Belizean foresters with British foresters, and, 
occasionally, with the staff of the Agriculture Department, played a role in sustaining 
fire management despite inconsistent leadership and funding.  
Second, the research addressed the question of how wildfire has been 
cast as a ‘problem’ in the texts of these organisations and with what aims fire 
management has been designed as a solution. By and large, these texts have 
been written by the foreign staff and consultants of these Belizean organisations. 
The framing of the fire ‘problem’, and the aims of fire management have therefore, 
unsurprisingly, followed the Anglo-American trends in the understanding of fire 
ecology, and broadly in conservation and development, that I identified in Chapter 
two. Let me recapitulate how these discourses presented themselves in Belizean 
fire management.  
In 1921, in his Report on the Forests of British Honduras, forester Cornelius 
Hummel framed savanna wildfire as a problem in presenting it as hindrance to the 
development of a pine industry.6 Informed by equilibrium theory in ecology, Hummel 
understood the savanna (a term he reserved for grassy treeless areas) as degraded 
pine forest. Frequent wildfire was a cause of this degradation. If fire was 
 
5 Kull (2002); Petty, deKoninck & Orlove (2015); Mistry, Bilbao & Berardi (2016).  
6 Hummel (1921).  
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suppressed, the savanna would revert to pine forest. Fire management by the 
Forest Department was seen as a means for the state to support development. 
Development was understood as enabling capitalist investment in, and government 
revenue from, a pine industry. This was presented as beneficial to the Colony at 
large: legislation restricting fire use in savannas was justified for the greater good. In 
drawing upon equilibrium theory in ecology, associating fire use with primitive 
livelihoods, and appealing to elite economic interests, Hummel’s arguments for fire 
suppression were akin to the arguments of foresters in many European colonies in 
the early twentieth century.7  
In the 1950s, the way in which the Forest Department framed the fire 
problem changed. The aim of fire management was still to sustain the pine industry, 
which had grown significantly in the 1940s and 1950s. Fire was still deemed to 
hinder pine regeneration, yet Conservator of Forests Charles Cree, observed that 
complete fire suppression led to the accumulation of fuel.8 This made wildfires, 
when they inevitably occurred, very intense and destructive. Cree referenced similar 
observations by some fire managers in the southern USA, particularly in Florida.9 
The policy of total fire suppression was replaced with one of occasional burning 
under controlled conditions early in the dry season. Similar policies making 
controlled ‘early burning’ acceptable were also instigated in other European colonies 
in the mid-twentieth century, in Australia and various parts of Africa, for example.10 
Like elsewhere, this use of fire was deemed a ‘necessary evil’: in general, fire 
exclusion remained the goal. The Department did not suggest that low-intensity fire 
was or might enable the propagation of pine (as it is understood to today). Fire 
 
7 Pyne (1997); Kepe & Scoones (1999); Kull (2004); Kepe (2005); Laris & Wardell (2006); Pooley 
(2018).  
8 Cree (1956), ‘The present forestry programme. A reassessment’, [unpublished, BARS ASR-45-4], p. 
9.  
9 See Pyne (2016b).  




management was still the sole responsibility of trained Department staff: fire use by 
local people was still to be curtailed.  
Since 2009, the Forest Department has had a new wildfire policy.11 Following 
an approach introduced through fire management training given by TNC under the 
GFI in the early 2000s, the policy calls for ‘integrated fire management’.12 The policy 
recognises Belize’s savannas to be among those fire-dependent ecosystems in 
which fires play an important ecological role. This follows the paradigm shift in the 
science of ecology towards non-equilibrium theory, in which disturbances like fire 
are understood to maintain ecosystems like savannas in constant flux between 
different vegetation types in a mosaic. The fire problem is re-framed as one in which 
fires are too frequent and too intense, calling for use of prescribed fire and fire 
suppression to create ecologically-appropriate fire regimes. The policy does not, 
however, clearly articulate what such a fire regime might be for the savanna.13 
Elsewhere, non-equilibrium theory has informed ‘patch-mosaic burning’ approaches, 
which aim for more random fire effects on the landscape. This is not explicitly 
suggested in the Belizean policy.  
The policy of integrated fire management suggests that fire management 
should pursue multiple aims concurrently. In so doing it aligns with the dominant 
global narrative of ‘sustainable development’. A feature of this discourse is to 
suppose that conservation and development aims can be achieved simultaneously 
as a ‘win-win’.14 Within Belize’s new fire policy it is argued that fire management 
should still aim to facilitate pine regeneration to support the timber industry (and now 
it is understood that low-intensity fires at some frequency are beneficial to pine 
regeneration). Aligning with the rise of the nature conservation movement in Belize, 
 
11 Sabido & Green (2009).  
12 Myers (2006).  
13 Parr & Brockett (1999), Brockett, Biggs & Van Wilgen (2001), Parr & Andersen (2006). 
14 Adams (2008).  
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and awareness of its contribution to the tourist industry, the policy also argues that 
fire management should support wider ecosystem health. The policy recognises the 
‘responsible’ use of fire in local livelihoods. It is also suggested that fire 
management should also reduce the risk of fire and smoke to human health, and the 
risk of damage to property. There is no clear explanation in the policy of how a fire 
regime simultaneously pursuing each of these aims might look in practice. Nor does 
it address how approaches to fire management might differ in pursuit of these 
different aims, leading to trade-offs between them.  
Belize’s 2009 policy of integrated fire management aligns with further 
elements of the discourse of sustainable development. Following the trend towards 
‘participatory’ approaches in conservation and development, it calls for local fire 
users to be enrolled in fire management.15 It also follows the tendency towards 
market-based approaches, in speaking of recognition of the economic benefits of 
fire management, and of demonstrating these to local communities.16 The policy 
does not elaborate further on possible mechanisms by which to involve local fire 
users. Belize’s policies promoting participatory fire management parallel changing 
policy elsewhere – in Venezuela, Brazil and Australia for example – though certainly 
not everywhere.17 Official policies still limit fire use in many places. Similarly, 
Belize’s new policies have not been reinforced with new legislation: existing laws still 
limit local fire use in savannas.18 
TIDE also draws upon the notion of ‘integrated fire management’ in its fire 
management plan for the Payne’s Creek National Park, and surrounding savanna 
areas, written in the same year with assistance from TNC staff.19 Similarly, the plan 
 
15 Brosius, Tsing & Zerner (1998); Adams (2008); Brockington, Duffy & Igoe (2008); Dressler et al 
(2010); Raymond et al (2010); Calfucura (2018). 
16 Igoe & Brockington (2007); Adams (2008).  
17 Petty, deKoninck & Orlove (2015); Mistry, Bilbao & Berardi (2016); Eloy et al (2018).  
18 A similar situation exists in Madagascar (Kull, 2004).  
19 TIDE, (2009).  
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recognises that fire management should support pine forestry in the forest reserves, 
nature conservation in the National Park and the security and livelihoods of local 
communities. The management plan does not set out clear conservation targets for 
the National Park, although it suggests that the yellow headed parrot and Caribbean 
pine are keystone species in its management. It suggests, based on similar 
savannas elsewhere in Central America, that an ecologically-appropriate target fire 
return frequency would be every three to five years.20 The management plan does 
not lay out an approach for engaging local villagers. In 2015, aligning with examples 
of community-based conservation elsewhere, TIDE’s proposal for the Darwin Project 
suggested that local participation in fire management could be incentivised through 
the development of small businesses dependent on savanna resources.  
These policies follow trends in Western ecology, conservation and 
development, and move towards a recognition of the importance of fire both 
ecologically and socially. Yet, strikingly, each policy lacks clear engagement with the 
specific role of fire in the ecology of the Belizean savanna, and for its local people. 
None clearly defines the relationship between fire and pine or other conservation 
targets. Below, I will consider why knowledge and expertise regarding the local 
context has not informed these policies.   
The research addressed what expertise has been called upon in 
planning and implementing fire management, and in what contexts this 
expertise was granted the authority to do so. In Chapter two, I identified different 
ways of understanding expertise: as socially constructed and enacted, and deriving 
authority from its discursive context, or as possession of ‘real’ deep and tacit 
knowledge. Let me review how expertise has informed fire management in Belize in 
these terms, beginning by considering the ‘real’ forms of expert knowledge involved.  
 
20 Myers & Morrison (2006).  
303 
  
In Chapters four and five, I showed that for most of the Forest Department’s 
history, the expert knowledge deemed necessary in those leading the Department 
and designing fire management plans and policies was a formal training in forestry. 
Formal qualifications were, however, not deemed important for those junior staff and 
labourers implementing fire management on the ground. Since the 1990s, less 
senior staff have held qualifications in forestry, and the more recently appointed staff 
usually have qualifications in natural resource management or environmental 
science. Recently, those consulting for the Department on its fire policies have been 
experts in fire management specifically, working, for instance, with TNC. In TIDE’s 
case, the design of fire management on paper has also been informed by foreign 
fire management experts from TNC.  
Importantly, qualifications in forestry, or a formal training in fire management, 
have never been available at Belizean institutions. A bachelor’s degree in natural 
resource management has only been available at the University of Belize since 
2005. Most foresters leading the Department’s work were thus trained abroad, 
largely in Britain. Initially all were British, but by the 1950s, Belizeans were 
sporadically being granted scholarships to study in Britain, Cyprus, Costa Rica, 
Canada and the USA. They gradually came to take senior positions within the 
Department. Similarly, TIDE’s staff (all Belizean), and some local community 
members, have become technical experts in fire management by training under 
foreign experts, sometimes travelling to the USA to be trained.  
Thus, whether foreign or Belizean, those leading fire management in Belize 
have all possessed tacit expert knowledge of Anglo-American traditions of forestry 
and fire management; forms of what Fleischmann and Briske would term 
‘professional ecological knowledge’.21 Of course, those Belizeans involved in fire 
 
21 Fleischmann & Briske (2016). 
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management have additionally possessed local understanding (also a form of tacit 
expertise), of the savanna’s geography, and of local culture and politics. These 
forms of expertise have, no doubt, informed fire management practices, but there is 
little evidence of them in plans, policies and report of fire management. Interestingly, 
rarely has scientific expertise regarding the ecology of the Belizean savanna 
specifically informed fire management in plans or practice. Although the expertise 
called upon has been considered ‘scientific’, science, in terms of induction from 
observations in the Belizean savanna itself, has rarely informed the design of fire 
management. Only recently have TIDE’s foreign consultants introduced long-term 
plots for fire-effects monitoring, intended to enable adaptive management. That 
Belize’s fire management policy has rarely evolved in response to local conditions or 
research, mirrors experiences elsewhere in the Global South.22 Yet it is also true 
that, compared with other European colonies, there was a paucity of environmental 
research conducted in Belize.23 The lack of local research in Belize, is of course, in 
part the result of limited resources, but more broadly there has also been a 
privileging of general, technical knowledge over knowledge of the local context. To 
understand why, I must turn to the social construction of expertise in the Belizean 
case.   
General expertise in Anglo-American traditions of forestry and fire 
management has had authority to design fire management in Belize within the 
context of colonial development or international development. In other words, these 
forms of expertise have commanded authority with the agencies funding fire 
management. Forestry (as a science) was allied with colonial development in the 
 
22 Van Wilgen et al (2004).  
23 Burning experiments were, for example, carried out across French and British African colonies in the 
twentieth century (Laris & Wardell, 2006; Pooley, 2014, 2018). More generally-speaking, substantial 
scientific research was systematically instituted across the British Empire after 1940 (Clarke, 2007). 
Belize was small and received little scientific attention.  
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discourse of a British ‘Empire Forestry’. The proponents of Empire Forestry believed 
that similar models of forestry should be introduced across the British Empire, in line 
with its economic unification. Colonial forestry departments were to be staffed by 
foresters trained in Britain at the Imperial Forestry Institute, and thus to follow 
common forestry practices. Similarly, international development has valorised 
universal technical approaches.24 In Belize, like elsewhere, science’s discursive 
authority has lent authority to certain environmental narratives, even in the absence 
of data collection following the scientific method.25  
By contrast, less authority has been granted to these forms of expertise by 
political elites and fire users in Belize. In Belize, professional qualifications and 
expertise compete with claims to authority over management of land and resources 
that are often stronger: those based on class, ethnicity and nationality. Today, 
Belize’s political elites understand that technical expertise draws funding in the 
context of international development, but they do not always intend that the policies 
designed by experts should direct conservation and development on the ground. 
The implication is that the foreign scientific and technical forms of expertise 
discussed above have informed fire management plans and policies to a greater 
extent than they have informed fire management in practice. I return to this in 
addressing my fifth research question.  
The authority of foreign expertise in Belize has also been influenced by the 
social practices of these experts: as Wynne argues, social identities shape the 
public acceptance of expertise.26 For example, in the 1920s and 1930s, British 
foresters were disliked by the Belizean public, in part, because they positioned 
themselves as superior to other members of society. By the same argument, today, 
 
24 Ferguson (1990); Li (2007a). 
25 Sullivan (2000); Forsyth (2011).  
26 Wynne (1992).  
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TIDE’s staff trust the foreign consultants with whom they work and grant them the 
authority to inform the organisation’s fire management work, because of their strong 
inter-personal relationships.   
Let me review the methods of fire management that have been planned 
and those actually practised in Belize’s savannas, and, importantly, highlight gaps 
between the two. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Forest Department’s fire management 
was part of the Department’s routine work. It was not planned as part of time-
delimited projects. As such, it was informed by the general approaches laid out in 
Hummel’s 1921 report.27 Hummel envisaged a new Forest Act covering reservation 
of forests and defining regulations for their use. He called for an expert-led forest 
department to manage state forests, collect forest revenue and uphold the Forest 
Act. In terms of fire management specifically, he suggested that the Forest 
Department construct fire lines and fight fires in pursuit of complete fire suppression 
in areas to be delineated for pine regeneration. He also planned to introduce a 
licensing system for hunters, which he thought would enable regulating their use of 
fire.28 These suggested methods of fire suppression – physical and legislative – 
were akin to the methods of forestry departments in other European colonies.29  
Let me now compare these plans with fire management in practice in the 
1920s and 1930s. In 1926, a Forest Act was passed, which included rules forbidding 
fire use in forests on crown land. At this time only one area of pine savanna was 
delineated as a Forest Reserve: the Belize Pine Reserve near Belize City. Until 
1935, the Forest Department carried out fire suppression work (constructing fire 
lines and firefighting) only in two small parts of the Belize Pine Reserve. This work 
was experimental and different methods of constructing fire lines by hand were 
 
27 Hummel (1921).  
28 Letter from Hummel to Colonial Secretary, 9th January 1923, [BARS MP149/1923]. 
29 Pyne (1997); Kull (2004); Bennett (2015).  
307 
  
trialled. The planned licensing system for hunters was not implemented, though 
Department staff gave verbal warnings to local people they encountered when 
patrolling the Forest Reserve. The Department made ad hoc use of local media 
outlets to highlight the new fire regulations. In 1935, when the Belize Pine Reserve 
was de-reserved, the Department moved its fire suppression work to an area of 
Crown Land in the Stann Creek District known as the Grant’s Works. 
In the 1940s and 1950s, the Department wrote detailed plans for fire 
management to attract CDW funding (on approximately five-year timescales).30 
These called for an expanded network of fire lines and additional infrastructure to 
support firefighting: new roads, forest stations and fire lookout towers. New 
mechanical equipment was called for. As explained above, as in some other 
European colonies, from the mid-1950s, the Department began to plan prescribed 
burning early in the dry season (as well as continued wildfire suppression).31 The 
scale of the Department’s fire management work did expand in the 1940s and 
1950s, in line with these plans written to attract CDW funding. New equipment was 
purchased, and new infrastructure for fire management built. This, however, never 
reached the scale envisaged in the CDW funding plans. That, even at its peak, the 
colonial Forest Department’s fire management work fell short of that planned, 
supports Brett Bennett’s argument that many historians have attributed too great a 
power to colonial foresters to remake colonial environments.32 Bennett asserts that 
‘though foresters succeeded generally in convincing governments to create state 
forestry programs, foresters themselves had little power. Foresters usually wanted 
more forests and greater control over them, but they rarely received these requests 
 
30 Stevenson, 1944, [OWL MSS.Brit.Emp.s.366NeilStevenson(1)]; Stevenson & Lamb, 1947, [OWL 
MSS.Brit.Emp.s.366NeilStevenson(2)]; Cree, 1956b, [BARS ASR-1505-114]; Cree (1957).  
31 Laris & Wardell (2006); Van Wilgen et al (2004); Pooley (2014, 2018). 




in the face of competing claims by industry, local residents, and other government 
agencies’.33 I return to examining how local politics limited forestry in Belize below, 
in addressing my final research question.   
After 1960, the Department no longer planned fire management in schemes 
to attract CDW funding but instead intended to continue with fire management work 
under its general budget. There was a short-lived expansion of fire management 
work in the years after 1961, as an ad-hoc response to widespread fires resulting 
from fuel accumulation during Hurricane Hattie. In these years new fire equipment 
was donated to the Department, including radios. The Government ran a media 
campaign around forest fires, involving newspaper and radio communications, 
distribution of leaflets and a mobile cinema unit. A new Forest Fires Act was passed 
in 1962, enabling the Department to direct fire management on private land. Pyne 
has similarly noted how transient bursts of fire management activity by the state 
have often been triggered by large wildfire events in the USA.34 
After the mid-1960s, the Forest Department’s active fire management work 
in the coastal savannas gradually declined. In the 1970s, a new fire management 
plan for the Southern Coastal Plain was written by a British forester on a short-term 
secondment to the Department.35 There was no clear budget allocated for the work 
he planned. Rather, he detailed possible work were the budget to be allocated by 
the Belizean Government or were it to attract external funding. His plan called for 
restoration of existing lookout towers and stations that had fallen into disrepair, 
expansion of the network of fire lines, and a renewed effort with prescribed fire use 
and fire suppression.  The plan was never funded. 
 
33 Bennett (2015), p. 36.  
34 Pyne (2015).  
35 Johnson (1974).  
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The Forest Department has written no new plans for fire management in the 
coastal plain savannas since the 1980s. Provision of general fire management 
training to Department staff, the purchase of new firefighting equipment, and the 
development of new fire policies and strategies have been planned as outputs of 
short-term aid projects such as the Forest Planning and Management Project 
(FPMP) in the 1990s, TNC’s GFI and the World Bank-funded Key Biodiversity Areas 
Project (KBA), from 2015 to 2019. The Department’s 2009 fire policy lays out 
general principles for fire management, for example promoting prescribed fire use, 
and the development of community-based fire management.36 There is, however, no 
accompanying plan to lay out steps or allocate Departmental budget for achieving 
these policy objectives. The Department’s Forest Fires Communication Strategy, 
written in 2017 under the KBA project, lays out clearer activities and a timeline of 
media and outreach work for 2018 to 2022.37  
Despite these policies, since 1986 the Department has not conducted any 
fire suppression or prescribed fire management in the coastal savannas. It has 
made little effort to enforce the fire legislation or to facilitate community-based fire 
management. The Department has participated in fire management training, 
received equipment, and written policies to fulfil the necessary outputs under various 
funded projects. To date, it does not appear that the programme of work laid out in 
the 2017 Fire Communication Strategy is being carried out. In its lack of action 
towards instituting community-based fire management, the Department differs from 
state agencies in some other countries which have similar policies. In Madagascar, 
Mexico, Australia, Venezuela and Brazil, for example, states have actively 
 
36 Sabido & Green (2009).  




attempted to involve local fire users in the management of protected areas or have 
funded community fire brigades.38  
Unlike the Forest Department, TIDE, together with other members of the 
SBFWG has conducted prescribed burns and fire suppression in the Payne’s Creek 
National Park and neighbouring Deep River Forest Reserve each dry season since 
the early 2000s. TIDE’s fire management work draws upon a dedicated fire 
management plan for this area, written with assistance from TNC staff in 2009.39 
This plan calls for maintenance of fire lines, prescribed burning and firefighting to 
recreate a fire regime of low-intensity fire every three to five years. Fire 
management is planned in collaboration with other members of the Southern Belize 
Fire Working Group (SBFWG), including another NGO, local logging concession-
holders and community members. The group draws up detailed plans for the 
individual prescribed burns planned each dry season, which are (after the law) sent 
to the Forest Department in advance.  
TIDE has also planned and conducted fire management training for its staff, 
staff of other organisations and community members, and the purchase of new fire 
management equipment, as outputs of short-term funded projects, such as TNC’s 
GFI and the Darwin Project. The Darwin Project proposal also included activities 
designed to incentivise community-based fire management, like the development of 
small community-based businesses. These businesses were intended to incentivise 
fire management, both by creating alternative livelihoods to hunting, and by being 
dependent on savanna resources. In practice, the businesses developed had only 
tenuous links to savanna resources (and thus to fire management of the savanna at 
large). Elsewhere, there have also been attempts to create economic incentives for 
 
38 Kull (2002); Rodríguez-Trejo et al (2011); Petty, deKoninck & Orlove, (2015); Mistry, Bilbao & Berardi 
(2016); Eloy et al (2018); Mistry et al (2018).  
39 TIDE (2009).  
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community-based fire management, but more direct payments have been made to 
local people for their participation, for example through the establishment of paid fire 
brigades such as those that exist in Brazil, or through REDD+ schemes as in 
Australia.40 
I have shown that there have been significant discrepancies between fire 
management as planned, and fire management in practice (particularly in the Forest 
Department’s work since 1960). Fire management work was conducted on a far 
smaller scale than planned. Fire management often failed to achieve its broad aims 
as articulated in plans and policies.41 There have also been discrepancies between 
fire management in practice and written reports about it. How, then, can these 
discrepancies between the texts and the actual practices of fire management 
be explained?  I have made the case that, in large part, they can be explained by 
the situation in which fire management has largely had foreign, rather than local, 
funding and impetus. Before I review this argument, it is worth noting that an 
additional factor of relevance is that some of these texts were created as part of a 
short-term heightened response to large wildfire events but lost their salience later. 
An example is the Forest Fires Act, which was passed following the wildfires 
associated with Hurricane Hattie in 1962 but has rarely been implemented since. 
Pooley has also highlighted how ‘boom and bust cycles of controversy and 
forgetting’ follow large fire events.42  
The Forest Department’s fire management work has had short-term funding 
from various colonial or international aid agencies. The leaders directing fire 
management – British colonial foresters, Belizean foresters and foreign consultants 
– usually had short tenures with the Department. This was both because they were 
 
40 Petty, deKoninck & Orlove (2015); Mistry, Bilbao & Berardi (2016).  
41 As Kull (2004) has also demonstrated in Madagascar, wildfire policies and legislation have been 
insufficient to change local fire use, and reduce the number of wildfires. 
42 Pooley (2014), p. 7. See also Pyne (2015).  
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part of the colonial administration or were employed for short-term projects, and 
because Departmental positions for Belizeans have often been granted based on 
political allegiance. The Department thus struggled to maintain a consistent 
programme and to retain staff with expertise and interest in fire management. In 
Chapter five I described how this limited the potential for prescribed burning or 
scientific research to inform fire management.  
There has also been a change in the types of activities that are funded by 
foreign aid in pursuit of fire management. CDW grants directly funded the Forest 
Department to construct fire lines, fight fires and conduct prescribed burning. Since 
the CDW funding ended, foreign aid projects have generally funded training, policy 
development and limited new equipment (both for the Forest Department and TIDE). 
There has been no funding to ensure that these are then employed to carry out fire 
management in practice. Active programmes of fire management have depended on 
limited local impetus from Government and NGOs to finance staff time and 
transportation. With its limited resources, the Forest Department has generally 
limited its work to certain protected areas, limiting its ability to manage fires at the 
landscape scale, or to engage with local fire users.  
Belizean policies for fire management have often followed general, technical 
approaches. This has been because those designing the policies have had limited 
experience of Belize as a context, and because these approaches have been 
valorised by funders. As Ferguson and Li note, colonial and international 
development have tended to ‘render technical’ the ‘problems’ they would solve.43 In 
the colonial period, the philosophy behind British ‘Empire Forestry’ was that similar 
methods of forestry could and should be applied across the British Empire. Likewise, 
in international development it has been posited that foreign consultants with certain 
 
43 Ferguson (1990); Li (2007a). 
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areas of technical expertise could solve Belize’s fire ‘problem’. As a result, texts 
planning fire management have generally not attended to the working conditions 
and fire ecology of the Belizean savanna. They have not considered the economic 
and political influences on fire management. Even if largely unaccounted for in plans 
and policies, let me review how local factors have nonetheless frustrated fire 
management in practice.  
Regeneration of Caribbean pine has been an objective of fire management 
throughout the past century, but there has been a limited understanding of how this 
species behaves under different fire regimes in the Belizean savanna. Initially, the 
Forest Department believed that complete fire suppression would lead to pine 
regeneration. For three reasons this was mistaken: the resultant fuel accumulation 
eventually led to intense and destructive wildfires; pine was adapted to low-intensity 
fire and its seedlings grew rapidly in sunlit post-fire conditions; other factors, such as 
poor drainage, limited pine regeneration. Understanding is improving (in part as a 
result of studies elsewhere that have contributed to the general shift towards non-
equilibrium theory in ecology) but the complex local relationship between pine 
growth and fire continues to limit the applicability of externally-designed fire 
management approaches. In Chapter six I described how long-term plots 
established recently in Payne’s Creek National Park are demonstrating that TIDE’s 
staff have sometimes been mistaken in directly transferring approaches to 
prescribed burning from the USA to Belize. This is because these approaches have 
been developed for other pine species under different ecological conditions. For 
example, where prescribed fire is used to remove hardwood scrub in North Carolina 
because it limits pine growth, hardwood scrub may facilitate pine growth in Belize.  
In early plans for fire management in Belize, it was assumed that a pine 
industry would develop to justify fire management locally. In practice, because 
Belize was remote and lacked infrastructure, foreign capitalist investment in such an 
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industry was risky. It also depended on an international market for what was a 
poorly finished product, when compared to pine from the USA. In practice, only in 
the decades of timber shortage following the Second World War did a sufficiently 
strong market exist to justify large-scale investment in the Belizean pine industry. 
For the remainder of the past century the economic incentive for fire management 
has been weak. Even in the 1940s and 1950s, the pine industry primarily benefitted 
a single British company (rather than the local economy). Generally, the potential 
economic benefits of fire management in terms of pine regeneration, have been too 
long-term to be of interest on political timescales. For the Belizean political elite, the 
savanna’s primary value has been as land to grant for political favour, or as 
concessions for logging. There has thus been limited impetus for the Belizean 
Government to fund fire management in the coastal savannas for forestry or nature 
conservation objectives. After 1960, the Belizean Government repeatedly reduced 
the funding allocated to the Forest Department in general. This was due to growth of 
other sectors of the Belizean economy, and because of the Department’s 
connection with British interests, which made it unpopular as Belize sought its 
independence.  
Christian Kull has documented how, in Madagascar, the anonymity of fire 
users and weaknesses and peasant sympathies within the state have limited the 
implementation of fire management legislation forbidding fire use.44 Mathews 
describes a similar situation in Mexico, where official fire regulations ‘are part of the 
official discourse which justifies the forest service’s authority by representing the 
forests of Mexico as being at the mercy of destructive peasant farmers’, but, in 
practice state officials rarely enforce the regulations, and many are sympathetic to 
local fire use.45 The Belizean experience is similar, where legislation restricting fire 
 
44 Kull (2004).  
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use in savannas has existed throughout the past century but it has not been 
enforced by Forest Department officials. Inconsistencies within the Belizean state 
have limited the realisation of fire management policies and legislation.  
Local political factors have not only been unaccounted for in plans and 
policies for fire management, but, even when shaping fire management in practice, 
they have rarely featured in reports to international funders. Local hostility towards 
the Forest Department in the 1920s and 1930s, for example, was not mentioned in 
the Forest Department’s annual reports to the Colonial Office, which followed a 
standard format used across the British empire. Project reports for the Darwin 
Project, for example, neglected to discuss the trade-offs between different objectives 
in fire management, and presented the Forest Department as a cooperative partner. 
In TIDE’s case, strong personal relationships between various actors have 
sustained fire management over the past decade. Being independent of any one 
funded project, the importance of these relationships in fire management has not 
received due attention in reports for international funders. David Mosse’s 
ethnographic analysis of development projects provides a useful framework to 
understand this. Mosse suggests that local social and political relations strongly 
shape development, but that development actors must present their work in such a 
way as to makes the policies of funders appear to have determined project 
outcomes.46  
By examining both, I have demonstrated that there have been significant 
gaps between vision and execution in Belizean fire management. Carrier and West 
argue that too many scholars privilege a ‘book view’ over a ‘field view’ of the 
conservation and development institutions and projects that they study.47 In Chapter 
two I showed how this emphasis on discourse has often been inspired by the work 
 
46 Mosse (2004).  
47 Carrier & West (2009), p. 12.  
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of Michel Foucault. My work supports Carrier and West in their argument that this 
focus on vision and intent over actual practice has led to a literature that treats 
conservation and development interventions as overly powerful.  
 
7.2 From colonial to post-colonial fire management in Belize 
Let me tie these findings together with recourse to my research aims. First, I 
sought to examine how colonial and post-colonial fire management have 
addressed the ecological and political context of wildfires in Belize. In the 
previous section, I spoke to this aim with my first, third and fifth research questions. I 
described how throughout the past century there has been some continuity in the 
way in which fire management approaches have been introduced to Belize from 
elsewhere, with little attention to the local ecological and political context. This has 
been because fire management has often been funded and designed by agencies 
foreign to Belize. Funding and leadership for fire management have generally been 
short-term and lacked time to respond to local conditions. The agencies funding fire 
management favoured generalised technical approaches, because these were what 
it was possible to provide in pre-planned projects delivered by foreign experts. There 
have been some changes to the nature of foreign consultancies for fire 
management. Since the 1960s, consultants have less commonly held positions 
within Belizean agencies and have had ever shorter tenures in Belize. This has 
further reduced their potential to understand and consider local contextual factors. 
Kothari makes a similar observation that, with the transition from colonial to 
international development, development agencies have increasingly valued 
specialist technical expertise in development professionals, over the local contextual 
knowledge they might gain through extended residency in a country receiving aid.48   
 
48 Kothari (2005, 2006). 
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In recent decades, studies of colonial science and environmental 
management have overthrown the ‘diffusionist hypothesis’, which imagined that 
knowledge and practices were directly transferred from colonial centres to 
colonies.49 This study contributes to this literature. Echoing other studies of the 
variation in forestry practices in different ecological, economic and political contexts 
within the British Empire, Belizean fire management was strongly shaped by 
conditions in Belize.50 I gave examples in the section above and described how the 
effects of these local factors were sometimes written out of reports about fire 
management. This does not mean, however, that there was not, in practice, some 
adaptation of general methods to suit the context of Belize.  
Pooley emphasises that scientists think and write differently in the field and 
in dialogue with land managers, from the way that they do in official texts or more 
general theory.51 Foresters in Belize also experimented in response to conditions in 
the field, even if their official texts suggested that they were still following more 
universal principles. Methods were changed in response to local ecological 
conditions to a greater degree than in response to local politics. This was particularly 
the case between 1920 and 1960, where British foresters held senior positions with 
the Department for sustained periods. For example, in the 1920s and 1930s, the 
foresters experimented with different ways of cutting fire lines. In the mid-1950s, 
prescribed burning was introduced, to address the observation that there were risks 
attached to fuel accumulation after fire suppression. More recently, scientific 
monitoring of the effects of fire management introduced by TIDE’s foreign 
consultants has informed fire management practices. This was because sustained 
personal relationships outlasted individual funding opportunities. The ability to 
 
49 McManus (1999); Goldman & Turner (2011). Hodge (2011a); Vandergeest & Peluso (2011); Pooley 
(2014, 2018).  
50 Sivaramakrishnan (1997); Vandergeest & Peluso (2011); Hansen & Lund (2017).  
51 Pooley (2014, 2018).  
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respond to local ecological conditions thus depended upon those designing fire 
management spending time in Belize. Of course, to some extent, where there has 
been attention to local conditions it has also been as a response to a growing 
awareness of similar issues elsewhere. For example, when the Forest Department 
introduced prescribed burning, it was a response to local observations, but was 
influenced by the response of foresters to similar observations in the USA. The USA 
influence during the colonial period is another suggestion that the colonial Forest 
Department was not solely directed from the colonial centre of Britain, as the 
diffusionist hypothesis would suggest.  
Throughout the past century, fire management leaders and consultants have 
been far less responsive to local economic and political factors, including the limited 
long-term local economic benefit from fire management, the granting of savanna 
land for political favour, and the continued use of fire by local people despite 
legislation and propaganda campaigns designed to deter them. I should note that in 
Chapter four we saw one exception to this. John Oliphant, Conservator of Forests in 
Belize in the late 1920s, recognised that elite control over land strongly limited the 
work of the Forest Department. His attempts to initiate legislative reforms that might 
change the balance of power led to his removal from Belize by the British Colonial 
Office (who feared he might cause local political unrest). After Oliphant no forester 
made similar attempts to address these local political issues. They do not have 
technical solutions, nor are they amenable to foreign interventions.  
It is true that recent calls for community-based fire management appear to 
recognise the importance of fire use for local livelihoods and seek to create benefits 
from fire management for local people. Yet it is important to understand that these 
calls are not directly a response to recognition of the limitations of past approaches 
in Belize itself. Rather, they result from broader trends in mainstream ‘sustainable 
development’ towards ‘participatory’ approaches. Following this trend, in the Darwin 
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Project, activities were designed that were intended to create local benefits to 
incentivise fire management. Constrained by the limitations of a pre-designed aid 
project, however, the project staff did not challenge legal categories of use of Forest 
Reserves, nor the control of land by political elites. The Darwin Project was thus 
unable to create strong local benefits from fire management of the savanna 
landscape.  
My research suggests that the gap between plans and practices of fire 
management is one caused by a failure of plans and policies to account for local 
ecology, politics and social relations. It is interesting to reflect upon the extent to 
which this might have been otherwise. Undoubtedly, had more empirical scientific 
attention been paid to the fire ecology of the Belizean savanna, this could have led 
to more appropriate fire management approaches towards aims of forestry or nature 
conservation. Yet any scientists that might have conducted such work would still 
have been limited in their ability to influence fire management in practice by local 
political and social relations. All pre-designed attempts to manage socio-natures are 
fundamentally constrained in their ability to account for local complexity.  
All my research questions, aimed, in one way or another, to consider the 
Darwin Project in the light of previous fire management in Belize. It is useful to 
consider continuities and discontinuities, both ideological and practical. Ideologically, 
the Darwin Project (with recent official fire policies in Belize) departed quite radically 
from the twentieth-century fire management approaches of the Forest Department. 
These earlier fire management approaches, informed by equilibrium ecology, 
understood savannas as potential forest, degraded by fire. The aim was to grow 
pine for forestry. The Darwin Project, by contrast, was broadly informed by non-
equilibrium ecology, understanding the savanna as a fire-dependent ecosystem. 
The Project proposal recognised that the use of fire by local people was an 
important part of their livelihoods. The proposed activities were intended to reconcile 
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the differing aims of nature conservation, forestry and local economic development. 
The Project promoted the use of prescribed fire, which had been used only after 
1955 and in limited ways by the Forest Department. The Darwin Project was 
influenced by the idea of adaptive management. Unlike the Forest Department, the 
Project made efforts to introduce scientific monitoring of the ecological effects of fire 
management. Yet, like previous fire management programmes, the Darwin Project 
gave precedence to foreign technical and scientific expertise in the design and 
delivery of training in fire management. In the Darwin Project, as throughout the past 
century, environmental managers called upon local people to restrict their fire use in 
the name of conservation and development of the savanna.  
In practical terms, the Darwin Project was aided by infrastructure and 
technologies that were not available in twentieth-century fire management. This 
included the paved Southern Highway, mobile technology for communication, and 
more sophisticated equipment, such as fire weather meters capable of measuring 
factors such as relative humidity and wind speed. Yet there are continuities in the 
way in which the Project encountered practical limitations as a result of foreign 
funding and pre-design. Like previous fire management it was limited by its short-
term funding and faced political dynamics that could not be addressed using 
technical interventions. It was similarly limited because local political elites did not 
support fire management and its aims.  
All the same, the Project successfully enrolled a wider range of actors in fire 
management than did the Forest Department. The Project’s activities brought NGO 
staff, local pine concession holders and community members together to conduct 
prescribed burns. We might ask whether the relationships between these actors in 
the Project were more equal than previously, both in terms of conducting fire 
management but also determining the aims of fire management. In Chapters four 
and five I described how twentieth-century foresters cast local fire users as irrational 
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and aimed to prevent their fire use.  Prescribed fire use was understood as the sole 
domain of the Forest Department. I showed how local field assistants working with 
Cornelius Hummel were barely acknowledged in his reports on Belize’s forests. 
Before the 1970s, a single British company monopolised the pine industry, such that 
local people saw little benefit from fire management for forestry (despite the 
foresters’ discourse that would benefit the Colony at large). In many ways, in the 
Darwin Project relations between similar actors were more equal. Prescribed fire 
was something that local people could participate in and lead. There were efforts to 
involve local people in conducting and understanding field research. Today, local 
pine logging concession-holders are Belizean.  
In other ways, strong power imbalances were retained in these 
contemporary relationships. Long-term logging concessions are held by a handful of 
individuals, and few local villagers benefit from the pine industry. Political elites 
retain control over land and resources, despite policies calling for community based 
natural resource management.52 The Darwin Project paralleled experiences in other 
countries, where local recognition is constrained within participatory fire 
management schemes, as imagined by development projects and by official 
agencies. Like in most other examples of participatory fire management, there was 
little attempt to create space for local fire use, as it is already practised within local 
livelihoods.53 Environmental managers sought, instead, to involve local people in a 
separate and planned set of prescribed burning practices. This was coupled with 
attempts to create alternative livelihoods to reduce local fire use for hunting. As with 
examples of participatory forestry elsewhere, the valorisation of ‘professional’ 
experts limited local participation. Those defined as ‘expert’, designing project 
 
52 As is the case in many countries: see Ribot, Agrawal & Larson (2006); Larson & Ribot (2007); 
Nelson & Agrawal (2008); Poteete & Ribot (2011). 




activities and writing training materials and reports were predominantly foreign to 
Belize. All written outputs were in English. Local fire use was still subordinated to 
external technical expertise.  54 
There has been much scholarly debate over whether international 
conservation and development mirrors colonial conservation and development.55 
Given that this study spans a period in which Belize was a colonial and then an 
independent state, I can make some provisional observations in this regard with 
reference to Belizean fire management. I have identified three continuities in the 
history of fire management from colonial to independent Belize. First, throughout the 
past century, environmental managers have called upon local people to restrict their 
fire use in the name of conservation and/ or development of the savanna, posed as 
a ‘greater good’. Second, I have shown that plans and policies for fire management 
in Belize have generally been written by foreign ‘experts’ and funded by foreign 
agencies. Finally, both the colonial and independent Belizean state have been 
internally riven by competing local and external interests, with important implications 
for fire management in practice. In other words, similar configurations of power have 
been reproduced between foreign experts and funders, local elites, and local fire 
users. Countless studies have drawn similar conclusions about the persistence of 
power relations from colonial to international development.56 We might ask how 
significant this is, since the aims of these actors have not just remained locked in a 
static pattern, and fire management has evolved significantly over time. As Uma 
Kothari notes, while similar power relations are evident from colonial to international 
development, there have been divergences: ‘processes of globalisation, the setting 
up of the Bretton Woods institutions and the nature of international finance and trade 
 
54 Nightingale (2005) Green & Lund (2015); Lund (2015); Scheba & Mustalahti (2015). 
55 Cooke & Kothari (2001); Adams & Mulligan (2002); Kothari (2005, 2006); Wainwright (2008); Hodge 
(2010; Folke Ax et al (2011).  
56 For example, Cooke & Kothari (2001); Li (2007a); Wainwright (2008).  
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have altered the environment within which development takes place. Moreover, 
within the development process, changing discourses of foreign aid, theories and 
policies have successively shaped practices as have the evolving relations between 
the West and its former colonies’.57 The question is a complex one, and, because it 
is, neither broad generalisations nor too finely-drawn a comparison are appropriate. 
We can also question the extent to which the traces of fire management with which I 
worked enable direct comparisons between the past and the present. As I will 
discuss momentarily, the nature of my sources differed significantly for different time 
periods.  
An important finding of the research is that personal relationships between 
foreign and local actors in Belize shaped the outcomes of the Darwin Project. Some 
of these relationships were forged during the Darwin Project, but many of them pre-
dated the Project. The Project is unlikely to have long-term effects unless these 
relationships persist. More generally, TIDE’s fire management work in the future 
rests upon sustaining these relationships. This points to an important conclusion. It 
was perhaps not useful to isolate the Darwin Project as a focus for this research. In 
so doing, I presupposed that the Project, or other individual fire management 
programmes or policies were the most useful unit of analysis for understanding how 
Belizean fire management has evolved. Rather, contemporary Belizean fire 
management has resulted from sustained relationships between networks of actors, 
with which individual projects have articulated. As Rosalind Eyben notes, the history 
of international development is often ‘written about in terms of a succession of 
policies, discourses or institutions’, but ‘rarely considered is the interplay of these 
with individual lives’.58 For David Mosse, this emphasis on projects and policies over 
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social relations, is one upheld by the development industry itself, which demands in 
its texts, the ‘effacing of individual action, or denial of relationships’.59 Certainly, this 
was the structure demanded of me, in writing the Darwin Project reports.  
It would, however, be difficult to compare the human relationships involved in 
contemporary fire management with those historically. Many of the remaining traces 
of historical fire management represent individual projects and organisations. They 
do not reveal the extensive networks of actors which these projects and 
organisations interacted with or depended upon. Using such sources, I have largely 
written the history of fire management in Belize in terms of funding opportunities, 
projects and policies. This reminds us that research findings are structured by those 
traces of the past to which we, as researchers, have had access. The evidence I 
worked with was fragmentary and differed in nature in different time periods. My 
understanding of the more recent history was more richly informed by oral histories 
and for the last three years, my own observations. The Colonial Office records 
available for the 1920s and 1930s provided far more evidence of the political context 
to fire management than did the records available for the 1940s onwards, which 
were biased towards official plans and reports. My research findings are limited by 
my ability to take account of these limitations.  
 
7.3 Implications for further research in political ecology 
Let me draw some more general conclusions for studies of environmental 
management in political ecology. This research has demonstrated, after Lippert, 
Krause and Hartmann, that we should understand environmental management ‘as 
situated practice’ rather than as ‘the implementation of dominant projects and the 
materialisation of hegemonic discourse’.60 It calls for further detailed studies of 
 
59 Mosse (2011), p. 22.  
60 Lippert, Krause & Hartmann (2015), p. 1. See also Carrier & West (2009).  
325 
  
environmental management as it exists in different ecological and political contexts. 
In this way we might avoid re-inscribing the power of scientific discourse to make 
‘rules, technics or institutions appear separate from the apparently material world 
they govern’.61 This establishes a base from which to question the assumption that 
the environment can be designed or managed by scientific expertise.  
The research has highlighted two areas that merit greater attention in future 
studies of the practice of environmental management. First, much research in 
political ecology (this included) does not engage directly with state theory, or clearly 
articulate how it understands ‘the state’. The state is often treated as exogenous to 
local study sites, or as a hegemonic force opposed to local interests.62 My research 
findings, with other studies, suggest that political ecology must move towards a 
more nuanced conceptualisation of the state.63 I found that while fire management 
has been organised by the Belizean state, the state is and has not been a uniform 
entity. The state’s fire management has never been directed by a single rationality. 
The Belizean state has been a space continually contested by foreign and local 
interests. The relative influence of different actors over its policies or its practices 
have differed. Environmental management has been shaped by social relations 
between government officials and ‘local’ actors. This suggests that more attention 
should be devoted towards the implications of internal inconsistencies, competition, 
and conflicts within states for environmental management in other contexts. 
Globally, NGOs have increasingly played a role in environmental management. 
Belize itself has been termed a ‘hollow state’, in which a network of NGOs provides 
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‘Europe-centred narrative of progress’ in upholding the analytical categories of ‘modernity’ and 
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a ‘state-like presence’ for environmental governance.64 Theorisation of the state 
within political ecology must carefully engage with the role of NGOs vis-à-vis the 
state. If the state is understood to be composed of social relations, we might 
question whether NGOs or civil society should be understood as separate from the 
state at all.65 
Second, my research suggests that we should observe more closely how 
trust and inter-personal relationships shape environmental management. It is easy, 
as a researcher, to focus on individual policies or projects, because these commonly 
leave a trail of texts for study. Yet a singular focus on individual policies or projects 
as drivers of environmental management detracts from understanding the ways in 
which they interact with existing social networks. In the past decades, 
anthropologists have drawn attention to the importance of inter-personal 
relationships in shaping international development practice.66 There has been recent 
recognition of the relevance of this work for examining environmental management 
practices, and this would be an interesting field for future study.67 As Fechter notes, 
an emphasis on agency need not replace, but, rather, should complement more 
structural analyses of development (or conservation).68 
Finally, this research points to the value for political ecology of continued 
engagement across the disciplines of historical geography, science and technology 
studies and anthropology. Each of these fields has developed rigorous empirical 
analysis of the practices constituting science, environmental management and 
development in different contexts. They offer methodologies – archival, oral 
histories, ethnography – that, in combination, can provide a strong platform from 
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which to question dominant assumptions about how environmental management 
should be and is shaped.69  
 
7.4 Implications for stakeholders in Belizean fire management 
This research speaks of and speaks to various stakeholders in Belizean fire 
management: local fire users, international funders, the state Forest Department, 
Belizean NGOs, logging concession-holders and Belizean politicians. Here I turn to 
the question of whether, and if so, how, this research should be useful to these 
stakeholders. As a caveat, it is important to stress that the research has not 
suggested that these are homogeneous groups of stakeholders. Rather, it has 
demonstrated that these groups are interrelated and cross-cut by power-relations 
and divergent aims.   
This research, like most in political ecology, was driven by normative aims 
towards environmental justice. Yet there is an argument that too much research in 
political ecology offers only academic critique and not practical strategies in pursuit 
of such aims.70 At the same time, there are many perspectives regarding the form 
that practical strategies for a more ‘useful’ political ecology might take.71 Some 
would argue that critical research, if carefully communicated beyond academia, can 
inspire new ways of thinking and plant seeds for practical change, over which others 
should take ownership. Others argue that political ecologists should be directly 
involved in activism. Many stakeholders expect researchers, at the very least, to 
provide them with explicit recommendations, in the form of policy prescriptions, for 
example.   
 
69 Brannstrom (2004); Offen (2004); Goldman & Turner (2011); Fleming (2014); Davis (2015).  
70 Walker (2007).  
71 Blaikie (2012).  
328 
  
One important conclusion of this research is that there are significant 
structural constraints facing actors in Belizean fire management. Practical strategies 
suggested for these actors must address or acknowledge these constraints. Some 
limitations could be ameliorated, but as I will stress in the final section, many are 
inherent to the very notion of planned environmental management. Another 
conclusion of this research is that a more environmentally just approach to fire 
management will, in Belize’s current political climate, not gain traction and 
acceptance on the ground simply from the development of new policies for fire 
management, even if these are officially adopted by the Belizean Government and 
its agencies. Indeed, Belize’s official fire management policies are relatively 
progressive compared with those in many countries, in that they recognise the 
ecological and social importance of savanna fires. As TIDE’s protected areas 
manager puts it: ‘We have developed a lot a [sic] plans, good plans, and they are 
just sitting on shelves’.72 This thesis, therefore, does not conclude with explicit policy 
recommendations for fire management in Belize. Instead, I identify three areas 
which need deeper consideration in the future, informed by the findings of this 
research. I then provide reflections on the practices by which I might bring these to 
the attention of stakeholders in Belizean fire management, beyond simply placing 
them in this text.  
First, the research draws attention to the importance of local ecology and 
politics in shaping Belizean fire management. It suggests that external advisors in 
fire management should aim to gain understanding of this context, by consulting and 
creating more local and scientific knowledge rather than relying on professional 
ecological knowledge. It implies that local fire managers should more carefully 
evaluate the relevance of externally-derived approaches. Importantly, it points to a 
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need to enable local ownership of ecological and historical research to inform fire 
management. The little research that has been carried out on wildfire in Belize, has 
been conducted by actors foreign to Belize (my research is not an exemplar of this 
long-established tradition: I sit with Hummel here).  There are many reasons for this, 
among them limited opportunities to obtain academic qualifications in Belize, limited 
funding for research available to Belizeans and poor access to relevant primary and 
secondary sources in Belize. It is no simple matter to overcome the significant 
limitations facing research institutions in the Global South: they are intricately 
intertwined with broader structural inequalities in the international political 
economy.73 Yet future funding for fire management might begin, in small ways, to 
address some of the barriers facing local research. Funding might favour wildfire 
research conducted at Belizean institutions, such as the Environmental Research 
Institute. Foreign scientists working in Belize should, at the very least, engage with 
and collaborate with researchers at these local institutions.74 This research has 
demonstrated that social, political and historical research are pertinent to 
environmental management in Belize. Many historical records located in Belize are 
poorly preserved, and there is limited local recognition of their potential relevance for 
contemporary environmental management.75 There is potential for researchers and 
students of the Environmental Research Institute in Belize to archive and make 
more use of these records in research.76  
Second, this research suggests that fire use and management must be 
understood in the context of broader struggles over land and resources in Belize. If 
 
73 Alatas (2003); Unterhalter (2010).  
74 Paige West and John Aini, for example, demonstrate that meaningful, long-term research 
collaborations are possible between scholars in the Global North and South (West & Aini, 2018).  
75 The Belize Archives and Records Service, while aware of various decaying deposits of records 
across Belizean Government departments, lacks the resources and space to preserve and house 
them.  
76 During my PhD, I worked with a student intern at the Environmental Research Institute to catalogue 
the records at the Forest Department’s head office in Belmopan. Similar efforts might be made to 
examine and digitise some of the decaying records at other Forest Stations.  
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NGOs and members of civil society in Belize wish to use fire management in pursuit 
of nature conservation and/or to benefit local villagers, they must be prepared to 
advocate more comprehensively, more forcefully, and more politically, against the 
control of land by local political elites and by absentee landowners. This is not 
something that international development funding is likely to readily support, nor is it 
something that external consultants or technical interventions can easily address. 
But, paradoxically, these will only be effective if they communicate and interact with 
social movements in Belize. As Williams argues, ‘participatory development’ is not 
inherently doomed to failure, but, rather, is enabled or constrained by its political 
context.77  
Finally, the research calls for recognition of the fundamental importance of 
long-term inter-personal relationships in sustaining fire management in Belize and 
enabling it to adapt to local conditions. To external funders of fire management, it 
suggests a need to support existing relationships, and to be aware that technical 
interventions rely upon these relationships. It points to a need to support these 
continuing relationships with funding. To existing networks of fire managers across 
government, NGOs and civil society in Belize, it re-affirms the importance of sharing 
and replicating their model more widely. Similar associations of land managers 
using prescribed fire have successfully shared knowledge and resources 
elsewhere.78 
These lessons from my research, as they apply to external advisors to 
Belizean fire management, apply no less to me as I attempt to make my research 
useful to stakeholders in Belize. As Piers Blaikie suggests, ‘to ask whether political 
ecology should be useful … is to become involved in a critique of development 
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practice itself in its broadest sense’.79 My research suggests, and others attest, that 
external actors aiming to influence environmental management will only have local 
impact through sustained engagement and personal relationships that go beyond 
written outputs.80 I certainly do not assume that this thesis, being lengthy and written 
for an academic audience, will automatically reach Belizean stakeholders. I have 
begun to build personal relationships in Belize, but it is difficult to have a sustained 
engagement within the timeframe of a PhD. It will be important for me to continue to 
communicate this research, through informal conversations and actions in Belize. I 
will have to tailor how I present the research to different stakeholders, who will hold 
different expectations of me and of the research.81 Their expectations of me will be 
influenced by my involvement with the Darwin Project. They may for example, 
expect me to play the role of the ‘development expert’, expecting clearer technical 
recommendations to guide fire management than I have been able to provide here.   
 
7.5 Renewal and fire management in Belize 
In examining the politics of fire management in Belize, I believe that I have 
identified two of its fundamental failings throughout the past century. First, in their 
aims to enable the development of pine forestry or nature conservation, fire 
managers have not recognised local livelihoods involving fire use as legitimate. I 
would argue that this represents an environmental injustice. Second, fire 
management has been planned with too much confidence of remaking fire regimes 
in the Belizean savanna. Fire managers have not recognised fire management as 
locally inflected. I have linked these attitudes to the structural limitations of 
development and to persistent power relations between foreign agencies, local 
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political elites, local fire managers and fire users. In so doing, I have not offered 
much hope for future fire management in Belize.  
Political ecologists often tell stories like these. It is the very nature of political 
ecology to challenge fixed assumptions about the environment. Robbins has called 
political ecology the ‘trickster science’ in that it ‘emerges from the instability of other 
fields of study, developing time-and-again from the internal contradictions and 
weaknesses that lie within these very fields’.82 I, with most political ecologists, 
would, however, be the last to suggest that this calls for the abandonment of other 
disciplines of study, or of normative stances and action towards issues of 
environmental justice. This research is wholeheartedly not a call to abandon the 
issue of wildfire in Belize’s savannas. As long as the savanna ecosystem exists in 
Belize, fire will be irrevocably bound to the future of this landscape and its people 
and biodiversity.  
I opened this chapter with a quotation from Stephen Pyne, in which he 
describes an approach to fire management that he calls ‘renewal’.83 He was inspired 
by the work of a friend of his who managed fire in Everglades National Park in 
Florida, and who, it happens, also featured in this thesis as the fire management 
consultant to the Darwin Project. In this quote, Pyne makes some important 
observations, which have relevance for fire management in Belize and more widely.  
Pyne distinguishes between renewal and restoration. Restoration suggests 
that we have the ecological knowledge and the practical means to return to a 
desired historical environmental state or fire regime. In Belize, as in most places, 
there is very little knowledge regarding historical fire regimes. More fundamentally, 
as I discussed in Chapter two (Section 2.2), ecological research suggests that 
feedbacks within ecosystems often prevent simple reversals of change. Non-
 
82 Robbins (2015), p. 98.  
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equilibrium ecology teaches us that ecosystems are in constant flux, suggesting that 
there is no ‘ecologically appropriate’ fixed state for the Belizean savanna.  
Pyne also separates renewal from redemption. He goes on to argue that fire 
management in the Everglades National Park is limited because the land is subject 
to many interests and influences, from local American peoples, commercial 
developers, a local nuclear power plant and environmental groups with differing 
interests. Similarly, in Belize, environmental managers cannot ignore the multiple 
interests with which they compete. Neither should they assume that their work can 
satisfy all these interests, as in the framing of ‘integrated fire management’ as a 
‘win-win’. A call for redemption might suggest that it was possible to undo the 
legacies of former approaches to fire management, in that they have had unequally 
distributed costs and benefits. To make such an assumption would be to ignore the 
structural constraints operating similarly in contemporary fire management and in 
historical fire management. It might also suggest that we can operate independently 
of those power relations with which international development, like colonial 
development, is infused. External agencies cannot, for example, bring about the 
participation of local communities in fire management, independently of these power 
relations.  
To me, Pyne’s ‘renewal’ implies a recognition of the limitations inherent in 
the very notion of environmental management. It suggests working with an 
awareness of the deficiencies of all plans and prescriptions to account for ecological 
complexity and political realities. It calls upon us to recognise that fire behaves 
differently and takes on new social meanings across time and space: fire, and its 
management are always context specific. Most importantly, Pyne does not dismiss 
the need for continued human engagement with fire in the environment.  
To me, this concept of renewal has a strong affinity with political ecology. 
Bruce Braun has identified an ‘experimental turn’ in political ecology that he 
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identifies as ‘the expression of an emancipatory or at least democratic desire that in 
important respects extends political ecology’s critical impulse’.84 ‘Experiment’ is a re-
framing of our engagement with socio-natures away from the idea of environmental 
management. It calls for recognition that what we term environmental management 
‘is necessarily an experiment in producing novel ecologies’, but, more importantly, 
that it plays out within sites of political struggle.85 In other words, to be experimental 
should not be to suggest that all novel ecologies will have equivalent outcomes for 
different human groups. All interventions should be accompanied by explicit 
acknowledgement of the politics involved.  
In many ways, Belizeans are well placed to be experimental in their future 
relationship with savanna wildfires. Belize is not beset with the legal and 
bureaucratic barriers that limit practical experimentation with fire management in the 
USA, for example. In conducting this research I came to understand that  Instead of 
relying on professional ecological knowledge, a greater emphasis on existing local 
knowledge, and on developing scientific knowledge, would enable fire management 
to be more reflexive to local conditions.86 Neither ‘renewal’, nor ‘experiment’ provide 
a clear way forward for fire management in Belize. They do not have a solution to 
Belize’s fire problem. They merely suggest a more realistic way for fire managers to 
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